

# Ethics and Natural Law

A Reconstructive Review of Moral Philosophy  
Applied to the Rational Art of Living

By

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TO THE MEMORY OF

MARK HOPKINS

TEACHER OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE  
1830-1887

The American Socrates who, probing the resources of thought in the minds of his pupils, guided them of themselves, as it were, to discover, put together, and complete conceptions as nearly harmonious as possible concerning the power and purpose of life in all its relations to themselves, their fellows, their country, and their God; with treasured recollections of processes of thinking illustrated by him for nine hours a week during an entire College year, while all whom he instructed were alert with interest, and many were frequently thrilled as rarely by the cumulative effects of any other form of eloquence, this excursion into the field of applied ethics which this great educator had made peculiarly his own is gratefully

DEDICATED



## PREFACE

THE principles of ethics have been discussed in many comprehensive volumes. A new discussion cannot be attempted without causing the intelligent reader to ask why it is needed. Without referring to other reasons, a sufficient answer to this may be found in the fact that the war just closing has directed attention, as, perhaps, nothing before ever has, to the influence upon public sentiment and private character of certain ethical theories; and, in connection with this, to the importance of making, if possible, a more careful study than has hitherto been attempted of the practical effects of all such theories. It has come to be recognized more universally than up to this time has been the case, that none of these can be supposed to have merely a speculative or philosophic value. A reconstructive review of them, therefore, in accordance with this conception of their influence seems necessarily suggested, if not demanded.

To recall the facts with reference to the origin and development of the conception, the reader needs merely to be reminded that there has been no charitable way of explaining the alarming innovations in warfare and government which have been adopted in Germany and Russia except by attributing them less to the inherent nature of their inhabitants than to false opinions inculcated among them for many years through educational training and popular literature. Through only such agencies could whole communities have been induced to believe that the state is the source of moral authority, and that, in case of conflict between it and individual opinion and conscience, the latter must invariably be made to yield, even if this involve such clear violations of the principles of individual moral sense as are manifested in the worst results of warfare.

In Germany, the extent to which the theory that a man's

first duty is to obey the dictates of someone at the head of the state, or of some official representing him, had been accepted by even the most intelligent people was shown early in the war by ninety-three of its foremost university professors who signed a statement with reference to the causes of the conflict, and to the methods of conducting it in Belgium which few, if any of them, could have had opportunity to verify, and which, subsequently, was proved to be false. How could men with previous high reputations as historians and teachers of ethics have been induced to exhibit themselves as victims of one of the worst effects of national tyranny? How could they have been made to convict themselves of being either willing to swear to what was false, or afraid to keep silence? The only reason which can be conceived for this is that the evil spirit of which, to use the language of Scripture, they were temporarily possessed, was in some way connected with a false ethical theory with reference to the relation of the state to its own people and to those of other nationalities.

As for the Russians, their acceptance of a similar theory was manifested by what happened when the Czar who was at the head of their church as well as state was removed. After the people had lost him, many of them seem to have lost everything that had the slightest influence in the direction of morality. Apparently, in some communities almost every man who owned a gun and nothing else went shooting for his neighbor and his neighbor's property; or, if, now and then, he did consider the rights of others, these were those alone of his own class, working for whom he could have the gratification of feeling that he was really working for himself. Toward persons of other classes, he manifested still less courtesy, consideration, helpfulness, sympathy, to say nothing about truthfulness, justice, rationality, self-denial, and self-control, than had the official autocrat whom the revolution had removed.

How much better, the reader is probably now inclined to exclaim, are the conceptions and characteristics of the people of our own country! But are they so much better? Or do we merely imagine that they are so because the facts with reference to them have been more or less concealed? Let us recall how close is the connection, in these days, between other countries and our own; and how inevitably any thought originated in one of them is communicated to all.

President R. B. Hayes once, in referring to a fortunate diplomatic escape, aptly quoted to the author the well-known saying that "a merciful Providence seems to take care of children, drunken people, and the United States." A few years ago, many of our keenest thinkers feared that we were drifting toward a national moral collapse not exactly the same in form but as threatening in disastrous effects as that which has overtaken some of the peoples of Europe. Now, at last, many think that they have reason to hope that this danger may be averted because of the lessons taught through what has been experienced in this war.

The fundamental causes of the conditions revealed by it so far as they are moral, which are the only ones that concern us at present, are all connected with a single conception, which, in a general way, may be termed materialistic. To perceive what is meant by this term, let us analyze it a little. As we do so, we shall find three of its constituent elements particularly prominent. The first traces the source of morality to that which is external to the man, not internal. This explains why the conception identifies it with the decrees of the rulers or other officials of the state. It is because these are the representatives of the state's external organization. The second attributes promotion of morality to exercise of physical rather than psychical force. This explains why the conception is associated with the effects of militarism. The third associates the object of morality with bodily or practical, not mental or ideal betterment. This explains why the test of its efficiency is supposed to be afforded by an increase in a nation's or an individual's financial, commercial, or landed possessions.

Thus analyzed, it is easy to perceive that every phase of the general conception is at variance with certain fundamental principles that underlie our own country's institutions. According to these principles, moral actions, as proved by the fact that they are not attributable to a lower animal, are traceable to a man's individual rationality—to what is within himself; or to conform this statement to the title of this book—to what he has been made to be through the operation of natural law. For this reason too such actions are legitimately influenced by only one thing,—not physical force but psychical truth; and for this reason, too, they result not in an increase of material bodily possessions but in ability to subordinate all possessions to the

control and purposes of the higher intelligent nature. So far, therefore, as moral conditions can be judged by the theory of which they are expressions, it would seem that we have reason to claim superiority for our own country. But do all our country's people accept the theories that have been stated, and conform their actions to them?

A professor in a prominent American theological seminary was removed from his position a year or two ago because of his expression of views supposed to indicate loyalty, not to our own nation, but to nations with which ours was at war. Long before the war, however, the same professor, in the presence of the author, had defended the sabotage methods of the English suffragettes—in other words, the obtaining of a political and legislative end through the use of physical force. Is it too much to say that, in defending this method, he had already manifested disloyalty of feeling toward the principles at the basis of our institutions? No matter how desirable a change in laws may be, no reform, in a republic like ours, can begin to be as desirable as faith in human reason, and in truth as the chief and, usually, the only appropriate agency to be used in causing the reform. Truth is evidently never so regarded when there is resort to methods of controlling opinion or action that are not in their nature psychical. In cases of riot, rebellion, or war, physical force must sometimes be resisted by physical force. But otherwise brickbats, bludgeons, bonfires, bullets, or even ballots, if the latter be aimed at intimidating and suppressing the rational promptings of the mind on the part of voters or legislators, are not needed; but only a change in the opinions of individual citizens. These vote for the law-makers, and, therefore, more or less control the law-makers' actions. As a rule, men's opinions are appropriately altered partly by personal experience and association with others, and partly by arguments presented in books, magazines, newspapers, or public addresses. After this effect has been produced, a similar effect will also be produced upon the legislators for whom the majority vote. Moreover, because conforming to the opinions of people in general, laws so occasioned will be obeyed without need of any great effort to enforce them. This is one reason why the constitution of the United States prescribes certain subjects concerning which laws can be passed by only the Congress at Washington; and certain other subjects concerning which laws can

be passed by only the State legislatures. In a country as large as ours, those living in one section often demand laws of which those living in another section have no need, and frequently disapprove. Certain occurrences illustrating both the advantages and the disadvantages of this constitutional provision are mentioned in Chapter XXI of the present volume.

Of course, one who acknowledges the principles just stated and accepts truth as the sole or main weapon through which to attain political results, must, with it, often exercise patience, content to wait until his adversaries have had time to think and reconstruct their conceptions. But this is something that the most elementary forms of courtesy and respect for others and for their opinions ought of themselves to incline him to do. Much more should he do this in a country whose whole form of government is based upon faith in human nature and in the workings of the human mind. An American ought to be in sufficient sympathy with this faith to believe that all that is necessary in order to induce the majority of people to think and to act in accordance with right is a persistent presentation to them of the facts of a case and of inferences legitimately derived from them. When success has crowned effort thus pursued, its effects are well-nigh certain to prove comprehensive and permanent. Nothing is so difficult to reverse as public sentiment that is a result of ample instruction and deliberate reflection.

Disbelief in the effectiveness of these two latter agencies is largely owing in our country, as in Germany, to the attributing of such moral influence as can thwart and end vice and crime to the enactments of the state. It is for this reason that many with the highest intentions have welcomed any methods, no matter how contrary to the spirit or even to the letter of our form of government, through which, as they have supposed, their wishes as expressed in their votes can be immediately transmuted into legal statutes. The error of their conception consists not in its ascribing a certain degree of influence to the action of the state, but in ascribing to it predominant and exclusive influence. Impersonal public enactments have nothing in themselves alone that can prove corrective of personal character. It is only the influence and example of other persons, mainly in the family, the school, the business, and the church, but sometimes also in the state, that is capable, as a rule, of inspiring to higher

and nobler effort. Few more debasing conditions could be found than in more than one State in our country in which a law is supposed to have been framed so as entirely to abolish them. See note on page 285 of this volume.

The failure of such laws to do what is expected of them is owing in part, as has been intimated, to the attributing of morality to material influences, but it is owing also to a false conception with reference to the aims of morality, and therefore to the end toward which these laws should be directed. Apparently, large numbers of people suppose them intended to influence merely the material conditions and environments of those for whose benefit they are enacted. This opinion seems to be quite general among those who emphasize the socialistic side of work among the masses. It may be ascribed to some even of those engaged in that kindly, humane, and self-denying form of service that is termed settlement-work—the settlement of educated, refined men and women in a slum neighborhood of a city with the object of associating with the families surrounding them, and, through example and instruction, stimulating and leading them to more intelligent, industrious, clean, refined, and enjoyable modes of life. There is no doubt that some, even of these workers, have directed their attention too exclusively to bodily and material betterment, and, in doing so, have forgotten the mental and the spiritual. Some of them have gone so far—one or two occasionally in practice, but more in theory—as virtually to emancipate themselves and their closest followers from what they consider mere conventionalities of society and church; but which are really the best methods yet discovered through which physical conditions can be made to have a molding influence upon psychical possibilities. The purely socialistic conception of all forms of benevolent work is too apt to put the cart before the horse; to assign supreme importance to that which is merely the husk, the form, the appearance of morality; and to overlook or, at least, underrate that which constitutes its kernel, its spirit, its essence of life.

The most unfortunate result of this view is that, to those who accept it, the whole object of life—that which explains it—remains unperceived and therefore unsought. As a fact, it is impossible to emancipate a human being from the restraints of material surroundings. All his efforts to do this, or any other person's efforts to do it for him, can



merely, even when most successful, change the form in which these restraints are manifested. As a fact, too, he ought not to be emancipated from them. He needs them. He must have them. Otherwise his higher nature cannot be developed as it should be. It becomes him, therefore, in any country in which the restraints have been proved to be less irksome than in others, to be profoundly thankful that this is so; to guard sacredly such rights as he already possesses, and to welcome changes in the methods of society or state so far only as it can be made clear that they will further the facility with which the individual can give expression, in word or deed, to those promptings within him which, for reasons to be unfolded in this volume are always, at one and the same time, the most in accordance with his own highest desires and with the greatest good of others.

Enough has been said in this preface to suggest to those interested in the subject why it is that the author has thought it desirable to re-examine the philosophical bases of ethics, together with some of their more important practical applications. Notwithstanding the very valuable work that has been done in this department, circumstances have changed, and additional discussion seems to be needed. This is especially true as applied to certain theories that have only recently attracted particular attention. But it is also true of others that have been discussed for years but are beginning now to be viewed in new relations. Take *institutionism*, for instance, which is exemplified in the German conception of morality as determined by the state. This conception is too narrow. It leaves out that which is determined, and ought to be determined, by other conditions, especially by those that concern the individual. Or take such theories as have been termed *intuitional*, *emotional*, *instinctive*, *teleological*, *utilitarian*, *hedonistic*, or such aims of ethical action as have been associated with *altruism*, *universal welfare*, *the greatest happiness of the greatest number*, *benevolence*, *sympathy*, *love* or *the highest form of self-realization*. A man might aim at what he might consider the most important of these, and yet scarcely attain that which would make him a useful enough citizen to keep him out of a poor-house. There seem to be in them all more or less evidences of a lack of thorough analysis. Of course, the same accusation is likely to be made against any theory, and, therefore, against that presented in this volume. At the present time,

it is most likely to be made by those who have become interested in the results of the study of physiological psychology. These certainly have something to do with the conditions underlying ethics. Why, therefore, has this subject not been more fully discussed in these pages? There are two reasons. The first is the present indeterminate character of these results. This is acknowledged even by those who think themselves justified, as all do not, in arguing that conditions have been considerably changed since Professor William James (1842-1910) of Harvard University said, in the epilogue of his *Psychology* that the results give us only "a string of raw facts, a little gossip, and . . . a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, but not a single law in the sense in which physics show us laws." The other reason is that, according to the theory presented in this book, the features that are distinctive of ethics do not begin to exert their influence until after those distinctive of psychophysics have, so to speak, been ended. The latter have to do with the methods through which certain physical elements and instrumentalities of thinking are derived and combined into psychical results. Ethics has to do with the effects of certain completed psychical results after they have assumed the form of definite tendencies and conceptions. Even then, moreover, according to the theory that this book has been written to emphasize, the ethical results are not connected with the psycho-physical processes by way of derivation from them or development through them, but by way of antagonism and counteraction. This is a condition not disputed but admitted by such forerunners of physiological psychology as Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley (see pages 98, 99). None of them deny an ethical interference attributable to an *a priori* influence. Huxley, for instance, says in his essay on "Evolution and Ethics" that "the practice of that which is ethically best . . . involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that"—meaning evidently *the survival of the fittest*—"which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." Yet what evolutionist has ever propounded a theory that can fully account for this condition? Is it not justifiable to say that, as applied to ethics, a theory thus defective indicates a lack of thorough analysis?

Perhaps it may not be out of place to add here that the analogies between ethical results in character and those of

harmony in æsthetics which are brought out near the close of the more theoretic part of this discussion were suggested by an expression of some anonymous journalist describing in 1876 the author's father, B. W. Raymond (1801-1883) who was a prominent merchant and mayor of Chicago. "The whole aspect," it was said, "is that of harmony . . . of character." The conception developed from this suggestion is that the ethical, wherever manifested, begins in the individual—in the inner and conscious harmony produced by desires having their source in his mind, when they are balancing and, if need be, subordinating but not suppressing desires having their source in his body; and that it is to this internal experience in the individual that we must trace all such external relations as can be rightly termed harmonious, whether manifested between one or more individuals, or between collections of individuals, as in nations.

In connection with this conception, the most important moral agency is proved philosophically to be that which almost all people who are not philosophers have in all ages believed it to be—namely, conscience. Whether restraining from evil or impelling to good, all the functions of this are shown to be comprehended in a consciousness of conflict between the body's desire and the mind's desire. As indicated by an examination of the natural action of each of these desires, it is shown that the former necessarily seeks satisfaction in obtaining that which gratifies oneself alone, no two persons, for instance, being able to eat or to drink exactly the same thing. On the contrary, the latter desire necessarily seeks satisfaction in obtaining that which, at the same time, can be gratifying to another. Whatever ministers to the mental nature, as is suggested even by the anatomy of the brain, comes through the eyes and ears, and that which is apprehended through these need never be the exclusive possession of one person. Scenery, music, poetry, argument, truth can all be enjoyed to the full by one who is sharing them with others. Naturally, therefore, the body's desire tends toward the irrational, the animal, and the selfish and the mind's desire toward the rational, the humane, and the non-selfish. In itself, however, neither of the two is necessarily moral or immoral. The gratification of both is needed for the continuance of human life. That which connects them with morality is the impossibility

occasionally of gratifying desires of each kind at one and the same time. Then the two conflict. One becomes aware of this fact through conscience. Its function is to direct thought to a condition of discord not harmony within one's own nature; and, in some instances, it continues to do this until the man has recognized, that, in the case presented for his consideration, bodily desire should be made to accord and harmonize with mental desire—a result that can be attained through any agencies or methods connected with the mind that are capable of giving it an influence sufficient to accomplish this purpose.

The trend of thought thus indicated might be supposed by some readers to be incomplete, because, after applying the principles unfolded to the relations of the individual to family, school, society, industry, bargaining, employment, and government, no mention is made of religion. But this is in accordance with a deliberate intention. Dr. S. S. Laws (1824 —), formerly President of the University of Missouri, used to make a distinction between ethics and religion, to the effect that the former has to do with duties that grow out of relations which the moral agent sustains to other finite agents; and the latter to those that he sustains to God; or to put it differently, that the former has to do with conduct as related to present life on earth, and the latter as related to future life beyond the earth. According to either statement, a consideration of religion is not necessary to the completion of a discussion upon ethics alone. For other reasons, too, it seems wise to omit any reference to forms of religion in this volume. Only by such a course does it seem possible to enable it to accomplish all the purposes for which it was designed. Among the countrymen of the author who must constitute his constituency are Catholics, Protestants of many different sects, Christian Scientists, Spiritualists, Theosophists, Hebrews, Mormons, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Confucianists, and the adherents of many other forms of religion. The time may come when what is written here may be needed as an aid to instruction among the young. No textbook should contain material tending to undermine the religious beliefs of any families represented by pupils in either public or private schools or colleges. The time also may come when the book may be needed on account of the influence which it seems fitted to exert upon mature minds. It is exceedingly

important in a great country like ours to have the people accept, as applied to family, school, society, business, and government, a single standard or like standards of morals. But how can adherents of different religions or forms of religion be expected to accept these standards unless it be made clear to them that, in doing so, they are not accepting a single religion, or form of religion? And how can this be made clear to them? How else, if an author have argued for universal acceptance of his standards, than by his own action in setting an example of not applying them to religion, but leaving the adherents of each religion free to make their applications for themselves?

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that a book which, for the reasons just mentioned, avoids religious controversy cannot have an effect upon religious life, and upon all forms of it, whether considered in their relations to theory, or to practice. Just as a man's moral nature is based and conditioned upon his mental nature—the nature that differentiates him from the brute—so his religious nature is based and conditioned upon his moral nature. In the degree in which he has right ideas with reference to morality, he will have right ideas with reference to that which is fundamental in religion. Take, for instance, the conception, in this book, of desire as lying at the basis of all thought and action; or of higher desire as often struggling against lower desire; or of the necessity in case of conflict of not allowing this latter desire to outweigh the former; or of the peace of conscience that attends the harmony produced when this result is obtained; or of the mental ideal that inspires toward the realization of this harmony; or of the spiritual life that is reached and possessed by him who experiences this realization—is it possible to avoid perceiving that all these prepare a man for the acceptance of religious conceptions? What could be more religious than the complete recognition of the obligation resting upon the only being in the world distinctively characterized by the possession of mind never to allow influences having their sources in this to be outweighed by those having their sources merely in the body? If a man, when the temptations and troubles incident to physical conditions assail his higher nature, treat them as the successful mariner does the winds and waves upon an ocean, he may make them all instrumental in furthering his own progress. But, if he

act otherwise, if he do nothing to resist and master them, he will make no progress and probably will be overwhelmed and lost; or if his life be not lost, it will be devoid of experiences that would have made it much better worth the living. The ocean never appears so grand and beautiful, so exhilarating and enjoyable, as it does to the mariner who is conscious of holding in subjection all the elements of a storm and of using them to speed his vessel upon its course. And so with the spirit of man when confronted by material obstacles. One never appreciates the grandeur and beauty of the physical world as he does when he is inspired by a realization of the importance and dignity of his own destiny in view of the number and magnitude of the forces that are at work on every side of him, and which it is his privilege to master, and, having done so, to turn into that which shall contribute toward his own psychical advancement.

The ancient astrologers, accepting what they considered to be the testimony of their own consciousness, adopted the theory that every man is at the center of the universe. They found it impossible not to conceive this to be the case,—not to conceive of the universe as extending as far below them as above them, as far to one side of them as to the other side. Therefore they concluded that a man's mind which constituted his psychical self was influenced not only by his own body which constituted his physical self, but by everything in the world with which this body could be physically connected, even by that which is in the heavens above the world—in other words, that his whole character and career were influenced by everything in the physical universe of which he conceived of himself as the center. This ancient astronomer, whatever may be thought of the details of his theory, had, certainly, a general conception that was suggestive and sublime. Just as every wheel whirling in a flour mill exerts an influence upon every granule of the product that the mill turns out, so, as he conceived, does everything that moves about one's individual life, not only in a man's physical body, but, beyond the limits of this, everything in the world, everything below, above, and about the world, all the planets in their courses, have an influence in shaping the destiny of even the least of the living creatures that this mighty revolving machinery of creation is bringing to perfection. According to this theory, which does not differ essentially from that of this volume,

every man is connected with everything; and yet everything can affect him as it should in so far only as it is made by him to serve his mental and spiritual requirements. But to serve these, there is not a valley too wide, a mountain too high, a star too bright, nor a universe too vast. There is a sense in which all these are but partial factors of the environment, the investiture, the embodiment of his single human soul. An ethical system that is capable of including in its outlook a conception like this ought to be thought broad enough not to exclude from its range any consideration needed in order to render it complete.





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# Ethics and Natural Law

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## CHAPTER I

### HUMAN EXPERIENCE STARTED AND DEVELOPED FROM DESIRES

Purpose and Method of this Essay—Man, an Embodiment of Desire—This Desire has Two Sources, One in the Body, the Other in the Mind—In Both Cases the Object of the Desire Seems to be to Attain Unity between Two Persons—This Object not Fulfilled through the Means by which it is most Naturally Sought—The Ends as Well as Sources of the Desire of the Body and of the Mind Differ—Perception, Sensation, and Instinct Logically Precede the Practical Appeal of Desire to Consciousness—Meaning of Desire—Human Desire not the Same as Animal Appetite—What is Meant by Desires of the Body and of the Mind—The Relation that Desire Bears to Thought, and to Feeling or Emotion—Feeling or Emotion does not Become Desire until Becoming Active, instead of Passive—Consciousness Testifies that Thought as well as Feeling may Influence Desire—The Same Fact Revealed by Observing the Normal Action of the Will—And by the Testimony of Conscience—Reason for Beginning this Discussion by a Consideration of Desires—Where Desires of Body and of Mind Meet in Consciousness is the Best Place in which to Study that Relationship between Body and Mind Needed for a Knowledge of Ethics—Science Confirms the Conception that Desires are at the Basis of Human Action—Connection between Physical Organs and Psychical Experience—Automatic and Cerebro-Spinal Nerves—The Influence of the Former Precedes that of the Latter—Reason for Associating not only Lower but Higher Desires with the Automatic Nervous System.

WHEN studying man, it is natural to start where his history begins. Of this beginning, revelation, tradition, legend, and history have tried to inform us. They may have given us truth; but we can be certain that it is this, so far only as, in some way, we have

discovered it for ourselves. The fact that a wise man pays heed to voices calling from an unseen distance, does not relieve him, when following the path that leads to it, from using his own intelligence. He feels that information imparted by others can never be as trustworthy as knowledge obtained by himself. A similar conception, too, influences his attitude toward what he learns subsequently. He cannot admit that any mental process can develop knowledge from that which does not start with it. He would consider a tower built upon quicksand as firmly based as thought inferred from mere hearsay. In this essay, an endeavor will be made to ground what is said upon personal, and, in this sense, actual knowledge;—in other words, to show, if possible, that a system of ethics can be constructed upon what may be claimed to be a strictly rational basis.

Personally or actually, none of us know anything about the beginning of human life, in so far as by this we mean the origin of mankind. At best, we can do no more than draw inferences with reference to the subject. But we all know a good deal about the origin of a man. He is a result of that tendency in human nature which causes a man and a woman to mate and this tendency is owing to that which, in both of them, may be termed desire. Man is a living embodiment of this desire. If we can find out exactly what the desire is—what are its constituent elements—we may do something in the direction of solving the questions with reference to what a man is, and what, in this world, is, or should be, expected of him.

The desire has, apparently, two sources. In part, the body occasions it. Its rudiments, at least, are in the lower animals among whom it performs the important function of promoting the continuance of life in successive generations. But the desire is traceable in part also to the mind. Even among the lower animals, among birds and not frequently, among insects, the gratification of it is preceded and accompanied by a sort of courtship that suggests more or less exercise of as much mental potentiality as they may be supposed to possess. Among human beings these mental influences are still more in evidence; and few thinkers deny that, in importance, they outrank the bodily. All men, it is asserted, are mentally conscious that, when they are entirely separated from their fellows, they are not fulfilling all the demands of their nature; and, it is said that

this consciousness alone is sufficient to cause them to seek to form such unions with others as, in accordance with their physical constitutions and the customs of society, are afforded in marriage.

From the beginning of courtship to the consummation of marriage, the one underlying motive, according to some, is this desire on the part of one individual to come into union with another individual. For what other reason, it is asked, do two people that are, as men say, in love, touch hands, caress, clasp, and kiss one another? For what else do they try to unburden their minds so completely that, apparently, nothing but the hollowness left behind can afford a reasonable excuse for the emptiness of their phraseology? What are they endeavoring to do but to get nearer together, so that, if possible, they may become conscious of being at one? And what possible result could, at the time, seem to them more inspiring to anticipation than the achievement of this purpose?

Now let us notice a somewhat unexpected anomaly. This is the fact that this desire for union is never fulfilled by means of the agency through which, apparently, nature first prompts one to seek it. Mental union, whether we consider this to be that of thought or of intention does not necessarily result from bodily union such as is brought about by marriage. This usually leads merely to fresh exemplifications of disunion; *i. e.*, to the conception and birth of more individuals conscious of separation from their fellows. Just when the most influential desire of which, perhaps, a man is ever conscious is upon the threshold of realization, nature, as if to trick and cheat him, checks that which might insure a full consummation of his wish, and drives him back to conditions that have been changed in only one regard. The desire of one individual life for union with another individual life has been transferred to one more human being, who, at some future day, may, in his turn, transfer it to another, and, through his offspring, perhaps, may continue to transfer it to many millions of descendants.

The desire, therefore, of which a man may be said to be a living embodiment apparently springs from two different sources—from the body and from the mind; and that which issues from each of these sources tends toward a different result. The desire of the body which, as will be shown on page 20, involves or develops what might be termed the

physical, the animal, the egoistic or the material tends toward that which accompanies a consciousness of separation between individuals; and the desire of the mind, which word will be used in this book in the sense indicated by the Greek word *νοῦς*, and, as will be shown on page 20, involves or develops what might be termed the rational, the humane, the altruistic, and the spiritual, tends toward that which accompanies a consciousness of union between them. Because the use of the word *mind* necessitates, now and then the use also of the adjective *mental*, and because the application of this adjective is sometimes, as stated in *The Standard Dictionary*, "popularly but improperly limited to the intellect" as distinguished from the emotions and will, it may be important here in order to avoid misunderstanding, to direct attention to the fact that hereafter in this volume the words *mind* and *mental* will be used exactly as authorized by that publication. The word *mind* will indicate "the entire psychical being,—that which thinks, feels, and wills"; and the word *mental* will indicate anything "pertaining to mind, including intellect, feeling, and will, or the entire rational nature." The differences just explained between the desires of the body and those of the mind will enable us to understand why it is that those whose thoughts dwell upon suggestions from the body which itself is physical and material, are always estimating the value of what they term progress by some physical increase in the constituents of property, personal, communal, or national; whereas those influenced mainly by suggestions from the mind which itself is incorporeal, psychical, and spiritual, manifest frequently what is considered an inexcusable disregard of any element of progress of the kind termed physical. To the latter class the highest conception of human advancement seems to be that which shall bring mind and spirit into unity with one person, as in love or friendship; or with many, as in association and fellowship; or with all men as in altruistic efforts; or with God as in religion.

Before proceeding further in the direct line of our thought, it seems best to turn aside for a moment, and explain why this treatise has been begun by directing attention to human desires. This is not because these are supposed to furnish to consciousness the earliest testimony to the fact of one's existence. Before experiencing a desire, one, of course, must have been made aware by *perception* of a difference

between himself and something else; by *sensation*, or physical feeling, of a difference between pleasure and pain; and by *instinct* of a method in accordance with which the mind can increase the pleasure and avoid the pain, through apprehending the drift before comprehending the details of thinking. But these are elements of experience that are discoverable only by analysis. In that which first brings them before consciousness, they are combined together, and, not only so, but are often developed into the later and more intelligible forms which they assume after they have passed into the region of clear thought, emotional sentiment, and personal inclination. Before reaching this region, too, the elementary experiences that have been mentioned have an important bearing upon action in general. Especially is this true with reference to instinct. Indeed, one could say that it is never wise for a man to ignore the guidance of instinct, except in cases in which it is clearly the result of promptings of the body as contrasted with the mind. Perception, sensation, and instinct, however, have nothing to do with moral action until their influence is revealed in connection with the desires. This fact justifies beginning this treatise with a consideration of these latter.

A few words further may be in place in order to show why the influences of body or of mind that we have been considering can be properly designated by the term *desire*; as well as to explain the meaning intended to be attached to this term when it is employed hereafter. By desire is meant a tendency to activity that is inherent in the man in the sense of being started from within him. The tendency may be drawn toward particular forms of activity by external objects or circumstances; but these do not create it. They would have no influence upon it, were it not already in existence. No babe would accept nourishment unless previously feeling an impulse to take it. It needs to be said, too, that this word desire has not been selected in ignorance of the distinction sometimes drawn between it and what many philosophers term an *impulse* of bodily appetite, and sometimes also drawn between it and the results of yearning or aspiration associated with the exercise of the mind. But ordinary language sufficiently differentiates between these extremes by terming the former lower desire, and the latter higher desire. We could not say, except when speaking metaphorically, that a man had

an appetite for fellowship, or a yearning or an aspiration for food. Yet, in both cases, it would be appropriate to use the word desire. In a place where, as in the present discussion, a generic term is needed, it seems allowable to use this one which, without any change in its accepted meanings, may be made to serve the purpose.

It is important to recognize, also, that lower desire in a man does not mean exactly the same as appetite, nor higher desire exactly the same as yearning or aspiration. It is conceivable that an animal should have appetite without aspiration, or that an angel should have aspiration without appetite. But such a condition is not conceivable in a man. His material or bodily nature is so connected, in every part of it, with his mental nature that whatever is experienced by the one is almost necessarily experienced by the other. He cannot be conscious of an animal feeling without being conscious also of a human thought; and it is the two together that make a man's desire—his very lowest desire—different in the reach of its possibilities from animal impulse. When we say that a man indulging to excess in lust or passion is a brute, we are not condemning the brute, nor the animal nature that a man shares with the brute. We are condemning the mental nature which we all feel that, in a man, should act in conjunction with the animal nature.

This fact with reference to the double relationship of desires, both to body and to mind—a relationship suggested by what was said on page 2 has a noteworthy bearing (see page 19) on the whole subject before us. Everybody speaks of desires that are bodily or physical, and of those that are mental or rational, and the same phraseology will be adopted in the discussions of this book. But let it be understood here, once for all, that these terms are not meant to indicate a quality that is exclusive. The very adjectives used might of themselves indicate this. A *musical* comedy is not all music, nor a *comical* situation all comedy. It is justifiable to apply the same principle to the words *bodily* and *mental*. In the human constitution, body and mind are so closely connected that one cannot invariably separate that which has its source in the one from that which has its source in the other. Even if he could, the difference between the influences of the two seems to be determined not so much by their constituent elements as by the proportionments and

adjustments of these elements—by the primality or dominance of the one or the other of them. Human desire involves thought—and, therefore, the exercising of conscious mentality. But in bodily desire, for reasons to be given on page 20, the source and end of gratification are in the bodily nature; and in mental desire, they are in the mental nature. In other words, one might say that, in bodily desire, the thought of which one is conscious is subordinated to physical feeling which it attends and serves, whereas, in mental desire, this feeling is subordinated to psychical thought which it attends and serves. A man's bodily desire is never exercised without some intellection; nor his mental desire without some sensation. The reader needs to bear these facts in mind. Otherwise he may make the mistake of supposing that, hereafter, in this book, desires of the body as contrasted with those of the mind may indicate merely the difference between the sentient and the intellectual. The distinction between the two cannot be indicated thus. It is more nearly allied to that which is meant when, in referring either to real things or to ideal thoughts and the emotions accompanying them, we contrast the material with the spiritual, the distinction between which will be found indicated on pages 38 and 39.

Are we then to look upon desire as something that always includes thought? Not so, perhaps, if the subject be considered merely philosophically. For purposes of analysis, we can separate thought in desire from the feeling in it. But, practically, they seem inseparable, because it is the thought in consciousness—*i. e.*, the effect of the desire upon the thought—that reveals to the mind the fact that the desire is present. As Sir William Hamilton (1788-1844) says in his eleventh *Lecture on Metaphysics*, "Let the mental phenomena be distributed under the three heads of phenomena of cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; phenomena of feeling, or the capacities of pleasure and pain; and phenomena of desiring and willing, or the powers of conation. The order of these is determined by their relative consecution. Feeling and appetency suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, therefore, stand first. But as will and desire and aversion, suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and painful, the feelings will stand second, as intermediate between the two." It will be noticed that this statement accords perfectly with the conception of desire expressed in

the preceding paragraph—*i. e.*, of desire as being a result of the exercise of thought and feeling in combination. To accommodate the statements made on page 6 of this volume, to those of Hamilton, it would be necessary merely to supplement them by saying that when, in a desire, the thought is more influential than the feeling, the desire as a whole gives expression to the mind and when the feeling is the more influential, the desire as a whole gives expression to the body.

It is important to notice, too, that the feeling, or, if not traceable to the body but to the mind, the emotion involved in desire is not merely passive in character, but active. In a passive way, a man may feel that fresh spring water is cooling to his tongue, or may have an emotion awakened by hearing a church bell, and yet experience no desire either to receive or to reject the one, or to hear or not to hear the other. Human desire is a thoughtful feeling that is connected with a consciousness of being impelled to action. The Germans trace this impelling to *bestrebungs Vermögen* (strife-power); the French to *élan vital* (vital push); and it seems to be the same as that recognized in the modern theory of some of our scientists and philosophers which is termed *energism* (see page 57). This theory was devised in order to account for the working out of the results of evolution; and it may be defined as a tendency causing everything that has life to push outward and onward in lines that develop its own possibilities. It seems to be because of the recognition of this activity in connection with desire that the latter is so frequently considered, as by Sir William Hamilton in the passage just quoted, a function of the will. It is apparently considered so even by those who do not always include thought as a preceding condition or a constituent of desire. For instance, Professor Wilhelm M. Wundt (1832– ), of Leipsic University, in Chapter I., Section 1 of his *Principles of Morality*, as translated by M. F. Washburn, says that "Every act of will presupposes a feeling with a definite and peculiar tone; it is so closely bound up with this feeling that, apart from it, the act of will has no reality at all," and again in Section 3, "feelings and impulses are not processes different in kind from will, but elements of voluntary activity itself and separable from it only by abstraction." And then he goes on to say that "we should always yield to the first feeling or impulse actuating us, were it not



counteracted by another which overcomes the first because it is stronger."

A statement like this, unless its terms be very clearly defined, is apt to be misleading. This particular statement seems, at first thought, to be at variance with the testimony of consciousness. Every man is aware within himself of instances in which a logical presentation of thought by another, or merely a recalling by oneself of facts or arguments appealing to rationality or imagination, has counteracted the influence of feeling, no matter how strong it may have been. If instead of using the term feeling, one use the term desire, saying that the will acts in accordance with the stronger desire, he is nearer the truth, because, as has been shown, the conception of desire includes a conception of the influence of thought as well as of feeling. Every man sometimes finds himself of his own will, performing a very repulsive duty that does not fulfill, nor promise to fulfill, any influence of which he is conscious, except a mental conclusion, resulting from sheer reasoning. This is a fact which it does not seem philosophical to disregard.

Moreover, when one turns to the will itself, there are additional reasons for this view. In former times—and notwithstanding certain present tendencies to ignore this classification it seems wise to continue to emphasize it—the main functions ordinarily ascribed to will were choice and volition. The first has to do with the selecting from among others of some general end to be sought. The second has to do with the selecting from among others of different particular means to be used for the attainment of this end. Both these functions are as nearly connected with reasoning and judging as they are with feeling and emotion. If so, there is no warrant for holding that the latter are connected with choice or volition in any sense that is not true of the former.

This conception of the inevitableness of the influence of feeling or emotion upon the action of the will is at variance not only with the testimony of consciousness, but of that which men term conscience. If the action of the will be wholly determined by feelings, and these be determined, as many hold, by a man's nature or environment, then nature or environment and not the man himself is responsible for the right or wrong of his actions. No man feels that this

is wholly true. However strong a temptation may seem, most men have a conception that, if they could not resist its coming, they could have avoided it by flying away when they received the first intimation of its approach. They cannot rid themselves of a feeling that it is to their own discredit when they do wrong; and to their own credit when they do right. Of course, some of the conditions of life are determined for us—the body, brain, and temperament that we inherit, the family, race, society, nation, religion, or age into which we have been born with the associations, customs, and laws by which we find ourselves surrounded. These are conditions which necessarily suggest to all thinking people an overpowering influence of fate or destiny, and to religious people an overruling Providence,—what they term a result of divine decree.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless every man feels that, although his life is limited by conditions like these, and many others too subtle to describe or even detect, his own will, acting inside of these limitations, has a degree of freedom which makes him responsible for certain things that he does. He is like a boy shut up by his parents in a house on a rainy day. He is not responsible for what goes on outside the house—in the garden or stable. But he is responsible for what goes on inside the house.

<sup>1</sup>In connection with this thought it is difficult to avoid mentioning one extremely anomalous fact. It is this,—that every suggestion that human life is entirely subject to fate or destiny, as in theories not only of phrenology, palmistry, and astrology but in the theologies of almost all religions,—that every such suggestion is derived from an observation of conditions and laws of the external world which, in themselves, are material and physical in their nature; and that, on the contrary every suggestion that, within certain limits, a human will can act freely and thus to an extent control one's own destiny, is derived from a consciousness of conditions and laws of the internal mind that are spiritual and psychical in their nature. Yet the majority of religious writers have attributed the former influence, which is distinctly material and physical, to God, terming it the result of Divine Sovereignty, and, at the same time, attributed the latter influence, which is distinctively spiritual and psychical to man, terming it the result of human agency. Is it strange that those taught these two conceptions should so often substitute a deceptive and hypocritical observance of external courtesies, customs, and conventions for morality, and of external professions, rites, and ceremonies for religion? No wonder that the prophet of Nazareth and his followers should have felt constrained to declare God to be "a spirit" (John 4:24) exercising the functions of his kingdom not outside the mind but "within" it (Luke 17:21) through an influence "strengthened with might by his spirit in the inner man" (Ephesians 3:16)!

There he must be quiet, gentlemanly, and decent. So within the limits assigned him, every man feels a degree of responsibility. This feeling must have a cause, though it may not be possible for us to determine exactly what this is. It may be a second desire exerting a direct counteracting influence upon the first desire; or it may be a thought exerting an indirect influence through a second desire that it occasions. Either of these conditions, too, may result from a man's own action or from the action of other people. These people may be present with him and speaking to him; or they may be distant from him and merely conveying impressions to him, as is held by those who believe in telepathy or in other psychical influences exerted by the living, the dead, or the Deity. Philosophically considered, all these theories are admissible in a sense not true of theories that practically ignore or deny the testimony of consciousness with reference to responsibility. The only conception absolutely consistent with every condition seems to be one recognizing, back of all the material or mental mechanism of human life, an impelling agency connected with personal desire, and which, within certain limits, is able in some way to exert a controlling and directing influence upon every personal action.

Now we come upon the most important of the reasons for beginning the discussions of this volume with a consideration of human desires as these have just been defined. Before mentioning this, however, the reader perhaps should be reminded that, though thinking, feeling, and desiring may follow one another logically in the order of sequence indicated in the quotation from Hamilton on page 7, they may not manifest themselves in this order to one's consciousness. In other words, while it is philosophical to suppose that no human being could experience human desire unless he were first capable of thinking and feeling; it is nevertheless equally philosophical to suppose that he may not become conscious of these latter until he has been made aware of them through the desire experienced as a result of their combined action. Indeed without experience of this desire, which it will be recalled that Hamilton makes a function of the will, a man, perhaps, would have no consciousness at all so far as consciousness involves a sense of personality; *i. e.*, a sense of a personal will capable of being used for a personal purpose. A babe, for instance, would never

think about drinking or reach out his hand for a cup if he had not begun by feeling the impulse awakened by thirst. So with innumerable thoughts and actions connected with other subjects. Some rudiment of desire gives rise to them. Later in life, when the desire and the thought or feeling occasioned by the object desired have been many times associated, the consciousness of the one does not necessarily precede that of the other. A man who is asked to drink by no means always desires to quench thirst before he accepts, nor does he always, before desiring to fight another, wait until after he has had time to hear an insult, and to think about it. The most that can be affirmed is that the thought, emotion, and desire are apt to manifest themselves in connection. But an analysis of the conditions in childhood, as well as in mature life, seems to render it philosophical to ascribe to desires a primary influence in making all the action of the mind expressive of the personal character of the one who experiences them.

If this be so, it will be recognized at once that ethics, which has to do with the methods of making thought, feeling, and practice expressive of the right kind of character, must begin with a consideration of the methods of influencing the desires. It is only when agencies of appeal come into contact with these that the effect produced upon opinion, inclination, and conduct can be expected to be thoroughly satisfactory, in the sense of being in accord with that which is most fundamentally right in principle and application.

This conclusion, developed from an examination of the facts of consciousness through what may be termed a metaphysical method, will be found to be confirmed when we turn to consider the light thrown upon the same subject by the facts revealed through the methods adopted when studying the physical sciences. Very lately, Dr. George Howard Parker (1864- ), Professor of Zoölogy at Harvard, in a paper published in Volume XLVI. of the *New Series of Science* has asserted "that we have reason to believe that muscular activity preceded nervous origins," that "our own sensations are not our most fundamental and primitive nervous processes; but behind these and of much more ancient lineage are our impulses to action, our wishes, our desires, and the whole vague body of nervous states that drive us to do things. These are the most ancient and deeply seated of our nervous propensities, and immeasurably

antedate in the point of origin our sensations with all that supergrowth that constitutes the fabric of our mental life."

As most of us are aware, the significance of this testimony is connected with the recognition of the fact that all a man's psychical experience, so far as concerns his consciousness in this world, depends upon the physical life that is in his body; and that any particular phase of this consciousness, such as is manifested in the exercise of desire, depends upon the existence and action within him of the physical organs fitted to promote it. In other words, if we find that the physical organs needed in order to convey a consciousness of desires are the earliest of those that are developed in the body, then we have one reason, at least, for arguing that it is with some beginnings of these desires that a man's conscious life begins.

Bearing this thought in mind, let us now notice further that all anatomists agree in tracing the activities of life in the human body to two systems of nerves—one formerly termed the great sympathetic system, but more recently, through the influence of Dr. Langley of Cambridge, the automatic nervous system; and the other termed the cerebro-spinal system. The former is chiefly located and performs its chief functions in the trunk of the body, and carries on, without voluntary action on the part of the man, such operations as are essential to his keeping alive, like the beating of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the processes of digestion, and the movements of the lungs so far as these latter are involuntary. In other words, this sympathetic or automatic system carries on the functions of that which may be termed basic in animal life. In this life, the system is always found. Indeed, traces of something analogous to it, are said to be found even among the vegetables. The cerebro-spinal system of nerves, on the other hand, is chiefly located and performs its chief function in or from the brain and the spine; and is the source of all voluntary muscular or mental action. This system differs from the automatic in being much more largely and fully developed in man than in the lower animals; and, for this reason alone, as well as for others that need not be mentioned, anatomists attribute to its action most of his distinctively intellectual qualities.

From these facts, it is evident that the first experiences of a child accompany the action of the automatic nervous

system, a system which he shares with the lower animals and the effects of which he experiences in the same involuntary way as they do. He breathes, and digests, not only, but he drinks automatically, and, in connection with the latter, develops desire. If he did not develop this, the automatic system would soon have little to digest. It is a question of course whether one ever becomes conscious of the promptings traceable to this system except as its nerves come into contact with some of the ramifications of the cerebro-spinal nerves. But even if this contact be necessary, the automatic system must be regarded as the primary, notwithstanding its being only the indirect, source of the influence communicated.

The question may naturally arise now whether the consciousness of higher or mental as well as of lower or bodily desire may rightly be associated with the action of the automatic as well as of the cerebro-spinal nervous system. Among others who have tried to answer this question is Dr. Richard Maurice Bucke (1837- ), Superintendent of the Asylum for the Insane at London, Ontario, Canada. In Chapter III. of a book entitled *The Moral Nature of Man*, in speaking of the higher emotions which, in a different way from that indicated in this volume, he associates with the moral nature, he shows, among other things, that these are ordinarily felt to manifest themselves in the trunk, and thus in that part of the body where anatomy finds the chief nerves of the automatic system; that these higher emotions are often accompanied by tears, perspiration, dryness of the throat, and other phenomena that involve an action of the glands, which anatomy has found to be under almost exclusive control of this system; that higher emotive expression, as in thrills, chills, laughter, and sobs, is rhythmical, which is particularly the case with action attributable to these nerves, as in the circulation of the blood and in the movements of the digestive organs and the lungs; and also that this system manifests a larger proportionate development in the physical frames of women than in the frames of men, and that the same is the case with the emotive development. Facts like these, in connection with others which all anatomists acknowledge, need merely to be observed and stated to have it recognized that when it is said that desires constitute the earliest experiences of a man's consciousness, and as such lie at the basis of all his

subsequent developments as a human being, there is no reason why the term desires as thus used should not include those that appeal to consciousness as higher or mental as well as those that appeal to it as lower or bodily.\*

\*No attempt has been made in this book to analyze the different sources and effects of thinking which precede that manifested in ethical action. Such an attempt would have involved a departure from the two chief purposes of the book, one of which, as stated on page 2, was to ground its discussions upon personal and, in this sense, actual knowledge; and the other, to meet the requirements of those of different trainings and beliefs such as are mentioned on page XIV of the Preface. There are no objections of this sort to the use of the term *mind*. What this means everybody, at least in a general way, understands. Had an attempt been made to show the relations to it, or influences upon it of such features as are termed *soul*, *spirit*, *physical*, *psychical* or *spiritual*, the discussion would have entered upon debatable territory. For instance, when the word *soul* is used, some think that nothing is meant that actually exists; some think of an invisible body living inside of one's visible body, and destined to be itself visible in a future state of existence; some think of a center of self and personality exerting a motor-influence, as it were, through all life, whether bodily or mental, and whether on earth or beyond it; some think not so much of motive, as of emotive influence; and some of a source of unity grouping together all the qualities which, in this book, have been attributed to *mind*. *Spirit*, again, is a term that has been used as a synonym for every one of the different meanings that have just been recalled in connection with *soul*; while, to a large number, the term seems to refer only to some greatly attenuated physical substance perceptible to those alone who have had exceptional, if not abnormal, experiences. So with the other terms that have been mentioned. Some class as *physical* everything visible, from rocks to angels; as *psychical*, everything suggesting self-direction, whether in insects or seraphs; and as *spiritual*, everything connected with the underlying life that seems to control growth and movement in the universe. Nobody denies, however, that every man who has a *soul* or *spirit*, or is subjected to *physical*, *psychical* or *spiritual* experience, is made conscious of the fact because of having a *mind* which, in some subtle way, is connected with each of these agencies of influence; and, at the same time, is connected, so far as concerns life on this earth, with a *body* which is clearly distinguishable from *mind*. In order to fulfill the purposes of this book, therefore, no factors entering into that which results in moral action need to be discussed other than those that can be considered and, sufficiently for the end in view, differentiated under the terms *body* and *mind*.

## CHAPTER II

### DESIRES OF BODY AND MIND OFTEN ANTAGONISTIC AND NOT NECESSARILY DEVELOPED FROM ONE ANOTHER

Desires of the Body and of the Mind—Superior Claims, when the Differ, of the Latter Desires—Testimony of Science as to Different Nerve-Sources of Each Form of Desire—The Sources in Different Parts of the Brain—Desires of the Body are Accompanied by Consciousness of One's own Physical and Personal Individuality, Tending to Self-Indulgence; Desires of the Mind by a Consciousness of Things External to One, Tending to Gratification in the Non-Selfish—Desires of the Body End in Physical Sensation; those of the Mind in that which Develops Rationality—And, as Contrasted with the Brutal, the Humane—Summary of the Differences between the Causes and Effects of Desires of the Body and of the Mind—Are both Forms of Desire Developed from the Same or a Similar Source?—How Desires of the Body Develop—Why they Develop in this Way—Fear and Hate Occasioned by Limits Assigned to Bodily Indulgence—How Desires of the Mind Develop—Causing Consciousness of Sympathy, Confidence, and Consideration towards Others, and High Attainments of Manhood—Yet Bodily Desire is also Needed for full Development of Character—The Two Forms of Desire must be Attributed to Two Different Sources—Attributing them thus Seems to Violate Philosophical Unity of Conception—Reference to an *Æsthetic Principle*—Analogy between *Æsthetics* and *Ethics*—The Connection between a Mental Cause and a Material Effect in *Æsthetics*—And in *Ethics*—Human Intelligence Forms the Connection—This Conception Obviates an Objection to Evolution as Materialistic, and Accords with a Law of Nature—Manifest in Every Department of Nature's Activities.

LET us notice another important fact with reference to these different desires and the activities to which they lead. This is the fact that, at times, they are not only different but decidedly antagonistic, so much so as to be mutually exclusive of one another. They cannot, all of them, be fulfilled at one and the same time. This is true of any two desires that are essentially different; but it is especially true when one desire is of the body and another



of the mind. We give an instance indicating such antagonism. It has to do, too, with those desires which have been said to be fundamental to the very existence of human life. It will be perceived also that this instance illustrates conditions which, in general outlines, have been repeated innumerable times in the history of the race. The author was once told by a friend that, when quite young, foolish, and rash, having not yet acquired sufficient self-control to manifest even common sense and decency, he fell desperately in love with a girl, as she, apparently, did with him. They were alone together one day. "Will you let me do anything to you that I want to do?" he blurted out. "Yes," she answered; "but I have always felt such a contempt for girls that let a fellow do that." This answer, as he expressed it, cooled him off immediately, and for all time, so far as concerned his committing another similar offence. Could he make a girl for whom he cared anything at all feel a contempt for herself? This, for him, was impossible.

What had rendered it impossible? The majority of people would probably say his conscience. But conscience is an agency that has a cause for its action, and one object of this discussion is to find out, if possible, what, in a given case, like this, is its cause? Just now, we are trying to ascertain the condition in consciousness—the emotion and thought preceding, or, at least, accompanying the action that men attribute to conscience. Why did the young fellow pause to ask for the girl's consent? Was it not because of an influence that was distinctively mental, traceable, primarily, to psychical thought; and not bodily in the sense of being traceable primarily to physical feeling? And why did his companion answer as she did? Was it not because of exactly the same reason? He desired unity of thought with his companion; and she desired unity of thought not only with him but with others of her companions who, at the time, were suggested to her. The consciousness in a case like this, of desires, or of phases of the same desire within one so different as to be antagonistic, is an experience common to all up to the time when frequent disregard of the condition has made them perverts. It is a consciousness that causes the majority of people—not the minority, as members of the minority are apt to suppose—to accept, as a matter of course, the ordinary customs and conventionalities of society. They do not themselves expect to

act in all things exactly as they please, nor—except, possibly, in Russia—have they any admiration or even respect for others who do act thus.

Now that we have noticed reasons for believing that the desires for union which precede the birth of offspring include experiences that are both of the body and of the mind, and in such a sense as to be often antagonistic; and reasons for believing also that the same is true with reference to similar forms of desire that develop later in the life of the individual, let us, as when considering the influence of desires in general, turn once more to the testimony afforded through more or less scientific investigations. Years ago, Francis Joseph Gall (1758–1828), a native of Baden but a resident of Paris, was able, as a result of studying the contour of the head and skull, to convince many of the substantial truth of what, since his time, has been termed phrenology. One conclusion of his theory was that mental and moral traits, as completely as bodily traits, are traceable to nerve-action taking place in different parts of the brain. Of late years, the same conclusion has been reached by a more thorough study of the effects upon different parts of it of accident and disease, as well as by dissecting it after death. In certain details, the results of phrenology and of anatomy and modern science differ; but even this fact furnishes no sufficient argument against the general conclusions of either. It is perfectly conceivable that the circumference of the range of any department of nerve activity, which circumference alone is considered in making a phrenological decision, should manifest itself, in some cases, in a place on the surface of the brain remote from that in which anatomy locates a nerve-center. The important matter is that, according to the testimony of all such branches of inquiry, physical and mental traits are traceable to different spheres or sources of brain-activity. For instance, referring to this subject, Dr. W. H. Howell (1860– ), of Johns Hopkins University, in Chapter X. of his *Text Book of Physiology*, quotes at length certain statements made by way of suggestion in the “Gehirn und Seele” of the German, Dr. Paul Flechsig. In discussing the association-areas of the brain which, according to this latter writer, are “the portions of the cortex in which the higher and more complex mental activities are mediated—the true organs of thought,” and “the greater relative development of”

which "areas is one of the factors distinguishing human brains from those of lower animals," Dr. Flechsig speaks, among others, of two subdivisions—the only ones relevant to the subject which we are now considering. "Basing his views," says Dr. Howell, "upon the nature of the associative tracts connecting those with the same centers, he suggests that" one of the areas "is concerned particularly with the organization of the experiences founded upon visual and auditory sensations, and shows special development in cases of talents such as those of the musical which rest upon these experiences. The" other "area being in closer connection with the bodily sense-area may possibly be especially concerned with the organization of experiences based upon bodily appetites and desires. In this part of the brain possibly arises the conception of individuality, the idea of the self as distinguished from the external world, and in alterations or defective development of this portion of the brain may lie possibly the physical explanation of mental and moral degeneracy. This general idea is borne out in measure by histological studies of the brains of those who are mentally deficient (amentia) or mentally deranged (dementia)."

These quotations would, manifestly, be very insufficient if meant to impart anything like accurate or complete anatomical information. But for the one purpose for which they have been introduced here, they may be considered adequate. This purpose is to direct attention to the testimony—and it could be abundantly confirmed from other sources—that they furnish concerning the existence of certain separations in the thought-apparatus of the brain between nerves that are vehicles of that which is bodily, because conveyers of activity connected with the organs of touch, taste, and smell, and other nerves that are vehicles of that which is mental, since they convey activity connected with the organs of sight and hearing. Whether one suppose that the sensations of which he is conscious when he experiences desire have their origin in these nerves themselves; or that they have their origin in a form of conscious life beneath them and beyond them, of which life the nerves are merely instrumental agents, the legitimate inference is the same and inevitable, namely, that the two phases of desire, one of the body and the other of the mind, are started into activity by influences coming from different directions and having different tendencies.

As related to both directions and tendencies, it is worth while to notice that Dr. Flechsig, in the passages just quoted, associates with the experiences based upon the bodily appetites the origin, in the brain, of the "conception of individuality, the idea of self as distinguished from the external world." This remark of his is suggestive of broader generalizations than are thus indicated. Notice, first, that, judged by the effect upon consciousness, the desires of the body—those that operate through the organs of touch, taste, and smell—are all exercised for the sake of experiencing the pleasure that they bring to the organs of sensation and to the physical body possessing these organs. Exactly the opposite is true of the desires of the mind. Science has discovered that there is more or less organic sensation connected with seeing and hearing. But no one has ever been directly conscious of this fact. He is conscious merely of something external to himself which through the agency of eye or ear, is brought to his attention. Notice, too, that the desires of the body operating through the organs of touch, taste, and smell can never be fulfilled except so far as a man brings into his own physical form, or into contact with it, the external object for which he craves. To enjoy this object at all in the way in which he desires, he must eat, drink, clutch, fondle, or inhale it. In all cases, where such possession is practicable, he cannot be satisfied except when he himself and he alone has full possession of the object. No one can eat or drink exactly the same thing that another is eating or drinking. This fact makes these lower desires not only bodily and physical, but causes them necessarily to involve more or less of selfish indulgence which, in case of excess, may become brutal. The opposite is true of the desires of the mind awakened through the agency of an organ of sight or hearing. These can very often—indeed almost always—be indulged to the full without the slightest necessity for selfish possession or appropriation. One man's seeing or hearing need seldom prevent others from seeing or hearing exactly the same thing. Many thousands, at the same moment, may enjoy equally the same mountain scenery and the same symphony. Indeed their delight is enhanced by the knowledge that other persons are sharing it. These higher desires, therefore, are not only mental, but, instead of being necessarily individual and selfish, they are, from

the very nature of their influence and effects, social and altruistic.

Notice, once more, that, while it is possible for the effects conveyed through the organs of touch, taste, and smell to be discontinued after producing no more than a physical sensation, it is not possible for the effects conveyed through the eyes and ears to do this. In this latter case, every effect, no matter how slight, is in itself a process of thought or emotion. Every process of thought or emotion is necessarily followed by others suggested by it; and all the processes together develop and constitute for a man that mental condition which causes us to term him rational. The rational, therefore, as well as the mental and the non-selfish, is developed through the agency of that which influences the mind through the eyes and ears. It is by means of that which he has derived through these that a man acquires the ability to formulate his desires into thinking, or at least into definiteness and accuracy of thinking. No one could distinguish between different thoughts unless he could express them in different words. These words he either hears from others or originates for himself. When he hears the words, he usually receives them in the form of sounds. When he originates them, he usually derives suggestions for them from the forms of sight. For instance, he takes, at times, a sound that signifies one thing that can be seen and makes it apply to another thing that cannot be seen, but which appears to him to involve an effect that is similar in principle. Thus he uses the words, *bright*, *clear*, and *cloudy*, not only to refer to the atmosphere and water through which bodies may be trying to move, but to mind and brain through which half formulated conceptions may be trying to move. At other times, he takes two or three sounds, each of which signifies a different object or conception and puts them together. This method causes the sounds to represent or picture an object or conception that is compounded in idea, like *understanding* or *uprightness*, or is continuous in relation, like words that follow one another in a sentence. The ears and eyes therefore, furnish a man with that which enables him to construct language; language enables him to make those distinctions which are essential in order to think clearly; and, wherever there is clear-thinking, there is also rationality.

It follows as a corollary from this that these organs of

sight and hearing which minister to the desires of the mind as distinguished from those of the body are the sources of the possibilities of all the forms of rational development which we are accustomed to associate with distinctively human advancement—of all the possibilities, for instance, of art, philosophy, science, or religion. Every one of these is due to a further unfolding of the principle underlying language. Art, for instance, emphasizes and extends in music and poetry, the manner in which language uses sounds, and in painting, sculpture, and architecture, the manner in which it uses sights. Philosophy emphasizes and explains the methods through which sounds or sights act upon one another as they do; science emphasizes and investigates the matter which constitutes the substance of that which is heard or seen; and religion emphasizes and relates to action the supposed origin and destination of this. Finally, the whole result and tendency of thinking, when rationally and not physically influenced, is to seek and accept as reasonable and true not such perceptions as are peculiar to some individual—merely, perhaps, because they accord with his wishes or interests—but those that seem to be recognizable universally and necessarily, and thus seem to be not merely relatively true but absolutely so, at least as nearly so as a being of limited intelligence can surmise. All of us when we speak of reason and truth mean to refer to something that may be supposed to exist independently of, or aside from, our own or anyone else's personal opinion or judgment. It is in this ability to formulate thought through the use of the sights and sounds of nature, and to build them into language, conceptions, theories, and ideals that a human being differs from a brute; and the very non-selfish rationality that causes a man to recognize that truth is something that is shared by others and is derived from others as well as from oneself naturally tends to awaken a sense of dependence upon them, confidence in them, and sympathy for them such as is expressed in what is ordinarily termed the humane as contrasted with the brutal.

To sum up what has been said, we have found reasons for tracing the nerves conveying a consciousness of lower bodily desires to a different nerve-center in the brain from that to which can be traced the nerves conveying a consciousness of higher mental desires; and we have found reasons for associating logically the former desires with that which is

bodily, selfish, physical, and brutal; and the latter desires with that which is mental, non-selfish, rational, and humane.

If this be so, the natural inference would be that the two forms of desire—those of the body and those of the mind—are essentially different, and can be related in consciousness only or mainly by way of counteraction. But there are many to whom this conception is not acceptable. It seems to them far more philosophical—indeed the only view that is philosophical at all—to suppose that, while apparently different, both forms of desire are merely phases indicative of different stages of a method of influence which, in origin and essence, are not dissimilar. This conception usually manifests itself in the statement or implication that all the effects usually attributed to the psychical or mental are developments of that which first manifests itself in the physical and material. A tendency of modern thought in this direction will be considered in what is said of evolutionism in Chapter VII. But certain aspects of the tendency it seems important to consider in this place. Let us ask then, for a moment, whether it is philosophically necessary to connect in the way in which some of these thinkers have done the physical with the psychical.

In answering this question, it is best, perhaps, to begin by assuring the reader that, so far as a negative reply is given, it is not intended to deny that many of the possibilities of the mental nature are traceable to the influence of lower bodily desire. Every thinker admits that such is the case. In a man, body and mind are inseparable. Whenever the body works, the mind works. Whenever there is a physical desire, there is also, with the physical feeling that occasions it, a psychical thought that accompanies the feeling; and therefore any sort of a desire may be associated with thought. But, according to what has been said, the mere existence of thought as a constituent of a desire, does not make the desire itself bodily or mental. To be either of these the bodily or the mental quality, if it do not begin it, must, at least, predominate in it. A desire and the thought necessarily associated with it are of the body in case they are started, dominated, or directed toward their end by sensations within oneself experienced in the organs of appetite like those of touch, taste, or smell. A desire and the thought necessarily associated with it are of the mind in case they are started, dominated, or directed toward their end by

surroundings outside of oneself experienced, so far as consciousness is aware, through, but not in, the organs of apprehension like those of hearing and seeing. With this understanding of the conditions with which we are to deal, let us try to ascertain so far as possible the phases and qualities of experience, which, as a man passes from childhood to manhood, each of these two classes of desire that we have been considering is likely to develop in him.

As applied to bodily desire, probably no one would deny that, in strict accordance with what has been said of the tendency leading to a man's birth, his first impulse seems to be to form, so far as possible, a bodily or physical union between himself and that which seems outside of himself. His first indications of individual activity are usually manifested by putting into his mouth everything that he can get hold of. He is satisfying his appetite, and older people know that this is necessary in order to sustain and develop his physical life. But the child knows nothing of this necessity. All that he is conscious of is a desire to appropriate from another physical form that which he can bring into union with his own. When he gets older, he uses his hands for the same purpose. He grabs at everything that he can touch. Then later, urged on by a similar motive, he uses all his limbs reinforced by every possible exercise of voice, eyes, and ears. During most of his childhood, most of his sources of energy seem to be fulfilling mainly a desire to seize upon everything about him in order to possess and use it exclusively for himself.

It is not strange that this should be the case. Whatever physical possibility may have led to his origin, this would never have taken place unless it had been sought through bodily means. It is only natural, therefore, that the earliest efforts of his life should be in the same direction. A human being is not a brute, but, when he is born, he enters into an existence for which brutes alone seem thoroughly fitted. His first impulse, more universal in youth than in age, is to satisfy every longing, no matter what may be its character, through physical means. As contrasted with himself, the world appears large. What can he do better than to grasp with his hands for some of the large things about him? Of course, even while doing this, he necessarily begins to think about the object to be obtained, and the methods through which thought and will combined can obtain it; and, whether



he succeed or fail in the effort that he makes, it is inevitable that this should involve a great deal of reflection, introspection, ingenuity, and intellectual endeavor of all kinds in order to thwart and overcome hindrance and opposition. Undoubtedly these experiences develop his thinking powers. But in what direction? Never, apparently, in such a direction as to make his desire predominantly mental. If not influenced in some other way than by the physical and selfish desires that first actuate him, these remain predominantly bodily. It was physical force that appeared first to hinder and oppose his desires; and it is this that seems to train all his subsequent development. This may seem to be the case at first because some things are so far away that his own physical limbs are not strong enough to carry him to them or because, when he gets to them, some one stronger physically than himself pushes him away from them or snatches them from him. But always what opposes him from without seems to be some exertion of physical force; and, as he grows older, he is apt to become more and more conscious of this fact. He wants playthings; but is kept from them by larger people to whom they seem to belong. He wants to play; but surrounding him are those who are older and who make him study or work. When thwarted he wants to fight with his fists, or to denounce with his tongue, but about him are plenty of others to defeat him in the one case, and to silence him in the other. In short, when he wishes to appropriate what he desires from the objects and opportunities on every side of him, he finds himself prevented more than by anything else by bodily force, or, if not by actually exerted force, by threatened force.

The only result of this, and of this alone, so far as it succeeds in suppressing the expression as well as the fulfillment of his desires, is fear; and so far as fear alone exerts a permanent influence upon his emotive condition it excites him to hate. The effect of fear and hate upon his character, as he grows older, is not to extinguish his bodily desire; but to cause him to gratify it by subterfuge, by lying, cheating, stealing, seducing, and, possibly, murdering, in all of which he is aware that he is running the risk of having others, alone, or acting together, in fulfillment of arrangements that they have made for the purpose, detect, outwit, arrest, imprison, or execute him. The arrangements thus

made are usually expressed in laws; and the feelings of those against whose actions these laws are directed are almost invariably hostile. Yet many suppose that law is the only sufficient remedy either for crime or for any other public evil, whether it be financial, social, industrial or political. Men suppose this because they expect the state to compel obedience to law through the use of force. Too often, however, they forget that force is in danger of inciting men against whom it is exerted to hostility, rebellion and revolution, and, in such cases if individual selfishness or class interest have been manifested in the exercise of the force, the same is likely to be manifested in the methods used in resisting it. Even, too, though this resistance prove unsuccessful so far as concerns outward results, it may, nevertheless, as shown in the cases of many fanatical agitators, develop such thoughts and feelings and, ultimately, such characteristics in those who have been made the subjects of force as to render it virtually impossible for them to believe that human beings can be effectively influenced in any way that is distinctively nonselfish, reasonable, humane or altruistic. In the opinion of such agitators, nothing can be set right except through the application of force. The effect of mere external restraint is the same in our age, as it was when the Apostle Paul declared that law alone cannot make men righteous, because, so conditioned, "law worketh wrath" (Rom. 4: 15).

Now let us consider the influences exerted primarily through desires that are of the mind. These, as has been said, are awakened through the agency of the eyes and ears, not because of conscious bodily sensations excited in these organs but because of surrounding sights and sounds of which these organs convey intelligence. Everybody must have noticed that the lower desires in almost their earliest manifestations, may be antagonized by the higher. That babe is exceedingly young whose animal appetites cannot be counteracted and sometimes entirely overcome by the mother's appeal through the ears by a lullaby or through the eyes by twirling some glittering object. In such a case certainly that which appeals through the ear or eye cannot be said to be any development of that which appeals through the stomach. As a child grows older other appeals to his higher nature can keep him from touching, tasting, handling, and using what he should not; and can cause him to work

and study rather than to loaf and play. Later in life, others than parents can incline him not only to refrain from interfering with the rights of his fellows but, through self-denial and self-sacrifice of his own interests, to help them to attain what they wish or need.

A person thus influenced is conscious not of physical force from without controlling him in such ways as to awaken fear and hate; but of psychical influences arousing mental desires within him through the presence of others in whom he has faith and for whom he exercises such thoughts and manifests such actions as faith and it alone is fitted to engender. His conception of human nature will cause him to treat his fellows with confidence and consideration, while endeavoring to enlighten, emancipate, help, advance them, and lead them to conduct in which all the tendencies are in the direction of truthfulness, honesty, and the elevation and preservation of life. A man must experience the influence of these higher desires, some of which are diametrically antagonistic to the lower ones, before it is possible for him to develop the best of which he is capable. This statement is true as applied not only to life in the present world but to the possibilities of life in a world beyond this. There are truths of which the mind is intuitively conscious, truths that are axiomatic, that do not need to be argued. Among these are the conceptions: that bodily things occupy space; that no two things doing this can, at one time, occupy the same space, and that, therefore, they cannot merge into complete unity, or be one in physique; that they must always remain two. This is what is true of the bodily or physical. On the contrary, with the mental or thoughtful it is just the opposite. It does not occupy space, and cannot be subject to its conditions. There is nothing apparently to prevent thought-life from an occasional experience, at least, of psychical unity. Indeed, it is not uncommon for men to cite supposed instances of this,—instances in which two different persons have been supposed to have had but one thought, feeling, or purpose; or, perhaps, millions of them to have been animated by a single spirit. In accordance with this conception, it is logical to surmise that the desire for union to which, as argued on page 3, human life on earth owes its origin, is a foreshadowing and promise of a condition that is certain to be realized wherever there is nothing bodily or material to interfere

with the fulfillment of desires that are purely those of mind and spirit.

Nevertheless a little further thought will convince us that the results even of these higher desires and of them alone will, in this world at least, no more satisfy that earliest, and fundamental human desire of one individual life for union with another individual life than will the results of the lower desires. Caressing and rocking a babe, pointing to objects or colors, and talking or singing to him may stay his appetite for a time, but it cannot do so long; nor even keep him alive; and though, as a child grows older, his own faith and love exercised toward others may lead him to work for them, and study, and deny and sacrifice himself, there is not one of us but would have serious doubts with reference to the prospects for usefulness in life of a son who should manifest such traits and such alone. Without strong appetites, often indulged, we should have no reason to anticipate health for himself, or even existence for his children. Without the desires associated with appetite for the possession and use of other material things surrounding him, to be gained by much reflection, planning, ingenuity, and industry we should have no reason to anticipate from any amount of self-denial and self-sacrifice on his part, even enough of acquisition and influence to keep him out of a poor house where to support him would be a burden to the community, or out of a peon gang, where, perhaps, the very conditions of his existence would be a curse to himself and everybody about him. If the tendencies traceable to lower desire alone might make of him a niggard, miser, dunce, or degenerate, those traceable to higher desire alone might make him a spendthrift, pauper, dupe, and in all ways generally incompetent; and the former of these are scarcely further removed from the traits of the ideal man than are the latter.

It seems, therefore, that, in order to account for all that a man should be or should become, we need to trace his possibilities of activity not to any one source of influence, but to two different and often antagonistic sources,—one within himself affording satisfaction in the sensation experienced in his bodily organs and necessitating his exclusive possession of the outward object occasioning the desire; and the other outside himself affording satisfaction by means of things apparently apprehended aside from any conscious

sensation experienced in his bodily organs or any exclusive possession of the sight or sound occasioning the desire.

To this conception of the existence of two sources of desire, and of an antagonism, at times, between them, the only logical objection is the seemingly well-grounded and very generally accepted opinion that a philosophical solution of any problem is successful in the degree in which it can include all the different phenomena associated with a subject, group them under one method of classification, and connect them with the operation of a single principle of universal applicability. It is felt that such a solution does not characterize a theory that divides the activities possible to the human being into two classes, different in origin and antagonistic in results. It is more philosophical, we are told, to accept as a hypothesis, even though it may not yet be a proved fact, the conception that all a man's activities, however psychical or mental, are developed from the physical and material. Especially does this conclusion commend itself to the thinkers of our own day on account of its supposed conformity to the evolutionary theory. But in Chapter VII. of this volume it is shown that some foremost advocates of this theory do not deem it necessary to accept this conclusion. They acknowledge that, while the general method of development may apply equally to the material and the mental, there is no scientific proof of such a connection between the two as exists in nature between cause and effect, or source and result; that the most to be said is that there is a correspondence or correlation between the two,—in other words, that their various phases develop according to similar methods, but on different yet parallel planes.

Years ago, in the Introduction to the Second Edition of *Art in Theory*, the author, after drawing attention to the fact that science deals with the facts and laws of physical nature, and religion with those of psychical nature, had occasion to say:—(*Art in Theory*, pages xxxix, xl) that “the mind is never strictly within the realm of science when arriving at conclusions otherwise than through methods dealing with material relationships. Nothing is scientifically true, unless it can be shown to be fulfilled in fact; *i. e.*, in conditions and results perceptible in ascertainable phenomena. The moment that thought transcends the sphere possible to knowledge, it gets out of the sphere of science. But, when it gets out of this, what sphere, so long

as it continues to advance rationally, does it enter? What sphere but that of religion? And think how large a part of human experience—experience which is not a result of what can strictly be termed knowledge—is contained in this sphere! Where but in it can we find the impulses of conscience, the dictates of duty, the cravings for sympathy, the aspirations for excellence, the pursuit of ideals, the sense of unworthiness, the desire for holiness, the feeling of dependence upon a higher power, and all these together, exercised in that which causes men to walk by faith, and not by knowledge? The sphere certainly exists. Granting the fact, let us ask what it is that can connect with this sphere of faith the sphere of knowledge? Has any method yet been found of conducting thought from the material to the spiritual according to any process strictly scientific? Most certainly not. There comes a place where there is a great gulf fixed between the two. Now notice that the one who leads the conceptions of men across this gulf must, like the great Master, never speak to them without a parable,—*i. e.*, a parallel, an analogy, a correspondence, a comparison. Did you ever think of the fact that, scientifically interpreted, it is not true that God is a father, or Christ an elder brother of Christians, or the latter children of Abraham? These are merely forms taken from earthly relationships, in order to image spiritual relationships, which, except in imagination, could not in any way become conceivable. This method of conceiving of conditions, which may be great realities in the mental, ideal, spiritual realm, through the representation of them in material form, is one of the very first conditions of a religious conception. But what is the method? It is the artistic method. Without using it in part, at least, science stops at the brink of the material with no means of going farther, and religion begins at the brink of the spiritual with no means of finding any other starting-point. Art differs from both science and religion in finding its aim in sentiment instead of knowledge, as in the one, and of conduct, as in the other. But notice, in addition, what an aid to religion is the artistic habit of looking upon every form in this material world as full of analogies and correspondences, inspiring conceptions and ideals spiritual in their nature, which need only the impulse of conscience to direct them into the manifestation of the spiritual in conduct."

This last sentence will suggest why the principle explained in this quotation is applicable, but in a general rather than specific way, to ethics as well as to æsthetics. An ethical effect equally with an æsthetic is due to the combined influence of the material and the mental. The chief distinguishable difference is that in art the mind works in connection with matter in order to produce a result to be represented to others; and in morals the mind works in connection with matter in order to produce a result to be realized in oneself. In fulfilling the method of æsthetics, a sculptor, to accord with his conceptions, models a statue. In fulfilling the method of ethics, a man models himself. Just as æsthetics has to do with the art of right designing and producing, ethics has to do with what may appropriately be termed the art of right living and doing, and just as æsthetics results in representative art, ethics might be said to result in presentative art,—at least in the sense indicated by the Apostle Paul when, in Romans 12 : 1, he says "I beseech you that ye present your bodies holy and acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service."

This principle, applicable to both æsthetics and ethics, has been pointed out in order to enable the reader to understand why certain relations between cause and effect which seem to be universal when all the factors to which they are applied are material, as in science, or even, sometimes, when they are all mental as in religion, do not exist at all when some of the factors—the causes, for instance—are bodily or material, and some of the factors—the effects, for instance—are mental or thoughtful. To illustrate what is meant by saying this, notice that no real, or logically organic relationship—but only an ideal, imagined or analogical relationship—exists between a pleasant thought and a smiling face, or a sad mood and a bent body; between a doubtful thought and a rising inflection, or any angry feeling and a husky tone; between playing a game and using the word *pastime*, or between being honest and using the word *upright*; between thinking of protection and throwing the palm of the hand up or out, or between thinking of concentrating thought, and pointing with the finger; and yet the relationship between the two in each case is apparently as close as it would be if they were organically connected. Moreover, this fact hardly needs explanation. In the actions of the least instructed as, for instance, in pointing

with the finger, the right mode of expression usually follows the thought or feeling that is experienced. So we might multiply indefinitely a man's mental activities and fit them to any outline, color, tone, or combination of these that is possible to music, poetry, painting, sculpture, or architecture. The principle will be found to be exemplified in all properly conceived and thoroughly executed artistic work, yet in hardly a single case does the mental result manifest the slightest organic connection with the bodily agency apparently occasioning it, or occasioned by it. There is no proof that the result is an effect of any thing more than association, suggestion, or imagination.

The reader has probably anticipated the application of what has been said to the subject immediately before us. Just as there is no actual organic connection between the bodily or material and the mental or thoughtful in æsthetics, so, as we have a right to infer, there is none in ethics. If material things do not, in a strict sense, develop into mental thoughts in the one department, why should they do so in the other? The practical results, as we have found, may be as effective as if they did so; but we have no philosophical right to affirm that they do so, unless we can prove it. What it is that connects the two, we do not know. We might say with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) in his *New Essays on the Human Understanding* that between the bodily or physical and the mental or psychical there is a "pre-established harmony,"—a creative provision or prevision, so to speak, in accordance with which, when the one acts as if it were a cause, the other acts as if it were a result. But this theory merely presents a hypothesis. It may or may not be true. It cannot be accepted as a fact. All that can be accepted as a fact is this, that in some way human intelligence is made to form a connecting link between influences some of which are bodily and some mental; in other words that the consciousness of man is influenced on opposite sides—or, better perhaps, from below and from above or from the inside and from the outside first by one tendency and then by the other.

By making individual conscious intelligence the connecting link between the two opposing influences, one is able to obviate the most important practical objection to extreme evolutionism. The objection is that the ascribing of mental activities of any kind to results of physical development



fulfilling natural law, tends to relieve the individual of any feeling of personal responsibility for his own actions or their results. But, besides answering this objection, a theory that enables one to make the man himself, or—what is the same—his own conscious intelligence the connecting link between agencies that arouse opposing desires also enables one to group, in just as true a sense as can the evolutionist, all the different phenomena associated with the subject under one method of classification, and connect them with the operation of a single principle of universal applicability. As a fact, they are very greatly mistaken who suppose it to be unphilosophical to hold that a human being is so constituted as to be under the sway of forces influencing his conscious desires from two antagonistic directions,—one from within and the other from without. This fact—if it be a fact—does not differentiate him from other related objects surrounding him; or cause his condition to be out of accordance with a law pervading all the universe, and apparently applicable to everything in it.

If we turn to any department of science this statement will be found verified. The astronomer, for instance, recognizes in the movements of every star in the universe, whether a planet, a sun, or a comet, a force that he terms centripetal, and also another entirely antagonistic force that he terms centrifugal. The first tends to draw everything inward to the center of its own body or orbit; the second tends to drive it outward away from its own body or orbit. Or if we turn to the botanist, we shall find that he too recognizes in every tree or shrub a force that holds every element of growth in it to its own trunk and root and another force, antagonistic to this, that pushes it outward toward air and sunshine, and especially in the case of parasites, toward other growing plants surrounding it. Even in objects apparently so minute as to be incapable of any divisions in either force or substance, science has found that, wherever there is life, the only possible way of getting it, or continuing to possess it is through the pressure of vibrations that force the elements composing it first one way and then the other way. Such conditions are acknowledged by scientists to exist. What then?—The conditions are identical with those to which we have found human intelligence to be subjected. Therefore the conclusions that have been reached in these pages do not exclude it from classification with other phenomena

of nature, or from the application of a principle causing all nature to illustrate unity of design. The scientist will tell us that centripetal and centrifugal forces are both essential in order to fulfill the one principle, or method, underlying what may be termed the life of the universe. The agriculturist will tell us that inside and outside agencies of growth are both essential in order to fulfill the one principle or method of growth exemplified in the life of the plant. The electrician will tell us that vibration is essential in order to fulfill the one principle or method that proves the existence of life in the atom. Now when a man detects in his own nature certain desires or different promptings of the same desire awakened by and for himself; and certain others, at times antagonistic, awakened by and for others, he has not removed his own experience from the operation of a law apparently pervading all existence; and if in this law philosophy can find a basis of unity notwithstanding apparently antagonistic forces, why should it not be able to find the same principle exemplified in human experience? Why, in the circumstances should not antagonistic promptings of desires at the basis of one's nature be exactly what we should have reason to expect? That we should expect to find them, and to find what is and should be the bearing of this fact upon every man's conduct and character it will be the endeavor of future chapters of this book to unfold.\*

\* This attributing of individual development of any kind to influences exerted from opposite directions seems needed in order to make philosophically acceptable, because showing its universal applicability, a theory now beginning to be widely adopted, and thus stated in Arthur Mitchell's translation of Chapter II. of Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*: "*The cardinal error (the italics are Bergson's) which from Aristotle onward has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature is to see in vegetable, instinctive and rational life three successive degrees of development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three different directions of an activity that has split up as it grew.* The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor generally of degree, but of kind." Of the differences between plant and animal, he says: "Everywhere we find them mingled; it is the proportion that differs." Of those between animal and man, he says: "From the fact that instinct is always more or less intelligent, it has been concluded that instinct and intelligence are things of the same kind, that there is only a difference of complexity or perfection. . . . In reality, they accompany each other only because they are complementary, and they are complementary only because they are different, what is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence." See also page 99.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PROCESSES OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS INFLUENCED BY DESIRES OF THE BODY AND OF THE MIND

Subject of the Present Chapter—Animal and Human Traits—Methods of Conceiving of the Influence upon Men of Lower and of Higher Desire—Tabulation of Processes of Intelligence as Developed in Connection with each Form of Desire—Explanations—Mental Desires are more Influenced by Thinking than are Bodily Desires—Possible, but not Actual, Separation between the Psychical Results of Desires of the Body and of the Mind—Dominance of the Latter through Influencing the Will—Desire as Affecting the Will—As Affecting Lessons Derived from Observation and Experience—From Information—Higher Desires aside from Knowledge Influential in Restraining from Vice—Lessons from the Reasoning Faculties as Influenced by Conditions of Desire—Recent Public Applications of that Principle—Imagination as Influenced by Conditions of Desire, as in Ideals—Ideals as Results of Imagination—The Possession of Ideals Differentiates the Mental, Rational, Non-Selfish, and Humane from the Bodily, Physical, Selfish, and Brutal Nature—The Character of the Ideal Depends upon the Contents of the Mind—Man can Live in a World of Ideals—This the Culminating Effect of Thinking as Influenced by Higher Desire.—Why Ideals are Hampered by Material Conditions—Why Certain Suggestions from this Fact may be Consoling and Inspiring.

**I**N order to anticipate objections to our general argument that, otherwise, might be suggested and need to be answered, it seems necessary to develop more fully than has yet been done the relationship between the character of each of the two classes of desire that have been mentioned,—those of the body and of the mind; and also to examine the character of the whole form of intelligent activity at the basis of which each of these respective classes of desire may be supposed to be especially operative.

We are all acquainted with a distinction frequently made, but with no attempt at philosophic accuracy, between a man—and it includes a description of his thinking as well as feeling—who is animal in nature, and one who is human.

Whether the two conditions thus indicated are essentially different, or whether, as argued by some, the latter with all its results is merely a higher development of the former, the two are at least dissimilar, and the dissimilarity ought to be capable of being indicated so that it can be recognized. A frequent conception is that a purely animal being has instinct, which some physicists ascribe to the transmission of acquired habits; and a human being has intelligence; but most thinkers are not satisfied with this statement. C. S. Meyers, for instance, in Vol. III. of the *British Journal of Psychology* says that to distinguish instinct from intelligence involves "a purely artificial abstraction." Men, too, have more or less instinct, and animals have more or less intelligence. If the statement were that animals are predominately governed by instinct and men are, or may be, predominately governed by intelligence, there would be less objection to it. The conception would then correspond to the distinction made on pages 6 and 7. It was said there, that, in bodily desire, the source and end of gratification are in the bodily nature, and that in mental desire, they are in the mental nature: in other words, that, in bodily desire, the thought of which one is conscious is subordinated to physical feeling which it attends and serves; whereas, in mental desire, this feeling is subordinated to psychical thought which it attends and serves. This is a distinction that can be easily understood and verified. In training a dog or a horse, one appeals to certain powers of perception, memory, association, attention, and obedience which presuppose some exercise of thought; but he does it through appealing, first of all, to physical feeling. He threatens or whips the animal, or bribes him with sugar or food. Sometimes the same is done in training children; but the older—the more human and less animal they become—the more feasible is it to appeal first to their mental nature,—to reason with them, to arouse their ambition, to stimulate their imagination, to conjure up their ideals. None of these methods of appeal would have any effect upon an animal. It is therefore logical to conclude that the nature which is started into activity by the desires peculiar to itself, includes feeling, thinking, and willing. When a man fulfills bodily desires his feelings, thoughts, and actions are all characterized by a bodily quality; and when he fulfills mental desires, by a mental quality.

Perhaps the best way to conceive of the difference between these two qualities is to consider the organism that produces thought as an instrument, and to regard desire as the force which operates through it. We all know how results in the same brain differ when a man drinks water or wine, breathes fresh air or laughing gas. In an analogous way, human consciousness may appear to involve a different nature when the force that impells it comes through physical appetite and continues to have a physical tendency, and when this force comes through rational excitation and continues to have a rational tendency. As Professor Rudolph Eucken (1846- ) of the University of Jena reminds us in Chapter I. of his *Life of the Spirit* as translated by F. L. Pogson, "Aristotle declared that the difference between man and the animals was that the latter cannot go beyond individual impressions and individual stimulations, while man, in virtue of his power of thought, can form universals, and let his actions be determined by them." When this is done, his processes of intellection are as nearly conformed as possible to what might be termed, as distinguished from methods of individual thinking, the methods of universal thinking, or, as Kant put it, the laws of "pure reason," being developed from a search for truth and right irrespective of any relationship to one's private interests, or, to phrase it differently, to the interests of one person considered as separated from others, because living in a separated physical body. In the same case, his action is as nearly conformed as possible to what we might term the laws of universal activity as distinguished from individual, being developed from a recognition of the claims or conditions of conception and conduct that are absolute and unvariable, and cannot be waived because of opinions or aims biased by one's own bodily or personal desires for self-indulgence or self-advancement.

On page 38, an attempt has been made to tabulate the two differently developed tendencies of feeling, thought, and action in accordance with these conceptions. Under the column headed Lower Desire are grouped the psychical results that can be attributed in some cases to animals, and, in all cases, to men so far as one considers only their animal tendencies. (See pages 21-26.) Under the column headed Higher Desire are grouped the results that can be attributed to men alone. The author is aware that this tabulation is incomplete and unsatisfactory. But to make it anything

else would require much more time and space than is at his disposal. He hopes, therefore, that, even as it is, it may serve the suggestive purpose for which only it is intended.

### A MAN'S PROCESSES OF INTELLIGENCE

AS REVEALED TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN CONNECTION WITH THE

*Lower Desire of the Body* or *Higher Desire of the Mind*  
*which, in its nature, is* *which, in its nature, is*

Physical, Selfish, Egoistic,  
 Inconsiderate, Brutal, and  
 Material

Thoughtful, Non-Selfish, Al-  
 truistic, Reasonable, Humane,  
 and Spiritual

#### *Become, when Affected through the Senses*

Source—Feeling  
 Nature—Sensation  
 Result—Appetite

Emotion  
 Sensitiveness  
 Aspiration

#### *Through the Will*

Source—Impulse  
 Nature—Conation  
 Result—Action

Motive  
 Choice  
 Purpose

#### *Through the Cognitive Faculties*

If, in their Receiving Powers,

Source—Occurrence  
 Nature—Perception  
 Result—Impression

Recurrence  
 Observation  
 Suggestion

If, in their Retaining Powers,

Source—Memory  
 Nature—Reminiscence  
 Result—Association

Remembrance  
 Recollection  
 Comparison

If, in their Collecting Powers,

Source—Instinct  
 Nature—Repetition  
 Result—Habit

Intuition  
 Classification  
 Method

If, in their Constructing Powers,

Source—Differentiation  
 Nature—Arrangement  
 Result—Combination

Analysis  
 Logical Sequence  
 Rational Judgment

If, in their Formulating Powers,

Source—Imitation  
 Nature—Reproduction  
 Result—Reality

Imagination  
 Representation  
 Ideality

It is not necessary here to enter into any explanation, or defense of the terms used or of the places assigned them in these lists. Perhaps, however, it ought to be said that these places do not represent any sequence in the order of time in which a man necessarily recognizes the different activities indicated. As a rule, the senses may be said to appeal to his consciousness first, followed by some slight effect upon the will before involving any very distinct action of the cognitive faculties. But the whole mind is a unit; and, so far as concerns that which is recognized by consciousness, the earliest impression may be occasionally conveyed by imagination, or ideality.

The one important fact intended to be brought out in this tabulation is that there is a difference at every analogous stage of mental manifestation between activities developed in connection with the desires of the body and those connected with the desires of the mind. The reader will notice that in all cases the main difference between the two is caused by the greater influence of thought in connection with the latter. It is because of the thinking that has been added to it that feeling becomes emotion; sensation sensitive-ness; impulse, motive; conation, choice; action, purpose; perception, observation; impression, suggestion, and so on. It must be borne in mind, however, that the psychical results indicated in both columns are experienced by all human beings. The only difference between them is that, in some men, dominance is given to the results developed in association with lower desires, and in other men to the results associated with higher desires. In case of conflict between the two, the men who gratify bodily desire are usually termed immoral. Those who subordinate this to mental desire are termed moral; and those who go further than this, and wholly suppress bodily desire, are by some termed spiritual. As generally used, however, this latter word merely indicates a tendency. No one living in a world where he needs a body, can be completely spiritual. Nor, as will be shown hereafter, is it right that he should be so. The term is conventionally applied merely by courtesy to certain persons who apparently approach the condition indicated by it.

The two contrasting columns will show also that each includes mention of all the three functions needed in order to render a mind complete, namely, feeling, willing, and

thinking. Therefore, though the bodily trend of intelligence and its mental trend are never separated in a man, it is conceivable that they might be separated. But the only thing that actually happens is that, as a rule, one of the two trends is more or less subordinated to the other. If the mental be subordinated to the bodily, the reader will recognize, even from what has been said already, and still more from what will be said hereafter, that there may be, philosophically considered, a need for something like that which religious people occasionally express by using the term conversion,—a need, that is, for turning the activities of the mind as it were upside down, so that, instead of having the bodily desires and their effects uppermost, the mental shall be uppermost.

Let us notice, now, how this conversion, or change in the trend of activities from bodily to mental, can be brought about. We shall find that, in all cases, it must start with a change in desires. For instance, to follow a line of thought suggested by the arrangements of the tabulation on page 38, it is natural, because morality is ordinarily manifested in action due to an exercise of will, to think and say that a man who is easily tempted to the wrong has a weak will; and the implication is that he needs, more than anything else, to have it strengthened. Many suppose, therefore, that the most important ethical and religious efforts are those directed toward influencing people, especially the young, to determine, once for all time, to lead, as applied to conduct in general and to certain courses in particular, an upright, or what for some means the same thing, a religious life. In a community in which there is a tendency to drunkenness, or to other forms of wrong doing, the services of a temperance-lecturer or a religious exhorter are frequently secured with the hope that his appeals will persuade those inclined to the evil to become inclined to the good. Not one word can be justly said against these theories, or the methods to which they lead—except where they are supposed to be based upon a complete view of the whole subject. But sometimes they are based upon a partial view, and, therefore, are expressions of what is only partly true. A right choice of a course of life is of tremendous importance, and men may be persuaded to it by an exhorter. But notice that the very fact that he is trying to persuade, indicates that he recognizes that the will—everything that



concerns its motive, choice, or purpose—can be influenced best indirectly, through influencing, first of all, the higher emotions and desires that lie back of it and determine its action. Could there be a right choice, or any agency that could be persuaded to make this, were it not for the existence in men of such deciding factors to which the persuader can address his appeal?

As has been said, these higher desires are a part of every man's inherited nature. We all must acknowledge too, that like other things in his nature, they can be greatly strengthened by environment and education. An exhorter in a community that had been prepared to agree with his premises by previous instruction and public sentiment might have thousands of converts whereas, in a different community, he would have, perhaps, not one. Those who overlook this fact, and, for any reason, fail to exert their influence so as to stimulate and strengthen the higher desires, are neglecting the one thing that is primary, and, therefore, the most important of all. There are religious people, for instance, who act, and sometimes talk, as if they believed that the only influence which they need to exert upon their children or friends is to lead them to some church where a revivalist can convert them; and yet whatever effect the revivalist may have upon them will depend upon previous effects that have been exerted upon their desires. And these effects have usually been determined by the example and precept of those with whom his hearers have associated in their homes, their schools, or their business. That this statement is true, may be confirmed by noticing that, while of those who attain to high excellence and usefulness, some were conscious in the past of a definite change in purpose accompanied by a choice to lead a right life; and some were conscious of no such experience, all were conscious of higher desires sufficiently strong to give a right direction to lower desires. In cases like this, it is the element that can be proved to be present universally which must be considered primary and most important. The necessary inference that must be drawn is that in acting in accordance with what is right, a man is sometimes conscious of controlling impulse by judgment, volition by choice, and action by purpose; and, sometimes he is not conscious of this. He seems to himself to perform a large number of the actions which would generally be considered right with no concep-

tion of the possibility on his part of doing anything else. In all cases, however, whether he be conscious of the action of will or not, he is conscious of the influence of higher desires.

An analogous statement can be made with reference to the influence exerted in connection with processes of thinking such as are tabulated on page 38 under the general heading of the Cognitive Faculties. For instance, men have learned a great deal with reference to the right conduct of life from noticing what the external world has presented to their perception and observation. But could mere perception or observation influence to any great extent a man whose deeper nature had not also been affected by it? Is mere experience in all cases sufficient? Does it always teach men what they need to know? Or does the lesson that it imparts depend upon something in the man himself which enables him to receive it in such a way that he can make use of it? An attempt to answer questions like these will convince us that experience, no matter how extensive, can afford little benefit to those who are thoroughly uninterested and therefore listless. Upon these it usually has no more effect than the shifting films of a moving picture which one forgets the moment he ceases to be face to face with it. It is only after a man's desires have been brought into exercise, after he has been led to think much about certain courses of action and the objects to be obtained by them, and to plan and to strive for these objects, that he is prepared, after either success or failure, to take to heart, as we say, and thus really to learn the lesson that experience is fitted to teach. With reference to such lessons, the same principle applies in ethics as in æsthetics. Experience gained by hearing good music, seeing good pictures, feeling their effects and having their methods of composition and production explained may prove of great advantage to a musician or a painter; but they cannot prove this until after æsthetic desires within him have been powerful and persistent through many months or years, and have thus given him practical knowledge and more or less personal mastery of his art. So in ethics. We cannot know or do all that we should with reference to any subject, unless we properly estimate experience. But we must be careful not to overestimate it. We must not assign it the wrong place. We must relate it, as nature does, to the higher desires, and make it subordinate to them.

The same is true of that which calls for an exercise of what in the tabulation are termed the retaining powers,—like memory and recollection. Very little knowledge, either of books or of our neighbors' lives ought to convince us that some of the worst characters that the world has seen have been the most accurately and fully acquainted with the history and probable consequences of wrong doing. It is a great mistake to suppose that a mere lack of instruction is the chief reason for a lack of virtue. No one could have made the Mephistopheles of Goethe's *Faust* less devilish by making him better informed. Indeed, moral character is often influenced for good when the conditions for a successful appeal to knowledge in any form are not fulfilled; when the one so influenced receives no adequate information or explanation for the course which he feels that he should pursue. On the other hand, no matter how fully these conditions of information may be fulfilled, the results will influence conduct only so far as, through their instrumentality, they may be made to reach and influence also the desires. For instance, we all believe that a boy should be told that he should not steal, and should have the reasons for this explained to his understanding. But not infrequently boys who have never been definitely taught this, will refrain from stealing, and separate themselves from the company of those who do steal, merely because of a vague inexpressible desire to act as seems worthy of themselves and of the approbation of others. One might say that they were too sensitive rather than sensible to trespass upon the rights and possessions of their fellows. So with vices. Many men will tell us that, up to the time when they were twenty-one years of age, though, perhaps, with ample opportunities and examples tending to lead them to go astray, and with no adequate knowledge of the dangers and diseases that such a course would involve, the simple desire to keep themselves clean and worthy rendered certain forms of indulgence on their part as impossible as taking a bath in a gutter. A young man starting out upon an engineering expedition over a western mountain was told that, in case he were bitten by a rattlesnake, the first thing to do was to drink enough whiskey to make himself drunk. He replied that he would rather risk the consequences of the bite than of the whiskey. This man may have needed additional medical education, though not for the purpose of

implanting a sense of obligation, but of supplementing and developing its methods of expression after it had been implanted by higher desire.

Most men, as they look back upon their boyhood, recognize that nothing except the influence of higher desire kept themselves and many of their companions from going astray. The author can recall that once when, from a boarding school that he attended, a boy was expelled for immorality, the teachers explained the nature and consequences of his offense. But, before hearing the explanation which, apparently, contained information new to the boys, the contempt with which their higher desires had greeted suggestions made to their lower desires had already ostracized the culprit so that he had had practically no companions. One who has read fiction of a certain class must have noticed that the fall into vice, which too frequently makes up the larger part of the story, usually follows an excursion to which venturesome feet have been allured by a tempter cloaked in the garments of virtue. The novelist seems to have recognized that the victim, to appear enough of a hero to awaken sympathetic interest, must be represented as being influenced by a higher as well as by a lower desire. He must appear to be the subject of a romantic affection, of a spirit of chivalry, inspired by contact with innocence and moved to protect the unfortunate. A similar conception influences many when thinking of their own acts. Few, until they have become, if not habituated, at least accustomed to some form of iniquity, will not feel more or less restrained from it by a higher desire; and even a convict in prison, whose guilt has been proved and is acknowledged, will usually argue that he has done no more than other people would have done, if only they had had the same opportunity, or the same ingenuity, as himself. In effect, this is the same as to maintain that he is as susceptible to the influence of higher desire as is anyone else.

Perhaps the largest number of those who fail to recognize the primary influence upon action of desire attribute right conduct to some one or more of the combined developments of intelligence as tabulated on page 38 under the headings of the collecting and constructing powers. To such thinkers, that course seems right which, by some intellectual process, can be proved to be reasonable. This is the conception which lies at the basis of the majority of such ethical

theories as the teleological, utilitarian, hedonic, and eudaimonistic, which will be discussed on pages 72, 73, 94-97 and 117-122. Concerning all of them, it can be said that they contain a partial truth of great value; but not the whole truth; and this fact alone, even if that which they ignore did not deserve primality would render these theories, at least in part, erroneous. Few who have tried to reform an idler, spendthrift, liar, cheat, thief, gambler, glutton, drunkard, or rake can have failed to recognize how few practical results follow upon explanations, warnings, or arguments addressed to his mere reasoning faculties. The appeal to these, even when presented with the most irrefutable logic, seems often to have absolutely no effect upon either his conceptions or conduct. Many a man has been told and convinced by his physician that smoking tobacco or drinking whiskey is impairing his health, but this does not prevent his desiring to do it, and so strongly too as actually to continue to do it. This certainly would not be the case if to understand, to infer, or to conclude were the same thing as to desire. While it is true, that results of reasoning and the conclusions reached by them have an influence, and an important influence upon conduct, it is not true that such is the case invariably. When it is not the case it is because there is still lacking some influence capable of making the right course seem desirable,—in other words capable of making an appeal to the desires,—an appeal, that is, to the sympathetic action of the emotional nature as well as to mere intelligence. Does not this explain why it is so widely recognized that the most effective method of bringing into the right path those who have strayed from it is through an influence of personality exerted either in private or public conduct, conversation, or address.

Is not this the reason underlying the movements that, of late years, have found expression in the "social settlement" and the "institutional church?" And, to make a broader and deeper application of the same suggestion, is it not the reason underlying the fact that all reforms, whether political, social, or religious, in the degree in which their influence upon communities has been thorough, widespread, and permanent, have been associated with some prominent person. Now and then too, this person, as has been supposed in the cases of Confucius and Socrates, may have had less to do with the actual shaping of the reform than some

of his followers like Mencius and Plato, yet to the world he has seemed to embody and represent it; and this has added greatly to its earliest and its latest popularity. Many more to-day are Buddhists, Mohammedans, or Christians because of what they know or think that they know about the founder of one of these systems, than because of any knowledge of the principles actuating him, or any serious endeavor to follow in his footsteps.

The relation between desire and the last of the cognitive faculties which are tabulated on page 38 still remains to be considered. This is what has been termed the formulating power and, as related to conduct, it seems to be the most important of all of them. It is the faculty that enables the mind to present to itself in a clearly apprehensible form the constructed results of its own thinking. The form is the final effect of psychical processes<sup>f</sup>—though it sometimes immediately accompanies them—such as are represented in the previous lists in the tabulation. In the degree in which this effect is more vaguely or more definitely conceived, we term the ideas that produce it general or specific. But not as mere ideas do they exert the most influence upon conduct. They do this when the ideas become what are termed ideals. When do they become these? It is when, in connection with ideas, another influence operates. This influence is defined by the suffix *al* which means *pertaining to*. An ideal is something pertaining to an idea. And what is this something? What can it be but the underlying energy or tendency in the mind that animates the idea, and which, as has been said before, reveals itself to consciousness as a desire? An ideal is a desire that has pushed through the different possibilities in the region of ideas till finally it has embodied itself in one or more of them. So we see that the same principle which renders the influence of desires necessary before the mind is fitted to avail itself of the ethical teachings of experience, information, or reasoning, applies still more forcibly to the effects of ideals. Indeed, these effects seem so important to some that, as will be noticed in a quotation in a footnote on page 67, Professor Josiah Royce (1865-1916) identifies them with the effects of conscience; and very nearly the same is done by Professor Warner Fite (1867- ) of Princeton University when, in his *Introductory Study of Ethics*, he associates the attaining of the end of obligation to the

maintaining in the pursuit of the ideal, a "maximum of sustained progress."

The ideas expressed in ideals differ in the degrees of distinctness with which through the representative faculty they are made to appeal to consciousness. Sometimes only a vague impression is produced; sometimes a vivid picture. In either case, the result can be attributed to the imagination. This is the source of any influence that, in any degree, tends to collect within the outlines of an apprehensible image—by which is meant a form—thoughts that, otherwise, could not be clearly conceived. When a young man says that he has an ideal of what a professional, married, or religious life should be, he may, or he may not be thinking of a picture representing to his conception certain phases of this life. But, in each case, he is exercising his imagination; and, almost invariably in connection with the unrepresentable conditions of this, pictures of it are emerging into his consciousness. The substance of these pictures, whether composed of sights or sounds is always taken from the physical world about him. For this reason, some confound the work of imagination with that of imitation, such as characterizes the antics of an ape or the tones of a parrot. But the object of imitation is attained when it reproduces reality. Imagination does more than this. It presents reality that it may represent ideality, selecting and arranging effects of nature which can be seen and heard in such ways that the thoughts and feelings which men naturally associate with these effects shall, by means of them, be communicated to the mind, either of oneself or of others. This difference between the work of imitation and of imagination is important. It distinguishes the conception not only of the aim of small art from that of great art; but of the results of lower animal intelligence from those of human intelligence.

The thought-life of the lower animal, so far as he possesses any of it, and the thought-life of the man, so far as he is merely like a lower animal, is started into activity and developed from that which appeals to him through coming into contact with his bodily senses. On the contrary, the thought-life of the human being, though influenced to some extent through the bodily senses, as is that of the lower animal, is also influenced by thought which is started into activity and developed from that which appeals from the distinctive region of the mind or of "pure reason" as Kant

put it. All the results of information and thinking have an influence upon his intelligent life; but the clearest and most decisive influence is exerted by what have been termed ideals. We cannot conceive of a lower animal as living in a world of ideals; nor of a man, rightly constituted and manifesting his best possibilities, as not doing so.

Every human being, merely because he has a mind as well as a body, has an ideal of some kind just as he has higher desires. His ideal, however—and this is an important fact to bear in mind—must be framed out of the ideas that he possesses. An “inner light” can do no more than reveal—though it can often too very differently color—the contents of that within the mind upon which it shines. For this reason, even though one’s desires be very high, the ideals to which they actuate him may be very low because of his ignorance or lack of mental training.\* In addition to this, though his ideal itself may be high, his lower desires, as in the cases of many drunkards, gamblers, and rakes, may so overbalance the influence of what is higher as not to allow it expression.

But whether his ideal be low or high, the culmination of that which separates him from the lower animal is found in the fact that, through all the possibilities in which the spirit within him is expressed, he can live, and always lives in part, and sometimes lives almost wholly, in a world of imagination. This fact is evinced in connection with about everything that he thinks or does. A large part of the normal child’s experience—and the largest part of all that he thoroughly enjoys—is made up of what he imagines that he might be and do, if he were an older person, or, at least, were not himself. In earlier times than ours, before the days of toys, most of the objects with which he played were merely symbols, not, in any sense, accurate imitations of that which they represented to his mind. But, for all this, he probably enjoyed them none the less. Indeed, as it is, he frequently uses toys to represent something else than that which they resemble; and when playing with them, or bounding along the street, or humming in rhythm to his own movements, it is often impossible to infer from anything that we see in him or hear from him what it is that is occupying his imagination. The same is true of a man,—of any man who is really doing efficient work. It is not what he sees, either in his home or business that chiefly inspires



his actions; but the vision filling his imagination,—the picture before him of what might be, should be, and, as he feels, can be. No matter whether he be master or servant, builder or helper, promoter or producer, the true measure of the success for which he may hope is, for him, determined less by the real result of the present than by the ideal possibility of the future. His worthiest share toward the up-building of his race is contributed in the exact degree in which he dreams himself to be less a citizen of the actual city that he sees than of the "New Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven." (Rev. 21: 2).

Since the time of Plato, the influence upon conduct of ideas, including that of the ideal, has been very generally admitted. Few would take exception to the association with the action of conscience, by Professor J. Mark Baldwin (1861— ) in Part III., Chapter XIV. of his *Handbook of Psychology* of "moral quality, moral authority, and moral ideal." At the same time, more could be made of this latter than has been made. It is really the culminating—almost the consummating—effect in the mind of all the processes of thinking started into action by desire,—the final concrete result of the mind's possibilities of intellection,—the shining goal, as it were, upon which every one of its reasoning efforts are focussed. The author once was leading a small boy toward shelter from a violent electric storm that was beginning. The boy begged to be allowed to stay out of doors, because, as he said, he wanted to be where, when the lightning flashed, he could look up and see heaven. What the boy imagined that he saw outwardly, every man, at times, imagines that he sees inwardly; and, as in the case of the boy, it is more likely than not to be perceived through and above the rifting clouds of a surrounding storm. That which starts mental activity causing one to look upward is the higher desire in him which, for the time being, at least, has gained a mastery over lower desire. That which stands between the senses and the object of desire is an accumulation within his mind of certain inheritances, tendencies, associations, traditions, reflections, inferences, speculations, or judgments, all involved in intellection, and often serving merely to becloud and obscure the mental outlook. But just as the flash and glow of light from the sky can organize that which threatens darkness into the grandeur of the storm and the glory of the sunset, so often can the inward

light reflected from the goal of aspiration turn that which has caused obscurity and confusion in the mind into visions of the highest beauty and inspiration.

Perhaps this chapter should not close without a suggestion with reference to one reason, at least, why, in the present world, notwithstanding the ideals of our higher nature and our consciousness of the far greater importance that should be attached to them than to the influences coming from our lower nature, nevertheless all the time we are subject, more or less, to these latter. Why, in this life, is the mental always hampered by the bodily? The only logical explanation is that, for some reason, the presence of the bodily is necessary for mental development. What soil and seed are to flower and fragrance, matter and flesh seem to be to mind and thought. The bodily man, apparently, is the mold in which the mental man is shaped. It is conceivable that if a dog had the articulating organs and the hands of a human being, he might be able to formulate thought, discriminate difference, use language and produce objects of workmanship almost as successfully as if human. At any rate, we know that the man himself could not do these things unless he had a body and a brain physically formed as they are.

These facts need only to be recognized in order to suggest a conception of life and its possibilities inconceivably consoling and inspiring. It is consoling because it explains in the same way as does the theory of development, but still more clearly than that, the reason for the disappointments and disasters with which every life is at times afflicted. Very often it is only through the disciplinary experience imparted through these that one who would advance to high achievement can learn what to do and what not to do. The sooner he recognizes this fact, the better will he be able to bear his troubles and the more benefit will he derive from them. But the conception is inspiring too. As intimated before, it gives a rational ground for entertaining a hope that, at some time, in some way, in part if not in whole, mental desires shall be fulfilled, and one's ideals realized.

## CHAPTER IV

### MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DESIRES OF THE BODY AND OF THE MIND

Recapitulation—Consciousness of Conflict between Desires sometimes Slight—When not so, the Opposition Is between the Desires of the Body and of the Mind—This Fact Is often Overlooked; but Is Fundamental—the Fact Accepted by Many Writers who have not Recognized its Full Import—The Consciousness of Conflict between Desires of the Body and of the Mind Necessitates Feelings of Unrest, Discomfort, etc.—Also of Obligation to Put an End to Them—And, to Use all the Mental Powers in Determining and Directing the Methods of Ending them—Nature Prompts every Man because he Is a Man to Subordinate the Bodily to the Mental—In the Consciousness of a Conflict that should be Ended thus we Become Aware of what is Termed Conscience.

**I**N the preceding chapters, it has been shown that a child inherits from his parents certain propensities which are partly of the body and partly of the mind; and that, corresponding to this, the earliest manifestations of personal consciousness on his own part are furnished through expressions of desires of the same differing character. They first cause him to wish for food for which he feels a bodily appetite; but, almost simultaneously, he gives evidence of a wish for that which shall reach his mind through his eyes and ears, as when his mother diverts his attention from the cravings of hunger by twirling a glittering object or singing a lullaby. We are justified in thinking, therefore, that his earliest consciousness is a consciousness of desires, which in their appeal to him have in them the possibility of manifesting qualities that are antagonistic to one another; and, besides this, that, as he goes on to maturity, at the basis of almost every thought or volition he becomes more clearly aware of this possibility. So long as he lives on earth, and possesses any consciousness whatever, it is impossible for

him to escape from a consciousness of desires within him that at times, may be in conflict.

Very often, this conflict may be so slight that one hardly recognizes its existence, as, for instance, when he is asked whether he will drink coffee or chocolate. But even this question may awaken in him a consciousness of opposing influences. In view of some nervous disorder, his physician may have advised him against the use of the one but not of the other. In this case, the conflict may reveal itself as no longer occasioned by a difference between two desires of the body, but between a bodily desire and a desire of the mind to be controlled by one's own reason, in view of the opinions of another whose judgment he respects. Or let one be deciding between reading a certain novel or a poem. If both courses appeal to him as the fulfillment merely of a desire of the mind, the difference between the two will probably appear to him to be slight; but if persons who have a right to exercise authority over him have forbidden him to read fiction but not poetry, or have presented arguments that appeal to him as reasonable against reading this particular fiction, then the conflict may reveal itself as no longer occasioned by a difference between two desires of the mind. One of the desires—because it is so selfishly self-opinionated as to involve disobedience to those in authority, and is, possibly, so self-indulgent as to involve expectation of participating through imagination in the wrong doing supposed to be portrayed in the book—may be, according to the explanation given on pages 19–23, almost entirely of the body, while the other desire, according to the same explanation, may be of the mind.

Of course, even in the former case, more or less desire of the mind may be present. The mere fact that one wishes to read at all is a sufficient proof of this. But, as said on page 8, desires are often mixed in character, and this to such an extent that it may be extremely difficult to distinguish the different elements of which they are compounded. The only thing that can be done with any approach to certainty, is to recognize that, in a given case, a desire is predominantly of the body or predominantly of the mind. It is extremely important, however, to observe that, wherever there is a perfectly clear consciousness of moral conflict, the opposing desires are traceable entirely or mainly to the former on the one side and to the latter on the other.

It is important to notice also that the contests between these different classes of desires are not to be rated as if they were of the same character as contests between desires of the same class. A man, for instance, who has lost his savings through unwise investments may say that he has done wrong; but no one would accuse him of having done morally wrong, unless, at the time when he decided upon the speculations that have ended disastrously, he subordinated higher desire, like that inclining him to enterprise, to lower desire like that inclining him to greed. This fact that, whenever a man is aware of a contrast between what is morally right and what is morally wrong, it is because of a consciousness of conflict within him between higher and lower desires, or between the results of these desires as developed in processes of thinking, is important because by many it is either overlooked entirely or so largely ignored as not to be assigned its due significance. For instance, James Martineau (1805-1900) in his *Types of Ethical Theory, Psychological Ethics*, Book I., Chapter I., starting out with what conforms in principle at least to the influence attributed in this volume to desire, says that, in deciding upon moral conduct, "What we judge is always the *inner spring* of our actions," and he confirms the general agreement of writers upon ethics with reference to this fact by quotations from Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephen, F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, and James Mill. After this he goes on to say, in Chapter IV., that "Each separate verdict of right and wrong pronounces some one impulse (or spring of action) to be of higher worth than a competitor. . . Each must come in turn to have its relative value determined in comparison with the rest." All this is true; but when he adds that "by collecting this series of decisions into a system we must find ourselves in possession of a table of moral obligation, graduated according to the inner excellence of our several tendencies," and attempts to tabulate these according to "their ascending order and worth," he reaches a result that few find satisfactory. One reason for this is owing to the fact that he has not drawn any preliminary distinction between lower and higher tendencies based upon a difference between those that are partly or wholly of the body and partly or wholly of the mind. His lowest, for instance, includes censoriousness which, is partly of the mind, his third the appetites, which are wholly of the body,

and his eleventh and twelfth, which is within one of the highest, include the affections, parental, social, and compassionate, which are partly of the body. A far more acceptable statement of the partial truth in Martineau's conception, because expressed in less specific terms and confined to that which is indisputable, is that of Professor J. Mark Baldwin (1861- ) formerly of Princeton University in Part III., Chapter IX., Sec. 7 of his *Handbook of Psychology*. "The determination of conduct in the concrete," he says, "as morally imperative takes place by a reaction of consciousness upon a group of alternatives in such a way that these alternatives are arranged in a scale of value with reference to the moral ideal and to one another; the highest value being approved as rationally right and the other disapproved as rationally wrong." But acknowledging, as one must, that this is true does not involve his rejecting the theory that the "highest value . . . approved as rationally right" may be so approved because one action manifests to a greater degree than another the influence of mind as contrasted with that of the body. To trace any number of differing results of higher or lower value to one underlying differentiation between two sources of desire is merely to get nearer to that which is logically necessitated in order to explain the conditions.

That this is so seems to have been recognized—how could it fail of recognition?—over and over again by writers upon ethics; but for some strange reason it has been recognized only incidentally and indirectly, with no comprehensive appreciation of its superlative importance. Notwithstanding the fact that these writers have directed attention to the bodily or physical and the mental or rational, together with their respective results, each has selected something else than the antagonism between these as the basis of his ethical system. Notice, in the quotations at the bottom of the page the way in which what is right and what is wrong in a man's conduct is referred to the opposing promptings of these two classes of desire.<sup>2</sup> In order to direct

<sup>2</sup> Years ago, *Plato* (430-350 B. C.) in his *Phaedo*, 24 and 32, reported Socrates (468-399 B. C.) as saying: "Does not the philosopher above all men evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion with the body? . . . what is purification but the separations of the soul or the mind from the body." The same general thought has been continued through all the ages and has been expressed by most of the scientists and

attention to that which the quotations illustrate, the author has inserted in the text an occasional word or phrase inclosed in parentheses indicating his own interpretations.

From this conflict between body and mind which apparently few deny, however disinclined to concede its due importance, three inferences seem inevitable. The first is that the consciousness of the conflict necessitates a consciousness also of unrest, annoyance, discomfort, and, in aggravated cases, of positive distress. Few cries can be more tragic in effect than are expressed in the words "What shall I do? What shall I do?" which are sometimes heard coming from a soul that has been made the battlefield of such a conflict.

The second inference is that this consciousness of conflict within necessitates a consciousness also that something ought to be done to cause the conflict to cease. In other

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philosophers of our own day. Professor A. P. Peabody (1811-1895) of Harvard University, in his fourth *Lecture on Moral Philosophy* says, "A person is realizing the highest good when these so-called lower (bodily or physical) forces are subordinated to the highest (mental or) spiritual forces." Professor T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) in his essay on *Evolution and Ethics*, says that "The practice of that which is ethically (mentally or spiritually) best. . . . involves a course of conduct which, in all respects is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic (bodily or physical) struggle for existence." Professor Frederick Paulsen (1846-1908) of the University of Berlin, says in the Introduction to Book II. of his *System of Ethics* translated by Professor Frank Thilly, "The rational (mental) will governed by an ideal subjects the lower forms of will, impulse and desire, which exist even in man as natural (bodily or physical) predispositions to constant criticism and a process of selection. This criticism we call conscience." Professor T. H. Green (1836-1882) of Oxford University, says, in Book III., Chapter III., Section 16 of his *Prolegomena of Ethics* that "the individual conscience (in man) is reason (mind) in him as informed by the work of reason without him in the structure and controlling sentiments of society. The basis of that structure, the source of these sentiments, can only be a self-objectifying spirit; a spirit through the action of which beings such as we are, endowed with certain animal (bodily) susceptibilities and affected by certain natural sympathies become capable of striving after some (mental) bettering or fulfillment of themselves which they conceive as an absolute good, and in which they include a like betterment or fulfillment of others." Professor Henry Sidgwick (1838-1901) of Cambridge University says in Book I. Chapter III. of his *Methods of Ethics*, "The conflict of practical (mental) reason with (bodily) desire remains an indisputable fact in our conscious experience." Professor J. T. Bixby (1843- ) of Meadville Theological Seminary, says, in Part II., Chapter III., of *The Ethics of Evolution* that the end of a man's morality is "the development of his spiritual (mental and rational) personality to the fullest,

words, a man is made conscious of what may be termed, in its graver developments at least, an obligation to bring an end to the condition within him,—an obligation of greater or less seriousness according to the greater or less seriousness of the issues that appear to be at stake. "Obligation" says Professor Frank Thilly (1865- ) of Cornell University) in Chapter III., Sec. 3 of his *Introduction to Ethics* "is not a special category or form of the reason; it is a principle fact which is never found in consciousness apart from other mental states." That this sense of obligation must accompany the consciousness of conflict seems to be self-evident. When one becomes aware of even a slight irritation on merely the surface of the body, he pays attention to it not only, but he feels soon that he must begin to do something in order to prevent it, or to end it; that he must scratch it, or use a salve upon it. It would be out of analogy for him not to feel similarly with reference to an irritation experienced amid the far more sensitive conditions of the inner mind.

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noblest, and highest life possible." Professor Rudolph Eucken (1846- ) of the University of Jena, in Chapter II. of *Ethics and Modern Thought*, translated by Margaret Sezdewitz, speaks of the "Spiritual (mental) force that exalts us above the animal (bodily) world." "Morality" he tells us "elevates the fact that all the variety of work is dominated by strife for a spiritual self." T. D. Stork (1854- ) in his *Hints toward a Theory of Ethics*, says "There you have ethics in a sentence. . . . It is the eternal conflict of the right of (mental) duty and the desire of bodily appetite." Professor Henri Bergson (1859- ) of the College of France expresses, in Chapter III., pages 268-9, of *Creative Evolution* trans. by Dr. Arthur Mitchell, an almost identical conception when he says that "philosophy introduces us into the spiritual life, and it shows us at the same time, the relation of the life of the spirit (and mind) to that of the body." "A philosophy of intuition will be a negation of science, will be sooner or later swept away by science, if it does not resolve to see that life of the body just where it really is, on the road that leads to the life of the spirit." Professor James Seth (1860-) of Edinburgh University says in Chapter III., Section 13 of *A Study of Ethical Principles*, "The demand is for such a perfect mastery of the impulsive and sentient or natural (bodily) self, that in it the true self which is fundamentally rational is realized,—that it may be the rational or human, and not the merely sentient and animal, that lives." Professor Charles G. Shaw (1871-) of the New York University in Part II., Chapter I., Section 2 of *The Value and Dignity of Life*, says "It is the destiny of man to strive. . . . The struggle is for spiritual life. A creature of (animal) nature, need not hesitate to approach the psychical domain of spirit." L. S. Thornton says, in Chapter V. of Part II. of an English Prize Essay upon *Conduct and the Supernatural*, "The natural



The third inference is that he must use his mental powers in determining and directing the methods that shall end the conflict. This is so because the very consciousness that makes him aware of the conflict is itself a function of the mind. If he possessed merely a body, there would be no such consciousness. It is his mind that occasions it, and to this he must look for the influence that shall end it. Indeed, there seems to be in nature as a whole, irrespective of any connection with morality, a tendency causing a man in such circumstances as have been indicated to fulfill the requirements of mental desire. The modern theory termed *energism*, mentioned on page 8, involves a recognition of this tendency. *Energism*, according to Professor Frederick Paulsen (1846-1908), one of its advocates (*System of Ethics*, Book II., Chapter II., as translated by Frank Thilly), holds to the existence in the mind of "inherent energies directed toward definite concrete activities." So far as forms

and the spiritual. In these lie the two centers of gravity from which opposing types of conduct proceed." Professor H. W. Wright (1878-) of Lake Forest College says in Chapter VI. of his *Self Realization, an Outline of Ethics*, "Man is primarily a being . . . of the animal species. As a self or person he is a (mental) spiritual being."

These opinions expressed by philosophers will be found to be confirmed by innumerable others who have written with merely a literary or religious purpose. The novelist Honoré de Balzac (1798-1850) for instance, giving expression, in his *Jealousies of a Country Town*, to the results of his own keen powers of observation, says of one of his characters, Victorian, "An indefinable flaw, often seen in young men, led him to will one thing and to do another. In spite of an active mind, which showed itself in unexpected ways, the (bodily) senses had but to assert themselves, and the darkened brain seemed to exist no longer. He might have astonished wise men, he was capable of setting fools agape. His (lower) desires like a sudden squall of weather overclouded all the clear and lucid spaces of his brain in a moment, and, then, after the dissipations that he could not resist, he sank utterly exhausted in body, heart, and mind, into a collapsed condition bordering upon imbecility." The *Apostle Paul* again says in Rom. 7 : 22-25, of his own experience, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my (bodily) members. With the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh (the body) the law of sin. Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The answer to this question, of course, is that deliverance must come through some influence, that, in some way—a way that will be discussed in following chapters of this book—shall harmonize, and, in cases where this is necessary, subordinate that which is of the body to that which is of the mind.

developed according to the processes of nature have in them a force that pushes them outward and onward along the line of their own possibilities, they necessarily give prominence and emphasis to characteristics that distinguish them from other products or sets of products. This fact is especially noticeable wherever the differentiating features are such as indicate membership in a higher class than that to which a product but for them might be assigned. We are accustomed, for instance, to rank human beings higher than animals, animals higher than vegetables, and vegetables higher than minerals. In each of these departments of life, nature seems to be prompting its members with as much persistence, apparently, as if they were consciously struggling to give evidence of their superiority, to keep pushing to the front the traits that distinguish them from the members of a department lower than their own. Among the vegetables, leaves, flowers and fruit are pushed to the front; and so among the animals, are legs, wings, arms, and other means of locomotion. As agencies of locomotion too, those that are emphasized are always the ones that are supposed to exhibit a higher range of ability. If a creature can crawl, he crawls; if he can also walk, he chiefly walks; if he can also fly, and fly well, he chiefly flies; if he can make a noise with his mouth, he lets his presence be known by making it, and chiefly produces the kind of sound peculiar to those of his own class. He wheezes, growls, barks, chirps, sings, or talks. The reader will recall what Burns says of the order of nature's development in one of these directions:

Her 'prentice han' she try'd on man  
And then she made the lasses, O!  
—*There's Nought but Care.*

And is it not a fact that the lasses talk more than the lads?

It is in strict fulfillment of this tendency in nature that every man, in a case where he can perceive clearly that one desire is wholly or mainly of the body, and another of the mind, and that he cannot gratify both at one and the same time, feels under obligation to exert, if necessary, all the energy of which his personal will is capable in order to draw from the resources of mentality within him the strength that shall enable it to counteract the influence opposed to

it. He recognizes almost as instinctively as he does the inclination to walk on two feet rather than on feet and hands that this is the only course which accords with his character as a man, as the sole being in the world with highly developed mental possibilities. He knows, without listening to argument, that it is not in accordance with his nature or the end for which it was intended that he should yield to the promptings of passion, greed, and appetite rather than to those of thoughtfulness, unselfishness, and aspiration.

It is difficult to conceive on what grounds anyone can deny these statements, but, if they be accepted, notice the inference. It is this—that with the very earliest manifestations of consciousness, the human being begins to be conscious of conflict between the promptings of the desires of the body and of the mind; and not only so, but conscious also that the conflict ought to be made to cease, and that this end must be attained by some agency that can adjust the expressional requirements of the former to those of the latter. If these statements be true, then in the consciousness of the human being, merely because he is constituted as he is, we can find that which philosophers, choosing their phraseology with more wisdom than they themselves have always recognized, have termed *conscience*. It seems as if every function of this, and every limitation of it—its failure at times to guide aright because of a man's being left to fulfill its indications according to his own judgment—ought to be capable of being explained in accordance with such a conception. If thus explainable, if conscience, with its associated sense of obligation to seek, as an end, that which shall conform the requirements of the body to those of the mind, be no more than an inevitable perception of consciousness whenever attention is called to conflicting promptings between bodily and mental desires, then what an accumulation of philosophical debris can the recognition of these facts brush aside from the pathway of the student of ethics! He will find no need of having that which inclines to morality or results from it attributed either to a special organ or function of the mind, or to a special or combined activity of organs never devoted to other and different purposes. He will find his investigations confronted not by theories but by conditions with which every one is familiar, because made aware of them, in almost the first act of testimony on the part of his own consciousness.

## CHAPTER V

### ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ETHICAL THEORIES

Bearing upon our Subject of the History of Ethical Theories—Chief Differences between these Concern the Source and End of Obligation—Earliest Moral Conceptions Based upon a Sense of One's Relations to Others. Institutionism *vs.* Individualism—Use and Meaning of the Word Conscience in Greece and Rome—Its Use at the Present Time—Intuition *vs.* Instinct—Promptings of both Attributed to Divinity—Other Moral Theories, Essentially the same in Ancient and in Modern Times. Reason for this—Contemporaneous Appearance in Greece of those Ascribing the Source of Morality to Thinking and to Feeling; to Reason and to Experiences of Pleasure and Pain—Criticisms of both Theories—Greek Philosophers who Combined both—The Functional School, with Suggestions of Teleological and Utilitarian Methods—Eudaimonism—The Cynic and Stoic Schools—The Sophist, Cyrenaic, and Epicurean Schools—Roman Stoics and Epicureans—Early Christian Ethical Theories—The Mystics.

THE statement made at the end of the preceding chapter needs no better confirmation than that afforded by the history of ethical theories. This will reveal that there are only a few of these that differ radically; that the same differences manifest themselves in every age, and do this in very nearly the same order; and that many of them would not manifest themselves at all, did their advocates go into the subject deep enough to discover that which is unmistakably fundamental in it, and treat this with sufficient comprehensiveness to avoid excluding those features considered fundamental by others. These are the reasons for directing attention to the following brief review of the more important of these theories.

The review will show that the chief differences between them have been occasioned by disputes with reference to two questions—one having to do with the source of obligation, and the other with the end toward which conformity

to obligation should be directed. In fact it might almost be said that past ethical "controversies" as well as those "of our own times," as declared by Professor W. R. Sorley (1855—) of Cambridge University, near the opening of his *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, have been "limited to the question of the origin of moral ideas," which involves that of the source of obligation, "and the question of the criterion of moral value," which involves that of the end which action is aimed to accomplish. After a little, we shall find that these two questions are much more closely connected than, at first, one might suppose. Before considering this, however, it is important to notice the answers that have been given to them in the past. Let us turn, first, to the opinions held by the ancient and medieval writers.

A sense of obligation usually impresses itself upon a child's mind at the same time as a sense of his relations to his fellows. He finds that he cannot have or do what he wishes because others wish the same; therefore he must yield his wishes to theirs, or suffer for it. He is conscious of this especially when others have authority over him, as in the case of a parent or a teacher. The same is true in the early ages of a race. Obligation is associated with men's conceptions of their relations to one another in general, and to those in particular who exercise authority in family or state. It is in strict accordance with this fact that we find the early moral philosopher of China, Confucius (552-479, B. C.) who had much more to say than would be expected in a philosopher of his times about "Self-development" and "Reciprocity," as in the Maxim in Analects, Book IV., Chapter XXIII., "What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others," nevertheless emphasizing in a way to suggest at least primary importance, obedience to parents, and reverence for ancestors. The Greek Pythagoras, too, (about 570 B. C.) is chiefly remembered because of his insisting upon the importance of harmony that should exist between oneself and the conditions, including both persons and things, that he finds surrounding him.

The conception of morality as derived from our relations to others, especially to others having more or less authority over us, lies at the basis of what is termed *institutionism*. This finds the source of morality in the customs of the society or the laws of the government with which one is connected. Both in China and Greece, however, there was

first developed an exceedingly provincial and mild form of institutionism. It was almost entirely limited to the influence of families and small neighborhoods. Even to-day in China there is very little of what could be termed national feeling; and an ancient Greek was much more loyal to Athens or Sparta than to Greece as a whole. This limiting of the effects of institutionism appears to have had much to do with the extraordinary results that civilization attained among the inhabitants of both countries as well as of Rome in her earlier period. Their institutionism was not such as to suppress with the united opinion and force of overwhelming numbers of people the exercise of individual initiative. Wherever this has been done to such an extent that the individual has been discouraged from giving expression to the results of his own thinking and feeling, there has been lacking one of the most indispensable agencies needed in order to maintain personal and private purity and integrity, as well as to correct public abuses, introduce civic reforms, and insure general welfare. Very naturally, certain persons have always recognized these facts and directed attention to them. As applied to morals they did so at an early period both among the Greeks and Romans by introducing the word *conscience*—a word that, apparently has always been intended to attribute a sense of obligation, in part at least, to a man's individual consciousness.

For many years, the word was employed with the same lack of endeavor to define it philosophically that we find in the talk and literature of our own country. The Greek term used for the conception, *συνείσθεσις*, was compounded from *σύν* meaning *with* and *εἶδον* a derivative from a word meaning *to perceive*; and its popular use is indicated in such a passage as that in Romans 2:15, "Those having not the law are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." The Latin word was *conscientia* from *con* meaning *with* and *scire* meaning *to know*.

In both languages, therefore, and, according to its etymology in our own language, the word means *to perceive with* or *to know with*. Some scholars add the word *others* as if it meant to know with others, or as a matter of common knowledge,—very much the same idea that we ourselves now

express by our word *consciousness*. Sir William Hamilton, (1788–1844), however, in the eleventh of his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, directs attention to the fact that this was only a later meaning of the Greek word, and that quite early among the Romans, as with the French of our own day, it meant both *conscience* and *consciousness*.

Seneca (3 B. C.–65 A. D.) for instance in Chapter V. of his *Anger* translated by Sir Roger L'Estrange, says that "the greatest punishment of an injury is the conscience of having done it." We might suppose that the word here meant merely consciousness were it not for the clause immediately following, "and no one suffers more than he that is turned over to the pain of repentance"; and shortly after he speaks of doing something "not in any transport of passion, but in honor and conscience."

This popular use of the term has continued to the present time, though philosophers have differed widely when they have tried to explain its meaning. A few associate it entirely with such conceptions of what is obligatory as can be derived from experience of that which is demanded by the state or society of which one finds himself a member,<sup>3, 4</sup> but the vast majority associate it with such knowledge of what is obligatory as is derived from a man's own consciousness.<sup>5–15</sup> Some assign the word indifferently to any or to

<sup>3</sup> Conscience ascribed to conceptions and habits acquired as the result of the influence upon experience of institutions: "Conscience is an ideal resemblance to public authority growing up in the individual mind, and working to the same end."—Chapter XV., *Emotions and Will*, Professor Alexander Bain (1810–1877) of Aberdeen University. "The frequent practice of abstaining from punishable acts generates the most important of all our active states, the aversion to whatever is forbidden in this form. Such aversion is conscience in its most general type."—Book IV., Chapter X., *Mental Science*, *Idem*.

<sup>4</sup> Conscience ascribed to conceptions and habits acquired as the result of the influence upon experience of one's relations to society: "It is from the fundamental unity of life, and the normal relations of men in society that our duties flow."—*The Ethics of Evolution*, Chapter II., Professor J. T. Bixby (1843– ) of Meadville Theological Seminary "The moral law is based on the promptings of the social impulse, the requirements of the associative life."—Section 7, Chapter XXVIII., *Function, Feeling, and Conduct*, Dr. Frederick Meakin. "The higher virtues are founded on the social instincts, and relate to the welfare of others."—*Descent of Man*, IV., Chas. Darwin (1809–1882)

<sup>5</sup> Conscience ascribed to the combined result of all the mental or psychical faculties when acting with reference to a moral end: "That principle by which we survey and either approve or disapprove our

all processes of the mind that have to do with determining right or wrong<sup>5</sup>; some to processes of thinking only<sup>6, 7</sup>; some to processes of feeling only<sup>8, 10, 11</sup>; and some to processes of both thinking and feeling<sup>9, 12, 13</sup>. Some limit its effect to action<sup>13</sup> and some trace its origin in all cases to the direct influence of divinity.<sup>14</sup> Few hold to a theory that is absolutely inconsistent with that presented in this volume.<sup>15</sup> But not many of them positively suggest it.

heart, temper, and actions. You cannot form a notion of this faculty conscience without taking in judgment, direction, superintendence.—*Sermons on Human Nature*, II.—*Bishop Joseph Butler* (1692-1752). "The whole moral consciousness of man in view of his own action and as related to moral law."—*Law of Love and Love as a Law*, Part I., Division VIII.—*President Mark Hopkins* (1802-1887), Williams College. "The single act of conscience may be a feeling, an emotion, an impulse, or a judgment, and as for conscience in the sense of a faculty distinct from the particular acts of the human mind, there is no such thing. The concept in its broad sense is merely a generalization from all these particular facts."—*Principles of Morality*, Part I., *Professor Wm. M. Wundt* (1832- ) of Leipsic University; translated by M. F. Washburn. "Conscience is a name for the consciousness of moral distinctions and of the obligation to respect them."—*Elements of Ethics*, Chapter VI., *Professor J. H. Hyslop* (1854- ) Columbia University. "Not only the end sought, but the manner of seeking it, affects the nature of Morality."—*Idem*, Chapter VIII. "The moral judgments taken together are referred to a power called conscience."—*Psychology*, Page 344, *Professor John Dewey* (1859- ), Columbia University. "Conscience is intelligence dealing with a subject-matter."—*Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, Part III., Chapter I., *Idem*.

<sup>6</sup> Conscience ascribed to reason considered mainly as a reasoning faculty: "Conscience, I therefore define to be the opinion of evidence."—*Human Nature*, Chapter V., Section 8, *Thomas Hobbes* (1588-1679). "Nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or depravity of our own actions."—*Essay on the Understanding*, Book I., Chapter III., Section 8; *John Locke* (1632-1704). "Conscience is reason discovering universal truth, having the authority of sovereign moral law and affording the basis for personal obligations. Conscience is thus seen to be a cognition or intellectual power, not a form of feeling, nor a combination of feelings."—*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, Chapter IV.; *Professor Henry Calderwood* (1830-1897) Edinburgh University. "Every man is consciously bound to do that and that only which the rational spirit that has been given him sees in its own rationality to be due to reason."—*A System of Moral Science*, Introduction Chapter III.; *Pres. L. P. Hickok* (1798-1887), Union College. "Conscience is pure reason discovering moral law."—*Elements of Ethics*, Prolegomena I.; *Professor N. K. Davis* (1830-1910), University of Virginia.

<sup>7</sup> Conscience ascribed to the intuitive action of the reasoning faculties, —the theory usually termed that of *rational intuition*: "Conscience is original, and no additamentum to our person. . . . Every man has,



Opinion is divided, too, as to how far it should designate merely involuntary and spontaneous processes like those of rational<sup>7</sup> emotional<sup>8</sup> or perceptual<sup>9</sup> intuition or instinct<sup>10</sup> or include also reflective and deductive processes like those of intellectual reasoning and calculation<sup>6</sup> or of emotional experience<sup>8, 11</sup>, and sympathy. The majority seem to think that the involuntary processes are more closely connected with the sense of obligation, and therefore with

as a moral being, a conscience . . . which does, in all circumstances hold before him his law of duty in order to absolve or condemn him."—XII., B, of the *Metaphysics of Ethics*; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), translated by J. W. Semple. William Jevons, Jr. (1794–1873) in Book I., Chapter I., of his *Systematic Morality* says that Samuel Clarke, Richard Price, James Beattie, and Dugald Stewart ascribe the origin of Moral Sentiments to "the self-evident dictates of untaught reason."

<sup>8</sup> Conscience ascribed to the intuitive action of the reasoning faculties as influenced by emotion,—the theory usually termed that of *emotional intuition*: "A natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent on them, or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not to be referred to any other quality perceivable by our sense or by reasoning."—*System of Moral Philosophy*, Volume I., Book I., Chapter IV.; F. Hutcheson (1694–1747). "To have the reflection in his mind of any unjust action or behavior which he knows to be naturally odious or ill deserving is conscience."—*Inquiry* (Part II., Section I; Lord Shaftesbury (1671–1713). "Conscience is a mental exercise by which we feel certain actions to be right, and certain wrong." He speaks also of "high consistency of character . . . leading a man . . . to feel his way through these requirements, and to recognize the supreme authority of conscience over his whole moral system."—*The Philosophy of Moral Feeling*, Part III.; Professor John Abercrombie (1780–1844), Glasgow University. "Conscience, a 'feeling of approval.'"—*LXXII. Lectures on Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Professor Thomas Brown (1778–1820), Edinburgh University.

<sup>9</sup> Conscience ascribed to the intuitive action of the reasoning faculties as influenced by perception, as of circumstances or occasions,—the theory usually termed that of perceptual intuition: "Conscience is the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of action. . . . Conscience feels a difference of worth, between one propensity and another."—*Types of Ethical Theory*, Book I., Chapter I.; Dr. James Martineau (1805–1900). "The mind discriminates between acts as right or wrong in very much the same way as that in which it discriminates between objects as black or white, by immediate and what may not unfitly be termed intuitive perception."—*Fourth Lecture on Moral Philosophy*, Prof. S. P. Peabody (1811–1893), Harvard University.

<sup>10</sup> Conscience ascribed to instinct,—a feeling in which the psychical tendency, emerging, as it were, from the physical, begins to influence the trend though not yet the conscious processes of thinking or reasoning: "To do right is to act in accordance with instinct which prompts us

conscience, than are the deductive processes, all of which appear to them to have more to do with the end toward which obligation prompts than with its source. In the same person, however, as we shall find presently, the two—the end and the source—are usually essentially similar, so far as concerns their rational or emotional quality. Rational intuition, for instance, as applied to the source of obligation is associated in the mind of Kant (see page 80)

to do in accordance with nature. . . . All that which I feel to be good is good. All that which I feel to be wrong is wrong. The best of all casuists is conscience."—*Ethics of Nature or Custom*; Works of J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778), Vol. IV., page 58; edited by V. D. Musset-Pathay. "The essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings."—*Data of Ethics*, Chapter VII., Section 44; *Herbert Spencer* (1830-1903).

<sup>11</sup> Conscience ascribed to conceptions and habits acquired as the result of the influence upon experience of the feelings of pleasure and pain: "Nature has placed mankind under the guidance of two sovereign masters; Pain and Pleasure. It is for them to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."—*Dentology*, Vol. I., page 137; *Jeremy Bentham* (1748-1838).

<sup>12</sup> Conscience ascribed to both reason and feeling: "We consider our acts external and internal, with reference to a moral standard of right and wrong. We recognize them as virtuous or vicious. The faculty or habit of doing this is conscience . . . it is established by such a culture of our reason as enables us to frame or to accept rules which are in agreement with the supreme law and by the agreement of our moral sentiments with such rules."—Volume I., Chapter XIV., *Elements of Morality*; *Professor William Whewell* (1794-1866), Cambridge University. "Conscience denotes all that intelligence and feeling of which a man is conscious in an act of duty."—*Science of Duty*, Chapter II.; *Professor H. N. Day* (1808-1890), Yale University. "Conscience is the intuitive faculty of moral judgment with the characteristic feeling that accompanies its exercise"—*Elements of Ethics*, Book II., Chapter II.; *Professor J. H. Muirhead* (1855- ), University of Birmingham. See also Book I., Chapter V., Sec. 5. of *The Theory of Good and Evil*; *Dr. Hastings Rashdall* (1858- ), Canon of Hereford.

<sup>13</sup> Conscience ascribed mainly to practical questions involving action: "The proper function of conscience is not to discern the difference between right and wrong in the abstract, but to apply the abstract law of right to concrete cases, and to discern what it demands in the varying exigencies of daily life."—*An Introduction to Ethics*; *Professor J. C. Murray* (1836-1917), McGill University. "Conscience is that act of the mind by which we apply to a particular case . . . the general rules prescribed by moral law," Chapter I., Section 10, *Elements of Morals*; *Professor Paul Janet* (1823-1899) of the Sorbonne, translated by C. R. Corson.

with the conception of a reasonable end that is rationally chosen for attainment, and emotional intuition in the mind of Shaftesbury (see page 91) with the conception of an emotional end—that of benevolence. So in the cases of all men, the source and end are so generally connected in kind that in what is to be said hereafter it will not always be thought necessary, even if it were feasible, to mention the views of individual writers with reference to both.

There is also a difference to which the attention of the

<sup>14</sup> Conscience as the Voice of God in the soul: "Conscience must be regarded as a subjective principle implanted in the reason of man, calling for an account of every action before God."—Apotome, Chapter III., Section 13 of *Elementology of Ethics*; Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), translated by J. W. Semple. "The secret presentment that one is not really separated from the one Will-to-Live contains the secret of conscience."—*The World as Will and Idea*, Section 65; Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1850). "Conscience is the representation of the supreme personality."—*The Principles and Practices of Morality*. Division IV., Chapter III.; Pres. E. G. Robinson (1815-1894) of Brown University. "Conscience implies a personal moral governor. . . . It is the voice of a personal law-giver."—*The Beginnings of Ethics*, Chapter XI., Section 106; President Carroll Cutler (1829-1894) of Western Reserve College. "The faculty of conscience in man postulates the existence of God as the necessary ground of its moral affirmations."—*Institutes of Moral Philosophy*, Chapter V.; Dr. L. B. Tefft (1833- ).

<sup>15</sup> In different ways the authors of the following approximate the conception presented in this volume, to the effect that conscience is the consciousness of conflict between desires of the body and of the mind. "The rational will governed by an ideal subjects the lower forms of will, impulse, and desire which persist in man as natural (physical) predispositions to constant criticism and a process of selection. This criticism we term conscience."—*A System of Ethics*; Introduction to Book II., Professor Frederick Paulsen (1846-1908) translated by F. Thilly. "This feeling of the ought (conflict) is not to be identified with any other content of human consciousness. . . . The feeling is primary, essential, unique; the judgments as to what one ought to do are the results of environment, education, and reflection."—*Philosophy of Conduct*, Chapter V.; Professor G. T. Ladd (1842- ) Yale University. "Conscience, that (mental) ideal of life which constitutes your moral personality." "The ideal that makes me this rational self, the very ideal that makes and inspires me."—*Philosophy of Loyalty*, Chapter IV., by Professor Josiah Royce (1855-1917), Harvard University. "Conscience is not a purely subjective principle possessed by man in his individuality, nor a wholly objective one that belongs to the race. . . . Conscience is a sentiment which arises when the individual whose (mental) humanity should lead him to rise above the natural (physical) order somehow turns against the world of humanity within him."—*The Value and Dignity of Human Life*, Part II., Chapter II., Section 3; Professor C. G. Shaw (1871- ), New York University.

reader should be called between an intuition <sup>7</sup>, <sup>8</sup>, <sup>9</sup>, and an instinct.<sup>10</sup> An intuition, whether started into activity by the rational or the emotional nature, is, in itself considered, a strictly rational and thinking, though at the same time, an instantaneous process, like the recognition that a whole is greater than any of its parts. In this way, Kant thought that a mind could instantly recognize, in certain cases, that a right act is better than a wrong act. But an instinct is supposed to guide an animal or a man not through thinking but in the place of thinking—by producing, as one might say, the effects of thinking and yet not revealing the underlying process or even the fact of thinking so as to make the agent of it conscious of it. The effect of instinct is experienced not in thinking but in feeling. As J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778) says in Vol. IV., page 58, of his *Works* edited by V. D. Musset-Pathay, "To do right is to act in accordance with instinct which prompts us to do in accordance with nature. . . . All that which I feel to be good is good. All that which I feel to be wrong is wrong." It is such a conception of the effect of instinct that causes Professor T. V. Moore (1877- ) of the American Catholic University to say in his *Historical Introduction to Ethics* that the ethics of the Greek Stoics was the ethics of instinct.

What is meant in this statement will be better understood when it is recalled that the ancients made no sharp distinction between instinct and intuition; and that this fact combined with their pantheistic conception of nature led them to assign to the prompting of either of the two, as well as to the rational results of this prompting, the authority of divinity. Cicero (106-43 B. C.), for instance, referring in Book I. of the *Tusculum Disputations* as translated by W. L. Collins, to the precept of Apollo as quoted by Socrates advising every one to "know himself" adds "To know the soul unless it had been divine would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a god." And Marcus Aurelius (120-180 A. D.) in Book IV., of his *Meditations* as translated by Jeremy Collier, speaks of a man of probity "keeping pure the divinity within him and obeying it as a god," and in Book III., "There is nothing more valuable than the divinity implanted within you, and this is master of appetites . . . has detached itself from the senses, as Socrates used to say, and shows itself submissive to the government of the gods, and helpful and benevolent

to mankind." These conceptions with reference to the divineness of the source of obligation, though not the pantheistic phase of them, were adopted later by the early Christian writers, and have continued to our own day (see footnote <sup>14</sup>); and in the form of the distinctions between the spiritual or mental and the material or the bodily indicated in the note beginning on page 54 have been essential constituents of a large number of the more important of recent ethical theories.

Now let us turn back for a little and notice the way in which other ethical questions were treated in the ancient theories. Here some of us may be surprised, at first, to find indicated still more plainly than in the case of conscience, that the conceptions of thinkers preceding the age of scientific investigation were practically the same as are those of men able to avail themselves of its most recent results. But, on second thought, we shall probably be reminded that this fact is not out of analogy with that which happens frequently. It is not unusual for scholarly and logical discussion to reach the same conclusions as those of a mind exercising only ordinary observation and common sense. There is an aspect, however, in which this fact does not disprove but rather serves to prove the wisdom of the scholarly and logical method. To be of practical value, truth should be made useful to all. But to become this, it should be made easy for all to recognize. Nor does the fact that nature fulfills the requirement in the case of any one truth, release the mind from the responsibility of expending thought upon it. A principle may seem very simple in its elementary stages and yet become very complex when traced, as must be done by philosophy, to that into which it develops.

An illustration of the parallelism of thought between ancient and modern writers upon ethics is afforded by an examination of the systems of the earliest of the Greek philosophers who based their ethical conceptions upon the testimony of one's own inward consciousness rather than upon what could be learned from customs and institutions which members of the community acting collectively had established.

As has been already intimated, these systems were suggested by the failure of institutionism to give full credit to the effect upon morals of individual initiative. There are

two sources of this initiative—one in the rational nature and the other in the emotional. It was natural, therefore, that each of these sources should have had its advocates. It would hardly be expected, however, that in Greece the earliest advocates of each should have been so contemporaneous that history now assigns the same date for the birth and death of both of them (450–370 B.C.). Of the two, Heracleitus attributed right conduct primarily to the guidance of reason, and Democritus to the guidance of sensation or feeling which, as he thought, was constantly teaching men what they should do or avoid doing by giving them experiences of pleasure or pain, a child, for instance, by receiving a kiss or candy when obedient, or a scratch or burn when teasing a cat or caressing a red-hot iron. Both theories, as most of us know, are still advocated to-day, sometimes as strenuously as if they had just been originated. Both, too, have much to commend them; yet both must be declared unsatisfactory when presented as if comprehensive of all the influences underlying right action. It is true that when a man's conduct is controlled by reason, it is not controlled by animal appetite; and, in this regard, is moral. But there are other constituents of morality which are results of the emotional nature. So with the theory that ascribes morality to the effects of experiencing pleasure and pain. It is a theory too limited in its applications to explain all that needs explaining. Yet it has been supposed to meet the demands not only of ethics but of æsthetics. Not merely the good and the wise but the beautiful and the artistic have each been supposed to be determined by the degree in which it fulfills the requirements of pleasure.<sup>16</sup> Many recent books unfolding this conception have been warmly welcomed as valuable contributions to modern scientific thought. Yet the very name now given to the theory, namely hedonism, from the Greek word ἡδονή meaning pleasure, reveals its antiquity; and a very little study of the motives actuating men ought to show one why it has never been universally accep-

<sup>16</sup>Wundt, *Physiologische Psychologie*, 4th edition; Ward, art. *Psychology* in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th edition; Lotze, *Outlines of Æsthetics*; Marshall, arts. on "The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered" in *Mind*, 1892; Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, Volume II., chapters on "Pleasure and Pain" and "Emotions of Relation." This author, however, in his fuller treatises, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* and *Genetic Logic*, Vol. III., *Interest and Art*, subordinates the hedonic to the ideal.

ted. Many people cannot avoid the conviction that, from its very beginning, morality is due, to some extent at least, to that which originates in the individual reason, or, in other words, in the mental nature. Pleasure and pain in the sense, too, in which they are used in the hedonic theory, are bodily. How can they alone, unless some influence from the mental nature coöperate at least with them, enable the latter to hold the bodily in subordination? Yet this is the condition, as large numbers believe, necessary to morality. When we get to the foundation of hedonism, we find its deficiency based, as is the case with many other theories, upon a supposed but not proved organic connection between the bodily and the mental. It is true that what brings pleasure will cause beauty so far as by beauty is meant that which harmonizes with the requirements of the bodily organs affected by melody, as in hearing, or by outline and color, as in seeing; and will cause right so far as by right is meant that which will secure the comfort and safety of the physical body. But beauty involves more than this, and so does right. Beauty must embody an ideal; and, although this may harmonize, and, in the highest art, must harmonize with the highest pleasure, it is not itself a direct result of aiming for pleasure, and for this alone. No one could realize his highest æsthetic ideal while seeking merely for his own or another's pleasure and for nothing else. So with the right. It must conform to obligation; and although the performance of this may and must harmonize with the highest pleasure, it is not itself the direct result of seeking for pleasure. No one would look merely in the direction of this, in order to find the pathway of duty. One often finds the latter in self-denial and self-sacrifice; in the most repulsive form of work and the most terrifying form of war. Even when this is not the case, even when what he does brings him pleasure, this fact affords no proof that pleasure is that for which he was aiming. Pleasure is a subjective result, a result experienced only within oneself; and we never can, nor do aim for a subjective result directly. We aim for it indirectly through some objective or external instrumentality which we suppose or hope that the subjective result will necessarily accompany. We may aim, for instance, for wealth, influence, or fame, because we suppose that it will be accompanied by pleasure. But if we do so, we shall soon find that the thing for which we are

aiming directly is that which is really absorbing our interest; that it is this for which we are really working, and frequently would continue to work, even though we knew that to obtain it would cause us more pain than pleasure.

Considerations, more or less like these, could not fail to appeal to some of the philosophers who followed Heracleitus or Democritus. They usually discussed the theories of both, siding with one or the other, and endeavoring, if possible, to find a more fundamental principle inclusive of the truth in each. For instance Plato (430-350 B.C.) makes Socrates (468-399 B.C.) whose teaching he represented, say, in Sec. 141 of the *Philebus*, "that the good and pleasant partake of a different nature, and that intellect (*i. e.*, the mental) partakes of a share of good more than pleasure does." On the other hand, Aristotle (384-332 B.C.) in Chapter X. of his *Ethics* says that, "pleasure is not *per se*, an evil, because the grounds on which it may be considered to be so, belong to those only of a grosser corporeal (or bodily) kind and not to the purer enjoyments of the ruling part of man's nature, the intellect" (*i. e.*, the mental). So, Plato could argue that the source of virtue is in thoughts or ideas, whether exercised intuitively or reflectively; and Aristotle could argue that the source is in feelings as of pleasure or of pain, whether experienced in sensation or in psychologic activities occasioned by them.

The chief contribution to Ethics, however, on the part of these three greatest of the Greek philosophers was the test which they began to apply, and which in no age since their time has ceased to be applied by some, in order to determine the right or wrong of an action. In Book III., 8, of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, as translated by J. S. Watson, we find Socrates declaring that "a thing is good or beautiful when it fulfills its purpose or function." This conception is repeated frequently in the writings of all three of these men, for which reason they are sometimes classed as the *functional* philosophers. In connection with this they may be said to have introduced into ethics the principle that underlies the modern teleological and utilitarian methods (see page 97),—the methods of determining the morality of an action by the right or useful end for which it is aimed. These are important methods, very often the only rational ones that could be chosen through which to fulfill a sense of obligation. But it is well to bear in mind that



they cannot, of themselves, create this sense. The Greeks, as we have noticed, recognized this fact in the use of the term *conscience*. So do the ordinary people of our own times. But some of our philosophers apparently do not, because unable to explain what conscience is when acting as it does. They seem, unconsciously to themselves, to desire to attribute it to some other department of the mind . the operations of which they can explain. At any rate, for some reason, they have discussed much more fully the end of obligation than its source; and very seldom recognize how closely the two are connected.

With reference to the general character of the end that should be sought when fulfilling the requirements of morality Aristotle, through sharing in the functional conception of Socrates and Plato, differed from them. The reason for this difference is indicated in the passage from his *Ethics* just quoted. Aristotle, however, did not accept hedonism. In Book X., Section 7 of the same work he drew a distinction between that which is indicated by the word *ἡδονή* and the word *εὐδαιμονία* meaning, as variously interpreted, welfare, prosperity, or blessedness. The theory of those agreeing with this general conclusion is termed *eudaimonism*. Some of the modern advocates of this theory are mentioned on page 93.

Both before and after the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, we find many who accepted only the rational theory previously taught by Heracleitus or the hedonic theory taught by Democritus. Among the followers of the former we find those of the Cynic School of Antisthenes (444-371 B.C.) and Diogenes (342-270 B.C.) who, to exalt the influence of the reason became ascetic, rejecting all forms of pleasure; and those of the Stoic School founded by Zeno (342-270 B.C.) and ably continued by Chrysippus (about 206 B.C.) The adherents of this school were enjoined not to pursue pleasure nor avoid pain, but, in all circumstances, to be rational and dutiful, and indifferent to personal consideration in the way either of indulgence for self or sympathy for others. Through organizing societies and sending lecturers into all the important towns and cities of Greece and Rome, the Stoics propagated belief in their form of morality on a scale comparable to that of the missionary work of our modern churches.

One reason for this we may surmise when we are made to

apprehend the motives to which they appealed. "To live according to nature," says Cyrus R. Edmonds in a note to his translation of the first of the *Paradoxes* of Cicero (106-43 B.C.), "was the basis of their ethical system; but by this it was not meant that a man should follow his own particular nature; he must make his life conformable to the nature of the whole of things. . . . To know what is our relation to the whole of things, is to know what we ought to be and do." As the Roman Stoic Marcus Aurelius (121-180 A.D.), in Book III. of his *Meditations*, as translated by Jeremy Collier, says, "Let your soul work in harmony with the universal intelligence, as your breath does with the air," and again in Book X., "Rational nature admits of nothing but what is serviceable to the rest of mankind." Notice how similar this is to the ground taken by T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena of Ethics*, as quoted on page 99.

Emphasizing, on the other hand, the influence of what can be learned of right conduct from pleasure and pain, contemporaneous with Democritus, were (450-400 B.C.), the Sophists, Protagoras, and Gorgias; then, the Cyrenaic School of Aristippus (455-356 B.C.); and, later, the School of Epicurus (341-270 B.C.). All of these ascribed the good to that which brings personal pleasure rather than pain, not necessarily through gratifying the appetites but through conduct which, all things considered, can bring one the greatest happiness. There was truth in this theory that needed to be emphasized; but the overemphasis given to it led at times to false views and unsatisfactory results.

The Stoic philosophy, making much as it did of abstinence, rationality, and obedience to duty, seems to have been particularly fitted to be accepted by the Roman mind. It was taught by Cicero (106-43 B.C.), but its most strenuous advocates were Seneca (3 B.C.-65 A.D.), Epictetus (about 45-103 A.D.), and Marcus Aurelius (120-180 A.D.). Very naturally, perhaps, too, in reaction against Stoicism, large numbers of the Romans also turned to Epicureanism, and to this in its very worst form, a form suggested by the atomistic theory of the world's origin propounded by Democritus. This, especially as elaborated by the Latin poet Lucretius (94-55 B.C.) in his very widely read poem *De Rerum Natura*, seemed to dispose effectually of any necessity for gods or their superintendence over human affairs, and to allow men to live without fear according to the precept,

"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," (I Cor. 15:32). Several years later Plutarch (about 48-120 A.D.), Plotinus (205-270 A.D.), and Porphyry (about 233-306), none of whom were Christians, developed in succession different stages of what seems to have been a combination of the emphasis given to rational influence by the Stoics and to emotional influence given by the Epicureans. Plutarch directed attention to the struggles experienced in the soul between good and evil; Plotinus, in his neo-Platonism, added to the ideal conceived by Plato the conception of transcending all thoughts through emotion and indulging in what he termed divine ecstasy; and Porphyry added to this conception the ascetic theory that to attain the desired end all the bodily appetites should be suppressed.

The earliest ethical theories of Christianity, as indicated in the writings of Augustine (354-430) and Ambrose (about 340-397), seem to have included conceptions derived from a consideration both of reason and of emotion, at the same time ascribing, at least, co-ordinate authority to the statements of the Scriptures and the requirements of the Church. After a time, these latter came to be more strongly emphasized. The theory of institutionism which in Greece and Rome when these were republics had exerted little influence came to be almost universally accepted, and for a thousand years the moral principles of the majority of the people of Europe came to be those that were traceable to what may be termed ecclesiastical institutionism. Anselm (1033-1109) emphasized the same; but also the effects on the individual of divine grace; Abelard (1079-1142) maintained the need of good intention and disinterestedness; and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) the importance of seeking an end insuring happiness or blessedness which, following Aristotle, in Book X., Chapter VII., of his *Ethics*, he distinguished from pleasure, dwelling too upon the dignity of human nature and the rational order in the universe; while Duns Scotus (1266-1308) associated right conduct with reasonableness which, in a free being, would conform, as he said, to the will of a reasonable God. According to W. E. H. Lecky (1838-1903) in Chapter I., page 17, of his *History of European Morals*, Duns Scotus and William Occam, his immediate successor, held that we have no innate knowledge of right and wrong, but that God reveals it to us in the Scriptures.

Added to the institutionists who emphasized a rational end in morality, there were always living those inclined to mysticism. This was primarily emotional, and often also ascetic. It seems to have been introduced into Christianity by Johannes Scotus Erigena (about 810-877) through the influence of the Neo-Platonism of Porphyry, and was subsequently developed by Hugo of St. Victor (1077-1141), Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), Bonaventura (1221-1274), Eckhart (about 1260-1327), and Tauler (1301-1361). These mystics all believed in a state of ecstasy where one could, spiritually, commune with God. Unfortunately many thought this the only requirement of morality; in looking inward and upward, they sometimes forgot to look outward and downward, their fellow creatures about and below them receiving little or no attention. Their morality, unconsciously to themselves, expressed itself in gratifying personal exhilaration. This, however, was not true of all of them. Many were illogical enough to live for other ends than the only one that they emphasized; and all of them, by giving consideration to emotion, even though, at times, too exclusively, prepared the world, when the occasion came, to recognize the claims of sympathy and humanity as could not have been the case had not these mystics accustomed large numbers to discredit theories and dogmas originated exclusively for and in the intellect.

## CHAPTER VI

### MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES: INSTITUTIONISM, EMPIRICISM, AND RATIONAL, EMOTIVE, AND PERCEPTIVE INTUITIONISM

Lord Bacon's Inductive Philosophy—Institutionism of Hobbes—Empiricism of Locke and his Followers—Rational and Innate Recognition of Right and Wrong—Critical Philosophy of Kant—His Distinction between the Noumenal and the Phenomenal—Distinction between Kant's Intuitive Theory and the Innate Theory of the English Rational School—Connection between the View of Kant and that of Leibnitz and Schopenhauer—Interchange of Effects between Mind and Matter—Practical Recognition of this Fact by People who are not Philosophers, and its Results—Connection between the Theories of Kant and the Idealism of Hegel—Connection between Kant's Theories and the Demands of Practical Morality—Connection between Hegel's Idealism and the Expression of the Ideal of Individuals—Outward Government Control Substituted by Hegel for Inward Self-control—Nietzsche's Emphasis upon Forceful Control, and its Effects upon Public Morals—Institutionism Cannot Meet all the Requirements of Morality—Partial Acceptance by Modern Writers of Institutional Principles—Influence of Kant upon Later Rational Intuitionism—The Voice of God in Man—Moral-sense or Emotional Intuitionism of Shaftesbury—Perceptual Intuitionism of Butler—Influence on Modern Thought of Shaftesbury and Butler.

MANY of the tenets of mysticism were traceable to imagination or sentiment rather than to any well reasoned out or even intelligent motive. A reaction against them was sure to come. It appeared at the opening of the period that we may assign to the modern writers upon ethics; and the first noteworthy name that we find here is that of Lord Francis Bacon (1561-1626), author of the *Novum Organum*. He is credited with being the earliest to insist upon the necessity, in all successful philosophic work, of what is termed the inductive method,—a method in accordance with which the mind refuses to accept information or conclusions with reference to facts or con-

ditions until after a thorough examination by oneself has confirmed their credibility. Ethics was a subject that, for centuries, Christian writers had treated as a department of religion; and religion they had based not upon induction but upon revelation. Bacon, however, did not hesitate to apply his theory even to this subject. His chief propositions with reference to it were that what is good is to be judged by its utility; that what is right is to be judged by its being beneficial; and that what is beneficial for society is to be judged by what is beneficial for the individual.

The fundamental principle underlying Bacon's method has been accepted by most writers upon ethics as, indeed, upon all phases of philosophy ever since his time.

Apparently, an almost immediate effect was produced upon Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) of Holland, who, in his great work on national and international law, entitled *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, revised, with new applications, the conception of the ancient Stoics attributing morality to that which is prompted and developed by nature. Very nearly associated with this conception is one attributing the same to laws and customs naturally made by men and applied to one another; and, just as we found this phase of the conception to be among the earliest to appear in China and Greece, so we find it among the earliest to appear in England. Bacon himself had emphasized individualism. Nevertheless, there is a connection between what can be learned from a rational consideration of individual experience and what can be learned from that which men have formulated in the regulations which in state and society they have made for the guidance of their fellows. This connection was recognized by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), author of *Human Nature*, *De Corpore Politico*, and *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*. He traced the authority of moral obligation to the enactments not of ecclesiastical law as did the medieval church, but of civil law. He did so on the ground that this law is devised to promote—and he seemed to suggest that it need not be followed unless it does promote—one's own personal welfare.

The theory in accordance with which the mind is supposed to derive its conceptions, or contents, as one might say, from its experience of conditions in the material world surrounding it—a theory for these reasons termed, vari-

ously, *experimentalism*, *materialism*, *empiricism*, from a Greek word meaning a result of experience, and *sensationalism*, meaning a result derived through the testimony of the senses—this theory, which both Bacon and Hobbes had accepted, was greatly reinforced shortly after by the *Essay on the Human Understanding* of John Locke (1632-1704), as well as by the works of his chief followers,—David Hartley (1705-1757), author of *Observations on Man* and *The Mechanism of the Human Mind*; and Joseph Priestley (1753-1804), author of *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, *Disquisitions Relative to Matter and Spirit*, and *the Doctrine of Philosophic Necessity Explained*. In connection with an acceptance of the "moral sense" theory (see page 91) which these writers did not hold, certain materialistic tendencies of empiricism were extended by David Hume (1711-1776) in his *Treatise on Human Nature* into a system of skepticism, as it was termed, causing him to affirm that the mind can not logically accept upon testimony any statement with reference to an occurrence—like a miracle, for instance—of a kind of which it has not had personal experience.

Meantime, in England, just as in Greece (see page 69) philosophers arose who could not accept the theory that the mind is dependent for its conceptions, especially those concerning right and wrong, upon what can be learned from the material world outside itself. These writers went to the opposite extreme. They maintained that, far from being derived from experience, the apprehension of right and wrong is an innate function of reason. They seem to have held the same sort of belief in conscience, together with its representation of the authority of divinity, as had been the case with some of the Greeks and with most, perhaps, of the early Christians. On the continent, this belief had seldom been seriously disputed. Philosophers like Descartes (1596-1650) in his *Meditations* and Spinoza (1632-1677) in his *Ethica* had differed from others mainly in showing a tendency to confine the work of conscience to the punishing of those who had already transgressed. As will be shown on page 114, this was in accordance with a very important truth; but the subject needed further analysis. Some of the very titles of the books written to confute the early English empiricism indicate the general trend of the arguments presented in them. Ralph Cudworth (1638-1715) wrote on *The Eternal and Immutable Morality*;

Thomas Tennyson (1636-1715) on *The Creed of Hobbes Examined*; Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) on *The Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion*; William Wollaston (1660-1724) on *The Religion of Nature Delineated*, treating the subject very much as did the Stoics (pages 68 and 74); Richard Price (1723-1791) on *A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals*; and Professor Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), apparently the last of those not influenced by Kant, on *The Outlines of Moral Philosophy*.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) began his philosophic inquiries by recognizing that there must be some truth in both the innate conception of the source of obligation and the empirical; and he believed that the tendencies to skepticism in the latter could be remedied by accepting the truth that is in the former. In order to determine what this truth is in each case he began, very rightly, by examining the veracity of the testimony furnished by each. In doing this, however, his interest in philosophic analysis seems to have carried him too far. Instead of contenting himself with the easily demonstrated fact that both inward consciousness and outward experience must be treated as if contributing something to the general ethical result, he attempted to investigate and discover the sources and methods underlying the contributions of each. This attempt of his explains the use of the term *Critique* in the titles of his three principal philosophic works,—*The Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *The Critique of Judgment*. The first of these books treats of the relation to mental and moral philosophy of that which, in most regards, corresponds to what in this essay has been termed the mental, but which he terms *noumenal* (from the Greek word νοῦς, meaning mind) the essentially *rational* by which he designates that which pertains to *pure reason*, or, as distinguished from the *apparent*, the *actual*, or, as the Germans express it, the *thing in itself*. The second book treats of the relation to philosophy of that which corresponds in general to what has here been termed the bodily, but which he terms the *phenomenal*, the *apparent*, and means by this to indicate the essentially *physical* or *material*.

In the first of these volumes, he endeavored, from a purely rational viewpoint, to unfold, among other things, the ethical truth with reference to right and wrong, including conceptions of God, of the soul and its continued exist-



ence. According to him, intuitions of reason direct all men toward the same decisions, and, therefore, indicate to them, and can be taken by them to indicate, that which is considered right by all their fellows. This conception he expressed in language which has had not a little influence toward causing a very wide acceptance of his whole ethical system. His language was that every man should act so that the "maxim of his will" can always hold good as "a principle of universal legislation." Unfortunately, however, Kant himself introduced an element of doubt into the trustworthiness of this rule of life by arguing elsewhere that all conceptions derived from the noumenal can be considered true only subjectively, as a matter of speculation in the realm of ideas; that we can have no objective certainty of any truth not obtained, or at least confirmed, phenomenally, through the senses, as a matter of observation. It is through an application of these theories that he endeavored to bring into his philosophic system that which should pay due regard to the truth emphasized in the innate theory of the source of obligation, on the one hand, and in the empirical theory, on the other.

The difference between the conceptions of Kant and those of the English rational or, as sometimes termed, Cambridge school just mentioned is much greater than on first thought, might be supposed. The "rational intuitionism," as it is called, of Kant, with its "categorical imperative" enjoining duty—because, apparently, of the distinction that he drew between pure reason and reason as influenced by practical considerations—assigned morality to the motive as distinguished from the methods or effects of action. The English rational school associated what it considered the innate recognition of right with every phase of conduct, just as closely as one ordinarily associates instinct with every movement of an animal and intuition with every act of mind. For instance, President Noah Porter (1811-1892) of Yale University, whose general views might be associated with those of intuitionism, in Chapter VIII. of his *Elements of Moral Science*, declared, in exact opposition to Kant, that "moral qualities and relations are limited to the person, and his personal vocations, and cannot be affirmed of his motives or reasons."

The conception that noumenal and phenomenal thinking may be non-coöperative apparently came to Kant while con-

sidering the same general subject that Leibnitz had endeavored to clarify through his theory with reference to "pre-established harmony" (see page 32). It is strange that neither of these philosophers should have recognized—what has been maintained throughout this essay, and what no thorough student of æsthetics can fail to recognize—that there is one place in which that which pertains to the noumenal, or, as one might say, the mental or spiritual and that which pertains to the phenomenal, or, as one might say, the bodily or material can be brought into touch with each other so as to act conjointly. This place is in the conscious intelligence either of the Creative Source of all life which originally brought them together, or of the created mind exercising a derived function producing an analogous effect. This is a view that seems to have suggested itself to Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) author of *The World as Will and Idea*. In a criticism of Kant's philosophy in the second volume of that work, as translated by R. D. Haldane, he points out that "a perception is a mere sensation, and only by an application of the understanding does our intellect change this mere sensation into an idea."

The truth seems to be that, in this case, we are dealing with effects in which it is impossible for consciousness to separate the bodily, especially as manifested in instinct, from the mental, especially as manifested in intuition. The only indisputable inference to be drawn from the effect upon each other of the bodily and the mental when acting together seems to be an application of the general principle of correspondence first clearly brought out in the philosophy of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) and best explained in his *Divine Love and Divine Wisdom*. His conception—to illustrate it in a manner conformable to our present purpose—seems to have been that there is a correspondence readily recognized by consciousness between, say, an external and physical movement like the pointing of a finger and an internal and a psychical conception like that of particularizing or discriminating; or, again, between a falling inflection of voice produced by the bodily organism and a decisive, conclusive mental intention. This correspondence, which is often perceived and put into use by children too young to understand explanations, is at the base of all language, either of gesture or voice; in fact of every form of art, or of any kind of human expression or communi-

cation. It is the result of an imaginative or image-making principle in accordance with which innumerable outward effects presented to eye or ear and inward effects presented to the mind are brought together in consciousness in such ways as to appear practically identical,—the one contributing the form or symbol, and the other the matter or substance of the thought. The application of the principle might, indeed, be said to be a foremost way in which human beings can manifest the creative trait of the divine source of all life from which they are derived. To recognize in practice, and to use as a constant habit, this principle of correspondence, is so natural to human nature that it may be considered essential to a possession of it. One is no more necessitated to separate in consciousness the psychical or internal—the noumenal, as Kant would term it—from the physical, the external, or the phenomenal, than to separate soul from body.

That this is so seems not to have been recognized by Kant; but it is practically recognized by the vast majority of people who are not philosophers. They draw no distinction between theoretical and practical morality; between thinking right and acting right. They do not believe that a man in a church on Sunday can be theoretically or sentimentally all that he should be, and yet, during the rest of the week, be practically the business swindler that he should not be. They believe that one's inward sentiments, if they could be ascertained, would accord with the testimony of his outward conduct. Still more, when they come to think of it, do they believe that his desires must accord with this. Conduct, as we shall notice hereafter, is moral in the degree in which, when necessary, the mental tendency in it has subordinated the bodily tendency. But desires are the source of conduct. The same condition, therefore, must exist among them. In other words, it is among the desires that the contest between the bodily and the mental, in which the former is subordinated to the latter, must take place and be decided. This is a general fact which, without explaining it through the use of the same terms, is very commonly acknowledged. The religious sect of the Quakers, for instance, when they speak of being guided by their Inward Light mean being guided by higher desire; and by this, they frequently mean, too, desire when prompting them in a certain direction as a result of an inward victory over

lower desire when striving to incline them in another direction. Kant, however, though he did not, because he could not, deny this inward conflict, did not insist upon the necessity for it; and in the emphasis that he gave to the distinction between pure reason and practical reason he could not avoid the suggestion that it was a contest in which very frequently higher desire would not be especially blameworthy if it were not successful.

Two results, important for us to consider, seem to have followed upon the theories of Kant. G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), recognizing the importance of the noumenal in the sense of the spiritual, emphasized it still more than did his predecessor—so much so, in fact, that he reduced the phenomenal, the apparent, or the physical, to theoretic nonentity, resolving all existence into the development or materializing of ideas. Why, he seems to have asked, should it appear philosophical to adjust the operation of pure reason to that of practical reason; why should we not suppose that everything ought to be, in the last analysis, a method of giving expression to pure or absolute reason,—to ideas? This conception led to the formulation of the philosophical system termed German idealism.

The other result of Kant's philosophy was more strictly ethical. It was a supposed justifiable separation of speculative from practical morality, as in the case, just mentioned, of a merchant apparently thinking in accordance with the principles of right when at church on Sunday, but acting in an opposite way when in his shop during the other days of the week; or—as illustrated in the late war—of a military officer being honorable, truthful, and humane when stationed in a village of his own country, but exactly the opposite when stationed in a village of an enemy's country. To think that different circumstances, as in these instances, can alter the morality of an act is perfectly logical in case it is held that, in order to meet the emergencies of experience, a moral decision can be changed after it leaves the mind; but it is illogical in case it is recognized that questions in dispute between lower and higher desire ought to be settled before they leave the mind. It is one thing to determine within oneself the right principle upon which one shall act, leaving open to be decided subsequently merely the methods through which to apply the principle; and another thing to delay the choice of a principle to a time when circumstances can

prove which of several principles promises to be the most expedient. Kant himself would have recognized this difference, but too many of those influenced by his philosophy failed to do so. They believed, or thought that they believed, in pure reason, and the categorical imperative; but many of them drew no distinction between the feeling of instinct and the judgment of intuition; and even when they did, they failed to recognize that nothing in either can indicate moral efficiency except as it is a result of mental desire that already within the mind has subordinated bodily desire to its own expressional purposes. The *innere Stimme*, or the "inward voice," of which we hear so much in literature traceable to German influence from the time of Goethe to that of Ibsen, is frequently a conception consistent with a thorough lack of recognition of the necessity or importance of any such inward subordination. This *innere Stimme*, traceable often to what is acknowledged to be impractical, may refer to instinctive or intuitive promptings that are either high-minded and wise, or are inexcusably whimsical and passionate.<sup>17</sup> This fact explains why so many German novels and plays inculcate lessons directed chiefly toward inducing people to quit or smash whatever is unpleasant or distasteful, especially in one's domestic surroundings, rather than first to attempt that change in one's own spirit which actual life usually proves to be the most feasible as well as the most modest and kindly. At any rate, whatever may be the result of this attempt, it is only when one is prepared to meet the conditions of the world in a right spirit that he can expect them to appeal to him as in themselves right.

Now let us return to Hegel. As has been said, he exalted the noumenal in the sense of the mental, the spiritual, and the ideal still more than did Kant, resolving all things into the development or materializing of ideas. The necessary

<sup>17</sup> Notice the following confirmation of this statement written by a German. Professor Kuno Francke of Harvard University in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, for October, 1914, said: "In contradiction to this fundamental American trait of self-possession I designate the passion for self-surrender as perhaps the most significant expression of national German character. . . . He loves to surrender to feelings, to hysterias of all sorts; he loves to merge himself in vague and formless imaginings, in extravagant and reckless experience, in what he likes to call living himself out. . . . No one is more prone to forget his better self in this so-called living himself out than the German."

inference was that it becomes every person to give expression to his own ideas, and to his own *innere Stimme* "inner voice." But different persons have different ideas. There must be something to limit different methods of expressing these, or there will be no peace in the world. The sect of Quakers, who were mentioned a moment ago, and those like them, would say that this peace could and should be preserved by doing everything possible to cause each individual to recognize in his own consciousness the presence of both bodily and mental desire, and to be careful to make all outward expression conform to the dominance of the latter. In other words, these people would say that the true method in which to control the world in such a way as to secure peace among men is to train each one to exercise self-control and to do this by keeping the mental, which is always non-selfish as well as rational, uppermost.

But Hegel did not think this. He seems to have been so influenced by Kant's theory as to conceive that nothing could keep the peace of humanity except force, exerted from the outside. "As for the ethical," he says, in Part III., Sec. 156, of his *Philosophy of the Right*, as translated by S. W. Dyde, "there are only two possible views. Either we start from the substantial social system, or we proceed atomically and work up from a basis of individuality. This latter method is void . . . since mind is not something individual, but the unity of individual and universal,"—a statement showing his recognition of the non-selfish origin of that which influences the mental or rational nature (see page 20). But Hegel's method of using this recognition caused him to identify all moral obligations with those prescribed in the family, society, and state. The latter, he says, in Sec. 258, "is the march of God in the world, its ground or cause is the power of reason realizing itself in will." Man is to "do nothing except what is presented, expressed, and recognized in his established relations." Thus the same thinker who in his mental philosophy represented an extreme form of idealism represented in his moral philosophy an equally extreme form of materialism, indisputably associated with institutionism and militarism, in this way making more plausible the theoretic separation between the speculative and the practical that was suggested by Kant.

After the time of Hegel, the most important of the German contributions to ethics seems to have been made

by Professor Wilhelm Max Wundt (1832- ) of Leipsic University. He was the first in that country, in fact in any country, to attempt, in accordance with the laboratory methods of physiological psychology, an application to all philosophic problems of the theory of evolution. However, his insistence upon the ethnic origin of moral principles, especially developed in connection with the customs of society, did not necessitate any fundamental change in the theories of those who had accepted the narrower conceptions of Hegel, attributing such principles to the influence of the state. Following Wundt, came writers of a more individualistic tendency, especially Frederick Paulsen (1846-1908) of the University of Berlin and Rudolph Eucken (1846- ) of the University of Jena. Quotations from the *System of Ethics* by the former and from *Ethics and Modern Thought* by the latter will be found in other places in this volume. The influence of those writers, however, upon the popular thought of their country seems to have been very slight compared to that of Frederick Nietzsche (1844-1900). This man was an eccentric, and, occasionally brilliant, essayist who, in books like those termed *Will to Power*, *Twilight*, *Ecce Homo*, and *Dawn of Day*, gave expression, but always in an incomplete, unsystematic way, to philosophical conceptions. Apparently he was an opponent of Hegel; but, in some regards, seems to have been his logical successor. In a world where right is determined by the state, Nietzsche pointed out that the agency needed in order to promote the influence of right is force; and, added to this, he said that those who embody and exhibit force thereby make themselves supermen; also that their standards are, and should be, different from those of other people who, as contrasted with them, are slaves; that as slaves, it is well enough for them to practice obedience, humility, gentleness, consideration, humaneness, and other feminine traits; but that from obligation to manifest these, the superman is absolved. It was asserted, too, that there were races of supermen; and that of these, the German race stood foremost. To manifest force by being dictatorial in family, school, and business; by maintaining universal military discipline in his own country; and by destroying, in strange contrast to the racial "gemüthlichkeit" (geniality) in which he once justly prided himself, the peace of neigh-

boring countries,—this the German was taught to consider his duty and destiny. "To despoil your neighbors," Nietzsche said, "is to deprive them of the means of injuring you." "Love peace as a means to new wars, and the short peace better than the long." So contrary to all the primary promptings of rational and humane non-selfishness were such doctrines, and, as regards details of presentation, so inaccurate, preposterous, ill-balanced, illogical, and contradictory, that sensible people outside of Germany usually considered him insane, and this not only during the last years of his life, when it was necessary to keep him under surveillance, but during the whole of his literary career. Some of his countrymen, however, seem to have taken him seriously. The results, combined with the influences already mentioned, were appalling. Those in the country not intellectually convinced of the rightness of institutionism were, at least, silenced through the influence of public sentiment due often to surreptitious military suasion; and the whole world outside of Germany was led to think that, perhaps, her best contribution to human progress had been the proof afforded by her that the highest developments of education, learning, diligence, and efficiency, if not accompanied by ethical development based upon true principles, may fail to exert the kind of influence most essential to the betterment of individual character; and that even a state religious organization may be so dominated by false moral conceptions as to lessen greatly any general faith in the efficacy of the methods of influencing men, which it was the primary object of the founder of the religion to introduce into the world.

Of course, as has been said before, there is some truth in institutionism. Customs and laws are outward and formal expressions of the inward wishes of certain, at least, of those by whom one is surrounded; and to do that which these wish, when thus expressed, seems, at first thought, to be the same as to be influenced by mental non-selfish consideration for one's fellows. But it is not the same. When a man gives expression to his wishes through the agency of physical force, and expects others to conform to them because of his exertion of this force, he is using a form of influence that is not mental. The effect of national militarism, for instance, is distinctly different from that of individual altruism. This is the reason why institutionism



like socialism, which also advocates the exertion over men of moral control through external force organized by the state to do this work, is not sufficient to meet the requirements of morality (see pages 285-291). The control of a man by others outside of himself can never take the place of his own inward self-control.

Nevertheless this view of morality as due to social or institutional environment has been revived lately in France, mainly through the writings of two professors in the University of Paris,—Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by J. W. Swan; and Lucian Lévy-Bruhl (1857- ) in *Ethics and Moral Science*, translated by E. Lee. See footnotes <sup>3</sup> and <sup>4</sup>, page 63.

Of a less extreme form of this view in which obligation is attributed in merely a partial way to our relations to our fellows, we find many instances as in *The Elements of Moral Science* of President Francis Wayland (1776-1855). For reasons that will be stated in Chapter VII., there can be no objection to emphasizing this source of moral authority except when it is done in such a way as to exclude the consideration due to other sources of equal importance.

The influence of Kant in the direction either of extreme idealism or of institutionism was, apparently on his part, unintentional; but he was the source of other influences entirely different which he did intend. Any just estimate of his work must give him credit for these. His distinction, for instance, between the noumenal and the phenomenal, even to those who did not accept all his inferences, and notwithstanding his conception of rational intuition, had the result of ascribing right conduct more unmistakably than had yet been done to the action of the whole rational nature, rather than to mere innate action that possibly at least, as in instinct, might be supposed to operate independently of reasoning; and his emphasis of the authority of the categorical imperative furnished not only a phrase but a formulated thought that has seldom been absent from any ethical controversy since his time. Among modern writers who, without accepting his philosophy in full, seem to have been greatly influenced by these two features of it may be mentioned Prof. Paul Janet (1823-1899) of the Sorbonne, author of *The Elements of Morals*. Prof. Henry Calderwood (1830-1899) of Edinburgh University, author of a *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*; President L. P. Hickok (1798-

1888) of Union College, author of *A System of Moral Science*; Prof. Joseph Haven (1816-1874) of Amherst College, author of *Moral Philosophy*; Prof. N. K. Davis (1830-1910) of the University of Virginia, author of *The Elements of Ethics*; Prof. E. J. Hamilton (1834-1919) of the University of the State of Washington, author of *The Moral Law*; and President John Bascom (1827-1911) of the University of Wisconsin, author of *Ethics*.

Another conception made to appear philosophical through the advocacy of Kant is the associating of the promptings of conscience as the source of the right motives upon which he laid extreme stress, with the direct influence of divinity (see footnote <sup>14</sup>, on page 67). His view upon this subject was not unlike that of Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) who, in the third of his sermons on *Human Nature*, referred to conscience as "the voice of God in man." This expression is true enough, if those who hear it recognize that it is used in a symbolic or literary sense; but it is hardly susceptible of proof if accepted as a philosophic proposition, or safe for guidance if supposed to be a literal statement. If there be a Creator, He must have created conscience or, at least, the conditions that occasion its action, and have intended by it to indicate what a man should do. But neither experience nor argument can prove that this indication is of the nature of dictation such as is ordinarily associated with that which we hear through what we term the "voice." The effect of conscience is frequently more like that of suggestion which leaves the mind free to decide upon its own methods of action according to the promptings of its own judgment. There is danger that, if we tell people that conscience is the voice of God, some of them—as has been proved in the case of millions of fanatics—will begin to think it an infallible monitor which relieves them of the necessity of expending any further thought upon a subject; and any endeavor whatever to enlighten such people is apparently doomed to failure. Nevertheless many lines could be filled with quotations from ethical writers who seem to be using this phrase as if in it the word voice could be interpreted literally. It would be unfair however to insert these quotations in this place. Many, if not the great majority, of these authors mean little more than is expressed by the quaker, Jonathan Dymond (1796-1828), when, in addition to opposing, in Chapter VI. of his *Principles of Ethics*, the

view just presented, he says that "the right is the will of God as expressed in various ways." Inasmuch as the dictates of conscience in different men often differ, it cannot safely be assumed that the right is expressed through it, either unequivocally or solely.

Through his presentations of the subject, Kant, as has been said, reinforced with more definiteness than had existed before, the rational theory with reference to the origin of the sense of obligation that had been held in England by such writers as Cudworth, Clarke, and Wollaston (see page 80). All these had traced morality to the action of the inward mind rather than to anything that could be learned from outward experience. But the action of the mind to which they referred had been that of the cognitive faculties alone. Long before the time of Kant, Arthur Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury (1671-1731) had pointed out that a man could be influenced morally through his emotions also. In his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit* and *The Moralists* he showed that, in connection with every prompting to duty, one is conscious of a feeling attributable to a *moral sense* or faculty. In taking this ground, he was ably seconded by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747); who, in his *Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Morality*, maintained that, in addition to the five external senses, we possess certain internal senses introducing us to aesthetics and to ethics in a way similar to that in which we become acquainted with metaphysical axioms. Lord Shaftesbury's conception which since the time of Hutcheson has been termed the *moral-sense* theory, and termed also, to distinguish it from the rational intuitionism of Kant, the *emotional intuitionist* theory, was subsequently accepted, in general, by Adam Smith (1723-1790) who, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, emphasized the influence upon right conduct of one's having sympathy with others; and by David Hume (1711-1776) in his *Treatise on Human Nature*. The same theory is usually represented as underlying the ethical systems of continental writers like Herbart, Rousseau, and Brentano.

Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752), in his *Sermons on Human Nature*, as well as in his famous *Analogy of Religion*, broadened this theory, assigning one's moral guidance less to a special sense than to a general mental result partly intellectual as well as emotional. This theory, together with that of other writers like Martineau, Lecky, and Pea-

body, is usually termed that of perceptive intuition. (See footnote <sup>5</sup>, page 64; also footnote <sup>12</sup>, page 66.) To Butler, conscience, without being especially analyzed, seemed a source of moral approbation and disapprobation, a great regulative force governing, restraining, and directing all the affections or passions. His general conceptions have had great influence in molding opinion in modern times, mainly, probably, because of their tendency to harmonize practically the results of intuition, whether rational or emotional, with those of experience, however derived or developed. This fact became evident in the writings of Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), the chief of the followers of Victor Cousin (1792-1867), founder of what has been termed the French Eclectic School of Philosophy, intended to reconcile idealism, like that of Berkeley and some of the Germans, with materialism, like that of Hobbes and Locke. Jouffroy, in an introduction to a French translation of Dugald Stewart's (1753-1828) *Moral Philosophy* pleaded for the equal claims of the facts of consciousness and of experience, both being related, as he showed later in his *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*, to his general proposition—not entirely unlike that of the ancient Stoics (see page 74)—that right is conformity to order as manifested in nature, a conception suggesting that of Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) and involving in some regards the same general principle as is expressed by Butler in his *Analogy of Religion*.

Undoubtedly both Shaftesbury and Butler were directed toward their ethical theories by the precepts of their form of religion, and also by a perception of the non-selfish tendency of all mental promptings; and a similar statement might be made of many of their followers. At the same time, philosophically considered, it is proper to attribute to the combined influence of these two men the recognition, among large numbers of more recent writers upon ethics, of the emotional in addition to the rational influences at the basis of morality. For instance, in the *Essays on the Intellectual Faculties and the Active Powers*, by Prof. Thomas Reid (1710-1795), the *Elements of Morality*, by Prof. William Whewell (1794-1868), and *The Divine and Moral Government*, by President James McCosh (1811-1894), the conceptions of all of whom are allied in most other regards to those of rational intuitionism, we find the source of obligation attributed in part to feeling, *i. e.*, to "moral sense"—in the

case of Whewell to "sentiment." Many other writers we find, like Shaftesbury himself in his *Inquiry*, terming the end toward which effort should be directed *benevolence*, as in *The Science of Duty*, by Prof. H. N. Day (1808-1890), the *Theory of Morals*, by R. Hildreth (1807-1865), the *Moral Philosophy*, of President J. H. Fairchild (1817-1902), and the *Theory of Good and Evil*, by Canon Hastings Rashdall (1858-), though the latter by no means accepts Shaftesbury's conception of *moral sense*. Sometimes we find used the terms, *sympathy*, *love*, or *love of being*, as in the *Theory of Moral Sentiment*, by Adam Smith (1725-1790), *The Nature of Virtue*, by Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), *The Law of Love and Love as a Law*, by President Mark Hopkins (1802-1887), and *Problems in Ethics*, by Prof. J. S. Kedney (1819-1911). Even the exceptional views of Mrs. P. E. Fitzgerald, in her *Rational Ideal of Morality*, whose whole discussion seems to be based upon a spiritualizing of the sexual relations, might be placed in the same category.

## CHAPTER VII

### MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES CONTINUED: TELEOLOGICAL, UTILITARIAN, EVOLUTIONARY, AND SELF-REALIZATION THEORIES

Teleological Theory—Association with it of the Functional Theory, or Fitness—Connection between Fitness and Results of Experience—Hedonism and Eudaimonism of Bentham—Utilitarianism—Its Accord with Pragmatism and Common Sense—Evolutionism and Energism—Intuitions and Instincts as Results of Experience and Inheritance—As *a priori* Natural Impulses—What Evolutionism Leaves Unsolved.—The Self-Realization Theory *versus* Evolutionary Materialism—A Recognition of the Importance of Non-selfish as Contrasted with Selfish Motives—Modern Development of the Spiritual Ideal in Self-Realization—This Conception not new, but widely Accepted only in our Time—Parallelism between it, and the Acceptance by Pragmatism of the Ideal as the True—High Moral Intent of this Conception; but not philosophically Derived—Nor practically Satisfactory.

MOST of the writers mentioned near the close of the preceding chapter could be classed as accepting not only the conception of benevolence as the end of moral effort, but at the same time also the teleological theory, this latter being the theory in accordance with which the choice of some moral end is essential to the determining of a moral act. In the degree, however, in which the sympathetic seems to a writer to have a less powerful tendency toward morality than does the rational, the end sought, instead of being termed benevolence, is likely to be described in such terms as the *common good*, *welfare*, and, with a suggestion of the conception of *self-realization*, to be mentioned on page 100, *the perfect development of life*, or *perfection*. One or more of these ends we find emphasized in *The Elements of Ethics*, by Professor N. K. Davis (1830-), *A System of Ethics*, by Professor Frederick Paulsen (1846-1908), *The Theory of Morals*, by Professor Paul Janet (1823-1899), *The Manual of Ethics*, by Professor J. S.

Mackenzie (1860-), *The Elements of Ethics*, by Professor J. H. Muirhead (1855-), and *A Study of Ethical Principles*, by Professor James Seth (1860-).

There is always a tendency wherever moral results are traced to intellectual processes other than those of intuition, to include among them such as are derivable from observation and experience. This leads to a conception of the end of moral action that suggests at once the *functional* theory of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle mentioned on page 72. One term used to express this conception is *fitness*,—the fitness of an action for the circumstances, the occasion, or the object in view. We find the term among other places in *The Elements of Moral Science*, by President Francis Wayland (1796-1865), and in the *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*, by Professor A. P. Peabody (1811-1893). It appears even as early and notwithstanding its association there with the innate theory of conscience, as in *The Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* of Samuel Clarke (1675-1729).

Fitness cannot be ascribed to any action that is not considered in relation to external surroundings, and to their influence upon it. For this reason, there is only one step—though sometimes it is a long step—between this conception and that which associates mental results, even though distinctively moral, with the influences of material and physical circumstances. Owing in part to this fact, but more to the natural reaction which is apt to manifest itself whenever in theory morality seems to be made too exclusively a matter of reasoning, we find very soon after the period of Cudworth and his followers mentioned on page 79 a revival of Greek *hedonism* tracing morality to the results of pleasure and pain experienced in the physical body (see page 70); and, at almost the same time, of *eudaimonism*, which may be said to trace it to the results of the same experienced in the mental nature (see page 73).

Both these theories were advocated at different times by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1838), author of an *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (see footnote <sup>11</sup>, on page 66). He maintained that moral conceptions result from what man has learned from experiencing pleasure and pain. In one regard, this theory involved ascribing obligations to an intellectual source,—to processes of induction and inference; but in another regard, to a sensational source,—to agreeable or disagreeable feelings. The theory, there-

fore, traced obligation to both rational and emotional influences. But of these all were the results of experience. In a later book, Bentham, evidently desirous of not ignoring the conception of mental non-selfishness, developed what is termed the "greatest happiness theory,"—the theory that the morally right is the obtaining of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In his *Dentology*, too, he began to indicate further distrust in the absolutely satisfactory character of his earlier conceptions by using in place of happiness as a motive to action, the term *utility*. Archdeacon William Paley (1743–1805), following the lead of Bentham, maintained in his *Elements of Moral and Political Philosophy* that, "Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness." He is usually represented as attributing obligation to self-interest; which, to him, of course, would mean enlightened self-interest.

The general theory of Bentham was adopted and very ably defended, as well as amplified, by James Mill (1773–1836) in his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, by Alexander Bain (1810–1877) in his *Mental and Moral Philosophy*, and by John Stuart Mill (1806–1879) in his *Utilitarianism*,—a term which, as applied to ethics, Mill claims, in his autobiography, to have originated.

Henry Sidgwick too (1838–1900), in his *Methods of Ethics*, after arguing in favor of the intuitional theory as applied to the action of conscience, says, in Book III., Chapter XIV.: "The intuitional method, rigorously applied, yields as the final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism,—which it is convenient to denote by the single word, Utilitarianism." Comte's *Positive Philosophy* ends similarly.

In this theory there is, of course, much to commend. Like the teleological it can be traced back to, if not through, the functional criterion of the three greatest Greek philosophers (see page 72); and of all theories it is the one most logically deducible from that most modern of philosophical methods which we find in pragmatism. If, as this latter system maintains, we can judge of the truth in any department by that which it can do, or, as in the case of any ideal, by that which it is worth to the one who adopts it, the criterion of utility can certainly be applied to morals. Moreover, it conforms to the requirements of idealists, not only, but of those who have merely common sense. To



quote from Chap. XIII., Sec. 2, of the *Ethics* of (John) Dewey (1859-) and (J. H.) Tufts (1862-), "the positive truth for which Bentham and Mill stand is that the moral quality of any impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the sort of consequences to which it leads in action"; and this conception, so far as it goes, is true; but there are also other conceptions not necessarily included in it that are equally true.

The teleological, hedonian, eudaimonian, and utilitarian theories have all been greatly strengthened of late years by the influence of modern evolutionism. The logical tendency of this theory, as most of us will recognize, is to ascribe ethical, as well as other forms of mental development, to the operation of the same laws to which the theory attributes the more intelligent characteristics of insects, birds, and beasts,—in other words to the results of experience. The conception, which is almost identical with that of Locke, is that men, whether considering their own actions or the actions of others with whom they have friendly or hostile relations, learn what to do or what not to do by noticing the pleasure or pain that seems to accompany certain courses of action. Most evolutionists would probably agree with Herbert Spencer (1830-1903), who, in Chapter III. of his *Data of Ethics*, declares the "ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness."

With reference to the origin of the sense of obligation which prompts effort to attain this end, however, evolutionary writers show less agreement. (See their definitions of *conscience*, Footnotes 4 and 10, pages 63 and 65.) Probably the most popular view among them is the view suggested by the large number of instincts that seem to be derived from inheritance,—like one, for instance, which prompts a dog that has always lived in a house to make the motions with his nose of covering with sand a bone that he wants to keep. Some therefore attribute all instincts and, because resembling instincts, all intuitions in a man to results of the same kind,—results that are owing to one's own previous actions or to those of his forebears. It is argued that these actions have cultivated habits of body or of mind of which ordinarily no one is conscious; but that, when they are needed, it is they, and therefore methods originally acquired by experience that reveal themselves in what men

term instinct and intuition. This conclusion is supposed to accord with statements like one made by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in Chapter IV. of his *Descent of Man*. The statement, by the way, is not without suggestion of the conception with reference to the moral import of the consciousness of conflicting desires that has been presented in this volume. Darwin says, "A struggle may often be observed in animals between the different instincts, or between an instinct and some habitual disposition, as when a dog makes after a hare, is rebuked, pauses, hesitates, pauses again, or returns ashamed to his master." In this struggle between an acquired habit of will and an original natural impulse Darwin recognizes the beginnings of conscience.

It is important to notice, however, that Darwin does not deny that, in connection with the development of conscience, there is an original natural impulse. In Chapter III. of the same book he speaks of "A short and imperious ought," and the "consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct." Indeed, not only Darwin but about all his more prominent followers have acknowledged the existence of this. Professor Frank Thilly (1865-) of Cornell University, in Chapter II., Section 4, of his *Introduction to Ethics*, says that "Spencer concedes the presence of an *a priori* element, and denies that conscience is merely an acquisition of individual experience." "According to Spencer, the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings." These are "not of supernatural origin, but of natural origin." "With this theory," he adds, "the views of M. Guyan, Leslie Stephen, B. Carrieri, H. Höffding, G. von Gizycke, R. von Shering, W. Wundt, T. Paulsen, S. Alexander, Hugo Münsterberg, Paul Rée, Georg Simmel, and A. Sutherland practically agree."

Not a few of them too, like Darwin and Spencer, would go further than this, and agree with the statement of their sympathetic critic, Professor T. H. Huxley, in his essay on *Evolution and Ethics*, that "The practice of that which is ethically best . . . involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." It will be noticed that, according to this acknowledgement, the principle exemplified in the evolutionary theory may be applied differently to physical and to psychical development. Why is this so?

The answer (see J. M. Baldwin's *Darwin and the Humanities*, Chap. III.) is that "there are stages of transition between . . . the physical fitness required for" the individual "and the social fitness required for" the group. "The group, for its struggle, requires organization" and "utility for the group presupposes self-control and altruism." This view, by separating social requirements from inner individual causes seems to introduce an illogical change into methods of evolution. The theory on pages 32-34 avoids this change by associating human mental desires with animal *a priori* impulses (page 98) whose psychical beginnings antagonize effects of the physical principle of "the survival of the fittest."

This latter principle, if supposed to indicate the relations that should exist between man and man, would justify savagery and warfare. The recognition of this fact has probably had not a little influence in causing the popularity in recent years of what may be termed the self-realization theory. This theory is related by way of reaction to the evolutionary in a way and degree parallel to that in which Platonism, Stoicism, neo-Platonism, and Christian Mysticism were related to the various forms of hedonism or Epicureanism which they followed. The theory recognises clearly that the methods applicable to material or bodily conditions are not applicable to conduct; that the greatest physical or material success in every sense may be attained when a man is brutal, tyrannical, and inconsiderate; but that spiritual success, which is necessary when conduct is involved, can never be attained except when one is the opposite; that the unselfish conceptions and the broad outlook necessary to the attainment of the highest morality can never be the outgrowth of that alone which is merely the selfish narrowness characteristic of an influence essentially physical.

The most important of the books that have been written as a result of this conception is the *Prolegomena of Ethics*, by Professor T. H. Green (1836-1883) of Oxford University. This author distinguishes clearly between that which works in the bodily and in the mental. He says, in Book II. A., "The one divine mind gradually reproduces itself in the human soul. In virtue of this principle in him, man has definite capabilities, the realization of which . . . forms his true good. They are not realized, however, . . . in any

life that has been, or is; . . . yet . . . the idea of his having such capabilities . . . is a moving influence in him. . . . As his true good is or would be their complete realization, so his goodness is proportionate to his habitual responsiveness to the idea." This conception of self-realization *i.e.*, of making real the ideal of the better or spiritual self—has taken a strong hold among many of the more modern students of ethics. As expressed by F. H. Bradley (1846– ) in Essay II. of his *Ethical Studies*, "In morality, the existence of my mere private self as such is something which ought not to be. . . . Realize yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole by realizing that whole in yourself."

This general thought thus expressed is not entirely new. Like so many other important ideas apparently originated in our own time, it was at least suggested by the great philosophers of ancient Greece. According to Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*, III., 8, Socrates declared self-knowledge to be the good end for which man should strive, and in Book X., Chapter VII., of the *Ethics* of Aristotle we are told that "the supreme good is not pleasure nor honor nor wealth but happiness and independence which consists in the exercise of reason or self-sufficiency." In our own times, the effect of this conception upon ethical thought has been very great. It finds expression in many different treatises which in other regards are by no means similar; for instance, in the *Methods of Ethics* by Professor Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) of Oxford; the *Manual of Ethics* by Professor J. S. Mackenzie (1860– ) of the College of South Wales; the *Elements of Ethics* by Professor J. H. Muirhead (1855– ) of Birmingham University; *A Study of Ethical Principles* by Professor James Seth (1860– ) of Edinburgh University; the *Introduction to Ethics* by Professor Frank Thilly (1865– ) of Cornell University; *The Philosophy of Conduct* by Professor S. A. Martin (1853– ) of Lafayette College; and *Self-Realization, an Outline of Ethics* by Professor H. W. Wright (1878– ) of Lake Forest College.

Even modern pragmatism, notwithstanding its logical acceptance of utilitarianism which was mentioned on page 96, has not escaped endeavors to conform the term "self-realization" to its requirements. To quote from Professor W. R. B. Gibson (1869– ) of Melbourne University in Lecture VIII. of his *Philosophical Introduction to Ethics*,

"This is the central conviction of pragmatism . . . that nothing is real to us except in so far as we realize it. . . . The concretest and most fundamental expression of self-consciousness is the postulate. . . . A postulate is an idea that has matured its motor-factors, an idea in the attitude of self-realization of working itself out. In this sense it seems to me almost if not quite identical with the motive in Green's use of the term as a self-appropriated motive, the motive with which the self has identified itself." This postulate is "an end or ideal of action accepted by the individual's practical consciousness as a right of its own moral nature, transmuted into a moral imperative. The demand for perfection is . . . for that which can harmonize the whole of life, and stand all tests."

Few can fail to recognize the high moral intent of the conception of life and of the aim of the individual in life that is brought out in *The Prolegomena of Ethics*. But to this conception considered as a complete statement of the whole of a man's duty, there are three philosophical objections. One has to do with its logical premise and the others with its practical results. The premise is not grounded upon a proved fact, but upon a supposition, or, at most, a deduction. That there is One Spirit pervading and animating every human agency of intelligence is the testimony of faith and, as many think, of revelation; and a religious sect, like that termed Christian Science, may be justified in accepting the testimony as a suggestion or confirmation of its system of doctrine. But a philosophical system should start with facts that can be known, and facts with reference to the mind cannot become known except by searching for them, in part at least, in consciousness. The existence of one spirit influencing all in the way indicated in the *Prolegomena* may be inferred from the facts of consciousness; but it is not itself discoverable there.

Again, two practical results of this conception are not satisfactory. The first of these results will become evident upon noticing again the quotation from Professor Green on page 99. In referring to the definite capabilities, the realization of which forms "a man's true good," he says, "they are not realized in any life that has been or is." Here is a chance for the same separation between theoretic and practical ethics as is attributed on pages 80-84 of this volume to the moral philosophy of Kant. The truth seems to be

that a man can possess no ideal that will greatly benefit him, if at the same time, he believes in his heart that it is impossible for him to realize it. This is the case even though he may believe it possible to realize it in a future spiritual state of existence, though not in the present. Ideas cause immediate action in the degree of their seeming to be immediately attainable. The moment that this statement is accepted, it leads on to the second reason why the practical results of the conception are unsatisfactory. They are so because the ideal presented by it to the mind is not inclusive of all a man's obligations; and, therefore, even when explained as meaning the realization not of the lower but of the higher self, it manifests a tendency in the direction of more or less narrowness of vision. It is simply not true that every duty of a human being clothed in a physical body with physical surroundings can be fulfilled by regarding solely his relations to the spiritual life of which man is a part and partner; and much less by regarding solely his relation to this spiritual life as embodied in his fellow men. This general subject is discussed in Chapter X. of the present volume. Here it is sufficient to remind the reader that, while a Stoic like Marcus Aurelius in Book VIII. of his *Meditations*, could say "work in harmony with the universal intelligence as your breath does with the air," he, or, at least, great numbers of his fellow Stoics, could deem it not logically inconsistent with so sublime a sentiment to cultivate indifference to human suffering and disregard of human necessities. The same has been true of others holding a similar theory as manifested in asceticism, mysticism, and other allied conceptions. So long as a man lives in a world partly physical as well as mental, he must be under certain obligations to his body; to the opinions which he forms with reference to his bodily surroundings and the rights that accrue to him in view of them. So long, too, as he possesses individuality, it is incumbent upon him to regard, in some degree, and not to neglect wholly, even for the purpose of serving others, this body of his and these opinions and rights. His principle of action should be to love his neighbor not better than himself but as himself, Lev. 19:18. Of course, all this is practically acknowledged by the most of those who think that they accept the theory of the Prolegomena; but the question under discussion now is not what they practically acknowledge but what is the legitimate logical

conclusion to be drawn from their theory. Only when this question has been answered, can one feel assured that the theory itself has been treated in a way that is philosophically satisfactory.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MORALITY ATTRIBUTED TO THINKING, FEELING, OR BOTH, WHETHER THROUGH INTUITION, INSTINCT, REASONING, OR OBSERVING

Summary of our Review of Ethical Theories—The Attributing of Right Conduct to Thinking, through Intuition or Reasoning—How this Fails to Accord with the Testimony of Consciousness—Moral Influence of Thinking alone upon Practical Results—Upon Philosophic Theory—The Attributing of Right Conduct to Feeling whether Resulting from Instinct or Experience—Arguments for and against this Conception—Its Influence upon Practical Results—Upon Philosophic Theory—The Attributing of Right Conduct to Thinking and Feeling in Combination—The Necessary Conditions underlying this Conception.

OUR brief review of the principal ethical theories has shown us that their advocates have not failed, either singly or collectively, to emphasize most of the important facts with reference to their subject. Their failures, so far as this word may be justly used, have been owing to errors in determining the proportionate amount of consideration that should be given to these facts,—in determining which of them should be treated as fundamental, which as of slight importance, and which should be entirely ignored. The theories have been shown to differ, first of all, in this,—that some of them, like *institutionism* when broadly interpreted, attribute the primary source of obligation and usually too the end toward which its fulfillment should be directed, to what may be said to come from outside the man *i. e.*, to what he has observed in his surroundings, as in the manners and customs of society and in the laws of government; and that some attribute the same to what may be said to come from within the man *i. e.*, to his own thoughts and to what, in a popular sense may be termed his feelings. This distinction applies, of course, merely to in-



fluences supposed to be primary. It could not apply to those acknowledged to be secondary. It needs to be noticed also that of those who attribute the primary source or end of obligation, or both of these, to what may be said to come from within the man, some ascribe it to his thinking, some to his feeling and some to the combined effects of both of these.

We have already, on pages 62 and 86-89, considered the results of extreme and exclusive *institutionism*. It will not be necessary, therefore, to mention these results again except incidentally. But with reference to the practical workings of the other theories—those that associate obligation with what is supposed to originate within the man—it seems important here that something more should be said. Let us notice, first, the theories that attribute moral influences to his thinking. These theories range all the way from those of extreme intuitionists to those of extreme empiricists. The intuitionists hold either that the right and wrong in certain cases, like those of theft and cruelty, are recognized by reason intuitively, and in such a way that among all men its judgments are virtually the same; or else they hold that right and wrong are determined by using intuition in the same way in which it is used in other cases; *i. e.*, when associated with the action of the other reasoning powers. The empiricists ascribe a knowledge of right and wrong to what one can apprehend or argue to be for his own good, either because of his individual experience of the pleasurable or painful results of his own actions, or because of what he has learned of these results—from the sayings or doings, including the enacted laws, of others.

Concerning the theories of all, whether intuitionists or empiricists, who ascribe ethical influences to mere thinking, the first fact to be observed is that their conception of doing right does not accord with that of which many men seem to be conscious, and of which they prefer to think that other men are conscious. Apparently, few can be completely satisfied with themselves when they are consciously disregarding feeling, and acting solely from motives of rationality, prudence, or calculation. Is it a fact that we give expression to these latter, and to these alone, when in the presence of those for whom we have affection or even high regard? Do we admire others whom we suppose to be always under the influence of such motives? Do we believe that such motives alone can do all for ourselves or for others

that is necessary in order that one should invariably do right? Does one exaggerate when he says that probably no people are more thoroughly disliked, if not despised, by a larger number of their fellows than those who convey the impression of doing everything as a result not of feeling but of intellectual insight or calculation? Even though they may do right, do not many of their fellows seem to think that this is done in a wrong way? People miss from such action that which could give it vitality,—that which seems necessary in order to make it represent the whole life of the man. How can such action represent this, they ask, if feeling be a part of life, and there be no evidence in what one says or does of the influence within him of those most powerful feelings which men term conscientiousness, sympathy, and love? Of course men differ greatly with reference to the quality and objects of the rational action which, according to them, determine obligation. But whether they attribute it to the work of intuitive reason, aimed for the most rational ends, or to the result of worldly experience directed to the attainment of personal advantage, the limitations suggested by any theory that excludes the influence of the feelings seem indisputable.

So far as a man acts upon the principle of doing only, or even mainly, that which appears rational, he never will do a large number of things which most people believe that every true man ought to do. Why, if running no risk of being discovered, should he refrain from lying, or cheating, or stealing when, by doing so, he can benefit not only himself but his family, his friends, his church, his nation? Why, if it may threaten harm to his influence or personality, should he help through controversy or conflict, the poor, the despised, the wronged, the oppressed, the beaten? Why should he sacrifice his reputation, his comfort, or his life, in order to proclaim an unpopular truth, advocate a persecuted cause, or die for a country? Why not keep his mouth shut, turn traitor to his convictions, and run away to another country? There is but one answer. It is because he is a man true to himself, recognizing how essential is that part of himself which gives him the feelings that men ascribe to conscientiousness, humanitarianism, and public spirit. It may not seem rational to become a martyr for a cause or a nation, but he feels that it is right; and there is nothing possible to merely the reasoning or calculating

powers of intellect alone that could account for such feelings.

These practical conclusions with reference to the subject are confirmed when we come to consider its theoretic aspects. Philosophically, it is difficult to conceive how anyone can suppose that a mere recognition, either as a result of instinctive perception or of reflective argument, that certain actions are wise or right can account for the sense or prompting of obligation. As Professor Frederick Paulsen says in Book II., Chapter V. of his *System of Ethics*, as translated by Frank Thilly, "The impulses are the weights so to speak, which keep the clockwork of life in motion; the reason cannot take their place. It has no motive force of its own"—a statement, that, as will be seen, accords exactly with what was said on pages 36 to 50 of the present volume with reference to the fact that desires—which involve feelings—underlie all our mental processes. Intuition and reasoning have a great deal to do with right action. But neither of the two is that which starts it, or gives it an end to attain. When a man has a prompting of conscience, the first thing that he experiences is a feeling. When he is incited to betterment, the first thing that touches his intellect comes through a sentiment or ideal; and both are widely acknowledged to be the results of thought when influenced by emotion. Of the reasoning or calculation through which, subsequently, that which influences him is developed into particular acts of conduct, he becomes conscious later.

Let us turn then to feeling—still using this word in its broad and popular sense—and observe how far the source and results of the sense of obligation can be attributed solely or mainly to it. As in the case of those who attribute these to thinking, the advocates of this theory are numerous and are distributed both among those who emphasize the influence of instinct or intuition, and those who are empiricists. The followers of Shaftesbury, for instance, who, as was said on page 91 made feeling the basis of the "moral sense" theory, are usually termed *emotional intuitionists*; and the study of the influences of pleasure and pain upon ethical development on the part of many modern evolutionists is a result of tracing obligation to emotion or feeling, even though this is done through an empirical method.

On first thought, the attributing of the sense of ob-

ligation to feeling seems to conform to the ordinary conceptions of the ordinary man much more closely than do the theories attributing it to reason. Every child, and almost every grown person, speaks of recognizing right and wrong by conscience, and when he says conscience he is referring to what is experienced within him as a feeling. One is often asked, therefore, by what authority philosophy can deny a condition of which almost everyone seems conscious. The opponents of the theory say that it is because the feeling is always accompanied by thought. Yes, says the other, and so is every feeling. An inflammation of the little finger, which calls attention to itself, is accompanied by thought; lonesomeness and grief are accompanied by thought; yet these facts do not render it impossible to separate the feeling from the thought. But the feeling of conscience, says his opponent, is authoritative; it must include something more than feeling in order to convey a sense of obligation. Every feeling of itself alone, answers the other, conveys a sense of obligation. If we disobey the promptings of taste, and fail to masticate our food, we cannot digest it. If we disobey the promptings of hunger and thirst, and fail to swallow, we cannot live. The attributing of the sense of obligation to a feeling in consciousness seems therefore to have a certain justification. But when one comes to consider the practical results of ascribing it to this, either exclusively or sometimes primarily, he finds reason to doubt the theory. Many who admit that, at times, they do things impulsively without calculation of the consequences, and that these things turn out to be right, are not sure that they were right because impulsive, or that they might not have been wrong. Many too who have had much experience in the world have noticed in themselves and in others influences that affect the mind through observation, association, habit, custom, knowledge of facts or of human nature in such ways as to modify results connected not only with their own applications of these promptings, but with the very nature of the promptings themselves. For instance, many boys in Kansas would intuitively feel it wrong to drink a glass of beer. Is it possible to conceive of a boy in Bavaria who should feel the same? An American could not conscientiously sink a passenger ship full of women and children. A Prussian could. Anyone who admits these to be facts must agree thus far with the theorists who

ascribe the sense of obligation in part to thinking, or to experiencing the effects of thinking, as distinguished from feeling.

A still stronger argument in favor of this latter view is presented by the practical results that follow reliance upon feeling alone as the criterion of right action. The most common excuse for inconsiderateness, unkindness, meanness, oppression, extortion, persecution, and massacre is that the perpetrators of it were sincere, by which is meant conscientious,—a word that has no relation to the subject except so far as the one using it holds to the theory that right is right, aside from all instruction or argument that can develop the thinking powers directly or the intuitive powers indirectly. It is because the savage is following his instinctive or emotional promptings with reference to what is right or wrong that he cheats or eats his enemies, and multiplies or murders his wives. It is because some of the Turks of to-day, as did some Christians of the fifteenth century, trust solely in their emotional promptings respecting conduct, that they are exterminating by fire and sword those who differ from them in matters of mere information, understanding, or association. It is because so many people surrounding us believe in a sort of combination of a temperamental and a categorical imperative revealed through feeling in such ways as to make the motive, irrespective of consequences, determine the ethical quality, that, following the example of others, they are oppressive to their employees, dishonest to their customers, cruel to their children, snobbish to their neighbors, and, possibly in most of the relations of life, are promoters of that which is evil instead of good, and yet are little more doubtful about the righteousness of their actions than they would be if they were exceptionally considerate, just, kindly, democratic, and public-spirited. The reason for this, of course, is that the promptings of the feeling which is supposed to be conscience are not always, when considered in themselves alone, truthful and wise. For instance, a friend of the author had a romantic attachment for a woman whom, for good reasons, he did not marry. Years after, when she had married another, and he himself had married not very happily, he lived near her home. He told the author once that whenever he met her, a feeling which only thinking enabled him to distinguish from conscience constantly impelled him to tell her what it seemed to him that she had a right to

know,—namely, that she was the only woman whom he had ever really loved, or could love. And, yet, if, in the circumstances, he had told her this, hardly any right-minded man would not have felt justified in considering him a dishonorable sneak.

The theoretical as distinguished from the practical objections to assigning the sense of obligation to feeling alone are just as strong as those assigning it to thinking alone. Man is a thinking being, and it is as such that anything that is to influence him as a man should influence him. His feelings would be of no use to him whatever unless, in some way, they were connected with his thinking.

This statement brings us to what is to be said of the third class of ethical theorists—those who assign the source and end of the sense of obligation to the combined effects of thinking and feeling. The first suggestion here is of practical obstacles to the application of the theory. It does not seem fitted to prescribe the limits of the influence of thought upon the one side or of feeling upon the other. As a result there is no certainty that those who accept this view will avoid the dangers attributable to either of the other theories. Besides this, that tendency in the human mind to resolve all possible conceptions into some single one that shall make a unity of complexity, seems to be instinctively opposed to giving approximately equal recognition to two sources of influence. On account of this tendency, there are few writers upon ethics, no matter how strenuously they may claim to ascribe due consideration to the effects of both thought and feeling, and to be misrepresented by those affirming that they do not so ascribe them who have failed to be classed as adherents of some theory, like that of “utilitarianism” or of “moral sense,” which they themselves did not intend to accept.

What is needed, therefore, in order to satisfy the demands in ethics of both theory and practice is that the effects of obligation shall be traced both to thought and to feeling, but to each of these when acting in such a non-exclusive way as to prevent either of them from being more influential proportionately than it should be. This, as will be perceived at once, would ascribe obligation to a union of thought and feeling, and yet a union of such a character that the influence of neither would be exercised in any way except conjointly with that of the other.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONSCIENCE, A CONSCIOUSNESS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DESIRES OF THE BODY AND OF THE MIND

Thinking and Feeling Are Both United in Human Desire—How Desires of the Mind can be Made to Seem Authoritative—The Facts Fit the Ordinary Conception of the Meaning of Conscience—The Function Assigned to Conscience here Is not Unimportant—Can this Conception of it include all the Requirements of Conscience?—Conscience is Primarily Felt within—Never Experienced except in Connection with a Conflict between Higher and Lower Desires—Even the Perversions of Conscience Show this—This Conception of Conscience Follows Logically upon Modern Theories Concerning the Subject—The Conception can be Reconciled with other Functions of Conscience—Conscience as Related to the Choice of an End toward which Obligation Inclines—Many Ethical Theories not Sufficiently Comprehensive and Fundamental—Mental Control as an Agency in the Stimulating of Mental Activity—In the Developing of Intelligence—In the Recognizing of Spiritual Communalities—Summary of the View of Conscience here Presented—The Importance of Using all the Possibilities of Mind to Prevent, in Case of Conflict with Bodily Influences, its Being Outweighed by them—Difference between the Conception of Conscience Presented in these Pages and other Somewhat Similar Conceptions.

IS it possible to find thought and feeling of the nature described at the close of the preceding chapter,—thought that is authoritative, yet not in such a way as to interfere with the authority of feeling; and feeling that is authoritative, yet not in such a way as to interfere with the authority of thinking? Yes, they can be found—very simply and naturally too—merely by observing the logical development of the condition of mind already described as being presented to a man in his first moments of consciousness. On pages 5 and 6 it was said that this made him aware of the impulses that are the beginnings of desires, and that these, even if manifested in mere appetite differ

from what we term appetite in a lower animal because, inasmuch as a man is a thinking being, we cannot conceive of him, as we can of the latter as having an appetite wholly separated from thinking. A desire is therefore a combination of the effects of both thought and feeling,—the very condition that has been shown to be needed in order to meet the first of the requirements indicated on page 110. The second of the requirements was that thought and feeling should be so combined as to render it inconceivable that either should be exercised in any other way than by these two when acting conjointly. This requirement would be met because the only factors contributing to the result would be desires; and every desire, as we have found, is a combination of thought and feeling.

But how, it may be asked, could any combination of the two, as represented in a desire, be made to seem authoritative? The answer is that, according to what has been said already on page 59, the very first consciousness that a man has is of desires, and, very soon too, of these not alone but of these in conflict. Anyone conscious of conflict—to repeat, because of its importance, what was said on page 56 must be conscious of inward unrest, disturbance, disorder; and conscious, therefore, that the conflict ought to be made to cease. A feeling that anything ought to be done involves some feeling of obligation. But, in this case, the feeling is enhanced, owing to the fact that the conflict is between bodily desires, which a man possesses in common with the lower animals, and mental desires, which are peculiarly human. To the latter, therefore, according to a law of nature (see page 58), he feels particularly obligated to give expression.

In this case the facts seem to fit exactly the requirements that most of us associate with conscience,—something that arouses an individual sense of obligation, and, with it, because it demands attention, awakens our rational powers, acting sometimes intuitively and sometimes reflectively; and may awaken also, because directing attention to an outside end obtained as a result of experiment and experience, our empirical powers. In a way, too, this something, that we have termed a sense of conflict that needs to be ended, is imperative; and yet it is not necessarily dictatorial. It does not always indicate exactly what a man should do,—the form of action through which he should manifest his



sense of obligation. This is left to be determined by circumstances,—by the results of his own individual thinking and observing. Whether, in considering conscience, one regard its primary or its secondary effects,—the feeling and thought that are combined constituents of the desires, or the subsequent feelings and thoughts into which these desires develop,—the presumptive inference seems to be inevitable. It is this,—that what we term conscience is attributable to a consciousness that the desires of the body and of the mind are in conflict.

But someone may ask: Can everything that men mean to designate when they use the term conscience be traced primarily to a simple experience like that of a consciousness of conflict between two different classes of desire? Before answering this question, it may be best, perhaps, to remind the reader that the experience to which reference is here made is by no means simple in the sense of having to do with agencies insignificant in their sources or effects. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find anything in human life more important than this conflict between impulses that come from the body and from the mind; and if conscience did no more than call attention to the existence of the conflict, the almost superlative rank of the function thus exercised could not be disputed. Even though one did not have the testimony of consciousness in proof of the fact, he might feel sure that a matter of such grave moment would be emphasized by nature in such a way that it would be impossible to overlook it.

It may be asked again whether this conception of conscience is sufficient to cover all the requirements of the subject. Under conscience must we not include everything that impresses us with a sense of obligation; and under this, if influenced by intelligence, must we not include a choice of the end toward which effort is directed, as well as of the means which, at almost every stage of progress, become themselves subordinate ends that must be chosen in order to secure the attainment of the principal end?

The reader will recognize that these three questions refer to two different subjects,—the same which, on page 61 were stated to be the two about which there has been the most divergence in ethical opinion. One question concerns the source of obligation, and the other two the end toward which conformity to it is directed. In answering the

questions, therefore, it will be well to separate them. First, then, does this conception of conscience cover all the requirements of it considered as the source of the sense of obligation?

It certainly does. In the first place, it would be difficult to find anyone who, when mentioning particularly his conscience, is not in his own mind referring to an agency that he feels within him,—an agency that he is justified in ascribing to the sphere of desire, inasmuch as the feeling, though it may be stronger, appears to be exactly the same in kind as that which he experiences in the case of any desire or aversion. If he did not feel this agency, he might speak of some other form of obligation; but he would seldom speak of conscience. As it is, a very small child recognizes the agency, and knows what is meant when his attention is directed to it. It is not philosophical to ignore a fact which accords with the testimony of the consciousness of almost everyone who understands exactly what that is to which the term conscience, thus used, is intended to refer.

In the second place, this agency of that which is thus termed conscience is never experienced except when there is a consciousness of conflict between a higher and a lower desire,—higher and lower respectively meaning, in the sense explained on page 6, a more nearly or entirely mental and a more nearly or entirely bodily desire. If one could conceive of a person who never, in any circumstances, had had experience of any but the highest desire, he could conceive of one unable to understand what conscience is. A man, all whose tendencies prompt him to honesty, and who, therefore, is never conscious of those prompting him otherwise, is seldom, so far as regards experience with reference to this subject, conscious that he has a conscience. A man, who on the whole wishes to be upright, yet whose desires are constantly prompting him to dishonesty, seldom fails to feel what he calls his conscience. If he obey it, he frequently deserves great credit for resisting his lower tendencies; but he needs to be careful, in such circumstances, not to pride himself too much upon his achievement. It may be that nothing, except considerations like those of the danger of being detected, prevents him from theft. A boy who finds a bicycle in front of his father's house and, without asking any questions, begins to ride it, will be more and more conscious of his conscience the farther he gets away, because,

while he desires to ride, he also desires not to trespass on the possessions or the rights of others. But if, while riding it, he happen to learn that it was left in front of the house as a present to himself, he at once becomes free from any consciousness of conscience because free from any consciousness of conflict between desires.

Even the perversions of conscience bear analogous testimony. These perversions are traceable sometimes to weakness of intellect or of will, and, sometimes, to wickedness. In the former case, when a man is conscious of this conflict between desires, he may fail to end it by coming to a decision in favor of one or the other. He may treat the conflict as if it were not something to which, as a practical man, he ought to attend. He is in danger, therefore, of allowing the condition to continue until, little by little, he becomes what people term morbidly conscientious, even, sometimes, insane. Every time two desires, however unimportant, conflict, he associates the feeling that he experiences with that which he has felt when considering a question concerning right and wrong; and the weakly weighed conclusions that he reaches tend little toward correct views of either. When perversions of conscience are due to wickedness, the man persistently disregards the conflict of which, at an earlier stage, he was forced to be conscious. As a consequence, after a time, little by little, he becomes accustomed to disregard it, and when this has become a habit, the sense of conflict becomes so deadened within him that it exerts no influence. He gratifies the first desire that comes to him, no matter what may be its source or character. He may cheat, steal, or even murder with no more compunction of conscience than if he were giving milk to a newborn calf. This deadening of conscience, as it is called, is sometimes ascribed, by those who hold to the theory that it is a categorical imperative in the sense of being the voice of God in the soul, to a supernatural and arbitrary punishment for continued sin. It may be and probably is a punishment; but the theory that is now advocated does not make it either supernatural or arbitrary, but merely a natural result such as is common to all functions either of body or mind when they are not kept in constant service. A bedridden man loses the ability to walk. A constantly domineered slave loses the ability to think for himself. A man who has, for years, allowed the conflict between desires within him to

have no effect upon him may do right on account of the presence or espionage of others whom he fears to displease or antagonize; but he is in danger of getting into a condition in which he will not do right whenever certain that he is alone—in other words, of his own initiative. In this condition he will seldom be what is termed a man of honor.

An endeavor has been made to show that conscience is a consciousness in the sphere of desire; and that it is a consciousness of conflict there, because, when the conflict ceases, the consciousness no longer exists. Now, let us notice, in the third place, that this conception of conscience follows logically upon the results of the most modern thinking with reference to the subject. A proof of this may be found in all the quotations in the note beginning on page 54. They all show that their writers recognize, but without carrying their recognition to its logical conclusion, the connection between conscience, or the sense of obligation, and the struggle between the bodily and the mental. So with the term *self-realization*. As explained on page 100, self, in this term, means the mental or rational as contrasted with the bodily or physical self. Notice, too, the view, more or less representative, of that of many evolutionists, which is quoted on page 98, from Darwin's *Descent of Man*. Here, too, the struggle suggested is between the bodily and the impulse from which the mental is supposed to evolve.

Now, having considered desires in conflict as the source of the sense of obligation, let us, in accordance with what was proposed on page 113, consider them as related to the end toward which conformity to obligation should be directed. The first thought suggested here is the impossibility of separating the quality of a desire from that of the end toward which it is directed. A desire is a desire for something. If it be right, in the circumstances, for one to have this, then the desire for it is right; otherwise it is not. In connection with this thought there is another suggested by the particular subject with which we are now dealing. The theory of this treatise is that mental influence is exerted through activity manifested in the entire range of mental possibility, this being begun, but merely begun, in the mental desire of which we become conscious in conscience. This desire, of itself, because it is a desire, involves in embryo, according to what was said on page 6, both feeling and thought, and because it is mental, it involves, according to

what was said on page 20, feeling and thought that are both rational and non-selfish. Therefore the end to which the desire prompts must involve the same. Moreover, as, according to what was said on page 12, desire is the primary influence of which the mind is conscious, every other form of activity of which it becomes aware must be considered secondary.

The fact that this is so seems to have been vaguely, though by no means clearly, recognized very often. It apparently explains why so many find unsatisfactory the ascribing of the source of obligation to the results of certain single phases of mentality such as are represented in the teleological, utilitarian, or hedonic theories, or even in the institutional or intuitionist theories, as well as the ascribing of the end toward which the fulfillment of obligation should be directed to the attaining of certain single objects, like personal advantage, the greatest happiness for the greatest number, universal welfare, love, benevolence, perfection, or self-realization. Not one of these theories seems to their opposers to be based upon a conception that is sufficiently fundamental. Some of them might be said to represent no more than a secondary mental result developed from a primary mental desire. Unless the influence of the latter were present, there might be an appearance of morality, but the spirit needed in order to give it actual life would be absent.

In order to show clearly the truth of this statement, let us notice the effect of subordinating, when necessary, bodily desire to mental desire upon each of the three main methods through which a man naturally gives expression to such tendencies as are actuating him. These methods are those of activity dominated by the will, of intellection dominated by the cognitive faculties, and of emotion dominated by what may be termed community-feeling.

As applied to activity, everybody admits that, as stated on page 197, this is necessitated often in order to fulfill mental desire, whereas it is not necessary in order to fulfill bodily desire. A man can do wrong and remain indolent; but to do right, as a rule, necessitates more or less hard work. Mental desire demands exceptional activity. Of itself, it can arouse the energism (see page 57) that is needed in order to obtain working results from other departments of the mental nature. As indicated already on page 107, these results cannot be ascribed to any sources that are connected

with mere cognition. However greatly they might develop one's understanding, sentiment, or judgment, they could not prompt to action unless impelled by desire, nor to mental action unless impelled by mental desire. And if mental desire be needed, where could it reveal itself more clearly than just where it is making the most effort to subordinate bodily desire; *i. e.*, in what has been termed conscience? Prompted to activity by this, intuition, or any other form of intellection, may exert great influence upon moral character, but it seems to be an error to consider this influence any other than secondary. Without the struggle of mental desire revealed in conscience, it might, and probably would, be merely passive, not in any sense active.

As applied to intellection, it is difficult to conceive of anything that could so stimulate development in this as the consciousness of the conflict that is constantly going on between that which is lower and higher in one's nature, and the serious consequences in conception and conduct, both to oneself and to others, in case the conflict is not brought to a right termination. It is only necessary to recall that the mental includes all in the rational nature that can be distinguished from the animal nature, in order to recognize that it includes every result not only of rational intuition but of all other rational processes, whether influenced chiefly by hedonic, eudaimonistic, teleological, or utilitarian considerations. The conception of conscience which has been presented here, although apparently depriving it of an authority which it is questionable whether any thorough examination can prove it to have, greatly enhances one's estimate of the importance and extent of its influence upon the whole structure of character. In this regard, the conception is much the same as that of the writers quoted in footnote <sup>5</sup>, page 63. Conscience is not something that has to do with a part of a man. It influences the whole of him. It is not like a limb that can be amputated, and yet leave the rest of the body as sound as ever. One would suppose, to hear some people talk, that human nature is a creation with dissipation below and religion above, and morality half way between the two, like a plant in a garden with dung about its roots and hot air about its fruit; or, better, because of a lack of life, like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, with feet of clay and head of gold. The truth is, however, that the desire of the mind which is

the cause of morality lies at the basis of everything that is right in rational action. Morality is that for the production of which, so far as one can judge by a study of a man's nature—even without borrowing testimony from that which is termed revelation—his whole human constitution is designed, and therefore, as we may suppose, created. Accordingly, the thinker who tells us, with great assumption of being able to distinguish between things different, that either philosophy, science, or art has nothing to do with morality, shows that he has a false conception of it; or else has so little knowledge of the workings of the human organism that anything that he may have to say upon the subject is of very little importance. Unless the leaders in these respective branches were, above all things, conscientious in their investigations and explanations of truth, or fact, or beauty, it would be impossible for the world to make any progress worth while. No department in any kind of endeavor can enlist a traitor more dangerous to its interests than is an unconscientious workman.

As applied to community-feeling, by which term, as used here, is meant the psychical union—the unity of emotion, thought, and purpose between one person and another or others, the effect upon morality of subordinating bodily to mental desire is still more marked than when applied to activity and intellection. As brought out on page 20, bodily desires, as a rule, seek the indulgence of bodily sensations, and necessitate for this the exclusive possession of the object of desire. It is impossible for one to eat or drink exactly the same entity that another is eating or drinking. On the contrary, mental desires perform their functions in the perceptive organs of the brain that obtain what they wish not from their own sensations but from what these sensations are instrumental in enabling one to see or hear. Nor does the fulfilling of these desires necessitate one's own possession of the object of sight or hearing. Very often, as when listening to a concert or observing a sunset, anyone else may enjoy it to the full at the same time with oneself. These conditions give a man a realization of the worth of things that do not belong to himself, or if they be his own, a realization of the pleasure of sharing them with others. It will be recognized, therefore, that the conception of conscience in this book is that which gives one a consciousness of a conflict between bodily and mental or rational desire, which

conflict can be satisfactorily ended so far only as the former is made to harmonize with the requirements of the latter, necessarily involves, in certain circumstances, the conception of the subordination of that which pertains merely to self to that which pertains to another, or to others than self. This is the truth underlying all those theories of ethics that are based upon one's relation to his fellows. It pervades institutionism because customs and laws of society such as are embodied in institutions are merely formal expressions of the opinions and wishes of one's neighbors in his own country or in other countries. The same conception underlies those systems also in which the end of morality is represented to be the expression of love, benevolence, universal welfare, or that which obtains the greatest good for the greatest number. The conception is equally evident among those who emphasize in morality what is termed spirituality—as in many of the quotations in the note begun on page 54 and, in the peculiar form of it, expressed by T. H. Green, which is criticised on page 101. There is an important truth brought out in all these theories—but it is not the whole truth, and for this reason considered practically, each is deficient. Exclusive institutionism, because of its tendency to extreme conservatism, may prevent the effects of initiative and independence. Exclusive altruism, because of its tendency to yield all to others, may prevent the effects of personality and leadership; and exclusive spirituality, because of its tendency to mysticism and asceticism, may prevent the effects of social reformation and civic betterment. For the same reason, the theories fail, when considered philosophically. Each of them emphasizes exclusively only a part of that which should be emphasized as a whole; and which, if emphasized thus, would necessarily involve the part. On pages 20–22 it is shown that what is termed the mental or rational necessarily includes all that nonselfish and nonegoistic consideration of others and of their opinions, wishes, and welfare which constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of these theories. Of them, as of those that emphasize particularly the need of activity and intellection in one who would conform to the requirements of morality, it may be said that they add nothing to that which may be included in the conception that has been presented in this volume. Moreover, when, in Chapters XIII. to XXIII., we come to consider the practical bearings of this



conception upon the conduct of life as manifested in courtship, marriage, the family, school, society, business, industry, and various forms and methods of government, we shall find the differences between right and wrong suggested in each case with a logical inevitableness which, as the author believes, cannot be paralleled by the results attained through an application of any of these other theories.

To sum up in a few sentences that which has been unfolded in the present chapter, it has been shown that the primary source of obligation is conscience; and that conscience is a mental consciousness making one aware, sometimes very gently and sometimes very emphatically, that bodily desire is interfering with, or—to use the phraseology already employed—is in conflict with mental desire, and preventing its fulfillment. This mental consciousness can not but have an effect upon mental action, and the primary end to be attained by this action is to cause this inward interference or conflict to cease. Such a result follows when mental desire is reinforced by mental action of any kind to such an extent as to keep bodily desire subordinated to it. This conclusion follows in accordance with what has been said, not only in this chapter but in Chapter III., namely, that mental desire underlies and may involve every possibility of the mental nature, whether volitional, intellectual, or emotional. The result, therefore, of the sense of obligation of which one becomes aware in conscience, influences the mind not primarily but ultimately in exact analogy with the way in which any other experience may influence it, whether coming from joy or sorrow, natural cause or accident, fire, flood, or war. A man will do morally right, however far from the absolute right his own ignorance or inexperience may lead him, in the exact degree in which his own mind, as a whole, working in accordance with all or any of its own possibilities, succeeds, in case of conflict with bodily tendencies, in outweighing them through the influence of that which is naturally and necessarily associated with its own higher tendencies.

Certain of the readers of this volume may consider this theory identical with that of intuitionism or emotionalism, or, at least, of emotional intuitionism, or moral sense (see page 91); But this the author cannot concede. It seems to him that the theory presented in this volume differs from

these theories and from any of the others mentioned in this Chapter in at least one characteristic. This is its endeavor to explain all moral activities—though not the decisions—of the mind, whether exercised by way of instinct, intuition, reasoning observation or calculation, by tracing them to a single conditioning source that is easily perceived and is constantly operative. According to what has been said, morality cannot be occasioned or developed by thinking alone, nor by feeling alone. It needs the coöperation, in every slightest detail, of these two processes of mind when acting conjointly. This condition, however partly acknowledged, is not recognized as indispensable in any theories based exclusively upon the effects of institutions, fitness, reason, intuition, or instinct, whether acting according to teleological, utilitarian, eudaimonian, or hedonic methods; but it evidently cannot fail to exert a practical influence wherever morality is attributed to effects wrought among the desires. This is the case because every desire arises from a combination of thought and feeling (see pages 6, 7, 8, 37, and 38); and all desires, taken together, underlie every possible development of either of these two factors of mental activity (see Chapter III.).

## CHAPTER X

### DESIRES OF THE MIND SHOULD NOT SUPPRESS, BUT SUBORDINATE, DESIRES OF THE BODY

The Difficulty of Understanding or Applying the Principles Unfolded in the Preceding Chapters—Two Possible Methods of Doing this—The Method of Suppressing Physical Desires, or Asceticism—Asceticism Wrong in Theory—Gratifying Physical Desire is Right—Asceticism Detrimental in Practice—Unnecessary as a Preventive of Evil—Illustrations—Easy Solutions of Moral Problems not the most Satisfactory—Modern Efforts to Create Right Opinions on this Subject—Bodily Desire should be Kept Subordinate—Importance of Mental Desire—But not to be Indulged to the Exclusion of Bodily Desire—The Greek Conception of Moderation—Neither Bodily nor Mental Desire Expressive of all of Nature's Demands.—When these Demands are not Fulfilled, any Desire may Become Overreaching—Overreaching Desires Tend to Irrationality and Selfishness—Even though Primarily Mental—In Beings both Bodily and Mental, the Desire of the One Needs to be Balanced against that of the Other—Balance as an Agency in Keeping Upright—Complexity of the Problem of Morality—The Problem Solved by Mental Action that is both Immediate and Deliberative—Adaptation to this Purpose of the Principle Underlying what is Termed Ethical Harmony.

IT has been shown in the preceding chapters, that all of the activities of the mind in willing and thinking begin in the desires, and partake of the quality, whether bodily or mental, of the desire with which they start; and also that nature by making man the only being in the world with a high mental development, seems to have indicated that, in cases where these two classes of desires in him come into conflict, the bodily needs in some way to be subordinated to the mental. On first consideration, it might be thought a simple thing for one to bring about this result. But it is not. The bodily is often so blended in consciousness with the mental that one's understanding has difficulty in distinguishing between the two; and, even when they can

be differentiated very clearly, he cannot always apply to a complicated condition a principle that can be readily applied to an elementary one. Because we experience no hesitation in attributing to the body the feeling caused by a blow on the head or an ache in the stomach, it does not follow that we can decide just as readily to what we should attribute the feeling caused by a slap on the cheek or a pang in the heart; and, of course, there are thousands of cases involving double relationships the unravelling of which would be almost a thousand times more perplexing than of these. The conditions therefore evidently demand further consideration than has yet been given them. Let us continue the subject in our present chapter.

What we wish to ascertain is the method through which when it is necessary to subordinate the bodily to the mental, this result can be produced;—not only, too, in simple but in complicated cases. Every one will probably recognize without argument that there can be only two ways of accomplishing such a result,—either one of the two desires or sets of desires that are in conflict must be suppressed while the other is allowed expression; or the two by some means must both be allowed expression but in such ways as to be made to work together.

Let us begin by noticing the former method; and, first, as applied to bodily desires. These are traceable, as we have found, to the lower part of a man's nature, and are manifested in results involving physical indulgence and more or less thoughtlessness or selfishness. It is only natural, therefore, that many should hold the theory that the best thing to be done with them is to suppress them. Not only individuals, but whole communities in certain places and ages have adopted this theory and tried to carry it into practice. The theory underlies every system of asceticism. There are thousands in India to-day who are called "holy" not only by themselves but by others because they go around without clothing or food except as they can beg these from their neighbors. All through Europe during the Middle Ages there were thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Christian monks and nuns who were given to fasting and to scourging themselves; and who were almost as much of a nuisance and burden to the community as are these holy men of India. Even in cases where asceticism has not been adopted in whole, it has been

adopted in part, as by the Greek and Roman Stoics, the medieval celebrates and the Renaissance Puritans. In many of our churches to-day there are people who have a subtle feeling, which they cannot explain, but of which they apparently cannot rid themselves, that any gratification of bodily desire is wrong.

But is this true? Is the belief justified by the conditions that we find in the world? It certainly is not. Every sane interpretation of these conditions proves that the physical desires were not meant to be suppressed. They were meant to be gratified. Otherwise, the lessons that we can derive from our own nature were intended to be mendacious. Other reasons, too, point in the same direction. It is because men gratify their desires to eat and drink and propagate, that they have health and strength and offspring; nor, when these desires have passed from primary to secondary conditions, when the elementary consciousness of self may have developed into a tendency at least to selfishness, are they meant to be wholly suppressed. A certain degree of self-love is necessary if one would do or be anything in the world that is of high value. Without it a man will have little of that ambition, enterprise, and diligence that enable one to arrive at the head of the workshop, warehouse, courthouse, statehouse, college, or church; and few would cause their friends to feel gratitude or pride in view of their achievements or careers. Business, society, education, philanthropy, religion, and government need leaders and where would be the leaders without those possessed of personality strong enough to push them to the front? When the Great Master of Nazareth denounced the scribes, pharisees, and hypocrites of Judea, and scourged the money changers and drove them out of the temple, he showed himself to have been swayed by desire physical enough to express itself forcibly through both language and limb. (Jno. 2; 13-16.)

We may conclude, therefore, that the gratification of bodily desire is not in itself wrong. But we can go further than this. We can say that it is often right, because it can be used as an agency to increase the strength and extend the influence of mental desire. To think otherwise would involve disregarding some of the clearest teachings of experience. The mental and the bodily are not brought together in a man without some purpose. The way in which the

former seems to be disciplined and developed by constant contact with the latter affords for some the strongest possible argument in favor of a personal rational existence in a life beyond the present. How can a man logically believe in his right to separate the influence of the two unless he believes in his right to commit suicide? He might as wisely slaughter a pair of useful horses because they needed constantly to be controlled as, for a similar reason, to suppress his far more useful bodily desires.

If this be true, it is no wonder that extreme asceticism has always been joined to methods of thought and action that have been detrimental to the community in which it has been found. It has always been accompanied by a great distrust in the inherent instincts of human nature; and a disposition to oppose even the innocent tendencies of these with extreme violence which has been a fruitful source of cruelty and persecution. Even where opposition has stopped short of these, the theory underlying asceticism has, of itself, caused a great deal of depression and distress, especially among the young. Some of them, if honest, have been driven into skepticism or infidelity, and some, if dishonest, into pretense or hypocrisy. Such results have been occasioned by their recognizing that it is impossible for them to live up to the standards prescribed by the community or by the church in which they find themselves. They want to eat, drink, and be merry in a great many different ways which someone declares to be wrong. These may be wrong. A great many things in the world are so; but then again the particular phases of these that such people desire may be right, and may seem wrong merely because the standard by which they are judged was never warranted by nature or meant to be attained by a natural man.

The most remarkable thing about asceticism is that, with all the discomfort that it brings to those who practice it, and with all the evils that accompany its effects upon others, it can be so easily proved to be unnecessary. Bodily indulgence can be subordinated without suppressing bodily desires; and, perhaps, more readily than if attempts be made to suppress these. There have been innumerable cases illustrating this fact. For instance, take the changes that have been wrought in customs of society that once almost necessitated very gross forms of gluttony and drunkenness.

In the early ages of all nations—as among savages of our own time—whoever went to a feast was expected to treat himself very much as does a hibernating bear trying to take in at one time enough to last him for a whole winter. The man stuffed himself with food and got drunk to his utmost possibility. Even in England, three hundred years ago, one could not everywhere prove himself an appreciative guest unless he came prepared to spend the last of the night on the floor under the table. Why is it not so in our own time? What has changed these old customs? One influence certainly—and many would consider it the most important—has been the discovery made by people that, in connection with bodily desires, mental desires can also be indulged; and, besides this, that the latter, if associated with the former but, at the same time, given priority, can afford a degree even of physical gratification far more complete and satisfactory, as well as more worthy of manhood. These mental desires lead to what is termed good taste manifested both in the seasoning of the food and in its æsthetic setting, as shown in the linen, the porcelain, the silver, the service, the flowers, the company, the dressing, the gentlemen, the ladies. In a modern banquet, the appeal through the eye and ear, to the mental nature, while it joins with the appeal to the mere bodily nature, so overbalances the latter that hardly one person out of a score would have it suggested to him to think—much less to say—that he was in the presence only of “food” or “feeders.” Of course, the glutton or the drunkard sometimes makes his appearance amid such surroundings; but few fail to recognize that he is out of place there. Of course, too, there are tendencies to luxury and to other forms of self-indulgence in modern banquets that need to be corrected through a more extensive development of the influence of higher desire. But the difference between them and the orgies of the savage is sufficiently well marked to illustrate the principle involved.

The same could be illustrated, too, from many improvements that have taken place in other social directions. It is to higher desires which have not suppressed but have subordinated lower desires that we owe almost all the conditions which we term, by way of distinction, those of civilization,—not only the polite but the kindly courtesies of ordinary intercourse, the agreeable cleanliness and the

attractive surroundings of homes and schools, the public games, concerts, pageants, and other entertainments that afford recreation to exhausted energy, the literary and social gatherings, and the institutions of marriage, and of the church so far as the latter appropriates the influence of beauty in ritual, music, or architecture. Not one of these results would have been possible if, in the Middle Ages, the world had been led to accept and to try to realize the ideal of the ascetic monk with his empty stomach, his starved face, his foul clothing, or his unwashed body.

It seems a simple and easy solution of moral problems to say, in case an action tends to the wrong, "Suppress it altogether." But a solution may not be satisfactory for the very reason that it is simple and easy. Many a problem in geometry could be solved by drawing a line across a figure, as guided by the eye alone. But, if so solved, the object of presenting the problem would not be attained. So with moral problems. To suppress all actions tending to the wrong, would involve suppressing about all that there is in one's entire bodily nature. What bodily desire is there that, when indulged in to excess, does not necessitate doing wrong? There is also another and a stronger objection to this method,—it would suppress about the best agency that it is possible to employ for the development of the mental nature. And to secure the development of this is, if anything, the primary object of human existence. If all men could learn to act rationally and humanely—in other words, mentally—in view of every emergency, the end of existence would probably be obtained. But how could men ever learn this, in a world from which every opportunity for exercising and strengthening the power of mental control were eliminated? The elements of all our nature, bodily as well as mental, are means to ends; and in order to attain these ends, we need to feel the presence and influence of every one of the means. Why do so many of the followers of the Great Master of Galilee fail to recognize that, aside from circumstances attending the conditions of his age, there may have been a profound reason founded on the requirements of human nature, why he came, as he said, "eating and drinking" (Luke 7: 34) and, when he "went about doing good" (Acts 10: 38), so associated himself with all classes of people, in all their occupations and recreations, that it was possible for some to term him "a man



gluttonous and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners?" (Matt. 11: 19). How better could he have emphasized that which was the most important of the lessons that he had come to teach, namely,—that the quality of life on earth is determined not necessarily by particular actions, but by the general spirit actuating them; by one's being in the world, and yet not being of the world (John 17: 14-16); by his using and enjoying the use of his bodily nature, and yet never forgetting that it is always to be considered an agency through which primarily to express the desires and designs of the mental nature?

It is because of an endeavor to counteract mistaken, and what are recognized to be injurious effects of wrong conceptions with reference to this subject that we owe what appears to be the most prevalent tendency among the moral and religious reformers of our own times. It started with what was formerly termed "muscular Christianity," emphasizing the religious effect of having a vigorous body; and it has been continued in movements like those of the Salvation Army and Volunteers, reinforced by revivalists in almost every sect who have presented the most solemn appeals for betterment with a levity of phraseology and a lack of dignity in bearing which, a few years ago, would, in themselves, have been considered almost sure proofs of immorality to say nothing of irreligion. To-day, in our country, this conception has been changed. Without being able to formulate a reason for their thought, the majority of good people seem to have come to recognize that giving full credit to the mental, whether considered as the mindful or the soulful, does not necessitate doing discredit to the bodily; that geniality of spirit can, perhaps, be satisfactorily expressed in a silent smile, yet giving vent to a loud laugh that shakes the ribs, is no sin; that there may be an incongruity between our conception of a minister and of a mountebank, yet where it is necessary to emphasize the importance of having a cheerful spirit, even the latter may have his uses; that a man is not necessarily any farther from the kingdom than from the creation of God, because he may happen to be watching the antics of a monkey. A more sane and intellectual endeavor to counteract the emphasizing of the mental by the suppression of the bodily is manifested in organizations like the Young Men's or Women's Christian or Hebrew Associations, the Knights of Columbus,

and various other societies which, as if to advertise their emancipation from exclusive spirituality, are officered by laymen rather than by clergymen. To recognize that the conflict between bodily and mental desire can be made to cease, without unduly suppressing either, is to find a sound philosophical basis for the general conception that underlies all these movements and organizations. They are intended to remind people of the fact that in the conduct of life, the bodily as well as the mental has a part to play that must not be disregarded.

But while giving heed to this bodily tendency of desire, it is important not to place it above the mental. Many seem inclined to do this. There are families in which the selfishness of the small boy is welcomed as, of itself, a harbinger of success in life; and there are many more families in which the selfishness of a parent manifested in unsympathetic dictatorial meanness is hailed as a guarantee that he is giving the kind of discipline fitted to train his children to right habits of submission and obedience to authority. It is the methods partaking of selfishness that, perhaps, more frequently than others, are taken to be indicative of worldly wisdom. Very often, in effect, though, of course, not in unequivocal language, one seems to be asked why a man should not practice deception with reference to his own achievements or position, if, by doing so, he can enhance his influence? It is said that the results of his doing this are good even upon people who discover that he has misrepresented; that it trains them not to be dupes. It is asked why a man should not cheat, if, by doing so, he can make more money in his business? It is said that, in this way, he can train even those whom he defrauds to be financially cautious. It is asked why he should not deal harshly with his employees, and refuse to give them a living wage, if, by doing this, he can add to his own profits? It is said that, in this way, he trains men to efficiency and economy. It is asked why he should not profess to believe what he does not believe, and become a member of a popular church, if, by doing so, he can make himself popular? It is said that in this way he will do good by casting all his influence upon what most people suppose to be the right side. It is asked why he should not refuse to acknowledge acquaintance with the poor or uninfluential, if, by doing so, he can convey the impression that he himself associates

exclusively with the rich and the powerful? It is said that in this way he can exalt the social standing of his wife and daughters, and increase the attention given them. So one could continue and mention an almost innumerable number of wrong things that are not usually treated as wrong, in ordinary intercourse, business, employment, or church fellowship. Why are they not treated as wrong?—Because so many people have become accustomed to see some neighbor fulfilling the promptings of desires that are egoistic, deceptive, dishonest, stingy, hypocritical, mean, and, in short, unconscionably selfish that no one's manifestation of these traits awakens in them sufficient surprise to lead them to endeavor to oppose him, even though their own consciences would render it virtually impossible for them to follow his example.

As for mental desires, probably no right-minded, not to say sane man, would seriously argue that, when they conflict with bodily desire, they should be suppressed. From the beginning to the end of life almost everyone is aware that he is in need of making a mental use of the information and suggestions that come to him through the eye and ear. And when one considers not the primary but the secondary effects of influences exerted upon the mental nature, as exhibited in every form of unselfish devotion to the welfare of another, the need that humanity has of them becomes, if anything, still more apparent. The world would never have become more than half civilized, had it not been for the self-denying labors wholly divorced from even the suggestion of working for personal advantage manifested by scientific investigators, indefatigable physicians, poorly paid theologians, and enthusiastic artists and musicians without number so engaged in the pursuit of truth, philanthropy, or beauty as to ignore not only indulgence in bodily appetite or comfort but even in the most ordinary joys of companionship and appreciation. We can scarcely conceive of anything that would more threaten all that is of real value in life than a theory that would tend to suppress these higher desires.

At the same time, just as in the case of the bodily, the mental desires must not be the only ones to be indulged. Nothing is more detrimental to body or soul than the influence, either upon oneself or others, of an intellect so absorbed in what are believed to be higher pursuits, as to

forget that one himself or others about him need to be provided with bodily comfort such as is furnished by food, clothing, and shelter. The slatternly slip-shod household of the impecunious scholar, the self-conscious affrighted looks of the flock of the unsympathetic puritan parent, the odor of sanctity literally surrounding the ascetics who make it a rule never to be tempted into the bodily self-indulgence involved in cleaning oneself or his raiment, are not conducive of the highest attainments of either ethics or civilization.

We may conclude, therefore, that the right method of ending the conflict between bodily and mental desire does not involve the suppressing of either. What then does it involve? How can the proposed end be attained? The ancient Greeks used to emphasize the ethical importance of regulating conduct by what they termed "moderation." This, it was thought, if applied to such indulgences as have here been attributed to the promptings of bodily desire, would prevent excess; and that excess alone involved immorality. None of this, it was pointed out, was manifested in moderate drinking of wine or feasting at a banquet. Only in cases of immoderate indulgence, when a man showed himself to be a drunkard or a glutton, could he be termed immoral. This principle of moderation was rational and satisfactory, so far as it went; but a moment's thought will reveal that it was not sufficiently fundamental. It could apply to such indulgences only as were not in themselves wrong, but could become wrong on account of methods adopted in giving expression to them. Eating, for instance, is not wrong in itself, but it may become wrong when it is overdone. The same, however, cannot be said of many other actions, like those involving falsehood, theft, and certain forms of vice. It would not end the evil of a man's ways to make him merely a moderate liar, thief, or adulterer. But if we say that, when tempted to do the contrary, a man should keep the mental and rational uppermost, we announce a principle that can be applied to all cases. It applies to drunkenness and gluttony because these make a man too senseless or stupid to exercise mentality either of thought or feeling; and it applies to falsehood, theft, and vice because these are, in all cases, opposed to such forms of mentality as are influenced by truth that is universal, and tend toward action that is nonselfish.

It seemed well to mention this ancient Greek conception because it might naturally suggest itself here to some reader acquainted with the subject. But what has been said has not answered the question asked at the opening of the last paragraph. It has not explained how the end of keeping the mental uppermost, when this seems necessary, can be attained. At most it has shown merely that it cannot invariably be attained by moderation. But this statement is negative. Let us try to find something positive. The condition presented is that of two conflicting agencies; and the question to be solved is how can the two be made to act together in harmony. Before trying to answer this question, let us examine more carefully than has been done the influence, as related to the general effect, of each of the agencies in circumstances in which only one of them is acting. In such a case all will acknowledge that neither class of desires, whether bodily or mental, is expressive of more than a part of that which a man's nature demands. Neither can represent fully both his physical and his rational needs, and so long as he possesses both a body and a mind, the needs of neither can be rightly neglected. The fulfillment of only one desire, or one class of desires, can never bring that which can satisfy his whole being. This is true as applied to one's consciousness either of pleasure received or of duty performed. By neglecting a part of that over which his personality has been given control, he has both missed an opportunity for enjoyment and has committed what religious people term a "sin of omission." As manifested in such a case, too, this latter seems certain to involve also a "sin of commission." It seems to be a law of human life that one who starts out to fulfill the desire of no more than a single part of his complex nature, will continue to seek for the satisfaction that he has failed to get, not by turning to another desire, but by continuing to indulge, and so to overindulge, the one that has already proved itself unable to do that which was expected of it.

This over-indulgence is characteristic of a large number of men. Apparently, however, it is never characteristic of the lower animals. It is difficult to induce a dog or a horse to eat or to drink after he has once appeased his hunger or thirst. Only a man, after he has had enough, still tries to take in more. In order to enable him to do this, he

tickles and irritates, and often permanently diseases his organs. He spices and sugars his food, and becomes a glutton; he brews and distills his beverage, and becomes a drunkard; he abuses and wastes his powers of generation and becomes an imbecile; he smokes and dopes narcotics and opiates, and becomes a dullard; he violates the laws of labor, rest, or recreation, and becomes a thief, a vagabond, or a gambler. Ralph Waldo Emerson speaks of men having oversouls. There is no doubt about their often having over—or perhaps what might better be termed overreaching—desires; and it is safe to say that whenever one is allowing these to determine his course, he is doing what the majority of people consider to be clearly wrong. Men dispute about the right or wrong of many actions, but when it comes to gluttony, drunkenness, debauchery, theft, vagabondage, and fraud, they cease to dispute. With reference to the nature of these, they are in substantial agreement.

Nor is the influence of overreaching desires manifested in merely the primary form of self-indulgence which is experienced in appetite. It is manifested in the secondary forms of irrationality and selfishness. Of the seven capital sins, selected for special mention by the old Catholic theologians, only one could be considered merely bodily. This was gluttony. The others—excessive pride, luxury, wrath, idleness, avarice, and envy—were as much allied to mere irrational selfishness as to appetite. It is right enough for a man to have sufficient consciousness of self, with its various demands, and possibilities, to make him prudent, diligent, economical, enterprising, ambitious, and pushing, but his whole attitude of mind becomes wrong when the desires underlying these become overreaching. Then they make him cowardly, crafty, miserly, scheming, treacherous, and mean in other ways too numerous to mention.

Mental desire, too, may become overreaching, making its own the bodily methods of activity normally fitted to serve only bodily desire. In this case, mental desire may become abnormally and immorally subordinated to bodily tendencies. No man more dangerous to the welfare of society exists than the scientist, philosopher, or artist, whether painter, poet, dramatist, or novelist, who has indulged so selfishly in what might be termed the pure wine of thought as to become intoxicated by it in such a sense as to remain numb to every

other consideration. And nothing is more common among men, and wrong, than to excuse one of this sort, sometimes for following self-exploiting and impractical theories so far as to advocate principles underlying economic and political changes likely to disorganize and destroy conditions necessary to the peace and prosperity of the community; and sometimes for ignoring such merely bodily, in the sense of material, matters as paying one's debts, providing food and shelter for those dependent on one, avoiding excessive attentions to other men's wives, or, under the excuse of manifesting the eccentricities of genius, disregarding those conventionalities of society that are essential, if for nothing else, to avoid setting a demoralizing example. Even in religion, in a direction in which one might suppose that no desires could be overreaching, we find the same tendency. All of us know some—and in certain periods of history they have included many—religious people in whom the desire to pray, to attend church, and to partake of the sacraments has been so overreaching as to crowd out every other conception of spiritual obligation. Louis the Fourteenth of France, at the very time when he was living what could be termed a grossly immoral life, was attending three religious services, including one mass, every morning of the week. It is remarkable how many people who seem to have an almost fanatical desire to have somebody preach to them, absolve them from sin, or, through supposed spiritual agency, cure them of disease, are wholly indifferent to a large number of things for the correction of which, and for little else, a philosophical mind is apt to think that religion has value. Even some of those who tell us that, through reading the Scriptures, meditation, prayer, and other such means, they have reached a higher life of religious ecstasy full of comfort and consolation to themselves, now and then show such utter disregard not only of the material wishes and welfare, but of the spiritual development and uplift, of those surrounding them, that the only way in which the man most willing to acknowledge their piety could truthfully designate them would be to term them "spiritual misers." Human desires, as we have found, have a constant tendency to be overreaching, to crave satisfaction beyond that for which they are intended.

What has been said will reveal to us the cause of this. It

is owing to a lack of comprehensive conscientiousness, or consciousness of that which is due to every factor of human possibility. The very condition that has been noticed so frequently in these pages as existing in a man's nature—a condition in which bodily and mental desires are both in constant operation—necessitates a comprehensive outlook. Otherwise, when two desires, or sets of desires, are in conflict, both cannot receive attention. When they do receive this, the principle in accordance with which both influence the mind is that of balance or counterbalance. All of us are more or less acquainted with the effects of this principle and have been accustomed to hear it attributed to the results of intelligent action. Few of us can think of higher praise that can be given to a man's judgment than to term him "well balanced" or "level headed." These terms recognize the importance of one's being influenced, whether morally or not, from more than one side. They are never applied to a man accustomed to allow his passions, his impulses, or his whims to upset him; never to one who exhibits petulance, precipitance, or sentimentality, or is a slave to prejudice, fanaticism, or bigotry.

In ethics, inasmuch as the primary source of conduct, either right or wrong, is in the desires, it is among these that we must first look for the factors that balance one another. If a boy, because he has a sympathetic nature, join a gang, and engage with its members in drinking, gambling, or stealing, what he most needs is to be led to associate with others who do differently, and will lead him to desire to do differently. If a man, because he has an intellectual nature, live alone among his books, ignoring every prompting to unselfish sympathy and helpfulness for others, what he needs most is to be drawn into society where, perhaps, he may begin to desire friends and, possibly, a family of his own. Recall, too, that always included with the desire are all the possibilities of feeling or thinking, into which the desire may develop. This means that, if a man desire bodily indulgence, then bodily selfishness or irrationality may characterize any of his brain's activities, *i.e.*, of his inferences, plans, imaginings, or choices; and one of these may be counterbalanced not only by a mental desire, but by some inference, plan, imagining, or choice into which mental desire has developed. A man whose bodily indolence or intemperance has brought privation and shame to his



family and friends may be entirely reformed, therefore, by argument and facts appealing not directly to his mental desires, but to some intellectual or emotional development of them,—in other words, by an endeavor either to quicken his perception of mental truth in the abstract, to outline mental ideals for his imagination, or to impress upon him a recognition of mental responsibility to and for others.

Balance will be recognized to be not an end itself, but a means used for the purpose of attaining an end,—a method through which the will accomplishes the purpose of mental desire. It is through balance applied to his physical frame that a man, in walking, keeps his head uppermost and his form erect. Sometimes the balancing factors are very similar in appearance and importance. This is the case with a man's two arms or two legs that balance when he is walking. But, even when doing this, he is applying the principle of balance to his head and shoulders which differ greatly from the lower limbs whose effects these counteract; and this possibility of balance between things dissimilar is still more evident when one is dancing on a tight rope or exhibiting agility in athletics. The rule is that the more apparently unlike the balancing factors are, the more skill does it require to manage them successfully. Skill, as most of us know, is always the result of a thoughtful exercise of will-power. The reader will recognize that this is also what is needed in order to secure morality. Just as a man, by applying the principle of balance, can cause his body to stand straight and to keep his head uppermost, so, by applying an analogous principle to his moral nature, he can maintain his uprightness and make all its possibilities subordinate to that which is mental.

Now comes an important practical question. It is this,—how can this result be accomplished? When one considers the innumerable activities, all involving minute differences in the aims and ends of emotions, thoughts, and deeds, between which, in case morality is to be manifested in the whole character, mutual counteraction is needful, the problem seems too complex to render it feasible or possible to carry out the principle just explained. How, in every one of, perhaps, a hundred cases, can a man find time—to say no more—to judge of the moral quality of one course of action, or, as is often necessary, of two counterbalancing courses? And, after he has made a choice between the two,

what shall be said of the feasibility not of adopting one and rejecting the other, which would be a comparatively easy thing to do—a thing done by every ignorant fanatic or frenzied mob that the world ever saw—but of adopting both, yet keeping the expression of the one in all cases where it will rightly adjust itself to the other? At first thought it seems as if the requirements of the situation would demand the calculating powers of an Archimedes and the wisdom of a Solomon. Indeed, it is not difficult to find able books in which the practical solution of such problems is declared impossible. "Altruism and egoism," says Prof. A. E. Tayler (1869-), of St. Andrews University, in Chapter IV. of *The Problem of Conduct*, "are divergent developments from the common psychological root of primitive ethical sentiment." The reader will notice that, in making this statement, the writer has not recognized, as has been done in this book, that the egoistic develops from lower, not higher desire; and that many daily acts of conscience involve the subordination of the promptings of the former to those of the latter. Had he recognized this, his conclusions that follow might have been less pessimistic. He goes on to say, "Both developments are alike unavoidable, and each is ultimately irreconcilable with the other. Neither egoism nor altruism can be made the sole basis of moral theory without mutilation of the facts." This latter is exactly what has been maintained in this book; and it will suggest to the reader why a theory such as the book presents seems to be needed. The author of the *Problem of Conduct* goes on to say, "Nor can any higher category be discovered by the aid of which their rival aims may be finally adjusted." The answer to a statement like this is that their claims can be adjusted by the action of personal will influenced by rational desire and doing its best to increase the strength of rational desire which, naturally, and, in those well trained, inevitably, whenever it conflicts with bodily desire, appeals to consciousness as the more important of the two.

Now let us return to that from which this criticism diverted us,—the difficulty of coming to right conclusions where great complexity characterizes the motives and ends appealing to one. Of course, the important matter here is to simplify things as much as possible; and, as a rule, the best way of doing this is to get down deep enough into a subject to come into contact, if possible, with that which

underlies all its influences and determines all its applications. Even when dealing with merely the intellectual relationships of a subject, this course is frequently almost essential. One of the best of the books on elocution, consulted by the author, when he was preparing his *Orator's Manual*, contained almost a score of different rules for determining the use of the upward as distinguished from the downward inflection. Of course, such a number of rules could be of no practical availability to a pupil who had to decide upon an inflection the moment that he came upon it in rapid reading. What was needed was a single principle underlying each and all of the rules, which principle could be recognized and applied immediately as a result of his first thought, though, at the same time, capable of being examined, explained, and made more lucid, as a result of a process of thinking. It was the recognition on the part of the Master of Galilee of this need, and his ability to state such principles, as in "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you," "It is more blessed to give than to receive," "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much," that gave him his place not only as a great spiritual but a great intellectual leader. As suggested through these quotations, this method of imparting truth is especially effective when one is called upon to influence not merely another's opinions but his conduct. When a question of morals presents itself for immediate solution, a man often has no time to argue with reference to the consequences. However true the "teleological," the "utilitarian," the "eudaimonian," the "greatest happiness," or other theories may be, they fail in such circumstances to meet the emergency. They are not, as we say, practical. They involve too much delay. Let us turn then, some may say, to the instinctive or the intuitive theory,—to something presupposing immediate action. But this again would not meet the conditions. An ethical system must include a consideration not only of that which can prompt to right in an emergency but can prove what is right in an argument. The short statements just quoted were fitted not only for immediate recognition, but they have furnished texts for millions of extended discourses. This is the same as to say that such statements were fitted to appeal to the action of the mind preceding the processes of reasoning, and also to its action accompanying and fol-

lowing these processes. The same must be true of the successful appeal to the mind of any ethical influences.

Now let us notice how perfectly both these requirements, as applied to conflicting desires within the mind, can be fulfilled by using the method which, when applied analogously in material relationships, is termed *balance*. What is it that causes a man to balance the different muscles and limbs of his physical body sufficiently to enable him to stand straight and walk? How, as a child, did he learn to do this?—Instinctively, not so? Nobody explained the processes to him. Without, as we say, understanding what he did, he felt his way to the results. But, when he grew older, and wanted to carry this method of balance to what we may term artistic perfection, what did he do? He experimented by himself, and learned from others. He became an expert, not as a result of instinctive or spontaneous feeling alone, but of processes also of observing, reasoning and, in short, thinking.

Can this analogy between learning to balance factors that are physical and to balance one factor that is physical by another that is psychical hold good when we come to examine more minute and complex developments of our subject? An answer to this question will be given in the chapter following. In it an endeavor will be made to show that, in contrast to the consciousness of conflict between higher and lower desires which has been attributed to what is termed conscience, it is natural and logical that a man should, at times, experience a consciousness also of an absence of conflict. This consciousness, analogous to the undisturbable poise of an athlete when all the conflicting sources of energy in his body are in perfect balance, will be attributed to what will be termed ethical harmony; and the correspondence between the method exemplified in it and in æsthetic harmony will be indicated, as well as the reasons why, in each department, the results, in view of the underlying requirements, can be considered natural and logical.

## CHAPTER XI

### ANALOGIES BETWEEN HARMONY IN ÆSTHETICS AND IN ETHICS

The Term Harmony is often Applied to Moral Conditions—Similarity of the Influences Tending to Æsthetic and to Ethical Harmony—Explanation of Arrangements Producing Æsthetic Harmony—Art Composition, Beauty, and Moral Character all Connected with Subordinating the Bodily or Material to the Mental or Rational—This Produces, First, an Effect of Order—Other Effects thus Produced—Other Analogies—Embodiment of Ideals—Harmony is Produced by Arrangement, not Suppression—It Affects Sensation aside from the Understanding—Can be Recognized by Ordinary Human Intelligence—By Natural Inference—Studying the Subject Increases Ability to Apply it—Its Principles Applicable to Courses of Action as well as to Specific Acts—Effects of Ethical Harmony between Desires, as of Æsthetic Harmony between Methods, Produced by Influences Essentially Non-selfish—The Results of Ethical Harmony Conform to every Requirement of Sociology and Religion as well as of Rationality.

THAT there is a close analogy between æsthetic harmony and the condition of the mind in which higher and lower desires have been made to work in unison, is a conception that has been frequently expressed by writers upon ethics. Plato, for instance, suggests it in the Fourth Book of *The Republic*, where he speaks of the temperate man "in whom the lower and higher souls are in harmony." George Combe (1788-1858) of Edinburgh University, in Section I, of his *Moral Philosophy*, says: "I consider the virtue of an action to consist in its being in harmony with the dictates of all the faculties acting in harmony and duly enlightened." Professor John Abercrombie (1780-1844) in Part III., Sec. 2, of *The Philosophy of Moral Feeling*, refers to "the harmony or principle of arrangement which various classes of emotion ought to bear

toward one another," and, most clearly and satisfactorily of all, Professor Frank Thilly (1865-) in Chapter IX. of his *Introduction to Ethics* declares that "the end is the development of body and mind in harmony with each other, the unfolding of all powers and capacities of the soul, cognitive, emotional, and volitional, in adaptation to both physical and psychical requirements." Let us, in this chapter, consider a little more fully than seems yet to have been done some of the philosophical and practical bearings of this conception.

Harmony is a term usually applied to certain effects of arrangement. This arrangement is sometimes found in nature,—occasionally in sounds, but more often in sights, as in the groupings of outlines or colors in flowers, trees, valleys, or mountains; or, as in the symmetrical proportions or balance of features in the frames or faces of men or animals. As a rule, however, harmony is not an effect produced by nature but by man, who rearranges that which he hears or sees in accordance with principles which he has developed and formulated in what is termed art. Art is a distinctly human product,—a result of human as distinguished from animal intelligence. To say this is the same, according to what has been hitherto unfolded in this volume, as to say that art is a result of the thoughtful action that distinguishes a man from an animal. It is this action, rearranging physical or bodily appearances—*i.e.*, the sights and sounds of nature—that changes their effects of confusion and discord into those of order and harmony. An exactly similar influence of the thoughtful upon the bodily occasions morality. This is an effect produced by the non-physical in mind upon one's own physical body (including his brain), or upon both the mental and the physical combined that exist in the bodies (including the brains) of others. See p. 4.

In the author's *Genesis of Art-Form* there is a chart which will be found reproduced on page 143. This chart was originally prepared that it might show the ways in which the earliest conceptions of the mind, intent upon expressing a thought in an external sound or sight taken from physical nature, pass through successive stages until they have manifested every phase of artistic embodiment, ending in what is termed harmony of tone and color. Of course, all the chart's applications to art-composition cannot be understood by the reader unless he has made a special study

## \* METHODS OF ART-COMPOSITION.

*Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of the Mind.**Mainly conditioned upon Mind.**Mind.* UNITY.*Matter.* ORDER.*Matter.*

VARIETY.

CONFUSION.

*Mind and Matter.* } *Mind and Matter.*

COMPLEXITY.

COUNTERACTION. } GROUPING.

*Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of Matter.**Mind.* COMPARISON.*Matter.* PRINCIPALITY.

CONTRAST.

SUBORDINATION.

COMPLEMENT.

BALANCE.

} ORGANIC FORM.

*Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of the Product.**Mind.* CONGRUITY.

" CENTRAL POINT.

INCONGRUITY. COMPREHENSIVENESS.

SETTING.

PARALLELISM.

} SYMMETRY.

DURATION  
IN TIME.  
EXTENSION  
IN SPACE.  
ACCENT  
IN STRESS AND  
LINE.RHYTHM  
AND  
PROPORTION.*Matter.* REPETITION.

" MASSING.

ALTERATION. ALTERNATION.

INTERSPERSION.

COMPLICATION.

} CONTINUITY.

QUALITY  
AND  
PITCHHARMONY  
IN TONE AND  
COLOR.*Mind and Matter.* CONSONANCE.

DISSONANCE.

INTERCHANGE.

GRADATION.

ABRUPTNESS.

} PROGRESS.

COLOR.

\* This blending in different art-effects of the influences of mind and matter, finally culminating in æsthetic harmony of tone or color, is used here to suggest an analogous blending in personal action of mental and bodily influences culminating in ethical harmony of character. See page 142.

of it; but the general principles involved are very easily grasped.

The chart will show us that art-composition begins with an effort<sup>18</sup> to continue the life and influence of a thought, which, when started in the mind, is unseen and unheard, by expressing it in a visible or audible material form. All expression on the part of a human being—even that which represents what is moral in conduct—is an effort in a similar direction. This effort begins, as indicated in the chart with the *mind*, and has to do throughout with the effects of the mind upon matter. What the mind wants to do is to give outward expressions in sounds or sights of such a nature that its thought will appear clear and intelligible to others owing to its singleness and simplicity; important and convincing to them owing to its insistence and reiteration; and, in case it be artistic, attractive and beautiful to them owing to the form with which imagination and imitation can cause it to be represented and embodied. The first aim of the mind, as indicated in the chart, is to find some one thing in material nature representing one thought,—a *stone*, for instance, representing *hardness*, or, contrasted

<sup>18</sup> The difficulty in accomplishing the object of the effort, so far as this is expended upon art, arises from the fact that the laws and conditions controlling the associations and sequences of thoughts in the mind are different from those controlling the associations and sequences of things in external nature. Because one thought—if we can imagine one thought as existing by itself—can be represented adequately and easily by one thing—*i.e.*, by one word, act, or object—it will not do to infer that the same can be said of many associated and consecutive thoughts. In external nature, things are often side by side or follow one another, while yet only one of them bears any relation to the thought that is in the mind. This is one reason why an effect of variety is universally attributed to nature. If a relationship of thought between adjacent or consecutive sounds or sights could always be perceived, variety would not be so much in evidence. As it is, nature seems characterized by it; and the thinker, whether he wish to understand and explain it as a scientist, or to imitate and use it for the purposes of expression as a painter or a musician, recognizes in it more or less confusion and disorder. He recognizes, too, that, as in the case of a disorderly writing desk or room, the remedy is to sort the different objects, and, putting together things that are alike, arrange them so that they shall have an orderly effect. A painter may mentally put together living creatures that are alike, and term them birds or beasts, doves or dogs. A musician may put together sounds of the same pitch, and term them A or B, or Do or Re, and so on. From the beginnings of order thus produced by an exercise of comparison, art goes on to develop the methods mentioned in the chart.



with it, a *sponge* representing *softness*. Then, to express the thought without the possibility of misrepresentation, the mind needs to illustrate it by getting together more things like *stones* or *sponges*. In other words, the first aim of the mind, in accomplishing its work of expression, is to find certain things in nature that, as indicated in the chart, produce *unity* of effect. If these things can be found, then one mind can make another mind understand what is meant by *hardness* or *softness*. Unfortunately, however, the first characteristic of matter that confronts the mind is—not *unity*—but *variety*. Notice the indication of this fact in the chart, and also that, from this point onward, the chart represents every advance toward harmony as being made by way of the principle underlying *balance*, though in the chart itself, this word, in a technical sense, is not used before we come to the fourth line. For instance, it is by bringing together *unity* and *variety*, and striking, as we say, a balance between them, that we get the idea of *complexity*. In the same way, *order* and *confusion* together suggest *counteraction*; *comparison* and *contrast*, *complement*; and *principality* and *subordination*, as in the head pitted against the legs of a man dancing on a tight rope, suggest, as indicated on page 137 *balance*, and this, as in the case of a house or of a church with doors, windows, tower, or dome symmetrically arranged, suggests *organic form*. Finally, when we come to giving like effects to unlike sounds and shapes by putting them into like measures of time or space, we get *rhythm* and *proportion*, together with those results of coalescing vibrations in which science has discovered the underlying causes of harmony of tone and color.

These methods, although, in the chart, applied to art-composition alone, are allied to those through which mental processes of thought and emotion are represented through any material forms; and they are identical with those needed in order to produce effects of beauty.<sup>19</sup> Harmony characterizes the cause, and beauty the effect, of conditions that are the same. Neither realizes its full possibilities except where there is a combination of a mental or rational ideal with a bodily or physical form of expression. What

<sup>19</sup> See Chap. I. of the Author's *Genesis of Art-Form*; Chap. XII. of his *Art in Theory*; Chaps. XIV.—XVIII. of his *Essentials of Æsthetics*, and almost the whole of *Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, and *Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*.

beauty is to human art, moral character is to human life. This conception is at the basis of the grouping together, of which we often hear, of "the beautiful and the good," indeed of *The True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, to quote the title of one of the books of Victor Cousin (1792-1867). In a broad way, all these may be said to be connected with the conception of harmony. In nature, a man sometimes finds objects to copy that are beautiful in themselves. In this case, as in what are termed symmetrical proportions in the human form, or regular features in the face, it is because, as a result of growth, they fulfill the requirements of harmony. But a large part of the work of the artist lies in arranging features, like outlines, tones, and colors that do not appear beautiful in nature, so that, by making them fulfill the requirements of harmony, they shall appear beautiful in art. Why are we not justified in applying the same principles to character? Some characters—and they are those that men are most likely to term beautiful—are naturally harmonious. Others have to be made so by moral culture.

The chart indicates that the primary endeavor in securing harmony, so far as it is applicable to the bodily factors, is *order*. It is not necessary to do more than point out that the same fact is true in ethics. No moral statement has been more universally accepted than the declaration of the Apostle Paul, in 1 Cor. 10; 23, that "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient,"—in other words, that any deed may be right if done when and where it should be done; that anything is *in order* if only it be kept in its own place. The same soil represented in a painting, if it be on a child's face, may make him seem ugly and disgusting, but if it be under his feet, it may make him seem beautiful and attractive.

The other methods mentioned in the chart are, many of them, technical, and are not applicable except in the connection in which they are there used. This would naturally be the case with terms prepared for only an æsthetic discussion. No one can glance at them, however, without recognizing that many of them refer to traits as desirable in human character as in human art,—terms, for instance, like principality, subordination, balance, congruity, comprehensiveness, symmetry, and progress.

Other facts also that are true of æsthetic harmony reveal

the parallelism between it and what is demanded in ethics. In both departments every development follows upon the expression of a single mental conception in a single bodily or physical form. In art, for instance, the conception of interrogation is represented in an upward movement of the voice; that of opposition, in a clinched fist; that of support, in a curved arch. In conduct, the conception of meanness may be represented in an insulting phrase, or that of haughtiness in an averted glance or an upturned chin. In both departments, again, the course of the development does not cease until it has been applied to factors innumerable in number and well-nigh infinitely complicated. Harmony of tone or color, for instance, results from putting together, in accordance with the same principles manifested in all the other methods, such sounds and sights as are produced by like numbers or multiples of like numbers of vibrations. These vibrations are so minute that hundreds and even trillions of them may follow one another in a single second. The computation of them is beyond the possibility of discovery by ordinary observation. Only science has been able to accomplish the task. Probably, everybody will be ready to acknowledge that the same principle is illustrated in ethics. Character, to be all that it should be, must be able to stand the test not only of a few single actions the right and wrong of which are clearly evident to superficial observation, but of continued and habitual action, involving a consideration of small details almost as minute and complicated as those entering into the effects of art.

Again, harmony in art is a result not only of grouping together small details but of combining them so that they shall produce unity of effect: so that, taken together, they shall appear consistent parts of the embodiment of a single important ideal. This is true as applied not only to a painting or statue, but to a building or a musical composition. What the artist has to do is, first of all, in his own mind to conceive of an ideal characterized by beauty sufficient to excite his emotions, and then he has to work hard in order to make every feature of his product a harmonious part of this embodiment. In the same way, a moral man's good ideals and emotions usually antedate his good deeds. Whenever we recognize that this is the case, and that his controlling desires are predominantly those of the mind, we are accustomed to judge and to say that the one who is gov-

erned by them is a "good man." But sometimes we cannot say of even such a man that his thoughts are wise, or his deeds commendable. Why not?—Because we perceive, and have to acknowledge, a detrimental influence that has been exerted upon them by the intellect and will through which, before being outwardly expressed, they have been obliged to pass. The fact that this influence has been exerted does not show that, in our conception of conscience, we should include the consideration of the actions of both intellect and will, as suggested in the definitions in footnote 5 page 63. If anything, it shows the contrary. Men who go astray merely because of what are clearly perceived to be defects of intellect or will are never held accountable either by themselves or by others for what are supposed to be violations of the laws of conscience. We may be indignant with a physician or surgeon who makes a wrong diagnosis or incision, and kills his patient. But we never think of sending him to a reformatory to be converted, or to a gallows to be hung. We recognize that he is not a moral delinquent, that probably he is not to be blamed for anything more serious than ignorance, stupidity, or lack of skill. Such considerations should convince us that we should not confound conscience, which awakens in a man a sense of obligation and a prompting toward the right in general, with intellect and will, which, in special cases, enable him to direct this prompting wisely and efficiently. At the same time we should never forget that all departments—if we may so term them—of the mind are closely connected. What characterizes inward conscience very soon comes to characterize outward conduct. That which is mental in desire cannot dominate the bodily in such a way as to produce a consciousness of inward harmony, without exerting great influence upon intellection and volition. This is the theory in accordance with which the thoughts presented in this volume have been thus far, and are hereafter to be, unfolded. Whether a man be judged by some single action, or by a course of action continued through a long interval of time, the test through which to determine his moral character is this: that his body's desires have been harmonized with his mind's desires through being subordinated to the latter's expressional requirements. As was explained on pages 4 and 20–22, by the word *mind*, as used in this book, is meant the source not merely of the cognitional as distinguished from the sensational, but also of

the rationally non-selfish, the humane, the altruistic, and the spiritual, as distinguished from the thoughtlessly self-indulgent, brutal, egoistic, and material, all of which latter are considered developments of the bodily and the physical.

In many other important regards the results of æsthetic harmony and of what may be termed ethical harmony are analogous. Notice that, as applied in any department, harmony indicates the ending of conditions occasioning conflict through using other means than suppressing a contesting source of activity. There is a great difference between the results of harmony and those of triumph, victory, or conquest. These latter involve mastery on the part of one of the contending parties or factors and the overthrow or enslavement of the other. After this effect has been produced, there may be a cessation of conflict, but there never can be thoroughly satisfactory or enduring peace. This, when worth having, can result only from some arrangement, adjustment, or assimilation that recognizes the rights of all the contending parties, and does proportionately equal justice to each of them. Where this result is reached, we are accustomed to say that the factors that have been in conflict have been harmonized. But, as brought out in Chapter IX., this is exactly what is done when the differences between desires of the body and of the mind have been adjusted ethically.

Notice, too, that, ethical, like æsthetic effects, are experienced, in large measure, at least, in the sensitive and emotional nature, before they make a distinct appeal to the rational understanding. The art-lover judges and works as guided by feeling and sentiment long before he proceeds, through methods of thought, to ascertain whether effects of tone or color fulfill æsthetic requirements as these have been systemized by science. Of course, the reasons for many—perhaps for all—of these requirements may be ascertained and explained; and a study of the subject may greatly increase an artist's ability to conform to them. But before and aside from any exercise of mere understanding, the ears and eyes must be able to recognize their results; and, were one deaf or blind and were he, for this reason, to fail to experience the sensation of harmony, no explanation could furnish a substitute for it. According to what has been said, exactly the same principle applies to ethics. The desires in conflict which occasion the disorder that needs

to be alleviated themselves involve feelings; and it is of them, and of the necessity of doing something to put an end to the discomfort that they occasion, that a man is first conscious; and if harmony results, it is amid his desires that he first experiences its influence.

Notice, again, that, as in æsthetic harmony, that which may be termed ethical can be experienced by anyone who possesses only ordinary human intelligence. It is not a perquisite of "the wise and prudent" alone, as seems to be the case with some of the results in consciousness seemingly required by certain phases of the teleological and utilitarian theories. Harmony or discord in music can be recognized when produced upon an instrument of six strings, like a guitar; or of eighty or more, like a piano. So with harmony or discord in moral results. The fully cultivated man of many talents, able to respond to that which comes from many sources of information, may give a more intelligent and complete expression to the feeling awakened by conscience, because able with more effectiveness to apply it to more subjects; but the feeling in itself alone may be no more clearly recognized by him than by the most uneducated child or inexperienced savage. This is a fact which, as applied to ethics, needs, especially in our times, to be strongly emphasized. The present influence of science and the predominating appeal to intellect have directed the attention of people, not too largely perhaps, but certainly too exclusively, to the importance of imparting, to the young and ignorant, information and explanation. In their way these may greatly strengthen and develop one's character. But, as already intimated in another place, to suppose that they are absolutely essential to elementary morality is to make a grave mistake. Before receiving instruction, even when a child, one often recognizes from mere feeling that his own nature is out of harmony, and not only this, but the reason for it. Is it some nervous bodily temper that overcomes him? In the humiliation that he experiences, he himself appears often to be able to recognize that what he needs is to be more thoughtful; *i.e.*, to fulfill the mental requirements within him. Is it a bodily craving for food, or for exercise, which causes excesses of appetite or of play, and, when one grows older, turns him into a drunkard, a gambler, a defaulter, a debauchee, a degenerate? In the pain and shame that he experiences, he, too, seems to

recognize that what he needs is to be made more thoughtful, to get into a condition, and to continue in it, where his reason and judgment can act clearly and authoritatively,—in other words, where he can fulfill mental requirements, and, by so doing, make a man and not a beast of himself. Or, again, is he overcome by an impulse to possess and to use for his own exclusive benefit that which in the material world environs the physical body? Is he tempted to obtain comfort, honor, position, property, control, and immunity from the opposition of those surrounding him, and, therefore, to ignore, discredit, deceive, defraud, oppress, oppose, or kill his fellows? He himself, aside from what he can hear or learn from others, cannot fail often to feel that, in doing these things, he is not exercising thought with reference to his own interests or those of his neighbors,—in other words again, is not fulfilling the mind's requirements. In fact, there is hardly anything connected with the conditions or activities of a human being which does not naturally and logically suggest the necessity for the dominance of mind and the subordination of the body. This is true as applied even to that which is represented through the mere appearance of his human form. His head is uppermost, and in it are the eyes and ears that most directly minister to the higher nature. Next in importance in serving the same nature, and immediately below it, is the breast, the seat of the heart and lungs, and, connected with it, the arms and hands. Lower down are the distinctly bodily or physical organs of digestion and propagation and, lowest of all, the legs and feet, whose chief function seems to be to carry eyes, ears, mouth, and hands to places where they can be made to do that which the mind demands.

Another fact with reference to æsthetic harmony that is paralleled by that which is true of ethical harmony, is that, while it can be enjoyed and to a limited extent produced by one who has not made a special study of the subject, nevertheless such study can greatly increase a knowledge of the principles underlying the subject and ability to apply them in practice. It was said on page 142 that artistic harmony is a product of a man as distinguished from a lower animal—a distinctive product, in other words, of the human mind. This implies that in addition to the feeling which, as has been said, recognizes, as it were, instinctively the presence or absence of harmony, its completed results,

such as are manifested in the works of the great composers, always involve, in connection with feeling, other thoughtful activities of which the mind is capable. The principles of musical harmony have been studied already for more than twenty-five centuries; and even yet its possibilities have not all been developed. The same is true of the principles of morality. It has been argued in this volume that the influence upon them of desire, and, therefore, of the feeling or emotion in desire is primary and universal; but it has also been reiterated many times that in every desire the thinking mind coöperates with this feeling or emotion. Both these conceptions can be held at one and the same time without either belittling the importance of that which is derived from feeling or exaggerating the importance of that which is derived from intellection. If we had no people prompted by feeling, or by natural instinct, as we say, to become musical or moral, we should have none who would become so through culture; and there would be no high achievements in either of the two directions.

It is important to bear in mind, too, that these desires of the mind, as has already been intimated, are needed to counteract not merely some single cases of wrong doing to which one is suddenly and unexpectedly impelled, but to counteract complicated courses of action with which these sudden acts are necessarily connected, and of which they might be said to be expected developments. This fact, too, seems to be indicated in the experiences of the very young. Those periods of depression and melancholy through which large numbers pass just at the time when they are leaving childhood and entering upon early manhood and womanhood are not caused, as a rule, by a conflict of desires occasioned by some single temptation. They are caused by the general condition of conflict now, for the first time, plainly recognized as within themselves, as existing between their own personal higher and lower desires. Up to this time in life, the normal child has been guided by his parents and teachers. Their influence upon him has been sufficient, if not to subordinate for him his lower desires, at least to rid him, in part, of the feeling that he himself should be responsible for subordinating them. When he recognizes that this responsibility is thrust upon himself alone, he not infrequently goes through an experience like that represented by the story in the New Testament of Jesus when tempted in



the wilderness by the devil (See Matt. iv., 1-9), and the only satisfactory way, often, of putting an end to such experiences is to make a deliberate choice, indefinite often as applied to particular actions, yet very definite as applied to general conduct, that all life hereafter shall be based upon the principle of subordinating, so far as seems necessary, the bodily to the mental, the irrational to the reasonable, the material to the spiritual. This is a principle influencing, as we have found, first the desires themselves, and, subsequently, as a rule, all the psychical activities through which they can find expression. The principle may not come to be fulfilled until after years of indecision and consequent mental disturbance and unhappiness. But sometimes the result may follow almost immediately, and when the relationship between lower and higher desire is once determined, many keen observers hold to the opinion that it is likely to be determined then and there for all time.

Finally, it is well to emphasize here once more the fact that the influence of æsthetic harmony is always non-selfish (see page 20). Works of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, or architecture may be purchased or stolen and kept where others cannot see or hear them; but there is no reason in nature why this should be the case. Millions of people may derive their fill of delight or inspiration from them without lessening in the least that which could be imparted to only one of their number. It is the same with the effects of what has here been termed ethical harmony as produced between conflicting tendencies in character. The man whose bodily nature has been adjusted to the requirements of his higher mental and rational nature brings profit and pleasure not only to himself but to all by whom he is surrounded. They enjoy life with him no less than he enjoys his own life. This is the fundamental truth underlying the injunction, often repeated by writers like Goethe and Emerson, urging upon individuals the duty above all things of self-culture. The injunction may be interpreted to mean a culture of selfishness; but never by one whose conception of that which should dominate is the higher and better self, and whose conception of culture is that which is imparted to the bodily by the rational.

To a man who has this conception, harmony within one's own spirit will be recognized to be only a prelude necessarily followed by harmony between different spirits. As the

thoughts and emotions of the mind are developed from that which is communicated through the eyes and ears (see page 20), nothing external to the man can be excluded from the mind's range of that which is fitted to influence higher desires. Every surrounding object attaches him to the universe outside of him of which he seems a part; while, at the same time, he seems a partner with every living being that inhabits it. From the theory here presented, all that is true in the systems that emphasize the obligations arising from one's relations to others and from the sense of national or universal brotherhood follows as a corollary. The theory does not lessen one's conception of the duty of striving for the welfare of his fellows; but, in connection with this, it emphasizes two other conceptions that some of the merely altruistic systems are inclined to ignore. Because the mental includes the rational, it emphasizes the intellectual as well as the spiritual; and, because where necessary the mental subordinates the bodily in personal character, it emphasizes the benefit imparted by morality to the individual himself as well as by himself to others of his community. There is, however, and should be noticed, an exceptional condition to which the principles just stated do not apply. It is illustrated in cases of emergency, as in warfare, which seem to call for complete self-sacrifice,—cases in which a hero not only imperils but surrenders his own life in order to save that of another. What seems to be true of such cases is that they transcend the fulfillment of merely moral obligation. They conform to religious prompting. They prove that the agent, whatever he may say of his own beliefs, down deep in his soul, possibly unconsciously to himself, has an overmastering faith in the existence of a life after death. Fortunately, however, Providence demands this form of self-sacrifice only rarely. As a rule, what most men most often need is the discipline that comes from their remaining in the world. Otherwise, they would not be in it. Conversely, too, what the world about them most often needs is the rational mode of life to which their own everyday example is fitted to incite their fellows.

## CHAPTER XII

### DESIRES OF THE MIND AND OF THE BODY AS INFLUENCED BY OBSERVATION, EXPERIENCE, AND INFORMATION

Recapitulation—Practical Applications of our Subject to be Considered First in their General Relations to all Actions—Effort Needed in Order to Strengthen the Desires of the Mind—That which Appeals to the Mind as Desirable—It is Ascertained through Observation, Experiment, and Information—Observation as Influencing Imitation—Training Imparted by Environment—Through Effects of which One is not Conscious—Influence of Suggestion—Strongest when its Results Appear Desirable in Themselves or so because Presented by One Personally Admired—Need of Caution in Choosing Associations—Opportunities for Influence Need to be Appropriated—Mistakes of Asceticism—Puritanism—Its Fundamental Conception—That which is Desirable as Ascertained through Experiment—Actions Tend to Repeat Themselves—Especially Actions Involving Morality—Guilt Determined by Quality not Quantity of Action—Molding Character by Causing Repetitions of Actions—Not Successful when Undesirable Acts are Repeated—That which is Desirable as Ascertained through Information—The Most Intelligent not the Most Moral—Moral Effects Depend upon the Influence Exerted upon Desire—and upon the Unconscious as well as Conscious Mind—What Determines the Moral Effects of Information—Mistakes of Modern Methods of Imparting Information; Newspapers—Novels, Plays, and Moving Pictures—Moral Studies in Schools—Influences to Inspire Higher Desire Should Accompany Information.

THE logical inference from the line of thought unfolded thus far in this volume is that moral character is determined primarily by the character of the desires that underlie and animate conduct. Some of these desires are largely or entirely of the body and some are largely or entirely of the mind; and the two classes of desire are often antagonistic, causing a man to be conscious, as in what is termed conscience, of a conflict between them. This conflict, before the mind can experience that peace which it

naturally craves, needs to be made to cease; and it has been shown that this result can be best attained not through the suppression of either class of desires, but, by bringing about a condition in which both classes can work together in harmony. It has been shown, too, that harmony is a result achieved in the degree in which desires are exercised in such ways that, when two conflict, the one that is more largely of the mind outweighs by its influence and keeps in subordination the one that is more largely of the body.

Having reached this theoretical conclusion, we are prepared now to discuss the more practical applications of our subject. In the present chapter these will be considered in their general relations to all actions; and in subsequent chapters in their special relations to particular actions. Under each head also, in fulfillment of the trend of thought on page 154, and of the method hitherto adopted in this volume, inferences will be drawn with reference to conduct as exercised both toward oneself, or in behalf of one's own interests, and toward others, or in behalf of their interests.

In accordance with this plan, our first thought is most naturally suggested by the emphasis that has been placed upon the influence of desires in general. If these, in the degree in which they incline toward the right or wrong, determine, as brought out in Chapter III., the right or wrong trend of a man's whole nature, then the most important general contribution that he can make toward the practical fulfillment of moral obligation is to cultivate what in the preceding chapters has been termed a harmonious condition of desires in himself and in others over whom he may be able to exert influence. Moreover, if this harmonious condition result, as indicated in Chapter XI., from the degree in which, whenever different classes of desires are in conflict, those that are bodily are kept in subordination to those that are mental, then, in so far as this is not the case, an effort is needed in order to develop and strengthen the latter desires.

It is only uttering a truism to say that all desires, whether bodily or mental, are directed toward the attainment of certain ends because these appeal to consciousness as desirable. They may appear to be thus directed, either because they are supposed to bring a passive form of satisfaction, as when something is felt to be fitting or appropriate (see page 95), or an active form of enjoyment. In the former case there might be only a mild experience of contentment; and in the

latter there might be a wild exuberance of delight. Some, in certain circumstances, would prefer the former to the latter; but nothing that could not find a place for itself between these two extremes could ever, by any possibility, appear desirable. To be able to do this, it must give promise of affording satisfaction or enjoyment; and, if it awaken a desire in conflict with another, which should be subordinated, as is the condition where the mental and the bodily are in antagonism, then that which appeals to the former of these should give promise of more satisfaction or enjoyment than does the latter. This truth is the one that is supposed to justify the "greatest happiness" theory. But the word happiness is not sufficiently comprehensive in its meaning. Satisfaction indicates what is broader. It may exist, as in cases of self-denial and self-sacrifice, where there is very little that could be termed happiness.

Now let us consider the methods through which the mind comes to recognize what it is that is desirable,—what it is that, when one is choosing, gives promise of more or less satisfaction or enjoyment. In answer, we shall find three such methods that are in constant use and are particularly prominent. These are observation, experience, and information,—that which a man notices in others, that which he derives from his own experiments, and that which he obtains from hearsay.

Observation antedates all other mental response to the influence of the outside world. It is necessarily so with children, but it is naturally so, too, with grown people. No other fact can account for the similarity in customs, costumes, sentiments, opinions, tastes, and judgments that characterize all the members of the same communities. This similarity is manifested often even among those who do not seem to derive personal satisfaction from the courses adopted, nor approve of them intellectually. It is apparently extremely difficult to prevent large numbers of people from imitating those about them, no matter how many arguments against doing this might be drawn from their own experience or from information imparted by others. Boys in America, for instance, because they observe that large numbers of men think smoking desirable, learn to smoke themselves, notwithstanding the nausea that accompanies their earliest experiments in this direction, and the universal testimony of teachers and physicians that in youth tobacco

weakens the brain and, both in youth and in age, the heart. A few years ago, young women in America squeezed their waists and in China their feet, notwithstanding their own experience of great discomfort in the one case, and of great agony in the other, and the testimony of other people to inform them with reference to future disease or cripplement awaiting such practices.

Perhaps the majority of the results of thinking and acting that become what is termed conventional are trained into men by imitation of that which they observe—a fact which one should bear in mind whether he be considering his actions as related to his own development or to that of others. Nor must it be supposed that it is the young or the weak-minded alone who are thus influenced. The author met James Russell Lowell shortly after his return to America, subsequent to his Ambassadorship to England. He was at that time over seventy years of age. Yet during the few years in which he had lived abroad, he had acquired not only a decided English accent, but a rolling of the *r* that might justifiably be ascribed to an English “brogue.” Another example: There is no one in America to whom greater power of originality and initiative could be rightly attributed than to the late Theodore Roosevelt. When he was about thirty years of age he told the author that he had made up his mind not to live any longer on his Western ranch. His reason was that he had found that the surroundings there had a tendency to unfit a man for conditions in the East, where he thought that, on the whole, his own work ought to be done. Of course, he was referring to only mental surroundings. But if a man of his strength of character could refer to these in such language, how much more reason would an ordinary man have to refer in like manner to moral surroundings!

Every child and every person, too, in mature life should be taught to bear in mind constantly the importance of placing and keeping oneself, so far as possible, in an environment tending to strengthen and increase the efficiency of his own highest desires. All of us—sometimes even when very young—are aware that certain places and persons, certain forms of recreation and occupation, are likely of themselves to have upon the one who chooses them an uplifting moral effect, and that certain others are likely to have the opposite. Few, however, fully realize the impor-

tance of treating the choice, when it is made, with sufficient seriousness. As in solving every other problem of life, so here, foresight, which is the chief characteristic of wisdom in any line, is by no means universal. What, in the beginning, may be an expression of nothing more than incautious curiosity or non-calculating self-confidence may lead in the end to moral ruin.

It seems particularly important to direct attention to this fact because the effects of observation are usually exerted through processes of thought of which the mind that they influence is not conscious. A man like Theodore Roosevelt might recognize the results of their processes in new tastes, aims, or habits that he found forming themselves within him; and a man like James Russell Lowell, if his attention were called to his accent, might recognize the results of association with Englishmen. But a person would show as little knowledge of human nature in general as of the natures of these men in particular, who could accuse either of them of acquiring results like these through conscious imitation. This fact is pointed out because of its illustrating an extremely important truth. It is this,—that the effects of environment, of the conditions in life and of the character of the persons by whom one is surrounded, are more often than not exerted upon the mind's unconscious rather than conscious processes of thought. What is meant by the unconscious processes, philosophers of every school have explained. A somewhat extended discussion of them will be found in the Author's *Psychology of Inspiration*, Chapters III. to VI., inclusive. Here it is sufficient to say that, in distinction from such contents of the mind as are floating, so to speak, on the surface of the stream of thought, and are therefore, recognized by consciousness, these unconscious processes are the constituent elements of the deeper currents constantly flowing on beneath the surface. That they are there, and constantly there, is evinced by the phenomena in natural sleep of somnambulism and of other forms of dreaming, as well as by the results of hypnotism and allied occult methods which are artificially induced. Besides this, largely through their influence upon the associations of ideas, these unconscious forces are recognized as powerful factors in determining the courses and conceptions of reverie, the picturings of imagination, the surmisals of speculation, and the conclusions of reasoning.

It has been found through experiments in hypnotism that the most effective influence upon these processes—the influence that can best impel their general tendency toward the attainment of particular objects—is exerted not directly by way of information or argument, but indirectly by way of suggestion. A hypnotizer, for instance, after he has put to sleep the conscious powers of a man and is trying to awaken to action his unconscious powers, does not assume the attitude of an instructor or a reasoner. He merely calls to the attention of his patients a certain place, person, object, or project, after which, starting with this as a source of suggestion, their minds continue to develop thoughts concerning it until they receive another suggestion.

What a mind derives from observation seems to come to it in the same way as does that which follows the suggestion of a hypnotizer—in other words, indirectly and without any conscious guidance on the part of the one who experiences the thought. As in the cases just mentioned of President Roosevelt and Ambassador Lowell, nothing has been knowingly, much less intentionally, acquired. Nevertheless, this much must be said in addition,—that observation seldom, if ever, leads to imitation except of outward manner, and this for the purpose of burlesque, unless, for some reason, that which is imitated has been made to appear desirable to the one who imitates it. All of us have known of persons who have lived for years in what to them was an undesirable environment without apparently acquiring any of the traits that they disliked. The author can recall an American family of boys brought up in London, and having the experience of associating with fellow students in institutions of the rank of Rugby School and Cambridge University, who, when they came home, had no accent that particularly distinguished them from their American associates. Possibly a reason for this might be surmised from the fact that, when they wanted to amuse their American friends who visited them in London, they would assume an exaggerated cockney drawl and say: "Now let's talk English." Is it not possible that the peculiarities of English pronunciation which Mr. Lowell had encountered in the drawing-room had been unconsciously imitated by him because they had seemed to him desirable, whereas those which had been encountered by these youngsters, largely probably, in the kitchen and on



the street, had not been unconsciously imitated because they had not seemed desirable?

This, however, is merely theoretic. One must not make too much of it. And yet a shrewd use of suggestions is the most prominent of the characteristics that distinguish a man who is sagacious. Whether or not this particular suggestion furnishes additional testimony to the subject now under consideration, the evidence from other sources seems overwhelming that unconscious imitation is practiced by the observer in the degree in which that which is observed appears desirable. It may appear thus either because, as already intimated, it seems to afford interest or enjoyment to the person who is the source of it, or because this person, as one who is loved and respected, affords interest and enjoyment, and because his actions, being a part of him, seem to be equally desirable with himself.

These facts carry with them their own lesson of caution with reference to the influences by which one allows himself to be surrounded, and with reference to the exercise of foresight in selecting the friends, businesses, pleasures, and associations in general that will be most likely to awaken and thus strengthen and develop higher rather than lower desires. Fortunately, the range of persons and purposes to which this method of selection can be applied is well-nigh infinite. As brought out in Chapter X., it is less the instrumentality used than the methods of using it that determines right or wrong. It would be difficult to find anything in the world, spiritual, mental, or material, that could not in some way contribute to moral requirements. The home, the school, the shop, the factory, the farm, the library, the art museum, the courthouse, the statehouse, the church and, in fact, all the avenues of civilization that lead into or through any of these are crowded with associations and opportunities that appeal to higher as contrasted with lower desire. But, as indicated on page 197, the lower or bodily desires are the earliest to manifest their presence, and few can turn from them to serve the higher or mental without an expenditure of effort.

What has been said should be borne in mind in one's treatment both of himself and of others. To attain moral excellence, a man must exert himself, and to enable others to attain it, he must present it to them in such ways as to induce them to exert themselves. As the exertion that is

required results from the effort of mental desire to keep bodily desire in subordination, that which ought to be done needs to be presented to oneself or represented to others as mentally desirable not only, but also as more desirable than if it, or something else, were merely bodily desirable. To others it can be made to appear thus, as has been said already, either because of the pleasure that it seems to give the people who experience it; or because of the character of these people which is so attractive in itself as to make everything attractive that is in any way connected with them. A boy is more likely to imitate a habit of a teacher whom he admires than of one whom he does not admire.

The moment that this is said, many of us will have suggested the mistakes of the ascetic puritanism of our country's earlier history. This system produced some results that were of great value. From its sense of responsibility to man, and of accountability to God, few could fail to receive important lessons with reference to both the dangers and the dignity of human life. Exceptional conscientiousness and efficiency became characteristic of many of those whose education and training were attributable to the system. But, for all that, there were always a number among those influenced by it to whom it did more harm than good. These were made up of various classes, but all of them agreed in this,—that they were conscious—some only mildly and some very wildly—of a lower as well as a higher nature, both of which they thought should be included in any rightly comprehensive consideration of life. Some of those who rebelled against the prevailing conception expressed their feelings in words, and were doomed to be deemed by their fellows eccentric or heretical. Many more, awed into silence and apparent submission by an unsympathetic, self-opinionated and occasionally inconsiderate and cruel public sentiment, concealed their convictions and became deceitful and hypocritical, while others still, because they found themselves out of sympathy with, perhaps, no more than the superficial phases of the beliefs about them, came to identify these with the whole underlying system of religion, and, after a time, began to dislike and oppose this also. An evidence of the frequency of this attitude was afforded by the saying, as if it were generally true, which was by no means the case, that “ministers’ sons,”—*i.e.*, the sons of those typically puritan—“turn out badly.”

The great mistake of the Puritans arose from their not recognizing the obligation on their part to make a right course of life, or themselves as representatives of it, seem attractive. An endeavor to do this they would have considered not only frivolous but demoralizing. Because they perceived, as all thinkers do, what has already been acknowledged in this volume,—that bodily desires are the foremost to exert their influence and the easiest to fulfill, they seem to have argued that the desires of the mind are in all regards the opposite, and that, therefore, one who is to be trained to follow their promptings on all occasions must be habituated in his youth to do what at first appears as undesirable and as difficult as possible. This explains the family discipline where children were not allowed to talk, or to play, or even, at times, to occupy seats in the presence of their elders. It explains the school drill intentionally made monotonous where all the pupils had to stand up and toe a line or sit straight on benches made unnecessarily uncomfortable. It explains the religious life with its technical catechisms, cant phrases, and long church services only slightly relieved by anything resembling music, in a building full of frost-laden breath and unheated in even the coldest weather. It explains, too, why almost every effort that was put forth to lead men toward the right was conducted by those thinking it their duty to make their faces look as sour and stern as human muscles could permit. What was there in conditions like these that could appeal to mental or rational desire and strengthen it so as to enable it to subordinate bodily desire? The truth is that the Puritans did not recognize some of the most imperative requirements of human nature. A minimum of this recognition would have speedily turned all the serious energy of their nature, for which our age so justly honors them, into wellsprings of joy flowing forth to a life about them, filled with the flowering and fruitage of beauty and goodness.

The second of the ways in which, on page 157, it was said that a man comes to apprehend what is desirable was through experience as derived from experiment,—in other words, through saying and doing what one has observed that others say and do.

Few facts are more universally recognized than that any action, right or wrong, tends to repeat itself. Men usually do again what they have once done. Not so often, but quite

frequently, they also refrain from attempting what they have never tried. These tendencies are all the more apt to be manifested when that which they have done has given them pleasure and satisfaction, or when, for any reason, that which they have not done, even though it may promise some degree of these, threatens to bring with it also some degree of pain and peril.

Such statements apply especially to actions that have to do with morality. One who has never indulged in falsehood, drunkenness, theft, or other like practices, finds it comparatively easy not to do so. Merely a suggestion given by his own judgment, or conscience, or what he knows to be the opinions of others, is enough to keep him from conduct of which he feels that good morals would not approve. Even if this do not keep him from it, the result is usually due to the persuasions of his comrades, rather than to the promptings of his own desires. These conditions, however, are often very suddenly changed after a single indulgence in any form of vice or crime. So far as concerns this form, the repetition of it becomes exceedingly easy. For one thing, the person committing the deed has learned from experience that the desire which prompted his wrong action is one that this action could gratify—not as fully as he had expected, but, at least in part. Moreover, he has usually learned that the risk that he feared to run is not as great as he had supposed, and this because he finds that the danger is more or less remote. The same is true of most of the dangers connected with wrongdoing. The results are not at once apparent. To the firmest believers in hell, there is, at least, one consolation. It always seems a long way off. So with retribution in this world. As a rule, a lie is not immediately detected; what is stolen is not at once missed; an intoxicated man can get to bed quite a number of times without being found out. All the conditions are just what they would be if some demon had arranged a trap in such a way as gradually to entice one where his ultimate destruction would not be readily foreseen.

Besides this—and it is a very important factor in the situation—guilt is a matter determined by quality and not quantity. A man who has unmistakably done a little wrong feels instinctively that others will be apt to class him with those who have done some great wrong. He feels that he has crossed a border line separating the good from the bad;

and is apt to act upon the supposition that he will incur no additional risk if he keep on in the same direction. At least, this conception, and the suggestions connected with it, are so impressed upon his mind that his ability to resist any strong temptation to repeat this form of wrongdoing is immensely weakened. These are facts that a very slight knowledge of the history of vice and crime can amply illustrate. It is not strange, therefore, that many young people, and undoubtedly the vast majority of them, and an equal proportion of older ones intent upon influencing others for good, hold the theory, and carry it out in practice that,

The time to stop sinning  
Is ere its beginning.

To this theory, more than to any other cause, many are accustomed to attribute all the integrity, trustworthiness, and morality which subsequently have made their careers a success. We all believe in reformation; but we all know that anything that has been patched up is never quite as satisfactory as if it had never needed repair. Wild oats cannot be sown without a waste of time and a dissipation of energy, and, to say nothing of the danger of reaping a harmful harvest, life is too short for the waste, and too much in need of effort, for men to afford to throw away the energy.

It is no wonder, in view of these facts, that many a person who considers himself to have charge of the moral as well as the mental development of others should become interested in devising means to mold their conduct, so that, in spite of their own bodily tendencies, they shall have experience of the good, and, after having had it, shall desire it, and continue to practice it. This conception is at the basis of many of the methods prevalent in families, schools, and churches. "Train up a child," said Solomon (Prov. xxii, 6), "in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it." There certainly is much truth in this. But what is meant by "the way" in which "he should go?" Many a boy, most scrupulously trained to go through with all the external forms that are supposed to express what is most pure in the family, upright in the state, and religious in the church, has departed so far from what these forms are intended and supposed to represent as to become notoriously immoral, dishonest, and depraved.

In such cases, what was there in the training that was lacking? The reader will anticipate the answer that best accords with what has already been said in this volume. The kind of life which this person was, in his youth, forced to live did not commend itself to him as desirable. No matter how much else may be accomplished, all is in vain unless the training has been successful in producing this latter effect. The child is to be taught to be clean, neat, gentle, kindly, polite, cautious, industrious, studious, obedient, truthful, honest, humble, reverent, and to manifest other traits of a similar kind. But he needs to be trained, not merely to be or to do certain right things, but to wish to be or to do them, and to take satisfaction in what he is or does. The result cannot be obtained merely through making the pupil repeat prescribed actions. Such a course by itself alone frequently has the opposite effect. Many a boy runs away from home, plays truant at school, and even to the end of his life refuses to go into a religious service—because of the conscientious and scrupulous efforts that others have put forth when he was young to mold his character in accordance, not with what his own better self can be led to desire, but in accordance merely with what they themselves desire. Even when he accepts the routine to which he has been trained, he may do this as a matter merely of form, leading him to become a hypocrite in whatever family, society, or sect he may find himself. No results having any permanent effect upon conduct are obtainable unless they have been so directed as to develop and strengthen mental desires. Of course, to influence these desires is no easy matter. It requires a degree of thoughtfulness, ingenuity, and imagination apparently beyond the possibility of large numbers of the parents, teachers, or preachers who undertake it. But the main reason why most of them fail is because they fail to apprehend its requirements. Of course, not apprehending these, they cannot be expected to fulfill them.

Before passing on to consider the chief ways of fulfilling them, let us notice a concluding subject already promised for this chapter,—that is, the third of the ways in which, on page 157 it was said that the mind comes to apprehend what is desirable, namely, through hearsay or through receiving information imparted by others. No one can doubt that any desire, especially a higher desire, can be greatly strengthened by being shown to accord with the discoveries

and promptings of intelligence. What is intelligence for, except to act as a guide to action,—of which moral action is merely one important department? No wonder that a man's conduct should be supposed to be determined largely by his general education and his special information.

This is a subject that does not need to be argued. But, in connection with it, one should always bear in mind that information designed to affect moral character must be so imparted as to influence mental desire, and so received as to develop it. The most intelligent are by no means, for this reason, the most moral. The best informed by no means lead the best regulated lives. Who have a more accurate knowledge of the evils resulting from an excessive use of alcohol or narcotics than have physicians? Yet statistics show that these belong to the very class most given to such excesses. Everyone who reads even a few books ought to know that some of the worse characters mentioned in history have been among those most fully informed with reference to right and wrong, and most thoroughly fitted to argue out the consequences of each; and that some of the best characters have received only a minimum of either instruction or mental training. They have become what they were, so far as one can make out, not so much because of what they have been informed as of what they have observed and experienced while associating with good people whose examples they have followed. More than this, it may be said that very often the influence of these people for good has been in proportion to their lack of knowledge, or of confidence in the effects of mere learning or logic. The writer has known intimately three large families every member of which has passed through life with an unimpeachable moral record. Yet, in all these families, the apparent lack, when the children were young, of instruction imparted merely as instruction, was severely criticized by the parents of certain other families, half of whose members, when they grew up, became a disgrace to them. This is no argument against instruction; but it is the strongest kind of an argument against supposing that this is all the influence, or the main influence, that needs to be exerted.

When we consider that the important matter is that the instruction, whether imparted by information or argument, should be of such a nature as to influence desire, it is remarkable how few of the methods used now in our homes

and schools are directed specifically to the attaining of this end. It seems to be supposed by many that a statement or picture once lodged in the mind stays still like a package put on a shelf in a closet, never changing form, and never having any different effect or significance than before it was placed there. They would be more nearly right if they supposed the mind to be like an overflowing caldron filled with seething material into which all things entering fall, to be caught up by the mass and borne about and away in the current of its own tendency. The tendency has been shown in Chapter III. to be determined predominantly sometimes by bodily, and sometimes by mental desire. Because, therefore, of what desires are in themselves, and also because they can be influenced by more than one agency, it is illogical to assign to information as large, not to say as exclusive, a degree of influence, as is sometimes attributed to it.

This fact needs particularly to be called to the attention of those whose conception of the influence of information is confined to that which affects merely the conscious as distinguished from the unconscious mind as described on pages 159 and 160. If there were no unconscious processes of thought determining the tendencies and associations of ideas that have an effect not merely on speculative imaginings, but on logical inferences, then one could always know beforehand how the mind would be affected by information. In that case, if a man were told, and believed it to be true, that to do something would bring on a particular form of disease, he would not do it. In that case, if he were told, and believed it to be true, that to do something else would cure a disease that he had, he would do it. But this is not the way in which human beings act. Within their minds are drifts of thought, controlled subconsciously by all sorts of desires; and these manifest a constant tendency to emerge into consciousness with sufficient strength to overwhelm everything—no matter how wise—that may be opposed to them.

Where information is imparted, therefore, it may or may not have the good effect which it is intended to produce. Its having this effect depends upon two things,—upon the strength and tendency of right desires in the mind that receives the information; and upon the ability of those who impart it to connect it with influences that shall awaken and energize these right desires. It is sometimes supposed



that to keep one informed of the character and results of vice and crime, will necessarily cause him to refrain from indulging in them. But no matter what may have been the purpose of giving such information, it will not benefit the hearer unless it has aroused in him desires antagonistic to the courses described. Otherwise, the information with the inferences and suggestions associated with it, may be developed in connection with the promptings of lower desires.

Having said this much, it is hardly necessary to point out to any one capable of drawing logical deductions the appalling mistakes that are made in some modern methods of imparting information, instruction, and even entertainment. Few newspapers fail occasionally to contain graphic representations to the imagination of the details of crime. Many have been committed\* by the young, and have not infrequently been suggested to them by what they have read of the crimes of others. Large numbers of offenses result from acting outwardly what has been acted inwardly over and over again in imagination, excited by suggestions derived from what has been read. It is a well-established fact that many a story about a bandit, burglar, or suicide, notwithstanding the dangers and horrors described, far from deterring certain people from a like experience, cause them to seek to imitate it. The example seems to produce a fatal fascination like that of the charm of a snake upon its victim. Those responsible for government who know so little about the workings of the human mind as not to prohibit by law the publication of these details, can scarcely be too strongly condemned. But someone may ask: "Would you interfere with the liberty of the press?" Certainly, just as one would with the liberty of an individual—a drunkard, a criminal, a maniac—in case he has become a menace to the community.

The same principle applies to making public the details of vice—though this is done less in newspapers than in novels, plays, and moving pictures. But would you interfere, someone asks, with the delineation of any phases of life, whether good or bad? Are not all these necessary in order to meet artistic requirements? Should we restrict and cripple art? Any one who talks in this way, and does so supposing that what he says furnishes an argument against any legitimate conclusion from the line of thought that is

here being presented, either knows little about art or cares little about morals. If he knew much about art, he would know that, at its best, it is not merely an imitation of nature, but an embodiment, through the use of the forms of nature, of an ideal; and that an ideal is a mental result, always attained through manifesting, in some way, the supremacy of the mental over the bodily. If he cared about morals, he would care for subjects necessarily suggestive of conceptions, and representative of conduct, of a high mental quality. As things are in our country to-day, it would be feasible for a maliciously disposed neighbor to ruin a young person just approaching maturity merely by lending him evilly selected novels and taking him to evilly selected theaters and picture shows.

In no way could character be more debased, except, perhaps, by having him study a textbook on sex hygiene in a public school. Not that any person should be kept in ignorance of what he ought to know, but that the lessons upon a subject such as this should be made as brief, and studied as little and seldom, as possible. Twenty minutes spent, once a term, by one in whom a pupil has confidence, in briefly telling facts, and a short visit, once or twice in a lifetime, to a hospital museum would give all the information needed by the ordinary young person with reference to the subject. There is no need of making an intimate acquaintance of a smallpox patient in order to learn to avoid catching his disease. The same is true with reference to more dangerous diseases. There are certain subjects concerning which the less that is said, or thought, or suggested, the better; and in any case, the surest remedy for the evils attendant upon them, is not to be obtained through the understanding.

There is such a thing as being too well informed. What is needed is something that shall set into operation a higher desire. Unless this be done, all the animating possibilities of thought may act there as fertilizing agencies act upon a seed and develop a crop of inconceivable troubles. It is true that a concentration of attention upon threatened consequences may repel or frighten from indulgence certain persons of certain temperaments. But in many it will be more likely to awaken false conceptions of human nature, disheartening views of their own share in it, morbid curiosity with reference to the taste of the forbidden fruit described, and delusive confidence in the efficacy of preventives or of

cures prescribed after infection. Not one, if influenced through the understanding alone, will be inspired to those exalted and purifying desires which alone can assure safety not only to body but to soul.

## CHAPTER XIII

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE

The Family has Bodily and Mental Relations to the Development of Character—The Bodily should not be Emphasized Unduly, though Public Sentiment against Marrying Physical Degenerates is Healthful—Mental Requirements should also be Regarded, and Anticipated in Education—Courtship, Friendship, and Love—The Qualities Attracting those who Fall in Love—Risks Attending Merely Bodily or Merely Mental Attraction—Methods of Avoiding these Risks—Effects of Sentimentality, as in Novels, etc., as Contrasted with Rationality, Especially as Exerted by Parents—The Cure for Unsatisfactory Marriage—Injurious Representations of much Modern Literature—Evils Wrought by Forbidding all Divorce—Good Accomplished by Resisting Tendencies to it, in Order to Balance the Bodily by the Mental.

IN accordance with the plan indicated on page 156, we shall now consider the practical applications of our subject, not, as in the preceding chapter, in their general relations to all actions, but in their special relations to particular actions. In doing this it is natural to begin with those primary and intimate relations of life that are found in the family. The family, consisting of father, mother, and child, constitutes the earliest form of human organization; and it always has been, and, despite efforts, especially at the present day, to minimize its prominence, it always will continue to be, the most important. The object of the family is the bodily and mental development of the child. What the child finally becomes is determined partly by that which he inherits physically at birth, and partly by that which surrounds and influences him psychically during his childhood. This is not to say that with his physical nature he may not inherit also certain psychical traits; or that with his psychical nature he may not acquire from environment certain physical traits. It is merely to say that

the primary source of influence in heredity is physical and in environment is psychical.

The reason why attention is directed to this fact here is because of the tendency in our times to emphasize unduly—and sometimes even exclusively—the influence of heredity. Eugenic requirements—*i.e.*, requirements determined by the physical health or condition of those about to marry—are, of course, extremely important. So far as feasible, the laws of the State should prevent the union of those afflicted with diseases of body or mind, such as are known to be inheritable, or with those infections following indulgence in vice, which, though apparently cured, leave impurity in the blood liable to be communicated to one's offspring, and to develop in these into idiocy, blindness, and other forms of infirmity. With reference to the risks incurred by marriage in such cases, because their beginnings can be easily concealed, young people ought to be fully informed; nor is any worthy purpose served by the modern novel or moving picture that represents a drunkard-hero or a harlot-heroine as marrying a high-minded girl or a pure-minded man, and the couple living happily ever afterward. Quite often the laws of nature prevent such people from living happily; and only unreflecting sentimentality could fail to recognize why nature, in preventing their happiness, is acting, on the whole, humanely and wisely. It is emphasizing for the young, as might be possible in no other way, the extreme importance of fulfilling always the requirements of higher as contrasted with lower desire.

But, as said before, what the child becomes is determined not only by what he inherits physically, but by what, in the earliest years after birth, surrounds him and influences him psychically. The contribution to moral character of the latter, too, is fully as important as the former. The human mind is never so susceptible to influence; so quick to learn the lessons or to acquire the habits, that others can impart, as during its first fifteen years of earthly life. The most that follows subsequently is little more than a process, able to finish and perfect, but not to change, the general tendency. A clear inference from this fact is that, before marriage, those who may become parents, especially the mother who must necessarily be brought into the most continuous and intimate relations with the child, need more or less preparation for the work. The traits essential for success in this

are love for human nature, hope for it, and faith in it. But where can our young people acquire these, or begin to acquire them? Certainly not in such families or churches as are permeated by an influence that can appropriately be termed exclusive or aristocratic; or in such schools or colleges as are dominated by class spirit, fraternity or sorority snobbishness, or a general atmosphere of hazing, even if the latter assume no meaner form than ostentatiously avoiding or insulting an acquaintance, or walking by on a dry path from which others have been shoved into slush and mud. Think of these things as a training for parenthood! As if one could not be loyal to one's own family, church, society, or class and still manifest the traits of a gentleman or a lady! As if the mental desire prompting to a revelation of the spirit of sympathy and service should ever be subordinated to a purely bodily desire to elbow another into discredit or discomfort in order to make a public display of one's own egoistic narrowness and selfishness! Of course, such things as have been mentioned involve comparatively slight deviations from the right, but, like little straws that show the direction of the wind, little offenses show the tendencies of the spirit,—tendencies, too, that, if they be not checked, may develop into offenses almost infinitely great.

After young people have left school—and, very frequently too, before this—they are supposed to have reached the period of courtship. At this time they are apt to become conscious of being called upon to solve a very perplexing question,—perplexing, because it is necessarily complicated. Courtship is introductory to marriage; and marriage, as indicated on page 3, is the result of a desire on the part of one individual for union with another, a desire that may be bodily or mental, or both; and when both, either the bodily or the mental tendency may dominate. The desire when wholly bodily is universally recognized to be more or less lacking in that which should characterize a rational being. The desire that is wholly mental leads to what is termed friendship; and the psychical unity—the agreement in thought, emotion, and action between two minds brought together in this relationship—is often as nearly perfect as anything in this world can be. The desire that is partly bodily and partly mental,—partly owing, that is, to inherited and temperamental traits and tendencies, and partly to psychical qualities and acquirements—is that which

leads to what is usually described as "falling in love." In this condition, if, in the desire, the bodily dominate, it is a lower form of love than if the mental dominate—lower, not merely theoretically, as a matter of philosophic estimation, but practically, as a matter of personal experience. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible for those who have lived for years in circumstances where mental desire alone could be fully satisfied—with invalid marriage partners, perhaps, or, especially in youth, with intimates of their own sex—to attribute to these years a happiness as nearly complete as seems possible in any earthly relationship, and to speak of them, notwithstanding subsequent marriage experience, as affording the only conception that they have ever attained of the possibilities of true love.

In case the two who "fall in love" be of different sexes, there can scarcely fail to be, as society is now constituted, a suggestion of marriage; and marriage, considered either as a civil or a religious contract, renders it important for those who plan for it to be able to determine what are the qualities in another that attract them, and whether these are qualities that are likely to attract them permanently. Here is the source of the perplexity that has been mentioned. People often misrepresent themselves to those with whom they become comparatively intimate. They may do this consciously, rouging their cheeks, dyeing their hair, living on borrowed money, and pretending an interest and enthusiasm in subjects for which they care nothing; or unconsciously, influenced by a subtle wish to conciliate or please others, because they are weak or vain, or only too genial or yielding in disposition. Even when there is no misrepresentation on the part of either of two persons thus interested in each other, both may often experience great difficulty in dissecting the actions of their own minds, and in arriving at any intelligent conclusion with reference to what it is that really constitutes that which they term their love.

Is it bodily alone, or mental alone, or is it both? and, if so, which of the two is uppermost? One is fascinated, perhaps, by the expressions of a face, or by the movements of a form; and this is as it should be. But are mere externals like these the only things that attract him? A snake fascinates, and how is a man in love to know that the feeling which he has is of any higher quality than that of the snake's victim? Even if it be recognized that the effect of the fascinating

influence is distinctly stimulating to mental activity, so, it may be said, is the effect, sometimes, of tea, opium, or whisky, and the main effect of each is undoubtedly bodily. On the other hand, suppose that one find himself in complete agreement with the thoughts or emotions of another, is psychical agreement—the fulfilment of mental desire—all that is needed in order to secure an ideal marriage? Those who have attended boarding schools that are apt to tumble together boys, at least, so that they have experience of many different room mates and bedfellows, know that there are some good friends who are not bodily attractive, and, on the contrary, that there are some not particularly good friends who are so. What if a man after marriage should discover that his wife belonged to one of these classes? For a constant companion, it would not be ideal to have her belong to either. The condition, moreover, would be one that could seldom be cured, because nothing can change one's bodily or mental temperament. An eminent lawyer over seventy years of age once told the author that not one day had gone by since he had graduated from college in which he had failed to write a letter, or, at least, some part of a letter, to his old college room mate. A man particularly fitted by temperament and character, one would think, for loyal devotedness in married life! And yet—though not one word from him ever justified the inference—his club mates used to say that he never seemed to be thoroughly enjoying his life except when his wife was in Europe separated from him by the whole width of the ocean.

Many a young fellow, in spite of many temptations, has been kept in the path of virtue under the feeling that he was in honor bound to bring to his future wife a record as unsullied as he expected from her. Providence certainly seems to be unnecessarily adverse when dooming such a man as this to spend a miserable existence with some misfit mate. In view of such cases, what ought to be done? Some have advised trial marriage that could be given up after a few months. But, for obvious reasons, this plan does not seem feasible. Marriage that could be annulled informally would lose much of its dignity and importance; and people would become less rather than more cautious before engaging in it. Besides this, a crowd of discarded brides and bridegrooms contributing tales and traits that had been collected as a result of promiscuous experiences of this sort



would not improve any of the conditions of society. Possibly, as the years go by, there may come to be some arrangement supervised by the families of the engaged parties which, while preventing the consummation of marriage, shall afford a satisfactory test of the advisability of more intimate and permanent relations; but, at present, no such treatment of the problem is in sight. The best that can be done seems to be to try to impress upon the mind of every young person the fact that there is no menace to one's future happiness so great as is afforded by enforced companionship with one of another sex who is not both bodily and mentally congenial. For this reason alone, most couples, at the time when marriage is suggested, ought to have sense enough to delay it until, by mutual understanding, they have made an honest and thorough endeavor with the utmost candor to reveal to one another the exact truth with reference to their inmost feelings, characteristics, opinions, and purposes.

Nevertheless, in most of our talks with the young in family and society, as well as in our novels, poems, plays, and moving pictures, the consummation of bliss in life is represented as being attained by engagement and marriage, both of which are begun and ended under the guidance of absolutely irrational fancy and whim, without the slightest exercise of wisdom or judgment. Exactly the opposite ought to be the case. Instead of acting like a moth about a flame, and hastening to hover around the object of attraction, and join oneself to it regardless of the safety of the experiment, a man ought to act like an intelligent being, and examine the character of the flame before he lets it burn him. He ought to learn all that he can about his charmer's associates, family, attainments, pursuits, and amusements; and, in case these prove unsatisfactory, he ought to avoid, so far as he can, any possibility of intimacy. Few can control desires after time has been given them in which to grow strong; but most of us can do so if we resist the beginnings of them. Even if we fail to do this, it is simply a matter of ordinary prudence to hesitate and investigate before making a proposition of marriage. In connection with this subject there are arguments—but they would not be convincing to people of our land—in favor of having the parents of the parties influence the selection of the bride or bridegroom. Seldom, at least, should they be left wholly

unconsulted. Unless abnormally heartless, they are naturally their child's best friends; and the family is unfortunate indeed in which some of its different members do not confide their heart secrets to one another. The writer has known of more than one large and interesting household in which a considerable part of the business of the parents, at one period, consisted in traveling about the country to hunt up the personal and family histories of those who had proposed to enter it through marriage. The importance of efforts of this kind will not seem exaggerated here by any one acquainted with society gossip, newspaper items, or the records of police courts.

But if, in spite of all precautions, married life prove unsatisfactory, what then? Shall the parties who have been married in accordance with ecclesiastical or civil law be divorced in accordance with the same? To this question different churches and states in our own and in other countries have given different answers. Some have allowed divorce at the request of only one of the parties, and for only a single case of disagreement between them. Others have allowed it in no case except where it can be proved that the marriage vow has been broken; and even then, freedom to marry again has been denied both parties. As usual, the wise course seems to lie between the two extremes. Few things could be more injurious in their influence upon a community, more destructive of good in the minds of the children of the families concerned, or more unexemplary in the personal character of a father or mother than for one of them to obtain a divorce, because of some transient disagreement or dissatisfaction, and, on the same day, perhaps, as has sometimes happened in our country, to marry another for whom this one has taken what may soon prove to be an equally transient fancy. Every argument in favor of easy divorce, or—what is virtually the same thing—"free love," as it is called, as well as every case in which this argument influences official action, emphasizes and makes more general the false conception that the supreme achievement of life is to recognize and gratify lower rather than higher desire.

Unfortunately, as applied not only to marriage, but, in connection with this, to many other interests, this false conception, at present, is quite general. Think of the popular novels and dramas of the day, and the works of Ibsen,

Sudermann, Hauptmann, and others, upon which so much of all modern literature is modeled. (See also page 185). What is the lesson that is taught in most of them? This,—that, if circumstances in life do not agree with one's bodily or physical comfort, as determined by his personal temperament or self-centered preference, then he should "kick or kill" somebody. With such teachings received and followed; it is easy to explain a certain weakened moral effect discoverable in our own times not only in family relations, but in many others. These teachings have more to do than many of us suspect not only with the number of modern divorces, but with the flirtatious vanities that precede them, including the guzzling, the tipping, the gossiping, the dressing and the undressing, the indecency of the dancing, the vulgarity of the language, the emptying of places in which serious problems of life are discussed, and the crowding of those that exploit the frivolous and the flippant. The same influence could be shown, too, to have had not a little to do with the self-seeking, the injustice, the cruelty, and the beastliness of some of the warfare begun in 1914. "Kick or kill" which is the teaching of the literature of which we have been speaking, is just the opposite of the teaching of the mental, rational, and spiritual nature. This enjoins consideration always, and sometimes service for others, at the expense, too, of frequent self-denial, and not a little self-sacrifice. Why should intelligent men, who should have vision enough to foresee the results of their own influence, join in an endeavor to lessen belief in those higher ideals of what life can do and be, the fulfillment of which alone can bring satisfaction to the individual or happiness to the community? Why is it, when the devil wants to incarnate himself, that he should so often find particularly favorable conditions among the possibilities of genius? And genius is capable of doing the world so much good!

The view with reference to divorce that presents the other extreme of opinion is as objectionable as the one just mentioned; and, strange as it may appear, it is objectionable for the same reason. Think for a moment what is, and must be, the theory underlying a law that forbids divorce either altogether, or for any other reason than adultery. This theory must be that marriage is a union merely physical in its origin and nature and capable of being rightly annulled for only a physical or bodily reason. In this aspect

of the subject, psychical or mental considerations may be entirely ignored. Yet for one intent upon keeping the balance between bodily and mental tendencies and, in case of need, subordinating the former to the latter, it is possible, in view of the highest interests of the children of a family or of other relatives, or, perhaps, of the offender, that even adultery may not appear to warrant divorce; while, in view of the same considerations, other offenses having nothing to do with adultery may appear to warrant it. Man was not made for marriage, but marriage for man. Any arrangements in life that can be unmistakably shown to interfere with the happiness, the prosperity, the profit, or the prospects of any individual ought to be made subject to legal redress. This fact does not excuse legislation allowing every irresponsible married malcontent to have his own way and thus satisfy his whim or fancy, irrespective of duty to himself or to others; but it does excuse and justify legislation allowing divorce for psychical as well as physical grievances. It is the right and duty of the public, to say nothing about the family of the sufferer, to prevent a woman or man from becoming a victim of one whose vice, criminality, or cruelty can be clearly proved. There would be less difficulty than now seems to be the case, in maintaining, in thought and practice, the mean between divorce made too easy and made too difficult, if the wisdom could be recognized of always deciding such questions according to the principle of subordinating, when the two conflict, bodily to mental requirements.

Meantime the thousands and millions of those whose wedded life has been not positively distressful, but only negatively unsatisfactory, should take consolation in the thought that these conditions have merely proved marriage to be on a par with almost everything else in this world. Moreover, a slight acquaintance with the history of human achievement would teach them that nothing perhaps—because nothing can stir one more deeply—is better fitted to develop what is fundamental in one's mental and spiritual nature than the experience that is termed—whether in or out of wedlock—"disappointment in love." Besides this, nothing is better established than the fact that many who are not congenial in early married life, after a few years, if they pursue the path of duty, settle down into a sort of brotherly and sisterly relation, where each experiences

both the development due to early disappointment and also the respect due to long continuance in well-doing. One thing in the world is sure,—that nothing is gained, and sometimes everything worth while is lost, by following the tendencies of merely lower or physical temper and temperament, and ignoring that which prompts to the conscious and often conscientious control exercised by higher mental and spiritual desire.

## CHAPTER XIV

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN FAMILY TRAINING

The Training of the Child the Chief Work of the Family—Necessity of Influencing the Child's Desires through Love for Him—Through Hope for Him—Through Faith in Him—Children Associate Mystery with the Prompting of Conscience—Importance of Developing their Tendencies to Reverence and Aspiration—Devotion, and Religious Suggestion in Family Life—Cultivation among the Children of Respect, Obedience, and a Sense of Duty—Other Traits, the Beginnings of which can be Cultivated in Childhood—The Chief Aim should be the Cultivation of Mental Desires which Chastisement alone Cannot Accomplish—Self-control should be Developed—Traits Connected with Truthfulness that Need Particular Emphasis in Childhood—Traits Connected with Purity—Importance of Parents' Gaining and Keeping their Children's Confidence—The Effects of this upon both Morals and Manners.

THE same balancing and, in case of need, subordinating of bodily desire in conformity to the expressional requirements of mental desire, the influence of which upon the development of conditions in courtship and marriage has been considered in the preceding chapter, is also demanded in the training of children. Owing to the relations in this between parents and their offspring, it is ordinarily represented, as in what is said of Love to Man, in Chapters II. and VII. in Part II. of the *Elements of Moral Science*, of Francis Wayland (1798-1865), that the parents, up to the time when the child becomes of age, are under obligation to support him, and to give him physical, intellectual, and moral training. Moreover, because responsible for his actions, they have a right to control him and them, and to receive his earnings. It is represented also that the child is under obligation to manifest obedience, reverence, and affection, and to support his parents in their old age. But how can these results be brought about in a way to

prove satisfactory to both parties? Evidently only through some agency that can influence the parents on the one hand and the children on the other through first influencing higher desire. Without this, parents may support, educate, and live upon the earnings of their children in an inconsiderate and cruel way; and, if so, the children will never feel under obligation to treat a father or mother in any different way from that in which they themselves have been treated.

This is merely to reiterate the general conception already expressed many times in these pages. Everyone must be inclined to the right through being influenced first to a right desire. This is especially true in the case of children. They are less susceptible than are grown people to influence exerted through the understanding alone. For this reason it is essential that the discipline of the family should give particular expression to the three methods of influence briefly mentioned in the preceding chapter, namely, love, hope, and faith—love for the child as he is, hope for what he may become, and faith in his own emotional promptings and intellectual tendencies as agencies fitted to develop what he is into what he should be.

These three are so important in dealing not only with children but with all people, that a few words with reference to each will not be out of place here. One of the commonest of human traits, implanted, probably, as an extension from the body to the mind of the impulse of self-preservation, is a sense of responsibility for the guardianship of what may be termed one's own personality. By this term is meant not his moral character but that result of bodily and mental temperament, traits, and tendencies which is peculiar to himself, and which gives a certain individuality of effect to all his acts, moral or immoral. Some years ago, after the Civil War in our country, the author, on many occasions, succeeded in getting former slaves to admit that before they were emancipated, the necessities of life—food, clothing, and lodging—had been easier for them to obtain than subsequently; but not one of them would say that he would be willing to be a slave again. They all preferred to keep their poverty rather than to lose the right to give free expression to their personality. A similar feeling seems to actuate everybody. In consequence of it, we all, more or less unconsciously, divide the people about us into two classes,—

those who have the same feeling as ourselves about our own personality, and those who have a different feeling. The former of these we like and sometimes love. To the latter we are always indifferent, and sometimes feel hostile. Those whom we like invariably pay deference to our methods or manners of thinking, feeling, or acting. Those whom we love go further than this. They admire our methods and manners, and not infrequently imitate them. We have all seen children and older people whose peculiarities of expression in face, movement, voice, and sentiment made them exceedingly disagreeable to ourselves; and yet these, apparently, were the very characteristics that made them appear attractive and even fascinating to someone who was related to them, perhaps as parent, husband, wife, or sweetheart. This result was as it should be. We ourselves did not need to love these people; nor did they need to love us. But if we had been a relative—a parent especially—it would have been different; and if our love for them had not come naturally, we should have been remiss if we had not tried to cultivate and express it. Think of the young people who live in almost perpetual misery because they are not conscious that anyone in their own home loves them,—*i.e.*, thoroughly admires and appreciates them for what they are! Notice that this misery is the result of non-selfish mental desire, yearning for an assurance that one has been of some use, help, comfort, or satisfaction to a fellow human being; and what can be meaner or more Satanic, if it can be avoided, than to greet the growing germs of goodness in such a character not with the genial influences of a warm and loving heart but with the chilling and deadening effects of constant faultfinding and correction? A parent who has not sufficient sense, not to say sensitiveness to the good, to welcome with manifest delight every indication of a desire for love on the part of a child deserves from him in old age nothing better than disappointment and desertion.

This suggests the second method of parental influence of which mention was made on page 183, namely, hope. Nothing can prove more effective in developing moral character than this. Whatever may be said of parents, it is a question whether anyone should be employed as a teacher, or licensed as a preacher, whose optimism does not overbalance his pessimism. As for the systems of instruction, either in churches or schools, that are based upon a pessimistic con-



ception of human nature and its requirements, it would be difficult to find terms in which to describe them that would be adequately derogatory. How can anyone suppose that higher desires, that must manifest themselves to consciousness and operate, if at all, inside the mind, can ever owe their origin or continued presence to anything merely outside the mind, like technical instruction drilled into one by a tutor, or critical espionage practiced by a chaperon! Yet conceptions like these are being constantly adopted, and by people undoubtedly sincere and religious. One might suppose their theory to be that a man comes into the world like a mere mass of matter to be molded entirely, as matter is, by that which is external. Of course, this theory contains the suggestion of a partial truth. Notwithstanding hopes that animate the mind from within, it often needs assistance and direction from without. The other part of the truth, however, is equally important. This is that every human being is an offspring of intelligent life, and that an offspring, like a river through which flow the waters that were once in its source, always manifests the quality and tendency of that from which it springs. So far as this source is divine, in man himself we must find a revelation of divinity. And if we do, and in the degree in which we do, must we not, and should we not, find in him that which can fulfill the highest possibilities of hope?

The third method of parental influence mentioned on page 183 was faith. The natural result of having love for a child, or other human being, on account of what he is, is hope for him on account of what he may become. Faith is an exalted accompaniment of this hope. Indeed, more closely than either love or hope, faith is connected with a recognition of the influence upon mind of higher desires. It is because we think of that to which these higher desires, as represented in conscience, have the power to lead a man, that we trust in him. So also should we trust in the child of our love and our expectation. Not that we suppose that conscience will always lead him to the absolutely right,—only that it will point him in the right direction, and set in operation forces in his mind that will all serve the same purpose. Conscience is to every man what a compass is to a mariner. It guides him, but it also necessitates on his part calculation,—often, too, in connection with a chart that represents what has been experienced by others.

The faith in our fellow men, of which we are speaking, whether they be grown people or children, is faith in all their processes of mind taken together because these are developed from the underlying mental desires that may, and in the majority of cases, do control men. As applied to grown people, the conception of influencing them through having faith in them is one of the most important contributions to practical philosophy that is attributable to modern literature. As applied to children, the same conception has wrought the noteworthy changes in educational methods exemplified in the kindergarten, the Montessori system, and various other courses of instruction in the secondary as well as primary schools of our country. These changes have led, in some cases, to extravagant and exclusive applications of the principle involved. But it contains one important truth; and the time is coming when not only in the family and the school, but in all the relations of society, business, church, and state, even in courts of justice and prisons, it will be recognized. No greater influence can be exerted upon a human being, especially when trying to incline him to the right, than to convey to him the conviction that one has faith in his higher desires. It is for these within himself that he himself, without often confessing it, has the highest regard and reverence. Those who recognize this fact, and that every man's own sense of obligation prompts him to loyalty to these desires, cannot fail to reveal to him that he is in the presence of those who have genuine fellow-feeling for him. The manifestation of this is certain to exert upon him what is, perhaps, the strongest of all possible personal influences,—that of a sympathetic and appreciative friend. A very young child, utterly unable to explain his reasons, cannot avoid feeling that faith so expressed proves, as nothing else can, the love and the hope that have been centered upon him.

For the reason that the earliest appeal of conscience to the mind is experienced in the form of a feeling rather than of a clearly understood conception (see Chapter IX.), there is always associated with it more or less mystery. Even those who do not term it, or acknowledge that they deem it "the voice of God in the soul," can hardly avoid treating it as if it were this. Justice Henry B. Brown, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a letter to the author wrote once: "I regard conscience as our safest religious guide, al-

though it sometimes leads two persons to different conclusions; and that our main efforts should be to educate the conscience to the distinguishment between right and wrong, and to the adoption of the one and the avoidance of the other." In this opinion, probably, the majority of thoughtful men would concur. But if, in the minds of grown people, the action of conscience be associated with both authority and mystery, much more must this be the case in the mind of a child who is still less able to understand the sources of his conceptions. In him especially, that which is authoritative and also mysterious necessarily awakens a certain degree of reverence. In this reverence, which the child naturally feels, or, with slight suggestions, can be made to feel, we have the beginnings of an important element of character. Without it as the basis of mental action perhaps no one, however scrupulously he may be trained through precept and practice, can ever become truly religious, or even—what is more to the point here—fundamentally moral. Whatever a child reveres, he can be easily inclined to obey; and when that which he obeys is, for reasons that have been given, the mental and spiritual, then there is nothing that is ordinarily considered right which he will not be prepared to recognize for what it is.

So important is reverence as an element of character that one cannot refrain from expressing regret because of the many families in which no suggestions are ever made to the children with the object of cultivating it. To make such suggestions it is not essential that parents should teach the tenets of any religious organization, or even belong to one. All that is necessary is that children should be aided in giving expression to mental desire which it is natural for them to express. Nothing possessing life, if wholly suppressed, can continue to live. But sometimes, if merely given vent, it may not only live but grow. So with the higher aspirations of a child. It may be as unkind as it is unwise to afford them no outlet.

The little evening or morning prayer taught by the mother, one or two verses read before the children at breakfast, or sometime during the day, by the father, from some book recognized to have mental or moral authority, together with a sentence or two uttered by the reader, expressive of a prayerful desire for protection and guidance—are these too much to expect from those who, by bringing children into

the world, have made themselves responsible for the moral conduct of these children in after life? It is true that the reaction in our country against the old-fashioned custom of having family prayers was not wholly unjustified. The complete chapters from the Scriptures that used to be read, each member of the family spelling out a verse or two as the whole went round and round the circle; the comments of the father upon the meaning of the chapter, employing either his own thoughts or those expressed in some commentary from which he quoted; the hymns that were sung, and the comprehensive prayers reminding one occasionally of those described in *Matt. vi; 1*, as coming from persons thinking "that they shall be heard for their much speaking,"—all these sometimes made the effect of the whole too much like that of a religious service, and service of any kind does not naturally appeal—as it has been said here that all successful mental influence should appeal—to the desires of a child. Besides this, the service was long; and it is not natural for a child to give long attention to anything. Moreover, the general effect was not devotional. The method used made the Scripture seem a reading lesson, and the commentary a lecture. Even the prayer did not represent any form employed by grown people when most in need of spiritual guidance and help. When perplexity and temptation come to them, they do not, as a rule, stop all business, fall on their knees, and utter a rhetorical invocation. Very often the most heartfelt and comprehensive prayer is too deep in the soul to find expression in sound, and too brief to be uttered in a single complete sentence. It must be admitted, of course, that all instruction must usually be imparted through form; but one should not overlook the fact that the essential part of that which is obtainable through the form is never in the form. The reverence which has just been said to be fundamental to morality is the substance of reverence, not the outward appearance of it.

There are many other traits very generally accepted as being essential to moral character, the cultivation of which—of course, merely in the tendencies leading to them—can be begun in childhood. Our dictionaries have defined most of them satisfactorily; and they need not be discussed here except so far as to indicate their relationship to subordinating, in case of need, the bodily to the mental. A

man may do this latter, when considering his actions as connected either with others or with himself. If connected with others, he may be influenced mentally either by their personality through his sympathies, or by their pronouncements through his rationality. If connected with himself, the consciousness of personality is so largely of bodily origin and tendency (see page 20) that he is seldom influenced mentally except by his own intelligence through his rationality. We may say, therefore, that he is mentally influenced either by the personality or pronouncements of others, or by his own intelligence. This statement most people will recognize to be applicable to traits that even the very young have learned to associate with the promptings of higher desire. That which is first recognized in these traits is usually vague and general, but nevertheless fundamental in character and capable of being illustrated so as not to be vague by associating them with traits connected with each of the sources of influence just mentioned. For instance, the vague feeling of reverence becomes, when associated with another's personality, respect; with another's pronouncement, obedience; and with one's own intelligence, duty. Other specific traits may be similarly connected with other conceptions in themselves vague and general.

To indicate some of these in the order in which they seem most likely to appeal to the intelligence of children, transparency of character may be connected with frankness, truthfulness, and trustworthiness; purity with cleanliness, decency, and chastity; patience with long-suffering, forbearance, and good nature; justice with fair play, impartiality, and magnanimity; generosity with humaneness, gratitude, and benevolence; honesty with fair dealing, candor, and probity; manliness with dignity, firmness, and courage; diligence with self-reliance, thrift, and efficiency; temperance with moderation, propriety, and abstemiousness; modesty with courtesy, considerateness, and humility; loyalty with fidelity, patriotism, and honor; chivalry with appreciation, responsibility, and helpfulness; and self-abnegation with self-denial, self-sacrifice, and altruism. Of course, to say that the manifestation of these traits involves the subordination of the bodily to the mental is virtually the same as to say that the manifestation of the opposite traits involves the subordination of the mental to the bodily. It would be difficult to find a better reason than this for stating that the follow-

ing, arranged somewhat illogically so as to make them correspond to their opposites in the list just given, are morally wrong: irreverence, disrespect, disobedience, neglect of duty, secretiveness, deceit, lying, guile, impurity, foulness, obscenity, sensuality, anger, rashness, revenge, cruelty, injustice, foul play, rapacity, meanness, extortion, cheating, fraud, theft, sneaking, shirking, poltroonery, cowardice, laziness, irresponsibility, extravagance, dependency, dissipation, drunkenness, gluttony, doping, self-conceit, jealousy, envy, snobbishness, trickery, espionage, treachery, hypocrisy, detraction, slander, slur, abuse, selfishness, self-indulgence, self-seeking, and in general all active malevolence.

Any person who will bear in mind that the difference between manifesting such traits as are indicated in the former of these lists and avoiding such as are indicated in the latter lies in the dominance given in the one to mental or thoughtful desire and in the other to bodily or physical desire will be careful to apply, at least, one important inference to the training of the child. This is that he needs, above all things, to have his own mental or thoughtful desires and designs strengthened and broadened so that these of themselves shall control his actions whether directed toward his own possibilities or toward those of others. When one clearly perceives that this is the end in view, he cannot fail to recognize that it can never be obtained through influence that is merely bodily, like the whippings that were supposed to be particularly effective in the days when almost everybody used to quote the saying, "Spare the rod and spoil the child." Whipping may sometimes be necessary, but if so, it is chiefly so as an agency to call attention to a subject. It is effective for good in only the degree in which it influences the thinking or mental nature. It is true that, as applied to the young or the mature, threats of what will be done in this world or the next, systems of espionage, prying into hidden resorts, scourgings, imprisonments, or executions may awaken in the criminally inclined a certain amount of superstitious reverence, apparent respect, outward obedience, and assumed or pretended traits resembling those mentioned on page 189; but no influences so exerted, can have any but the most indirect effect upon the moral character of the minds subjected to them.

What is needed in the child is a desire to manifest thoughtful

traits so strong as of themselves to overbalance his opposite tendencies. It has been shown that reverence can be cultivated through developing the suggestions derived from the experiences of conscience. Respect and even immediate and implicit obedience can be cultivated by kindness, awakening the confidence of the child, together with explanations revealing the superior knowledge of the parent, and the dangers that may follow the slightest act done contrary to orders or without having received accurate information with reference to conditions, as in trying to touch a red-hot poker, or to take a step on a broken bridge.

Not all of the other traits mentioned on page 189 need to be particularly called to the attention of children. But some of them do. Frankness, truthfulness, and trustworthiness, for instance, lie at the basis of all successful developments of a child's moral nature. This is because parents or guardians are not in a situation to give intelligent instruction to one whose deeds, thoughts, or feelings are kept concealed from them. There is nothing more important in family relationships than unshaken belief on the part of its younger members in the sympathy, consideration, and justice of its older ones. In the degree in which this confidence is lacking, and always when there is fear of scolding or punishment, the child's first impulse is to be insincere, secretive, and deceitful. If he act upon this impulse only a few times, he is in danger of forming a habit in the same direction, the evil consequences of which can scarcely be exaggerated. One who has formed this habit must depend for information concerning scores of subjects which he needs to understand upon that which can be learned from young people as ignorant as himself, or from older people who have little interest in his welfare, and sometimes a decided interest in the opposite. The result cannot fail to be, in many cases, disastrous. The only certainty of safety, or, at least, the best certainty of it, lies in the maintenance of confidential relations between the young and those who are their natural protectors.

Consider, for instance, the influence of such relations upon the cultivation, among those who are just passing out of the condition of childhood, of the traits that on page 189 immediately follow sincerity, frankness, and truthfulness, namely, purity, cleanliness, decency, and chastity (see page 214). Boys and girls, when quite young, can be made to understand the importance even of the last two of these,

as well as what follows upon a disregard of them, such as social discredit and disgrace, the loss of mental vigor, the contracting of diseases, and the character and consequences of these. Better than all this they can be made to understand the difference between the body and the mind, and the necessity of keeping the former in such a condition as to be able always to fulfill the uses and purposes of the latter. It is probable, too, that from no application of moral requirements can they learn these so clearly as from those connected with indulgence in physical vice. Nor, after they have once been made to understand what are the results of this, will it be difficult to inspire in them a desire to exert the self-denial and self-control that they will now recognize to be the primary conditions of success in an endeavor to become worthy of their mental possibilities. Once awaken in them this desire, and, as a rule, their whole moral nature will be given a right trend.

It is for these reasons that confidence established early in life between father and son, and mother and daughter, is so essential. If it do not exist, such traits as those that we are now considering cannot always be mentioned, when it is necessary, without concealment or embarrassment that will prevent their being discussed, as they should be, freely and fully. When there is complete confidence in a parent and in his judgment, such a discussion will usually be followed by a justifiable fear, on the part of the young, of the consequences of vice, and a wholesome disgust for those who incite to it. In connection with these, too, there will be impressed upon the mind a needed lesson with reference to the necessity in all circumstances of upholding one's right to maintain his self-respect, and never allowing a fondling fop or flirt to take the least liberty with his personality. Moreover, when a lesson like this is not sufficient, when a temptation comes of a nature that cannot be foreseen, confidence in the judgment of a parent may be a sure guarantee of safety. Thousands of young people have been kept from threatened danger not because of any clear perception or understanding of it, but because of a desire not to do anything, in the absence of their parents, which might not meet with their approval if present. A similar comment could be made to have a broader application. Few people could go far astray if they would always refrain from doing secretly what they would not like to have known publicly.



Special mention is not necessary here of the other traits in the list on page 189. They can all be taught in the same way,—by making constant appeals to thought and feeling of a character fitted to develop mental tendencies. Even such apparently superficial accomplishments as are termed good manners can be cultivated in such ways as to indicate the connection between them and higher desires. A child can be habituated to use phrases like “if you please,” “thank you,” and “beg your pardon,” and to keep his clothes and boots mended and brushed; and his hands, face, teeth, and body clean, because those actions show a proper regard and respect for that which is best both in himself and in others. He can easily be made to perceive that it is not right for him to be so lazy and selfish as to be disagreeable to those to whom he might give pleasure. Thus many methods of life to which a child can easily be trained, though not always moral in themselves, may tend to morality, and greatly promote it. Through precept and example he may gradually have cultivated in him habits of mental self-control that, whenever necessary, shall subordinate everything bodily about him or in him to rational and non-selfish purposes.

## CHAPTER XV

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN SCHOOL TRAINING

Education Means more than an Effect Produced upon the Understanding—The School should Impart, if not Religious Instruction, at Least a Religious Spirit—Use of Placards Enjoining Morality—Schools should Strengthen Mental and Thoughtful Tendencies—Instruction should be Adapted to both Bodily and Mental Requirements—Differences in the Methods of Appealing to Each Requirement—A Mistake to Suppose Mental Desire Influenced only through Bodily Desire—Educational Methods Injured by this Supposition—Study should be Made not Easy but Interesting—Two Ways of Doing this—Necessity of the Student's having Love for his Work—Drill Made Pleasant—Class-room Competition—Literary and Athletic Competitions—Athletics Sometimes Overrated—Large Schools and the Graded System—Co-education—Social, Scholarly, and Ethical Effects of the System—Young People Need Instruction by those of their Own Sex.

WHEN the child begins to outgrow the preliminary training of the family, he is usually sent to school, in order, as is said, to be educated. Education, as most of us know, is a word composed of two Latin ones, namely, *e*, meaning *from* or *out of*, and *ducere*, to draw. The word means more, therefore, than an effect exerted upon the understanding alone. It means a drawing of the intellectual out of its unintellectual surroundings: the freeing of the mind from any undue material influences,—as applied to moral conditions, the attaining of all kinds of mental and rational development notwithstanding bodily and physical environment.

With this interpretation of the object of education, we can recognize, first of all, and for the same reason as when considering the family on page 187, the appropriateness of associating, in connection with the instruction given in school, college, or university, that which shall cultivate a

sense of reverence and of obligation toward the sources of both mental and spiritual authority. These effects can be produced without trespassing upon anything outside the boundary of merely natural religion. They need not include instruction in any particular code of ecclesiastical belief. In our free schools, especially, but in our private schools, also, there are children of people differing in their religion; and leaving to these the dogmatic details of spiritual guidance is a simple matter of courtesy and duty. At the same time it would be perfectly feasible to collect for school purposes short devotional rituals and hymns, to which no parent could reasonably object, the use of which would greatly stimulate and strengthen the child's naturally religious spirit; and, no matter what the form of his family religion, would tend to make his own expressions of it more spiritual than they would be if the school made no recognition of spiritual obligations.

As applied to religion, there may be some readers inclined to question the feasibility or effectiveness of the course just suggested. But as applied to the accepted principles of morality, no one can doubt that there ought to be some method of bringing these to the frequent attention of school children. In certain cases this might be done by teachers, but many of the only subjects taught by them cannot naturally be associated with morality. Many of the teachers, too, have not sufficient personal influence to make their moral opinion seriously regarded, and the instructors even in a large school would not probably, all of them together, be likely to mention all the subjects demanding attention. The most authoritative, frequent, and complete moral influence could, perhaps, be exerted by hanging on the walls of the schoolroom large cards on which were printed, in type that could be easily read and understood, certain universally accepted rules for personal conduct. To avoid anything like a suggestion of propaganda, even a mention of the sources from which these were taken might be omitted. Of course, among them would always be parts, at least, of the Ten Commandments, and the Golden Rule. But the number of other sayings that might be thus treated is almost innumerable, *e.g.*:

"Enter not into the path of the wicked, and go not in the way of evil men. Avoid it, pass by it, turn from it, and pass away. . . . Even a

child is known by his doings, whether his work be pure, and whether it be right. . . . A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches."

"Withhold not good from them to whom it is due when it is in the power of thine hand to do it. . . . Say not to thy neighbor, Go and come again, and to-morrow I will give thee, when thou hast it by thee. . . . Devise not evil against thy neighbor. . . . Strive not with a man without cause, if he have done thee no harm."

"Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart, he that backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor; in whose eyes a vile person is condemned; he that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not."

Or Dr. Edward Everett Hale's

"Look up and not down,  
Look forward and ~~not~~ back,  
Look out and not in,  
Lend a hand."

Scores of times every day some of the children would read of subjects thus brought to their attention, and many times a teacher would use one of them as a text for a school talk. Is it possible to suppose that young people, thus made familiar with the first principles of morality, could ever grow to maturity in ignorance of them, or without some definite impression with reference to their importance? One cannot avoid suggesting that some enterprising printer might make considerable money for himself and do much good to others by preparing and distributing ornamental cards of this character.

Even when we turn from considering the relation of schools to religion or morality, and take up that which appears to some to be their only, and to all of us, their more direct object, namely, the development of the understanding, it is interesting to notice how much of their work suggests the same conception of the importance of procuring unity of action between the bodily and the mental nature that has been emphasized so often in this volume. This work is apparently confined almost entirely to two objects,—the getting of knowledge into the memory so that it shall be retained there, and the getting of the same out of the memory so that it can be used at the right times and places. The first of these objects usually requires not a little drilling of a character largely bodily or physical. The order of the

letters of the alphabet and their sounds when combined, the spelling and the meaning of words, the parts of speech, the conjugation of verbs in one's own and other languages, the multiplication and addition tables of mathematics, and geographical and historical names,—all are mainly learned and facility in using them acquired as the result of repetition, which is a physical process. The second of the objects, designed to accustom the pupil to recall, at the right times and places, what he has learned, is mainly attained through questionings which cause him to associate things and thoughts as a result of a psychical or mental process. In the school, therefore, bodily and mental training go together, and most people would admit that the latter, for which the former—the repetition of sounds—is merely preparatory, is the more important of the two.

There is a misunderstanding with reference to a difference between the nature of bodily and mental desires that sometimes leads to educational mistakes. The reader will recall that on page 7 it was said that all desires involve a combination of feeling and thought; but that, in bodily desire, this thought is subordinated to the feeling which it attends and serves, and in mental desire, the feeling is subordinated to thought which it attends and serves. As a result of this difference, it is evident that influences exerted upon bodily desire, which is attributable, primarily, to physical feeling, as in hunger, thirst, lust, or passion, must be more or less direct and immediate; while influence exerted upon mental desire, which is attributable, primarily, to thought, as in yearning, aspiration, speculation, or imagination, must be more or less indirect and mediate. The nature of bodily desire is such that it can be experienced in its full force at its beginning. The nature of mental desire, on the contrary, is such that it accumulates force as a result of a continuance of thinking, as in observation, comparison, reflection, and reasoning. One may become conscious of bodily desire, and drift into indulgence of it, without any exertion of his own. If he wish to drink champagne, he can do so and can get drunk without the slightest consciousness of effort. But not so with mental desire. When, notwithstanding a liking for champagne, one wishes to keep sober, to maintain his mental balance,—in other words, his mental control over his bodily nature,—he can do it in no other way than as a result of an endeavor, and sometimes of a struggle.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this mental control, though in it feeling is secondary and thinking primary, is just as truly a result of desire as is bodily control. This is not always recognized. No mistake is more common among parents, educators, reformers, and even ecclesiastics than that of supposing—often with no realization of its logical consequences—that all forms of desire have the nature of those that are started and developed,—as described on pages 24 to 26, from the bodily or physical side of one's being. Therefore, when it is argued that intellectual, moral, or religious deficiencies should be corrected, so far as possible, by influencing men through their desires, this statement, because supposed to refer to only bodily desires, may occasion a method of action likely to prove injurious.

Take the emphasis given by modern education upon the importance of watching the movements and choices of the child in order to discover his own inborn tendencies and aptitudes, and to direct his training so as to enable him to make the most of them. There is no gainsaying the wisdom of this course, or the advance in educational methods attributable to it; and yet it may lead to disastrous results, if the methods be applied merely to physical or bodily tendencies and aptitudes and not to psychical or mental. It might be supposed that this latter would not be done. What could be more senseless and wrong, in case one had committed to him the guidance of a musical genius, than to allow his physical or bodily indolence to keep him from engaging in the drill and hard work needed in order to develop his gift? Yet something resembling this is often done by those who have charge of the young. A great deal of the instruction imparted to-day in the family, the kindergarten, the school, and even the college and university, is based upon the conception that success in teaching may be determined by the degree in which pupils are made to enjoy it because it is conformed to their bodily desires, by which is meant to their temperamental as distinguished from their mental inclinations. That which is taught is not presented in ways to awaken mental desires, because it is recognized that the fulfillment of these cannot be attained along the line of least resistance. Because the mental necessitates effort, the teacher seems to fear that the fact may be revealed to his pupils, and this fear deprives them not infrequently of the only form of instruction fitted to enable them to develop

their aptitudes in such ways as to realize their highest possibilities. The author once undertook before some university professors to prove that, by a judicious use of the elective system, one could get a Bachelor of Arts degree from what was then considered the first university of the country as a result of doing less intellectual disciplinary work than would have been required by a female seminary of the previous generation.

And yet the slightest thought ought to enable one to recognize that no play even, to say nothing of employment, is rendered less desirable by the mere fact of its necessitating effort—though, of course, such effort should not be excessive. Where it is excessive, it introduces another principle. Some of the most popular games among our small boys are those in which they struggle the hardest; and what among grown people could involve more exertion than baseball, football, or tennis? The problem in education is to make study not easy but interesting.

This is usually done in two ways. The first way—a way in which the teacher is often greatly aided by the family and community, if moderately intelligent—is by picturing for the imagination of the pupil the completed future results which study is designed to obtain for him. The second way—a way in which, because of the ignorance of the requirements of culture, the teacher in our own country is often very little aided, if not actually opposed—is by picturing for the imagination the important but minute details that need to be mastered before any great achievement can become a possibility. Every teacher needs to bear in mind that no ordinary man, and, least of all, perhaps, no genius, can do all for which his aptitudes fit him, except as a result of mental desire that prompts him to choose the highest end possible to his own ability and to devote himself to the best possible means of attaining this end.

All successful scholars, or artists, whether mathematicians, lawyers, philosophers, poets, painters, or musicians, will bear witness to the fact that, at some time in their lives, and usually because guided and inspired by some efficient teacher, they came to have a distinctly mental desire that was the supreme object of ambition, and to have also an absorbing interest in the practice and drill needed in order to attain it. This is the kind of desire which the instructor ought to seek to find and awaken in his pupils, and

the kind of desire to which he should strive to conform his methods. It is because, in some way, something has awakened love for work, especially work adapted for peculiar aptitudes, that many an awkward gawk with a repellent voice has become a graceful and charming orator; many a slow writer with apparently no gift of expression has become a voluminous and widely read author; many a playground butt, whose opinion was never seriously considered by his comrades, has become a powerful political leader; and many an inferior reciter in the class room, a great scholar. No one can be a preëminently successful instructor unless he believes thoroughly in two possibilities,—that of the existence of mental desire even in minds where it seems most dormant; and that of the almost unlimited development that can be imparted to such minds through educational training. Unfortunately, thousands of teachers really believe in neither of these. How much the world suffers in consequence it would be impossible to ascertain or even to conceive.

The pupil's mental interest in even the bodily or physical drill mentioned a moment ago may be increased by having the object of the drill explained to him. But there are other ways of connecting a mental with a physical effect. When the writer was young, geography was taught by having the class sing the names of places in chorus, while the places themselves were pointed out by the teacher, or, later, by pupils, on a large map hung upon a wall. Sometimes, especially with small children, the mere rhythm of sound or gesture, which is made to accompany repetition, introduces a psychical or mental in the sense of an orderly and calculated form of interest. Best of all, for this purpose, however, is an occasional interruption of the monotony of repetition by questions applying what has been learned, like: "How much is seven times seven?" "How do you say in Latin: 'I have loved,' 'I should be loved,'" etc.?

At such times the spirit of competition among those who hold up their hands to be allowed to give answers causes the whole performance to have all the mental interest of a game. Of late years there has been a tendency to discredit every form of competition in scholarship, to abolish the marking system, the giving of prizes, the declaiming of speeches, or the reading of essays, in fact, of anything giving prominence to individual attainment. To abolish these would undoubt-



edly prevent a few cases in which selfishness and self-esteem are developed. But, in many cases, it would also prevent a development of the mental desire needed in order to overcome the indolent tendencies of lower bodily desire. As a fact, very few of those rendered eager to learn by healthful competition are influenced by selfish purposes or to obtain a mean advantage. The most of them are trying to do what they consider worthy of their better selves,—to show that they appreciate the advantages given them, and to please and honor their parents or guardians. The world cannot afford to lessen fair and sportsmanlike competition either in the school or in after life; and this for the reason that it is one of the most successful of all agencies through which to effect the sources of mental desire. Of course, there is a chance, too, of its also affecting the sources of physical or bodily desire; that it will make men self-seeking, deceitful, dishonest, overreaching, and characteristically mean. But this is a risk that confronts every man at every stage of his existence, from birth to death. There is no more reason why, because of this risk, one should seek to put an end to competition in work than to do the same in play. If he were successful in doing it in either, then, inasmuch as the most of life that is at all desirable is made up of either work or play, he might apparently succeed merely in making life appear desirable in nothing.

The principle just stated applies equally to the encouragement, among the students themselves, of literary, debating, social, fraternal, and religious societies, intended to develop other traits representing other needed characteristics or tendencies. The late war, too, demonstrated, more clearly than had been realized before, the practical benefits derivable from the training that precedes, the skill that furthers, and the fair play that accompanies the intercollegiate athletic competitions. All these, though emphasizing physical and bodily aptitudes, necessitate mental control exercised in connection with them. Many a student, because of being on "the team," has learned to put self-denial and reason first, and appetite and impulse second. When in training, he often cannot smoke, much less eat or drink, what he wants; and, when in practice, he cannot make, in violation of the rules, a single move toward what seems almost certain to promise for himself individual prominence.

All these effects are distinctly mental. Nevertheless, the

predominant aim of the athlete is bodily, and, in an institution of learning, it is an anomaly, in times of peace, that he should rank higher—it is not said as high—in the opinion of students and professors, as is sometimes the case, than does one who is proportionately successful in achieving an aim that is purely mental. All rules have exceptions, and, fortunately, in our times, conditions requisite for war are exceptional. But in ordinary times one could say that the college student who really considers athletics more important than thought-culture has an outlook upon life that is not right side up. Unless converted from his view, he is in danger of being obliged to support himself to the end of his days on his hands, with his head downward, and his face looking backward. The highest success is never reached by those who seriously aim at anything involving the assigning of inferior rank to the psychical or mental.

Other educational influences in our country seem sometimes to involve this. Recall, for instance, the methods in which our free-school system has been developed from the little country schoolhouse of our forefathers. Some of us are inclined to feel exultant in view of our very large educational buildings, and of the crowds of children that attend them. But, very often, these furnish merely one more illustration of the stupid tendency of the ordinary mind to confound that which is physically big with that which is psychically great. Many of these schools are inefficient for the very reasons that make us proud of them. If they had not been accommodated to the physical increase of population and the physical apparatus supposed to be needed for the purposes of education, the psychical result might have been better. If the small schoolhouse had remained the ideal even in large cities, the parents of each neighborhood could have continued to know with whom their children were meeting, and to exercise needed oversight over their associations; and the teachers could have had some personal acquaintance with families, and adapted their instruction to individual requirements. As it is, the children are in almost as much danger of learning what they should not from one another as of learning what they should from their teachers. The enormous quantity of educational results that have been turned out, too, has, in many cases, diminished their quality. Until quite recently, and, in some places, even yet, the machinery of the graded system, by being applied in the

same way to all, has forced dull pupils forward before they were prepared to advance intelligently, making them essentially superficial, and held the bright ones back, making them listless and indolent because of not having enough work to keep them busy.

The wisdom of educating boys and girls in the same schools and classes, too, is questionable. It may do well enough in small towns where parents can be on the watch and know the character of their children's associates; or in colleges and universities where all the pupils are sufficiently mature to take care of themselves and of one another. But, even in these, it is a question whether the constant association between the sexes does not tend to lessen the cultivation in both of psychical and non-selfish traits. Some insist upon it that, in such circumstances, the boys become less gallant and gentlemanly, and the girls less modest and lady-like; that the former do not yield, as they would to comparative strangers, the best seats, or pick up the handkerchiefs, books, or chalk that have been dropped on the floor; and that the latter learn not to expect these attentions, but to push forward and help themselves. As all approach maturity, too, at an age when the bodily tendencies are particularly strong, and the mental the opposite, it certainly does seem as if all associations and surroundings should be so chosen and directed as to strengthen the latter;—as if the attention of the pupil whether at work or at play, should be concentrated, if possible, upon that which is fitted to influence and develop distinctly mental and rational tendencies.

Certain indirect effects of that of which we are speaking also deserve notice. Few wise mothers care to have their daughters know about either the thoughts or actions of the ordinary immature street boy. A policeman of the author's district in Los Angeles—in a statement subsequently justified by an investigation by the Young Men's Christian Association and by a chairman of a regularly appointed physician's investigation committee—told him that, while he sent his son through the high school and university, the conditions were such that it was impossible for him to allow his daughters to finish their courses even in the high school, and he could not afford to send them to a private school. What can be thought of the wisdom or justice of a method of free education that renders it impossible for scrupulous

parents to accept its provisions? Even the mere inevitable competition in scholarship, if between girls and boys, is not desirable. It tends to make the former study too strenuously and the latter—strange as it may appear, because girls naturally recite better than boys of the same age—study too slightly. The ranking records of too many co-educational schools show two or three boys, too bright to be kept lower down, side by side with several girls in the highest group, while following these, with a few boys scattered among them, are most of the girls; and, finally, in the lowest group of all, with scarcely a girl among them, is the great body of the boys. If you ask the boys the reason of this, you find that many of them hold to the opinion that only girls and “sissy” boys care about scholarship. The truth is that boys, even those most influenced in other circumstances by the spirit of competition, will seldom compete with girls. A few will not because of a spirit of gallantry, but more because of a boyhood *esprit de corps*. The same conception influences them to neglect literary work, as in the debating societies, and to join “gangs” intent upon doing what girls cannot do,—a feeling that sometimes finds a healthful outlet in athletics, but sometimes, also—especially in large cities—in groups given to crime, and vice. It is not too much to say that many of those doing these things would have done exactly the opposite, had they studied where they would have been brought into competition with boys alone, and where brainy boys would have been fully respected for their intellectual leadership and thus rendered able to exert upon their fellows the influence needed to remind them of mental requirements. A considerable experience as a sort of Father Confessor of graduates of preparatory schools has led the author to the opinion that school sentiment controlled by the best element usually prevents organizations for crime and vice in large schools attended by boys alone; but not so often in schools attended by both sexes.

Another injurious effect of the latter schools is due to the limited number of teachers of one's own sex under whom a pupil sometimes studies. There are many things connected with quite a variety of subjects which the pupil should know, but which, in such circumstances, the teacher cannot always and sometimes should not tell him. There are other things of which any teacher ought to tell him, but which,

nevertheless, can have more satisfactory effects if told to boys by a man, or to girls by a woman. As applied to boys, for instance, this is true not only of actions like smoking, drinking, betting at cards, pool, and ball games, and prowling around the streets at night. It is true with reference to what might be thought very minor matters. That which a woman considers a praiseworthy result of caution, discretion, and tact, a boy, especially if discussing the subject with other boys, is likely to attribute to a lack of courage, honor, and truthfulness; and there is danger, if he try to follow her advice, that he may become, as has many a "mother's darling," a sneak, a tattletale, or a hypocrite. Even the purely intellectual training needed by a boy, with his greater tendency to reject formulation and learn of his own initiative through his own experiments, seems to necessitate a different form of teaching from that which is successful with girls. Indeed, there are many branches in which boys and girls appear to respond differently to the same methods of instruction. Let us hope that those who have charge of educational interests in various parts of the country will consider carefully the arguments in favor of and against the system prevailing in their community, and will have independence of character sufficient to cause them to dare to deviate from the paths already chosen, or even to retrace the steps already taken, in case this course clearly reveals itself to them as the wisest.

## CHAPTER XVI

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN THE GENERAL RELATIONS OF SOCIETY

Self-Control Needed by Members of Society; not Control of Other People—Mistakes with Reference to these Subjects—The Mature Require Different Treatment from the Immature—Too Strait-laced People Lacking in Moral Influence—Good Influence of Some Parents because not Strait-laced—To Act Morally, Mature Minds sometimes Need to Act Independently—Reverence, Respect, Obedience, Humility—Exerting Public Influence on the Side of the Mental—Importance of Community Influence upon Farm Life—Public Spirit—Frankness and Truthfulness—Cases in which these may Work Harm—Problems of the Kind Solved by Balancing Mind against Body—Why this Method Does no Harm—Promises—Contracts—Purity, Cleanliness, Decency, and Chastity—Reasons for these—Chastity Common, and Honored among Men, though for Business Reasons Less Emphasized than Integrity—Chastity among Women—Moral Obligations Rest upon All—Virtue its Own Reward.

**A**FTER one has passed beyond the instruction and discipline of the family and the school, he becomes a member of what is termed society. The chief difference between his experience now and that which has preceded it is that he is no longer subject to the oversight of "tutors and governors." He is expected to take care of himself, and to become conscious that in order to go right, he must exercise self-control. These are facts that are extremely significant. In them is to be found the most important of the differences between youth and maturity. Yet many fail to recognize this. They seem to suppose that because another who has had authority has taken charge of them when children, he can continue throughout their lives to do the same. They think, therefore, that they themselves are not responsible for the results of their own conduct. The blame for this, if there be any, they get into the habit of shifting upon some other member of their family

or upon some official of their state or church. This is the case quite frequently with those brought up where there is a great deal of supervision as was formerly the case in ancient feudalism or hierarchy. Others seem to suppose that, because grown people are responsible for the conduct of the child, they are responsible for that of everybody; and, forthwith, as soon as they themselves are grown, they begin to act upon this theory. They get into the habit of assuming responsibility for everything, some, apparently—especially those whose tendencies are puritanic—spending the main energy of life in dictating courses to be pursued by their neighbors.

Such people usually do almost as much harm as good. No one can be expected to attain to the highest manhood unless he recognizes that he must hold himself responsible for the results of his own actions; or to attain to the highest helpfulness to others unless he recognizes that, as a rule, he must leave them free to act out their own unhampered convictions. Many grown people as well as children are nursed into inefficiency by accepting the domination of strong-willed associates; and many more are provoked into effective rebellion against attempted domination. In the latter case, they feel, without always apprehending exactly why, that they have a right to liberty of action; and, if this be denied them, that they are being treated unjustly. For this reason, dissipation of all sorts seems sometimes only a natural reaction against excessive prohibitions of comparatively innocent beginnings of it. People who greet such beginnings with scoldings and punishments may have good intentions; but they do not adopt wise methods. They are trying to secure psychical or mental results through merely physical or bodily agency; and to do this is seldom possible. It is well enough to keep a boy who has not acquired sufficient knowledge to recognize falsehood—or sufficient logical training to weigh evidence—from certain actions, like reading immoral books or hearing skeptical lectures; or, while intellect and will are too weak to withstand and repel harmful suggestions, from associating with vicious companions. But, merely in order to do one's duty to a community, a mature mind needs sometimes to be acquainted with fallacious arguments and with the conditions of vicious life. Otherwise, a man may not be able to answer the former, or to reform the latter.

It is because these facts are not recognized that very often people who are what are termed strait-laced—people always apparently solicitous to fulfill literally the smallest details of action that others have prescribed—have little moral influence. Usually their hearts are not at fault. They are not insincere, as is sometimes represented. Their heads are at fault. They are basing morality upon a false theory, a theory so false that its erroneous nature can be recognized even by one not sufficiently thoughtful to be able to explain why he thinks it so. They are attributing moral obligation not to the psychical or mental; not to anything of which one becomes conscious through an effect produced first of all upon the mind; but to the physical or bodily—in other words, to an influence that would not be felt at all, were it not for the physical presence of others who seem to be exercising authority beside one or over one.

It occasionally happens that fathers and mothers, who indulge their own bodily desires, as in smoking and drinking, are more successful in training their sons and daughters to moral self-control than are those who are more strict with themselves and their families. This is possibly because such parents manifest more sympathy with their children, and so draw them nearer to themselves, and, by doing this exert a greater influence; but it is more likely to be because their mode of life emphasizes, as mere abstemiousness could not, the principle brought out in Chapter X., that the ideal of morality is realized less through the suppression of bodily desires than, whenever necessary, through their subordination.

Enough has been said to indicate the different aspects in which questions of morality may appeal to the immature and to the mature. The latter, as has been said, prefer to answer these questions as a result of their own thinking and feeling; or, so far as influenced by another, as a result of his appealing to their own mentality. For this reason, though the germs of all the principles of right living exist, and should be cultivated, in one who is still under the care of the family or the school, it is only later that they need to be explained in their more fundamental and comprehensive relationships. In accordance with this conception, let us now glance again at certain forms of action already considered, and also at certain additional ones that it has not seemed in place to consider previous to this.



The reverence for that which is mental or spiritual, respect for one's elders, and obedience to those in authority, which were mentioned in Chapter XIV. as traits that should be developed in a child, need to be retained in part by one in mature life. They cause a man to have humility in view of that which he cannot know, deference for the opinions of experts, and scrupulousness in carrying out the directions of those who have a right to give orders. And in no way, perhaps, better than through these traits could one reveal high intelligence and a character in which the mental is dominant. Contrary traits invariably show superficiality of conception, a limited outlook and a foredoomed futility of endeavor. Depth of thought is always awed by the mystery of the unseen forces above and about one. Breadth of view always recognizes the fruits that can be gathered from the wide experience of others; and efficiency avails itself of the machinery of custom and law which have been devised as a result of centuries of thought, and are operating to safeguard and prosper, not one man, but vast communities of men. There are times when individuals are justified in disregarding institutions that have become customary, legal, traditional, and sacred; but this is generally because the methods through which they happen at the time to be expressed, need to be reformed. It is seldom because the spirit or principle that is at the basis of them needs to be abolished. On the contrary, it usually needs to be represented, and therefore to be possessed, more fully.

In connection with this thought, one cannot avoid the suggestion of the importance of exerting such influence as one may have on the side of such agencies as, on the whole, are calculated to stimulate and strengthen other people's thoughtful desires. This is the reason why many a man is a staunch supporter of religious institutions, notwithstanding much, perhaps, in their forms and creeds that appear to him unsatisfactory. He recognizes that their predominating influence is intellectually and spiritually uplifting, and by his example he aims to draw the attention of his family and neighbors to the fact. For the same reason, he refrains from business and rests from labor on one day of the week. For the same, too, he associates himself with those who carry on activities intended in any way to benefit the community. He becomes not only a patron but an active participant of work intended to improve the condition of those

who have been unfortunate, whether because ignorant, incompetent, ill, or vicious. There are hundreds of ways in which society can enable him to join with others in holding out a helping hand to those who need it; and he shows himself to be extremely unwise, and possessed of a very narrow outlook upon his possibilities, if he fail to avail himself of his opportunities in these regards. An important fact that he should learn early in life is that a man can become interested in almost anything upon which he is willing to begin to expend labor; and if this labor be of a character particularly fitted to excite and develop in himself and others mental desire, he cannot afford in justice to his own nature, to let the occasion escape him.

Very recently the author has been reading an account of the youthful experiences of a boy brought up on an American farm of the Middle West; and the dreariness, the drudgery, the lonesomeness, the lack of interest in anything broader than itself, or stimulus to anything better, rendered the whole account pitiful in the extreme. Yet thousands of people belonging to the generation just passing away can recall conditions upon farms in the Eastern States—say in central New York—where life, though not devoid of laborious phases, was lightened by conditions of intercourse and enjoyment that not only made them delightful to remember but so contributed to the development of intelligence and refinement that the boys and girls of the farms could pass and did pass with scarcely any intervening experience into some of the most prominent business, political, and social positions of the country. That which chiefly contributed to this result was the intense community life of the neighborhood. In those days, this was usually connected with church life, but it was not confined to this. There were weekly singing schools, sewing and reading societies, lyceums, discussions, lectures, plays, sleighing parties, festivals—all sorts of methods designed to bring people together, and succeeding in doing so. In the Western farm life described in the book of which mention has been made, there had been no realization of the importance of community influence. Each incoming farmer had apparently bought as much land as he could, and placed his house in the center of it where he was removed as far as possible from any neighbor. If, instead of this, each newcomer had selected for his dwelling some corner of his property where his family

could be near other people, and had extended to other methods of life the feeling prompting this action, the whole nature of the surroundings might have been made more livable because more mental in the sense of rational and humane.

Think what it means for a member of society to become chiefly interested in devising methods of increasing the prosperity and happiness of those surrounding him, as contrasted with methods of increasing opportunities merely for himself! Think of the difference in moral character between the person who devotes his life to the former pursuit, and the one who devotes it to the latter! Nothing is more encouraging in the history of our country than its various social associations that have been directly designed to give expression and development to mental promptings. These associations do not, and need not, always have a distinctly moral aim; but reading, literary, musical, or dramatic clubs are mental in tendency, and, for this reason, even by the most pleasure-seeking, ought to be recognized as important alternatives, even if not substitutes for such methods of enjoyment as involve merely bodily indulgence.

Frankness, truthfulness, and sincerity also, that were mentioned in Chapter XIV., are traits whose importance is not diminished after the period of childhood. A man who is trying to give dominance to the mental will not hide his feelings and intuitions, or facts concerning which he has information, behind the mask of his bodily nature unless he has the best of reasons for it. If he do it because he fears that others may not agree with his opinions or accept his information, and so may not continue to be influenced by him, he is in danger, owing to his efforts to preserve their respect, of surrendering his own self-respect. If he do it because he has reason to fear opposition, ostracism, or persecution, he is in danger of proving himself a moral coward. If he do it, not because of any fear, but in order to gain the undeserved confidence of others, and, through flattery or fraud, obtain their admiration or help, then he has so completely subordinated the mental to the physical that he deserves all the opprobrium that is meant to be conveyed when one calls another a hypocrite or a sycophant.

But the question arises; Must one always be frank? Must he always tell the truth? Must he tell it to those whom it might injure? Would it be right for one to be instrumental

in any way in injuring others? Must one tell the truth to those who have no right to know it; or to those who, if told it, might use it for the purpose of harming themselves or others? Would it be right for one to be instrumental in bringing about this result? Suppose that an invalid be so ill that bad news coming to him suddenly might imperil his life, and the news arrive that his best friend has just been killed; suppose that a wife with half a dozen dependent children be asked by a hated husband, when drunk and in a violent temper, whether she loves him; suppose that a brother who is a spy condemned to be shot be hiding in his home, and his mother or sister be asked whether or not he is inside it; suppose the father of a family, trying to obtain a living for them, be questioned with reference to his methods of investing, buying, or selling by one who is known to be crafty and unscrupulous, intent only on taking an unfair advantage of whatever knowledge he may gain,—in circumstances like these, is the one questioned under obligation to be frank and truthful?

Some people find it difficult to answer such questions. Could not a part of the difficulty be removed by applying to them the principle that has been unfolded in this volume,—by taking the ground that a man in no circumstances should disregard the promptings of his mental or psychical nature? If he were to ask himself which course of the two would be the more thoughtful, rational, kindly, and unselfish, is there much doubt what would be his answer? But even in this case, he might hesitate. His very hesitation, however, would necessitate mental action, and, therefore, whatever were his decision, would tend to direct it aright. As Young says in the "Night-Thoughts,"

Who does the best his circumstance allows  
Does well, acts nobly; angels could no more.

At any rate, it is not likely that a question thus treated would cultivate in a man, as is sometimes supposed, a tendency to believe in using a wrong means in order to attain a right end. There has been no suggestion here involving the use of a wrong means. Thoughtfulness, rationality, kindness, and unselfishness are not wrong but right. Men who are scrupulously careful to carry out the promptings of these will be among the last to keep from a knowledge

of the truth those who ought to know it, whether in the home, the school, the shop, the office, the courthouse, the hospital, or the church. The suppression of the truth that from time immemorial has enabled the officials of nations and institutions to keep large masses of people over whom they have had control uneducated, ignorant, stupid, and superstitious does not need for its prevention a conception of the truth which insists upon its being expressed in all circumstances regardless of evil consequences. The result that is most important can be best attained by estimating the requirements of truthfulness, as of every other trait contributing to moral rectitude, by the degree in which it succeeds in helping to outweigh the bodily, in the sense of the physical, the egoistic, and the selfish, by the mental, in the sense of the rational, the humane, and the non-selfish.

In connection with any discussion of trustworthiness, a suggestion necessarily arises with reference to the keeping of a promise. This is the expression of an intention that has awakened expectation and action on the part of another. In case the promise be not fulfilled, the one to whom it has been given may suffer not only disappointment but, if the matter be important, serious disaster. To prevent such results, many a high-minded man has kept his word at the expense of sacrificing not only all his property but his life; and, among honorable people, an habitual promise-breaker is usually considered as almost typically inconsiderate, selfish, and untrustworthy. There are some cases, however, in which it is usually conceded that promises can be considered as not binding. These are cases in which the fulfillment of them is impossible; unlawful; immoral; based upon conditions subsequently proved not to exist; or not voluntarily given for the purpose of awakening expectation or action in those personally interested in the matter to which the promises refer.

A promise, when put into the form of a written agreement between two parties, each of whom engages to do certain things upon certain conditions, is termed a contract. The general principles underlying its fulfillment are the same as those underlying an ordinary promise; but as the contract is a legal document, the interpretation of its requirements and fulfillments, in cases of dispute between the contracting parties, is subject to determination by some court of justice.

The traits following transparency, frankness, truthfulness,

and trustworthiness, as mentioned on page 189 are purity, cleanliness, decency, and chastity; and none can reveal quite as clearly as these do the results of subordinating the bodily to the mental. Purity is a word used to designate the quality of one's feeling and thinking when his higher spiritual desire is least vitiated by an admixture with lower physical desire. Cleanliness indicates a subjective condition of mind or body that is characterized by purity. Decency is determined by the objective expression in word or deed of a condition of cleanliness; and chastity depends upon the application of all the three other traits to relations between the sexes. In the degree in which higher desire—the desire for that which is in accordance with a rational regard for the best interests of the individual and of the community—is uppermost in one's nature, chastity promotes continence and prevents intercourse not legalized by marriage. If a man were an animal only, and not a human being, he would not feel obligated to manifest these traits. They are all developments of a desire to do nothing unworthy of one possessing a mind by which he ought to be controlled. It is largely the consciousness of possessing this mind, and of not having used it as he should, that accounts for the sense of shame that almost invariably comes to those who have not been able to conceal from the general public the fact of their own unchastity. It is quite common for Japanese men to veil their faces when they visit haunts of vice; and we all know of the social stigma that is sometimes unjustly as well as uncharitably attached to a woman who is merely suspected of a fall from virtue. Perhaps, the same conception of that which becomes one who possesses a mind which should be enthroned over all action accounts for the ceremonies that apparently in all countries and among all races, however uncivilized, accompany marriage. It seems as if we must ascribe these ceremonies very largely to a desire to emphasize the psychical as contrasted with the physical side of marriage; as if they were needed to satisfy a certain demand in the minds of the participants to have the world recognize their acknowledgment of their allegiance to higher desire. If this surmisal be justified, then as long as human nature as at present constituted lasts, what is termed "free love" will probably be discredited, and those who practice it be more or less disesteemed.

Those acquainted with life in prisons and the sentiments prevailing in them agree in saying that, as a rule, a criminal believes that the only difference between himself and men outside the prison lies in the fact that these have had no such opportunity as he has had to commit the crime for which he has been punished; or else that they have committed it, and have never been found out. This principle applies to chastity. The unchaste think all others are the same. But the customs and laws of all races and nations prove this conception to be untrue. It is untrue even as applied to men as distinguished from women. It is men almost invariably who have set the examples for these customs and drafted the laws concerning them. It is true that men do not avoid other men known to have violated the principles of chastity as they do those known to have violated the principles of financial honesty. But this is owing to the requirements of business. One cannot well refuse to trade with others because they are unchaste; but he can and should refuse to trust them and should warn his neighbor against doing so, in case they are dishonest. There are other ways, however, equally emphatic in which men express their estimate of one who is unchaste. Think of the many adulterers who have been shot by fathers, brothers, or husbands! Anyone, too, acquainted with the blackballing of nominees for membership in any first-class college fraternity or city club will bear testimony that the feeling of disapprobation underlying this shooting is by no means confined to those who have a personal grievance. Some years ago, the managers of one of the most distinctly aristocratic men's clubs of the country informed a member that he would be expelled if he did not instantly withdraw a card of invitation to accept the hospitality of the club that he had sent to a certain foreign duke, against whom there had been no charge except the one that we are now considering. The duke, moreover, had already been accepted and fêted by the ladies of the city, and, some months later, took back to his own home one of the wealthiest of them as his bride.

It is true, however, that chastity is usually considered more indispensable to good character in a woman than in a man. There are reasons for this opinion. If a wife be unchaste, her husband can never be sure that he is the real father of her children. She offends not only against the law of right, but against his fatherhood rights in particular.

No consequence quite commensurate with this follows upon a similar offense on the part of a man. But even though this be the case, and even though a man believe—as most men do—that he is more susceptible to temptation in this direction than is a woman, these facts furnish no excuse for his own indulgence. The more difficult a duty may be, the more strength of character does it indicate and develop in the one who fulfills it. Another thing is also true. The more weak his character, the less can he afford to violate the law in accordance with which the bodily should be kept from outweighing the mental.

This subject can never be rightly discussed without recognizing that, as applied to it, and with a meaning different from that which is sometimes assigned, it is true that "virtue is its own reward." The joy and satisfaction that accompany most of the triumphs and achievements of life are lessened by a disturbing sense of the presence within one of more or less of the selfishness of pride and exultation. But there is nothing of these in the grateful feeling that one experiences who can look back upon no victim that has fallen and been deserted in his pathway, except that lower nature within himself which deserved defeat and over which he had a right to be a victor. The consciousness of having, by his own efforts, obtained peace for his own spirit, and of being at peace with his fellows is inestimably precious, whether one consider its effects upon his mind when at rest or in action. In order to experience all the enjoyment possible to life and all the inspiration that it can impart, one must have and continue to have an attitude of mind in which he can avail himself to the full of its mental as well as its bodily effects. Only the mental, developed, as we have found, by influences that come from without and above, is able to surround and surmount physical conditions with the ideal and imaginative charms that are essential to fit them to become things of beauty. Only moisture and sunshine which are not of its own evolvment can make the bush that grew into a mere thorny product of the soil burst into flower and fragrance. Few of those, therefore, who have formed habits of indulging in vice do not live in a world deprived of some of its charm and beauty. They are always more or less in the condition of the drunkard who cannot see wine sparkling in a glass without feeling an approaching daze of insanity, or drink it without a dread of stumbling into insensibility.



It sometimes seems as if all nature were a mighty instrument of tyranny from which the only possibility of escape is afforded by constant mental activity; that, in no other way except by exerting this, can one escape from servitude to laws that bring a man under the influence of pain and decay if they do not deprive him wholly of that consciousness of spiritual freedom which alone can insure perfect happiness. If one wish to have his life resemble a heaven rather than a hell, the first thing for him to do is to learn to treasure his physical body so far only as it may be considered a palace or a temple in which to enthrone, and, as it were, enshrine, his higher nature,—in other words, as an honored or sacred dwelling place, every part of which should be kept clean and pure because only thus can it always be prepared for high and holy uses.

## CHAPTER XVII

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND HABITS

Matters of Habit and Manner not mentally Unimportant—Mental Influence Exerted over Bodily Appetite—Selection of Food—Cooking and Seasoning Food—The Use of those Stimulants that are Injurious only to Self—Tobacco—Stimulants Injurious also to Other People, like Intoxicating Drinks and Opiates—Restricting their Use through Circulation of Information concerning their Effects—Regulating their Use by Law—Prohibiting it altogether—Objections Made to Prohibition—Those with the Same Moral Aims do not always Agree with Reference to the Means of Attaining them—Law Applied by Using Bodily Force can never Exert any but Indirect Influence upon Mental Results—However wisely Framed, Law can never be Substituted for Mental Self-control.

ON page 193 in referring to the virtues that can be cultivated in children, a connection was suggested between a thoughtful desire to be kind to others, and a desire to make one's self agreeable to them, as shown in keeping one's clothes and boots mended and brushed, and one's hands, face, teeth, and body clean. Many people who recognize the importance of these matters in children seem to forget that they are of equal importance in themselves. They seem to look upon grown people as they do upon grown plants,—as things not needing any longer to have water wasted on them. Just at the time when the Christian church with all the civilization surrounding it was preparing to plunge into the depths of the Dark Ages, one of its councils passed a canon prohibiting women from washing themselves for fear that they would make themselves too attractive physically. It was one way of trying to fulfill the ascetic conceptions mentioned on pages 124-128. But, as argued in subsequent pages, these conceptions were wrong. It is this fact that excuses the present chapter. It has to do with matters that many people suppose to be not in the least

degree related to morality. But they are related to this, if, for nothing else, for the very good reason that the body is the servant of the mind, and that anything that can make a servant more healthy and strong increases the efficiency of his service.

This fact suggests that the first way of obtaining bodily health and strength is through obtaining the right quantity and quality of food; and that the most natural way in which to do this is to follow the guidance of appetite. Notice, however, that, in order to be moral, a man must follow this guidance rationally; *i.e.* in a way dominated by mental considerations. Only in the degree in which he does this, will his appetite lead neither to overindulgence, as in gluttony; nor to underindulgence, as in famishment.

To consider a few directions in which the influence of mind is needed in order to overbalance that of mere appetite, take the question with reference to the different kinds of food that one can select. Not many of these are fitted for the use of everybody. Most of them are digestible for some but indigestible for others. Millions suffer from dyspepsia and die early because they themselves or others who provide food for them have never learned that such common staples as fresh bread, boiled potatoes, roast pork, uncooked fruit, and sweetened deserts are, for many people, little less innocuous than slow poison. No one, if he can avoid it, should be instrumental in foisting upon the community a bodily or mental invalid. One of the first duties, therefore, of every parent or guardian is to discover for his protégé, and of every grown person to discover for himself, what he can or cannot digest; and then to regulate all bodily indulgence to accord with this mental knowledge. As self-control exercised because of mental requirements lies at the basis of all morality, it is needless to argue that this elementary control of appetite may become an important factor in cultivating a moral habit of mind. Nor is there any doubt that the cultivation of it may be begun in extreme youth.

Until the children of the author were over ten years of age, they never could be induced to eat candy except after obtaining permission from their mother. This was no result of physical punishment but merely of explanation designed to train them through mental understanding. It is because of unchecked self-indulgence in such things that boys and girls sometimes begin careers that end in gluttony and dissipation.

But food needs not only to be properly selected. It needs also to be properly cooked and seasoned. A fellow professor once asked the author if he had ever taken a meal at the house of one of our colleagues. "No," was answered. "Don't then," said the other, "or you'll die soon, as he will. His wife doesn't know how to cook," and the professor to whom he referred did die within a year and of a stomach trouble. When what is to be eaten is well cooked and seasoned, the one partaking of it can hardly avoid keeping it in his mouth long enough to masticate and salivate it; and to do these is essential to successful digestion. The Catholic Church is justified in calling gluttony a deadly sin; but its being this is no excuse for making meals unappetizing. It seems to be a well proved fact that mental vitality, and to some extent sanity, depends upon bodily vitality. Up to a certain point, therefore,—the point where the physical is allowed to dominate—the "better a man lives," as people say, physically, the better will he live psychically.

In connection with appetite, one must consider the use of stimulants. Of these, there are two classes,—those in which one's excessive indulgence proves injurious to himself alone, as in the cases of tea, coffee, and tobacco; and those in which it proves injurious both to himself and to others, sometimes threatening and destroying property and life, as in the cases of beer, wine, distilled liquors, and various opiates. It is evident that the same methods cannot be applied to remedy the evils of both classes. When a man injures himself, he himself must usually apply the remedy. What he most needs, then, is to recognize and practice in his own person the principle of subordinating the bodily to the mental. So far as his experience or the investigations of others lead him to suppose that tea, coffee, or tobacco makes his mind work more clearly and his body more vigorously, or, at least, not less so, he is justified in using them; otherwise not.

Of course, freedom in doing this, as in doing other things, should be more or less restricted in the case of minors. To them tea and coffee, but especially tobacco, may prove very injurious. The Hon. Charles B. Hubbell, when President of the Board of Education of New York City, founded among the boys an Anti-Cigarette League. This was because of his discovery that hundreds of them, previously exceptionally bright and forward in their studies, became dull and backward after beginning to smoke,—especially if they used

cigarettes which more than pipes or cigars incline the user to draw the smoke into the lungs. In confirmation of the same fact the Hon. Willis L. Moore, when head of the United States Weather Bureau, told the author that, of the hundreds of boys employed mainly as messengers in its various offices throughout the country, those that had to be dismissed because of inattention, forgetfulness, and general inefficiency seemed to be invariably "cigarette fiends." Whatever may be the result of smoking after one has grown to maturity, its effects in rendering stale and tough the fresh sensibilities of the brains of the half-grown are about as indisputable as the effects of the same process when turning fresh pork into ham. Parents and guardians would do well to use every means in order to induce those under their charge to refrain from the habit until older. Pledging boys to do this is quite common with men even though they themselves smoke. Women who smoke often encourage the young of both sexes to smoke with them. This fact probably explains why to some a lady's cigarette always suggests moral irresponsibility and leakage. Some time ago the author was quoting to a leading physician in a large city, as an illustration of extravagance in statement, the remark of another, that a "woman who smokes will do anything," meaning anything bad. "I believe it myself," he said. It is not necessary to join in this belief in order to recognize that, by smoking, a woman does not always add to the charm of her companionship. The same is true occasionally of a man. It is strange how, at times, this habit tends to deaden one's sense of obligation to make himself agreeable, —to say nothing about being useful. Yet everybody probably knows not only women but men who can scarcely endure without nausea the presence of one smoking; or, even after he has ceased, the odor that often clings to his breath, clothing, and other surroundings.

Now let us consider the class of stimulants that prove injurious to others as well as to oneself. These sometimes necessitate more than self-control exercised by the individual tempted to indulge in them. Any course of action that may endanger the life and property of people in general justifies the exercise of control by one's associates in the community. This control may be expressed in either an informal or a formal way. In an informal way, men may seek to influence public sentiment and private practice by

refraining—and sometimes signing pledges to refrain—from using these stimulants, either when by themselves in their own homes, or when acting as hosts or guests to others. No one can fail to recognize the high purpose of those who pursue this course. The example of such people, however, will not be very effective unless they are careful to abstain from a censorious and apparently self-righteous attitude of mind toward a neighbor who fails to think or to act exactly as they themselves do. The neighbor may have been accustomed to use such stimulants, especially beer and wine, from childhood. He may argue that all the wrong connected with their use is in getting intoxicated, to which he himself is as much opposed as are the total abstainers. Not a few, too, honestly believe that these agencies are essential to preserve their health, absolutely necessary if they are to avoid chronic dyspepsia. It is evident that what people with such opinions, especially the latter, need is more than precept or even example. They need proof, and to know the facts on which it is based.

Fortunately of late years this has been recognized, and, as a result of investigation, there has come to be a growing conviction on the part of medical men that the corrective for indigestion is to be found more in a change of food and its preparation than in chemical changes wrought in it after reaching the stomach; and that alcohol, even though at times medicinally beneficial, cannot be used habitually without causing more or less of that "auto-intoxication" which precedes disease in some one or more of the bodily organs. As the best guarantee of morality in connection with any form of physical indulgence is the exercise over it of mental control, so, as a safeguard against the evils of this indulgence, there can be no doubt of the wisdom of the wide circulation among all classes of these carefully derived scientific conclusions.

Mental explanations and arguments, however, are not always of themselves sufficient to accomplish results such as, in this case, seem necessary. An appetite for intoxicants is often purely bodily and physical, and, at least when it leads to intoxication and violence, it needs to be counteracted by physical force. Where property and life are threatened, no one can deny the right and duty of the community to put an end to the danger through the enactment and enforcement of law. In many kinds of business, as on rail-

ways and in machine shops, where employees need, at all times, to have complete control of their mental facilities, these laws are frequently made by corporations. No men are employed by them who are known to indulge in a stimulant while at work, and, in many cases, to make sure that they will not do it then, they are forbidden to indulge in one when not at work. In almost all civilized states, too, we find laws intended to regulate overindulgence in this form of appetite. In some cases these are directed mainly against what is sold. Saloon traffic in liquors stronger than light wines or beers is forbidden, the adulteration of either such liquors or of stronger ones is made punishable; or the sale of any intoxicants to minors or drunkards is prevented—occasionally, as in Europe, by issuing licenses allowing those who have proved that they will not abuse the privilege to purchase whatever they choose. In other cases the laws are directed against the places in which the traffic is carried on. Sometimes the number of these is limited, or sometimes intoxicants are permitted to be sold only in a hotel or restaurant where food must be purchased at the same time with them. Sometimes dealers in them are obliged to obtain government licenses for which a high price is charged, with the double purpose of raising a large government revenue and of causing those who obtain them to assist in the detection and punishment of such as attempt to sell without them. In these and other ways, efforts have been made in almost every age and country to regulate the use of intoxicants so that the community shall not suffer from them.

But there are large numbers who are not satisfied with provisions made merely to regulate this evil. They say that all manufacture or sale of any intoxicants should be prohibited; and there is no doubt that, if laws could be framed and enforced in accordance with their demands, the remedy would be sufficient; that alcoholic drunkenness in the country would be entirely abolished.

This statement cannot well be denied; and because such is the case, a constitutional amendment providing for its abolishment has recently been passed in the United States Congress. There are many, however, whom this action has not converted to a belief in prohibition. They think that no such remedy, however carefully framed, can be successfully applied. They freely admit that it may accomplish the desired results in small communities in which people

in general approve of it, but they argue that it must be ineffective in large and mixed communities where there are many who have all their lives been accustomed to use alcohol, or who sympathize with those who wish to use it, or who favor indulgence, if moderate, and therefore consider such laws an unjust infringement upon personal liberty. It is argued that in a community containing many of this character there must be numbers of policemen, lawyers, judges, and jurymen who cannot be expected to be very alert in ferreting out and punishing violations of a law disapproved by many of their friends who, either by their votes or recommendations, have aided them in the past and might aid them in the future. In a republic, it is said, a law is executed in the degree in which it represents public sentiment; and, when it does not, there is danger of cultivating among certain classes a disregard and discredit of all legal enactments; of encouraging an illicit production of imitated liquors, fraudulently concocted from noxious chemicals, with the result of lessening the number of moderate drinkers, but at the risk of increasing the harm done to those who become such. (See footnote <sup>27</sup>, page 285.)

It will be noticed that the difference between the advocates of prohibition and of regulation, as applied to this evil, does not necessarily involve a difference in moral conception. Both may equally desire to keep the mental uppermost. Where they differ is in the method through which, as each argues, this result can be best attained. Together the two furnish a striking illustration of the way in which conscience, aroused to action by the consciousness of conflict between the mental and the bodily, starts and continues to impel the energies of the mind in the right general direction; but leaves the methods—the various steps to be taken while moving in this direction—to be determined, as must everything that is done by a free rational being, by the particular decisions of individual reasoning.

It must not be supposed, however, that this impelling energy of mental desire ever ceases to operate, even when the mental nature seems to be concerned only with the rational selection of methods. Here, as in every similar case, but more clearly than in most of them, one needs constantly to bear in mind that the moral effect of whatever measures are adopted depends entirely upon their influence upon mental desire. If either prohibition or regulation attain a



moral result, it must do so because of this form of influence. Prohibition, by making traffic in alcoholic beverages secret if not impossible, can, at least, keep it out of the sight of the young and others, and, therefore, from being an object of temptation to them; and, by making the traffic illegitimate, it can influence the thoughts and opinions of men so that they shall be opposed to this form of indulgence. Regulation, too, by making it illegal to sell to drunkards and minors, may produce a similar mental effect. But it must always be borne in mind that all methods of influencing morality by civil law are drafted primarily to affect bodily or physical conditions. If there be opposition to the laws they must be carried out through the exertion of physical force; and this, of itself alone, operating as it does only because of exciting fear of detection and punishment, can produce only a physical effect. Too many parents imagine their son to be safe from immorality because they have merely voted to abolish some external phase of temptation. But there are other forms of vice in which he may indulge still more for the very reason that this is denied him. Nor is there any certain guaranty that he will not indulge in this vice as soon as he gets where he can evade that which prevents it. Indeed, there are those who argue that conditions in which the young are constantly tempted to use alcohol, yet are constantly prompted to resist the temptation because of their own deductions from the effects exhibited in the drunkards by whom they are surrounded, are actually favorable rather than the reverse to the cultivation as applied to this evil of moral self-control.

It is never justifiable, however, for men to permit wrong, if this can be avoided, on the ground that good may come of it. This much, however, the statements that have been made ought to impress upon our minds, namely, the futility of expecting mere external law, administered through physical force, to accomplish moral results. These can be wrought by nothing except individual mental self-control. Laws against the use of alcohol, opium, cocaine, or like drugs are justifiable as a means of preventing the destruction of property and life. But let us not suppose that, except indirectly, they can have any great influence in preventing the destruction of individual character.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS AND PLEASURES

Clothing—An Agency for Mental Expression—Application of this Principle to Forms of Work and Art—Under-dressing in Society—Over-dressing—Bodily or Mental Desires as Shown in Ostentatious Residences—Money Wisely Spent to Gratify Public-spirited Mental Desire—Bodily *vs.* Mental Desire, as Shown in Feasting—In Dancing—In Card-playing; why Gambling and Betting are Wrong—Evil Effects Connected with them and Other Pastimes—Forms of Enjoyment in which One is Entertained by Others—Morality and Art—The Kind of Art that One should Patronize—Frivolous and Superficial Art—Every Part of the Human Form can Become a Vehicle for Mental Expression—Different Effects of the Actual Human Form and of its Representations in Art—This Difference Overlooked—Disregard of Proprieties in Moving Pictures and Theatricals—Disregard and Distortion of Truth for Artistic Effects in Dramas and Novels.

AFTER food and drink, the next thing that usually demands a man's attention is clothing. The primary object of this is to cover parts of the body which, if exposed, would become uncomfortably, perhaps dangerously, cold. In covering these parts, it is usually customary to leave uncovered, even at the expense of suffering from cold, the face and hands. This is because these are the chief agencies through which a man sees, hears, and obtains his thoughts, and also communicates them to others in speech and gesture, or carries them out in his deeds. In other words, these are the chief agencies of his mental nature. If they were kept entirely hidden by clothing, he could not use them for mental expression.

These facts with reference to keeping covered or uncovered certain parts of the body, and the reasons for the facts, seem to be instinctively recognized by most people. When they meet a man, they judge of his thoughts, feelings,

and character by first looking at his face, and then at his hands, and what he does with them. Clothing that reveals them, therefore, and conceals everything else, may be said to emphasize the mental or psychical nature. Clothing that does the opposite, causing an unnecessary exposure of parts usually kept hidden, emphasizes the bodily or physical nature.

Of course, this effect will not be produced in case the person is engaged in some form of work or recreation in which there is reason for the exposure. No one objects to limited clothing when one is stoking an engine or taking a bath in the ocean. To say no more, a reason itself is mental, and sufficiently so usually to render any effect into which it enters something more than physical. Because art, too, is usually associated with that which is mental in source and effect, a similar principle sometimes applies to it. (See page 236.)

There is an undue emphasis in the direction opposite to that of the mental that is sometimes forced upon one's attention through immodesty in personal clothing. It might be termed undress, but, with the strange perversity sometimes manifested in the words that people use, it is more likely than not to be exhibited in what they term full dress. Because it shows itself in an entirely unnecessary and therefore intentional exposure, or suggestion, of parts of the body that, as a rule, are kept concealed, such emphasizing furnishes a very clear illustration of subordinating the mental to the physical. Many women especially seem to be unaware that their method of dressing fails to manifest proper regard for the mentality of themselves, of their husbands, or of others who are obliged, perhaps, to associate with them. And many men fail to feel flattered by a suggestion made in public that their characters are such that they may be expected to be fascinated—to be led, perhaps, to “fall in love”—through an appeal made mainly to their physical nature. They are conscious in their conscience that this ought not to be. Some of them, therefore, often remember to the end of their lives the bored disgust with which, at some time, they have been obliged to pose as the delighted victim of such a mode of attack. Perhaps they can remember, too, how they envied, all the while, that other man, sitting near by, *tête-à-tête* with some modestly dressed, but, for this very reason, mentally fascinating woman, every

look in whose thoughtful face indicated that she was recognizing in her companion, and endeavoring to meet as a comrade, one who seemed to have a mind and soul. It is worth noticing with what unanimity artists in their canvases and spiritists in their conjurations, when they represent messengers from the psychic or spirit state, depict these, with exception of hands and face, as robed,—usually in white, the least emphatic of colors. This fact is a proof of what to most people is the mental or psychical ideal in clothing. Even the church choir boys in their white surplices appear to some of the worshipers to be veritable cherubs, though if it were not for their vestments, they might seem to the same worshipers very ordinary and unattractive. The transformation wrought in them by dress, with the suggestions accompanying it, might be attained through the same agency by many of their elders. It is too bad that ignorance of human nature and its mental demands prevents so many of the latter from availing themselves of their opportunities.

The principle under consideration may apply not only to underdressing but to overdressing. This causes dominance to be assigned not to the physical human body but to physical surroundings. Either condition subordinates the mental, showing distrust of its efficiency either in oneself or in others. No one can have much faith in her own or in her associates' possession of intelligence who thinks that she must recommend it to them by hiding her mind behind a mass, and sometimes a mess, of silk, satin, velvet, or jewelry. It would be difficult in any way to exhibit more infidelity to that which is highest in a man's nature. And when to excess in dressing is added paint on the face and perfume everywhere, it does not need the underlying suggestion that there are defects to be covered by the one, or disinfected by the other, to reveal the agent's wholly false conception of all that is noblest and best in human influence. In mercy to their kind, people who indulge in such practices ought to assume a virtue if they have it not, and treat men as if crediting them with some of the elementary traits of manhood, even if in doubt of their having any of those of morality.

A man's residence is merely an extension of the surroundings to which he begins to give attention when he starts out to dress. For this reason his home may indicate

the dominance in him either of bodily or physical or else of mental or rational desire. The former desire leads to a construction intended to call attention to one's physical resources, and, through this, to extend his physical influence and prominence in the community, causing his house to be, if possible, more costly, luxurious, magnificent, and showy than are any of those of his neighbors. Mental or rational desire leads to exactly the opposite,—to a construction erected in accordance with strictly reasonable, artistic, and public-spirited conceptions: to a house that is convenient rather than costly, comfortable rather than luxurious, and instead of being magnificent and showy, no more ornate than is fitted to blend well with the general effects that make one's neighbors' houses attractive and beautiful. Of course, in judging the style and surroundings in which a man lives, one should always bear in mind the different conceptions that people have derived from the different ways in which they have been brought up. What seems only a commodious cottage to some may seem a palace to others. It ought to be said, too, that a part of the reason why it seems what it does to these latter may be owing to wholly unworthy feelings of envy and jealousy. But for such feelings, they might derive great personal gratification from the house not only because enabling them to claim it as a civic asset adding to the charm and importance of their own neighborhood, but because enabling them also to enjoy and develop their æsthetic natures when looking at the lawns and gardens surrounding the house, and, possibly, at the works of art inside of it, to say nothing of availing themselves of the hospitality of its owners, which a right attitude of mind on their part might gain for them.

It has to be acknowledged, however, that sometimes those in the palatial residence are merely planning, through its agency, to gain for themselves a physically dominant position in society. When such is the case, some members of the family are almost certain to do this at the expense of becoming out of sympathy with the community. Some of them, in deference to what they choose to consider due to their own superiority, may acquire a habit of cutting the acquaintance of the poor, even if among their former intimate friends, and near relatives. In this way, antagonism is apt to be cultivated between different classes of society, lessening whatever tendencies any class may feel to give

expression to the mental traits of geniality and humanity. The large house often exerts a bad influence, too, through causing neighbors who cannot afford the expense to desire one equally costly; and this, if erected, may saddle them with a debt that ultimately causes them to lose the most, perhaps, of what they possess; or to visit this result upon their children. If there be many of these, no one of them can continue to live in the style to which he became habituated in his youth; and the main part of what he inherits in life may be merely disappointment and discontent.

If one have been so situated as to acquire, or to inherit, a large fortune, there are plenty of ways in which he can spend it so as to gratify a great deal more than mere bodily or physical desire. Why should one confine his sense of possession, to speak only of this, to that which is behind the door of his own house, or the gate of his own yard? Why should he not include very much more of that which can be found in his own town or county? He often could and would do this, if he had made others, in any way, recipients of his benefactions. One cannot contribute to the happiness, the education, the elevation of other people without beginning to take a personal interest in them, and the larger the number that are thus benefited, the larger will be the number of his interests. Why should he be willing to limit these to the narrow vision and selfish possibilities of a beast in a cave, when broad outlook and unselfish activity might give him a sense of fellowship not only with multitudes of men but with God? Instead of erecting one palace for himself and his family, he might build many cottages for working people equipped with every convenience. Instead of laying out a little front yard for himself, he might provide large playgrounds and parks for all his townspeople; or he might build and equip art galleries, libraries, schools, colleges, asylums, hospitals, and churches. There are no ends of ways in which he might spend millions without involving even a suggestion of the evils that follow upon household extravagance, moneyed aristocracy, and social ostracism.

Now let us consider the pleasures or recreations in which people, after they have built their houses, usually indulge. First of all, in feasting,—perfectly legitimate so far as it does not lead to such things as wastefulness, gormandizing, and intemperance. What does or does not involve these must be left to the good judgment of each host and guest.

But it is always important to get behind the viewpoint of the savage sufficiently to bear in mind that one's object, when tendering a feast, may be not physical but mental; not to fill a greedy stomach, but to give expression to a generous spirit. This conception undoubtedly lies behind a custom attributed to Clemenceau, that "grand old man," the premier of France at the time of the recent war. It is said that owing mainly to his age, he usually takes his own food with him when invited out to dinner,—a fact illustrated in an overheard question which he addressed to a waiter,—“Where are my noodles?” A few years ago there were in Washington two eminent men, approaching old age, who were widely entertained at dinner parties. One was reported to have gone to ninety-six of these in one hundred nights, eating heartily at each, and then he died. The other went to almost as many, but those who sat near him observed that he ate very little. He was always talking; he made of the whole a psychical performance; and, when the season was over, he was, apparently, in better health than when it opened. So in the case of social teas and receptions, and all other agencies that tend to physical excess and fatigue. In the degree in which each can be made mental, it can be made enduring and, in the best meaning of the term, enjoyable.

Next, perhaps, among the entertainments furnished in the home, is dancing. This is a natural expression of healthful and buoyant vitality and joy, made artistic by accompaniments of melody and rhythm. How anyone can think that in itself this form of amusement is wrong, is inconceivable, unless he have a theory in accordance with which he considers everything wrong that is pleasurable, artistic, or beautiful. But this remark does not apply to all forms of dancing. It applies to such forms only as do not allow the bodily to subordinate the mental. The old-fashioned Sailors' Hornpipe, Highland Fling, and Double Shuffle appeared to be pleasurable modes of natural expression conformed to the requirements of art. So with the Reel, the Quadrille, the Lancers, and the Morris Dances. The one chief impression conveyed by all of these was predominantly mental. Every bodily movement necessitated by them seemed interesting mainly because of the overflow of exuberant individual activity rendering it characteristic of personal thought and feeling. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of much of our modern dancing. It would be diffi-

cult to devise anything more essentially vulgar and vile than some of the performances associated or allied with what are termed the "tango" or the "hug." Only degenerates could originate them, and, once made fashionable, only those incapable of forming independent moral judgments could perpetuate them,—they so violate the first principles of propriety. How people can tolerate in a couple, when dancing, attitudes and movements that would insure their immediate expulsion from the room, if they were sitting, is simply inconceivable. In former times, young people were taught how to keep apart when dancing. Now many dancing schools teach them how to cling together. The result sometimes goes altogether beyond a mere tendency to vice. A father, who, fortunately, lives on terms of intimacy with his son, described to the author once the loathing for himself that the boy expressed one night when he came home from a high-school ball. Another boy of the same age, referring to this experience, simply said, "That is what it is for." And yet many society women encourage this sort of thing, not only in hotels and clubs but in their own homes! How thankful we ought to be that there are left in the world a few school-boys, and, as indicated in the note at the bottom of this page,<sup>20</sup> politicians and military men who can give us a higher mental ideal!

Next to dancing, as a method of social entertainment, comes, perhaps, card playing. The innocent form of this, just as in the case of dancing, is where the mental, in the sense of the rational motive, is uppermost, where the particular thing done is merely an agency of relaxation and sociability used to bring about a greater union of thought and feeling. But when the game is treated seriously and played for its own sake, and with wagers that, if forfeited, involve real loss, then we have the beginning of the vice of gambling. A professor of ethics of thirty years' standing

<sup>20</sup> "Newport, R. I., March 9, 1918.—War measures in Newport have spread to dancing: by an order of the board of aldermen to protect the men in uniform from influences not promoting the life of a sailor or a seaman. Conspicuously posted in the hall where society dances were the following directions in big letters: 'No ragging. No shivers. No mugging (cheek to cheek). Daylight zone between partners. The man's guiding arm should be extended laterally. The man's supporting arm should be placed midway up his partner's back. The girl's left arm should be placed on her partner's shoulder, and not clasped about his neck.'"—*Washington Post*.



told the author once that he did "not know exactly why gambling is wrong,—why a man, if he wants to play with what he himself owns, has not a right to do so; that, of course, one could say that he sets a bad example and tempts people to play who cannot afford it"; but "suppose that he never plays with such people?" The answer to a question like this which accords with the theory of this book must be begun with the statement that a man should never put himself under physical conditions over which his mind or his rational nature can exercise no control.

To gamble or to bet is to do wrong for the same reason as to get drunk, to yield to passion, or, except when some extraordinary emergency demands it, to allow oneself to be hypnotized. A man should never let any influence clearly outweigh the thoughtful and rational. He is doing this when, in a practical matter, involving gain or loss to himself, he ceases to exercise his own psychical reason and judgment, and permits the result to be determined by the operation of the merely physical forces by which he is surrounded. All the evils that follow upon gambling are traceable to this primary surrender of mental control. To it is owing the discredit that gambling throws upon human labor, which is the only legitimate way in which a man can ordinarily obtain money; upon reasonable purchase, which is the only legitimate way in which money can ordinarily be expended; and upon sensible economy and saving, which are the only ordinary means of assuring permanent support for oneself and family. A gambler plays with his piece of silver like a monkey. He does not use it like an intelligent being made for calculation and foresight. It is for this reason that, after a while, he frequently finds that he has fitted himself for nothing better than to bring shame or poverty upon his friends and family or to commit theft or suicide. There is no possibility of making a computation of all the irrational, selfish and inhumane consequences that may result after one has surrendered the form of control over his own destiny which it is his privilege and duty as the possessor of a mind to exercise.

One of the worst features of the vice is found in its associations. Almost invariably the forms of it connected with card playing and pool playing are accompanied by frequent draughts of strong drink which tend to create a drunkard's habit. The same is true in connection with betting at

a horse show or automobile race. The latter, drawing together, as it does, thousands of spectators intent often upon being thrilled by the anticipated possibility of the maiming or killing of some driver tempted to risk his life for the sake of money spent usually to increase the reputation of some mercenary manufacturer, is one of the most demoralizing entertainments that the world has ever known,—only a few stages behind the degree of debasement that led to the gladiatorial shows of ancient Rome. It should be prohibited by law. Nothing can be worse than a deliberate attempt to brutalize the instincts of a community by bribing in such a way as to lure toward death certain of the mistaken though often most enterprising and skillful of its members.

In most of the forms of enjoyment that have been mentioned a man entertains himself. There are other forms equally important in which he is entertained by others,—in which his own will is not active but passive. He feels and thinks in connection with what someone else presents to his eyes or ears. This introduces us to the sphere of art. But it was shown on page 22 that it is the thinking, feeling mind that is influenced through the eyes and ears. The thoughtful, therefore, must always be an element in the effects of art. Other considerations, too, show this to be the case. Why do we never attribute art to an animal? It is because of the absence in him of the higher mental nature. Whatever art we may study, its expressional possibility seems its primary and determining characteristic. That this is so has been brought out in what is said on page 142 of the present volume. It is also brought out in all the author's volumes on comparative æsthetics.

Because this is the case, the reader will recognize that the fundamental principle of morality is as important to success in art as in any other department. Those therefore who intend to praise an artist, as some do, when they term him conscientious, are amply justified. To be conscientious, as we have found, is to keep the bodily or physical from outweighing the mental; and this is something that every artist is called upon to do in connection with every line, color, tone, or word that he uses. He chooses and arranges each so as to represent such thoughts, emotions, and purposes as seem to him to be suggested by, because expressed through, the physical forms—together with what seem to be the laws controlling them—that he perceives in the world

surrounding him. The aim of the artist, therefore, though he himself may not always be able to explain it, or even to recognize it fully, is to interpret, at the same time that he represents, in accordance with what seem to be the requirements of truth, that which is revealed to him in external material nature, including, of course, human nature.

The principle thus stated, has an important bearing in this connection, because it indicates the kind of art that a man of right purpose should endeavor, so far as feasible, to produce or to patronize. This art should not be a mere imitation of what is presented in nature; nor should it be a mere expression of thought or emotion founded on an impression received from nature, irrespective of the form in which it has been presented there. Imitation does not become art except in the degree in which it shows the psychical effects that have been produced upon the mind by what has been seen or heard; and a representative expression of an impression does not become art except in the degree in which it shows that the mental suggestions that have been received are due to sights and sounds that actual experience can prove to be observable in nature.

The cultural influences that thoughtful people attribute to art, and which cause them to prize it, are owing solely to its fulfillment of these two conditions thus stated. The results that are merely those of imitation, expression, or impression may at times produce effects that are interesting, suggestive, or curious, but they can never produce the finest quality of art. This requires the exertion of a man's finest possibilities of perception and reflection. The product embodying less than these is always comparatively frivolous and superficial, of no essential value, however elaborately praised by people whose opinion partakes of the same flip-pant quality. There is so much in art, when earnestly and honestly pursued, to increase one's knowledge, to broaden one's sympathies, to stimulate one's imagination, to develop one's ideality, and to bring one's spirit into unity with the creative life and purpose behind the forms and forces about him, that it is difficult to exercise as much charity as one ought to possess toward the mistaken faddists who seem constantly doing all that lies in their power to degrade and demoralize an agency fitted, at its best, to be so generally beneficial.

This language is justified. Near the beginning of the

present chapter it was pointed out that mental emphasis is given to the human form by a method of personal clothing that leaves uncovered only the face and the hands. It was not said, however, that these were the only parts of the form through which thought and emotion can be expressed. In the author's *Orator's Manual*, pages 125 to 151, and in Chapters VII. to X., of his *Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, it is shown that mental life and meaning pervade every form and movement of the physical body. At the time when the author was giving attention to this subject, he could frequently obtain important information by noticing the pose, walk, and gestures of those so far away from him that the expressions of mere faces and fingers could hardly be distinguished. The policeman who gave the clew that led to the discovery of those who blew up the printing house of the *Los Angeles Times* in 1911, told the author that his whole theory which was taken to justify a search over all the country for the men described by him who were subsequently proved to be the criminals was derived from seeing, on the morning preceding the disaster, two entire strangers to him cross a street that was fully a mile away from the *Times* building.

For the reason that has been given, every part of the human form may be of mental interest, and therefore of mental value. This fact justifies in art a degree of exposure of the whole form that in a living person would be inexcusable. The marble or bronze of a statue, for instance, almost entirely eliminates the physical effect. This elimination is less marked in a painting because of the presence in it of the colors of life; but in all constructed products, the mental effect of the skill exhibited in the portrayal makes the whole result far less physical in its influence than it would be otherwise; and, frequently, as in the highest works of art, the mental intention of the whole is too distinctly represented to make any other inference from it logical. There is a thoroughly artistic reason, however, why an artist who wishes to exert an enduring influence upon all should try to select such arrangements of the forms at his disposal as to render any other than a mental inference not only illogical but impossible.

There is a closer connection between morality and what has thus been mentioned with reference to art than one might naturally suppose. Because some statues represent

unclothed human forms, what is to be said of those who seriously argue that this condition is one of the essentials that renders them works of art? and who maintain that any person getting himself into the same condition, or encouraging the action of one who does it, is furthering the interests of art? Yet, in our country there are women dancers who are advertised as cultivating artistic taste merely because they appear in public clad only in transparent gauze, and spend the time at their disposal in an apparent endeavor, often with slight manifestations of skill, to jump out even of the little that is on them.<sup>21</sup> There are worse forms in our country of the same tendency; and, so far as statistics are available, few women's clubs, supposed to be intent upon securing the uplift of their sex, have made any protest against them, though this has often been done by policemen, presumably because of having no appreciation of art! The forms of entertainment to which reference is made are those furnished by certain actresses for moving pictures. These consent to be photographed without a stitch of clothing on them and sometimes in the presence of hundreds of spectators; and then to have the resulting picture witnessed by millions more (see footnote <sup>27</sup>, page 285). This exhibition, which necessarily makes such an appeal to most of the spectators that the physical entirely subordinates the mental, is represented as justified because it is art! And art, we are told, can never be immoral! But any man of common experience, not to say sense, ought to know that an influence that cannot fail to shock many people, and at the same time blunt their mental sense of modesty, is injuring a very delicate constituent of the æsthetic nature; and that injury to it involves injury to other constituents equally delicate; and not infrequently may involve also the loss of some of the most exquisite as well as elevating experiences of which one can be conscious.

Of course, the same principle that applies to the moving picture applies also to the theater and opera. No contrasts could be greater than those afforded by the physical effects thrust into prominence through an intentionally suggestive

<sup>21</sup> "New York, March 13, 1918.—Mayor Hylan, in a letter to Police Commissioner Enright to-day, expresses amazement that a nude dancer was permitted in the Metropolitan Opera House. After the dance . . . said: 'According to pure art, as shown by its statuary, mostly of the dance, there is nothing lewd about the nude.'"—*Washington Post*.

lack of attire augmented by the vulgar movements and language and even—in an artistic sense—music of some of our public performances, and the mental effects produced sometimes by the same companies of actors, but entirely different because of studied propriety in costumes, artistic conceptions of beauty, tasteful arrangements of color and pose, carefully executed results of individual and concerted skill, and conscientiously composed music. There is absolutely no common standard in accordance with which one can compare the efforts of mercenary managers or actors to conform to what they suppose to be the depraved desires of men, and the efforts of those who contribute to the healthful enjoyment derivable from operas like those of Gilbert and Sullivan and from many other higher forms of comedy, pantomime, and pageant. One who seeks to keep the bodily subordinated to the mental will always try to manifest his disapproval of any vulgarity that befouls innocent fun. There are few meaner men than those who pander to vice; who are willing to make money by poisoning the wells of public pleasure, by communicating moral disease and death to him who comes to them for recreation. But next to these in meanness is the one who knowingly patronizes the person or the place where this sort of work is carried on.

In the higher forms of the drama, whether comedy or tragedy, as also in the novel and the poem, the chief departure from mental requirements is usually manifested in a disregard of truth. Historically considered, this latter is always the source of whatever mental interest one has in the actions and experiences of those surrounding him. It is these mainly that prompt his powers of observation and imagination to produce such results as we find in story-telling and play writing. One might suppose, therefore, that all novelists and dramatists would try to have their works continue to manifest a logical development of the purpose to which they owe their origin. But writers must draw largely upon their imagination for the details both of their methods of presentation and of their plots; and, while doing this, it is difficult for them to resist the temptation to sacrifice that which they have found to be true in life to that which they suppose will be effective when presented in art. If they yield to the temptation, we find them trying to attract and hold attention through portrayals of extraordinary and, now and then, impossible actions and events,

chosen in hopes that they may appear startling and exciting. Their whole object sometimes comes to be the producing of a sensation. A sensation is an effect excited in the nerves; and, as the nerves are a part of the bodily nature, plays or novels intended only or mainly to affect them may, for that reason alone, be said to appeal particularly to this nature. But there is another and a better reason for ascribing to them this form of influence. This is because it is so clearly devoid of any traces of a rational and non-selfish desire to increase the reader's knowledge of the true conditions of human existence and of what is demanded in order to develop its best possibilities. The highest success is sometimes represented as attained, if not promoted, through courses of conduct which, if pursued in actual life, would ruin a person's reputation and career. Before giving any other evidences of repentance or reformation, the worst conceivable characters are represented as unexpectedly manifesting almost every conceivable virtue. Undoubtedly changes in character do take place; but in real life there are mental and moral reasons for them; and to make a study of these reasons is one of the most important and interesting of the services rendered to the world by art when true to life. A writer of novels or plays who does not recognize this fact may cast his influence, even though not intending it, on the side of immorality. What else can result where wealth is represented as if it were attained, as a rule, through dishonesty; or marriage through unchastity; or where antagonism to parents is represented as justified, because they object to having their son go into partnership with a defaulter, or marry a harlot? Forgiveness is undoubtedly a duty; and the world needs to have this fact emphasized. We should all deal kindly with the fallen; but never at the expense of forming intimacies or partnerships involving one's accepting for himself or others standards of life lower than the level on which his own ideals have been moving. It is poor policy to make one's own bed in a gutter in order to coax others to get out of it. Almost the first requisite for one who would save the fallen is to preserve his own standing. Otherwise, he will not be in a position to lift them up. Neither will he be in a position where others like himself will recognize the good that he is trying to do, and come to his assistance. Those in need of reformation cannot always obtain it without receiving help both from

the individual at their side and from the community. Individual methods will suggest themselves to the considerate and kindly as opportunities open. Public methods may be furthered by exerting one's influence in the enactment of laws like those, for instance, suggested by Judge B. B. Lindsay, of Colorado,—laws transferring certain cases of moral delinquency to chancery jurisdiction, treating the perpetrators of them as wards of the commonwealth, and receiving and examining in secrecy all evidence with reference to them. It is only right that, so far as possible, methods of this character should protect at least the young from ruinous publicity, insure, if personal injury have been received, the care of the sufferer at the expense of the aggressor, and, if possible, rectify all wrongdoing in such ways as to avoid social scandal and ostracism, and afford a remedy complete and permanent. But all this is very different from the exploiting of such cases, as if grievous wrongs against society could be committed without occasioning shame to their perpetrators; or as if there were no need, before being restored again to the confidence of the community, of their manifesting what John the Baptist, in Matt. iii., 8, termed “fruits meet for repentance.”



## CHAPTER XIX

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BUYERS AND SELLERS

Importance of Business—Of Developing the Traits of Character Needed for Success in it—How Property may be Acquired—Money as a Medium of Exchange—The Object of Business is to Exchange what One Has for what Another Has—Can be Conducted in Fulfillment of Lower or of Higher Desire—Civilization the Result of the Latter, Giving Men Confidence in One Another—Honesty Proved the Best Policy by People who have Actually been Honest—Riches not usually the Result of Extortion but of Diligence, Self-Denial, and Saving—Examples—Successful Men usually Keep the Bodily Outweighed by the Mental—Lack of Success often Due to Outside Circumstances—Often Due to Men's Own Unacknowledged Deficiencies—The highly Rational and Humane Man Studies and Gives in Exchange what Others Need and Want—Large Services of this Kind Justly Receive Large Recompense—Injurious Lack of Stimulus to Effort where this Principle is not Practiced or Accepted—Duty of the Individual to Subordinate his Own Interests to those of the Community.

**A**FTER leaving school, most people not only become members of society, but usually engage in what, in a broad sense, may be termed business. The majority do this in order to obtain a livelihood, and all would be wise to do it though for nothing else than to obtain an interest in life. Business, in some form, necessarily engages a large part of every man's attention. By means of it, he himself, or someone else upon whom he is dependent, is obliged to obtain his food, clothing, lodging, and almost all his necessities. Not only a babe but a grown person could scarcely continue to live, were not some of his fellows constantly working for him in farm or factory, or transporting the products of each to market or shop in which he can purchase them. He does this by exchanging what he himself produces, or possesses, for what others produce or possess.

Every form of material success for the individual or the

community depends so largely upon the methods in which these exchanges are conducted that the moral considerations having especially to do with them, like sincerity, frankness, truthfulness, fairness, justice, and honesty, need to be scrupulously regarded and particularly emphasized. It is remarkable how soon the slightest deviation from their requirements excites distrust in the minds of others, and how the slightest regard for them, as in the case of an employee who never fails to return to his employer a stray penny picked up on a floor, causes confidence. Possession of that to which one is rightly entitled has so much to do with his ability to provide for the comfort and prosperity of himself and of those dependent on him, that he cannot, without almost criminal neglect, disregard any tendency to deprive him wrongly of any part of it.

The wrong methods of depriving one of what he owns can be best understood after recalling for a moment the right methods of obtaining it. According to Francis Wayland, where he treats of the Love of Man, in Part II., Chapter III., of his *Elements of Moral Science*, "property may be originally acquired like unoccupied land and the wild life inhabiting it." This statement, which was virtually accepted by all at the time when it was made, would be modified by certain later economists, especially Herbert Spencer (*Social Statics*, Chapter IX., ed. 1850) and Henry George (*Progress and Poverty*, Book VII., Chapter I., ed. 1879). They say that unoccupied land belongs to society (or the government), and that the private possession of land which is essential to production must be secured under conditions protecting society's original right to it. Wayland goes on to say that property may also "be acquired by labor, or by exchange, by gift, by will, or by inheritance under law. But, in all cases of transfer of ownership, the consent of the original owner, either expressed or interpreted by society, is necessary to render the transfer morally right. And, lastly, although the individual may not have acquired a valid title to property, yet mere possession is a sufficient bar to molestation, unless some claimant can prefer a better title."

According to the same author, the right of property may be violated by taking it "without knowledge of the owner, or theft," or "by consent violently obtained, or robbery"; or, "by consent fraudulently obtained, or cheating," as by the

false pretenses of a beggar, or of a deceptive bargainer. The same principles are applicable in cases of lending property, as in cases of total transfer. The underlying requirement is that there should be no deception or default on the part either of the owner or the borrower. The property must be capable of producing what is represented by the one, and must be used only for the purposes represented, for the time specified, and upon the conditions indicated by the other. To quote again from what is said of the Rights of Property, in Chapter III., Section IV., of the same book. "If I hire a farm, I am entitled, without an additional charge for rent, to all the advantages arising from the rise in the price of wheat, or from my own skill in agriculture. But if a vein of coal be discovered on the farm, I have no right to the benefit of working it, for I did not hire the farm for this purpose."

It is mainly to the conduct of the dishonest bargainer that the attention of an ordinary business man needs to be directed. One is always liable to have dealings with some member of this class, and not infrequently to be tempted himself to join it. This is because most people, when they think of business, think mainly or entirely of "making money," *i.e.*, of increasing the amount of it that they themselves possess. They overlook the fact that, primarily, business is an exchange of what one himself produces or possesses for what another produces or possesses. Money—and that alone—is merely a means through which such exchanges can be conveniently effected. For instance, a farmer who wanted a watch could not easily take a carload of wheat around with him, when he went shopping, and leave it on a watchmaker's counter. What he does, therefore, is to make the exchange indirectly. It is in order to do this that civilized people have come to use a piece of coin cast from gold, silver, copper, or nickel; or a slip of paper printed as a bank note or check. This coin or paper answers the purpose of a certificate, stating, in the case of the farmer, for instance, how much his grain was worth to those who actually received it. It is as a matter of convenience mainly that the farmer uses this certificate in the form of a coin or bank note and exchanges it for the watch. Of course, everybody knows that the paper of the bank note has no intrinsic value. It is the promise printed upon it to pay a certain amount upon its presentation at a bank which indicates that it represents this amount of value. To some, but to

a far less, extent the same is true of coin. It is the government impress upon copper, nickel, and sometimes even upon silver and gold that determines definitely what it is to be considered worth when used as a medium of exchange.

Of course, these facts are not new. But it seems worth while to recall them here in order to remind the reader that, primarily, the object of buying and selling is not, as some suppose, to increase the amount of the money that one possesses; but to make feasible and convenient such exchanges of products between different persons as are needed in order to secure their welfare, and often, indeed, to insure their lives. These exchanges are innumerable in number, and, in making them, every man virtually hires an innumerable number of workers whom he pays for their services. Moreover, as he is supposed to return an equivalent for what he gets, he himself is virtually hired and paid for his services by an equal number with whom, if he do not share his products, he at least shares his possessions that are the products of someone else. The moment that we recognize these conditions, we ought to recognize that the money that passes between people when anything is purchased or sold is, in the first place, a token or representation of an exchange of products, and, in the second place, a payment for the services or labor of the one through whose instrumentality the products are obtained or the exchange effected.

With this conception of the object of business, we can understand why and how it can be conducted in fulfillment of either lower or higher desires, *i.e.*, in an immoral or a moral way. The man actuated by lower desire may work solely for the purpose of what is termed "making money." In other words, because the conditions of life are such that one is obliged to exchange what he himself possesses for other things that others possess, he may wrongly avail himself of the opportunity, and in a spirit of selfish devotion to his own greed and a desire to increase his bodily or physical possessions, he may, in every trade that he makes, for himself or others, try to outwit the person with or for whom he bargains, and thus get the better of him, and receive in exchange or wage that for which he has not given a fair equivalent. For instance, he may exaggerate the difficulty or expense of purchasing that which he is selling, demanding more for it than the market price at which he is aware that others are selling it; or he may misrepresent its character, term that

pure wool which he knows to be mainly cotton, or a part of a farm, meadow land, when it is really a marsh. Of course, business conducted according to such methods necessarily involves an almost constant manifestation of not only negative insincerity, unfrankness, and deceit but also of positive untruthfulness, injustice, and unkindness; together with the violation of many other of the moral traits mentioned on page 189. Yet there are thousands of persons who both practice and commend such methods. "Business is business," we are told, and by this is meant that it is a department of activity to which the ordinary laws of morality or religion cannot be made to apply. But, as business concerns the largest part of the interest and occupation of almost every man, we might as well say that, to the majority of men, these laws are matters of only minor interest.

Fortunately, however, this is not true. To most men they are matters of the very greatest interest. If it were not so, they would not have developed the conditions of trade—to say nothing of civilization—that exist at the present time. These are the results of men's accepting the representations, the statements, and the promises that are made to them. In other words, they are the results of men's having confidence in one another. They would not have this confidence, were there not good reasons for it. They have it because the majority of men, even in business, are honest. It is fair to conclude, too, that they are honest because actuated by principle, because conscience causes them to recognize that it is their duty not to allow desires prompting them to seek their own selfish bodily advantage to outweigh those that prompt them to give expression to humane unselfish mentality.

Of course, honesty may be actuated also by policy. But no one could have discovered it to be the best policy before many had begun to practice it; and the beginning of this practice, as of everything else that is right, must be attributed to higher desire.<sup>22</sup> There is no objection, however, to

<sup>22</sup> An illustration of this statement is afforded in the experience of the Elgin National Watch Company, organized in 1864 with the father of the author, B. W. Raymond of Chicago, as its first President. As soon as this company began to earn a reasonable percentage on its capital, and before there were any demands for such action on the part of purchasers, the selling price of the watches was reduced. This course was continued year after year with the result, each time, of

using the arguments derivable from policy to confirm the promptings traceable to principle. Undoubtedly the man who is sincere, frank, truthful, just, kind, and honest will, in the end, be more successful in business than will the one who is the opposite. Men can be cheated once or twice by the same person, but not a large number of times. After that, in case they have found out the truth—and they usually do find it out—they will trade with others. It will be observed, therefore, that, as a rule, the profits that are made by a sharp and deceitful bargainer, though, now and then, disproportionately large, are not continuous nor cumulative, and seldom result in what would be called even a moderate fortune. The great merchants and bankers of every country are, most of them, scrupulously honest, as much so in giving the last penny of interest due from them to others as in teaching what some of them claim to be a needed lesson in integrity, by exacting the same when it is due from others to themselves.

Nor do most of the men who become rich practice extortion. Comparatively few of them do so. Some have inherited money which has given them a start in life.

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largely increasing the sales, and correspondingly decreasing the cost of each product of the larger output. The method pursued proved to be the best policy; but that it was this could never have been found out by the stockholders, had they been influenced by irrational greed for material gain rather than by a rational desire to conform their actions to the psychological workings of the human mind and spirit. As a fact, the first promoters of this enterprise were public spirited in doing business, interested in developing the possibilities of American inventive genius, in supplying clean and attractive work for æsthetically inclined employees, especially women, and in bringing watches down to a low enough price to enable almost everybody to own one. In fulfillment of analogous purposes, the company, years before the general agitation for the reforms, adopted the eight hour working day with a half-holiday on Saturday, built and conducted for the use of the workers the best hotel in Elgin with reading, library, music, dancing, and smoking rooms, and an adjoining gymnasium with facilities for playing tennis and golf; instituted free medical, nursing, and hospital emergency service; augmented by fifty per cent. the sums paid by employees for the establishment of Aid, Mortuary, and Pension Funds; and have lately organized an Advisory Council of Workmen. Is it strange that, in such a company, there should be among the employees large numbers of high school graduates, and not a few college graduates? The author knows of, at least, one of these who went from a by no means commanding position in this establishment to an important professorship in the East.

Possibly this money may have been obtained in the past through extortion; but the very fact that it has been inherited shows that its present possessor, at least, did not so obtain it. The majority of the rich in our country, especially of the very rich, have been poor boys who have begun their careers with scarcely a penny to call their own. How did they get more? By practicing fraud and deceit? Not so often in this way as by manifesting, under all conditions of temptation, truthfulness and honesty. If they had not done this latter, they seldom would have been promoted to a higher position than their first one. This implies that from the very start they began to exercise that rational mentality that lies at the basis of all true success in life. They revealed an interest in their work, showing that they were putting their minds into it. Because this was the case, they were observant too. They noticed what was needed as well as what was enjoined, and, very soon, someone recognized that they had a power of initiative that would prove beneficial if transferred to a larger and broader field. Meantime, even when receiving a small salary, they had learned that the only money that a man can be said to possess—as when one speaks of what he is worth—is that which he has saved, or which a father or someone else has saved for him. So they began at once, in order to increase their possessions even by a very little, to deny themselves certain indulgences, as in smoking, feasting, riding, and sight-seeing. It requires only one dollar a week deposited in a savings bank, giving 4 per cent. compound interest, to bring one at the end of twenty years sixteen hundred and twelve dollars; and only five dollars a week to bring him, at the end of the same period, eight thousand dollars. Whatever one may save thus, and whatever it may bring, the fact that a man has saved, at least a little, is often the one thing that enables him to avail himself of a great opportunity when it is offered to him.

The author once knew a cash boy in a drygoods store whose widowed mother had no means of support except himself. He became an expert salesman in its wholesale department; and a new firm, backed by abundant capital, offered him either a salary of five thousand dollars a year or, notwithstanding his own lack of capital, a partnership with a certain share in the profits, in case there were any. The first question asked by a successful merchant whom

the young salesman consulted was this: "Have you saved enough money to support your mother for a year or two, in case the profits of the firm are nothing?" The young man said that he had. "Then take the partnership," was the advice. The young man did this, and at the end of the first year reported several thousand dollars as his share of the profits. He added this to the capital of the firm, and in about twenty years more, almost before he had reached middle life, he had retired from business with over a million dollars.

Thousands of instances of a very similar kind could be cited. They all prove, contrary to the opinion that is often expressed, that even business, allied as it is, in many of its features, to that which is material and physical, may be controlled, just as is the case with everything else in this world, by the mental and rational. As a rule, no man can attain business success through physical indulgence, indolence, shiftlessness, thoughtlessness, or indifference to the permanent welfare either of himself or of others. He must, at every stage of his progress, manifest thoughtful denial, industry, carefulness, foresight; and both the spirit and ability always and everywhere to be helpful, if not indispensable, to his fellows.

Of course, it is not true that everyone who manifests some of these traits, or all of them together, will be successful. This is a world in which misjudgment, accident, sickness, fraud, fire, flood, and countless other agencies are constantly thwarting, in the most unexpected ways, the results of the keenest foresight, the wisest calculation and the most cautious management. But if one cannot predict business success with certainty to those who manifest such qualities, he can, at least, do the opposite. He can predict a lack of success to those who do not manifest them.

The number of such people in the world—people who fail to fulfill one or more, if not all, of these requirements—is, unfortunately, very great. Like most of us, too, they are seldom able to see their own defects, or to appreciate the excellences of those who differ from them. They think that they themselves have as good a right to success as anyone; and that, if another have attained it, and they have not, he has in some way been given, or has taken, an unfair advantage. It is with them mainly that the opinion is originated and fostered which attributes the acquisition of



wealth to mere luck, or, if to anything else, to unworthy qualities which are added to this, like deceit and dishonesty. Such conceptions, applied without discrimination, are not in accordance with facts, and often do great harm to those who are influenced by them. They prevent people from perceiving or imitating certain psychical qualities that all men need. Too often the unscrupulous politician, aided by the demagogic editor, so poisons public sentiment that a man is discredited for the very reason that ought to make him lauded; and his opinion and advice are rejected simply because his achievements have proved him to be wise.

To show what is meant, let us go back, for a moment, to first principles. On page 241 it was said that the most apparent object of business is to enable men to exchange with one another their products or possessions. If this be so, the successful business man must be the one who does the most to facilitate such exchanges; who finds out, through investigation or surmisal, what people desire; and then, availing himself of the possibilities of husbandry, manufacture, or transportation, carries this to them, and receives from them in exchange, and carries to other people what they, in turn, desire. He thus confers a needed favor upon each party that shares in the exchange; and he deserves, because he has earned, the percentage which, as a rule, they are glad to give him as a commission for enabling them to make their exchanges. When a man, owing to his methods of truthfulness, honesty, industry, alertness, self-denial, saving, or foresight in deciding upon investments, has gained a few thousand dollars, then he is often in a position where his investigations and surmisals with reference to what people desire will enable him, through acting as a medium of exchange between them, to gain very much more.

Men who do not think may suppose it to be as clear as an axiom that he has no right to receive as exceptional an amount as he does for his services. This is true in some cases. But it is not true in all cases. It should be remembered that great undertakings involve great risks, and need a large margin of profit to replace possible losses. Besides this, the benefit derived from the initiative, the invention and the industry of such men is often large, and deserves a large reward; and this not only that they may be compensated for their own labors, but that others like them may be stimulated to attempt achievements of a similar charac-

ter. Just in the degree in which a community lessens the possibility of a man's receiving great honors or emoluments for great public services, it lessens the probability of deriving these from younger men, who in time, shall take his place. The people of Australia are said to have succeeded better than those of our country in reducing the possibility of one's acquiring more possessions and prominence than falls to the common lot. But it is also said that the most evident way in which that country differs from ours is in the comparatively small number of the young who attend high schools and colleges. Why should they attend these? Why should anyone try to fit himself for a higher position in a country in which the laws are so formed—if, indeed, this be true—as to lessen the number of such positions, and, if possible, to prevent the attainment even of these? Where untrained and unskilled men, owing to an influence exerted through a majority vote, can do just as well in life as can those who are the opposite, what inducement is there for a young person to spend time, money, and energy in obtaining schooling and experience? And yet the business of a country should be conducted in ways conforming to the results of information and intelligence. To accomplish this end, schooling and experience on the part of some are necessary; and, in order to make them realize this fact, it seems necessary to cause them to anticipate larger salaries than they would earn had they not taken the trouble to study hard in order to fit themselves for the larger service demanded.

What people sometimes forget, but should always bear in mind, is that the education which the young are thus stimulated to receive benefits not only themselves but the entire community. Our national government educates certain young men at the West Point Military Academy, not in order to enable them in the future to take social and public rank as majors, colonels, and generals, though this is an incidental result, but in order that the nation, in case of war, may have men of sufficient military intelligence to prevent it from being destroyed. The same principle is applicable in commercial and industrial relations; and it is only uttering a platitude to say that all connected with these, just as citizens connected with a country that needs to be defended, should recognize the fact. They should not judge of conditions solely as they affect their

own selfish and personal wishes but as related to the body of society with which they are associated. It is not too much to expect of them, if, in any regard, they can detect more evidences of education, experience, or efficiency in another man than in themselves, that they should feel gratified rather than humiliated when this other man rises to a position of greater influence and emolument than their own. They ought to recognize that, on the whole, this is as it should be. Their attitude of mind should be the same as was that of a friend of the author toward work in the late war. He was a student in a military school, and enlisted as a private on the day that he was twenty-one, refusing to let his father use the influence which possibly might have been exerted so as to get him commissioned as an officer. He said that he did not want to be an officer unless he could prove practically that he ought to be one. This is an example of not allowing bodily and self-seeking considerations to outweigh those that are mental and altruistic. Think what a contrast it presents to that of too many others whom we are obliged to meet in this world! How large is the number of those otherwise fitted to be leaders, perhaps, toward all that is best in life, who seem hardly able to utter a sentence without revealing so many evidences of underlying desire to attain their own physical advancement, together with such suggestions of personal envy, jealousy, and greed, that it is well-nigh impossible to refrain from a certain feeling of contempt for them, so completely do their whole characters seem to be dominated by that which is prompted by their lowest and most selfish desires! Indeed, not seldom the high places which others are seen to reach so affect a man of this character that, to judge from his own words and deeds, he would be willing, instead of following their examples and climbing the stairways that they have built for his use, to pull down the whole structure of civilization with every result of science or art attained by the great thinkers and toilers of the past, under the deluded supposition that his mind created to be inspired by the highest desires could be satisfied when, without taking one step to lift himself upward, he could stand upon the fallen towers and turrets because, forsooth, they had all been levelled to the common dirt in which he and his kind prefer to grovel.

## CHAPTER XX

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES

Mental Desire as Manifested in Relations between Employers and Employees—Once the Former Used, and the Latter Obeyed, Force alone, as if each Possessed only a Physical Nature—Both can best Further One Another's Interests by Acting out the Promptings of the Mental Nature—Former and Present Relations between Employers and Employees—Right Relations between the two Fundamentally Connected with that which Determines Moral Character—Both Parties Ignore this Fact—When they Perceive and Act upon it, the Labor Problem will be Solved—Demands of Labor in England—Cannot Accomplish All that is Required—Industrial Liberty as Applied to our Own Country—Different Conceptions of it—Why the Granting of it is Opposed—How it might be Granted—And Increase Industrial Efficiency—Would be better Done by Contract than by Government Action—Other Mental Methods that can be Used by Employers—Same Principles Applied to Employees—The Importance of Enjoying One's Work—The Cheerful and Interested Worker is the One who Receives Promotion—The Labor Agitator Urging the Use of Force is often the Laborers' Worst Enemy—Mental Influence, not Physical Force, the Means of Securing Permanently Beneficial Results.

THOSE who are engaged in business always belong, as related to one another, to one of two classes, or both; they are either employers or employees, or else, as frequently happens, others are working for them at the same time that they are working for others. Is there any principle of conduct, which, if carried out, can make both employers and employees act in business relations truthfully, honestly, fairly, and justly? Why not? Why cannot this end be accomplished by the principle that has been applied in this volume in connection with every other moral obligation? What more is required than that both should give expression to mental desires,—that these latter

should never be allowed to be outweighed by any merely bodily or physical considerations?

The need of following this course will become apparent when we consider the history of the relations, as gradually developed in periods preceding our own, between employers and employees. Before the time of civilization—and the same is true in our own time wherever there is little or none of it—the employer, like a giant with pygmies or a master with slaves, usually compelled his helpers to carry out his orders by exerting or causing to be exerted the most strenuous kind of physical force. Even as late as when the Suez Canal was dug, the contractors, with the sanction and help of the government, would arbitrarily draft gangs of men and put them under overseers who with whips would drive them miles from home, make them work from dawn to dark and keep them at it for as many months or years as seemed necessary. As a perfectly natural result of this method, antagonism arose, and has always been continued between employers and employees. But, because there was once antagonism, is no reason for continuing it, in case the conditions have been, or can be, changed. What is it that can most effectively change these? What but a change in the method that started them? This method was the treating of human beings as if they were mere brutes, as if they were possessed of only a physical nature, incapable therefore of being influenced by any appeal except to it.

In order to change the conditions, it is evident that the treatment of employees should begin to be that fitted for men possessed of minds. Very little thought, too, will reveal why, for other reasons, this should be the case. What is it, for instance, that, in order to obtain the best results, the successful employer most needs in the persons whom he employs? It is not mere physical force such as he could obtain from animals or machines. This might give him help at certain times. But it could not begin to give him the help needed at other times, or that at most times can be afforded by those capable of thinking, feeling, and willing. The wage that he pays would obtain for him little service of real value, if it did not include what could be contributed by these; and the proof that he recognizes this to be a fact is shown by the readiness with which he gives the largest wages to those who have manifested the most intelligence, loyalty, eagerness, and persistence in carrying out his instructions.

On the other hand, the employee wants and needs the same characteristics in his employers. He wishes to serve men with mental natures,—not embodiments of brute force who treat him with no more consideration than if he were a mere spoke in the wheel of a big unthinking machine. The proof that they have this feeling is shown by the way in which many laborers shirk work when they can, go on a strike, as it is called, when they dare, and spend most of their lives in a state of chronic antagonism to those by whom they are employed. It is contrary to reason to suppose that this could be the case to such an extent as it is, were the latter, in every regard, kind, honest, fair, and just. In the circumstances, what seems to be most needed, therefore, whether we consider the employer or the employee, is a character that is rendered moral through keeping the physical in all cases subordinate to the psychical, not allowing bodily considerations to outweigh those that are mental.

This is something which in innumerable cases, in almost all ages of the world, certain persons have scrupulously tried to do. For centuries, preceding our modern industrial period, it was customary for a young man to enter some shop as an apprentice. Here his relationship to the manager was often as satisfactory as that of an adopted son. He was kindly treated and carefully trained. If he did his duty, he could look forward to becoming a master workman or even a partner in the business, or to conducting a business of his own. But of late years these conditions have been changed. The small shop with its few workmen, living together almost as one family, has been superseded by the enormous establishment with thousands of workmen. It is impossible for those in authority, either as owners, who frequently live at a distance, or as managers, to know personally any but a very few of the operatives. Frequently there are absolutely no channels of mental communication between employers and employees. To the former, the latter represent merely so much bodily force that can be applied to physical production. Very naturally the employees who recognize this condition do not like it. They want to be regarded and treated like human beings who have a mental nature.

It follows from what has been said that the methods of securing the right relationships between employers and employees are closely connected, indeed fundamentally connected, with those which determine moral character.

The questions involved in these relationships can be rightly solved so far alone as each of the interested parties is actuated by higher mental, non-selfish, rational, and humane desire.

Very singularly, however, both parties usually refrain from emphasizing this fact. The officials of corporations that have done the most to provide for the safety, comfort, and prosperity of their operatives are usually the very last to attribute their action to higher moral motives. As a rule, they say that it is due to exercising practical common sense in their efforts to secure content and efficiency among their workmen. On the other hand, the leaders of the operatives seldom base their demands for improvements upon their wish to obtain higher moral treatment. They usually speak only of justice. These facts are due to traits in human nature that none of us can fail to admire. They show how many people there are who are too modest to boast of having higher moral ideals than have their fellows; and how many feel that their fellows will appreciate action that is represented to be mainly a manifestation of the underlying principles of common sense and ordinary justice.

At the same time the fact that the non-selfish and humane are not emphasized is apt to lead both employers and employees to overlook or disregard their real importance in producing the general result. Both classes are in danger of coming to think that they are dealing, not with anything which, in origin, is traceable to higher desire, but with demands connected almost exclusively with lower desire. What other effect can be suggested when agitators go around, as lately one prominent man has done, urging that labor be put "into the saddle," or, as another prominent man on the opposite side has done, demanding that labor be put "into its place"? Such conceptions and exhortations, with the actions to which they logically tend might attain a physical result but could not possibly attain a moral result. For the latter, the world needs to have all classes together put "into the harness," where each shall "lend a hand" and serve rather than drive his neighbor. When that which is the moral problem has been solved in this way, there will be little trouble with laboring men. Otherwise, they might receive the largest possible minimum wage for the fewest possible hours' work sufficient to keep the industry going, and still be discontented. On the contrary, if treated with

kindness and courtesy, they might accept, with cheerfulness, as do many of our household servants, as low wages for as many hours' work as would be necessary to enable their employers to remain in the employing class. There are quite a number of industrial centers in our own country whose conditions can verify this statement. But in them the rich have never forgotten the promptings of their higher desires sufficiently to become ostentatious and snobbish, nor the poor sufficiently to become pretentious and fawning. The employers still remember that many of themselves once did the same kind of work as is now done by the least important of their employees; and in school and church and social gathering an effort is put forth to make everyone feel that he is treated with such kindness and courtesy as is due to his mere human personality.

It must be confessed that these conditions do not exist in many places in our country; and, undoubtedly, in fewer places in Europe. But they might exist everywhere; and in only the degree in which they do exist can all the social conditions of industry become wholly satisfactory. For instance, attention has recently been called to the demands of the Labor party of England. They are stated to be (a) The universal enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law; (b) The Democratic Control of Industry, *i. e.*, control by the operatives; (c) The Revolution in National Finance, *i. e.*, the taxing of only the wealthy; (d) The Surplus Wealth for the Common Good, *i. e.*, the confiscation of the possessions of the nobility.

There is no need here of considering these demands in detail, though the effects of one or two of them will be mentioned hereafter. It is sufficient to notice in this place that only one of the demands could be granted without involving action which those against whom it was directed would consider unjust, and would not permit unless compelled to do so through the use of threatened or applied force. Moreover, this force would be resisted. It would be resisted not only by the wealthy and aristocratic, but by others who would say that, according to the testimony of history, an application of the principle underlying such methods of disposing of property would imperil the ownings of every man in England who had saved enough money to have possessions; and, in fact, would imperil the whole structure of what is termed civilization, because this is



founded upon the individual's right to possess property, and the obligation of the government to render this possession secure. At any rate, it is evident that the character of these demands and the methods needed in order to get them carried out would augment rather than lessen the tendency to try to secure and to continue to maintain human betterment through the agency of physical force. It is true that, in some cases, they might ultimately lead to desirable results. But even though in industrial centers this might be the case, the remedy would be too narrow in its applications to apply to all the conditions needing attention, like domestic and mercantile conditions, together with the results of laziness, unthrift, drunkenness, vice, and crime, as, for instance, in East London. It certainly is true that reforms brought about through force exerted by a single class in the community for the purpose of subjecting to its own interests the interests of all other classes, is not the right way in which to promote the universal prevalence of a spirit that is non-selfish, rational, and humane.

In our own country the demands of labor, while, in some directions parallel to those of the English workers, are less revolutionary. Among native Americans they usually are associated with extending the democratic principles of our government into what is termed Industrial Liberty. Let us examine, for a little, what this term implies, and find out, so far as we can, its relationship to the general moral requirements of which we have been speaking.

Liberty is a word that may be differently interpreted. It does not mean the same to one person or set of persons that it does to another. In a large community where the wishes of one man are often opposed to those of his neighbor, liberty, if all are to have it, must necessarily involve on the part of almost everyone more or less self-denial and compromise. It cannot possibly exist among people all of whom are determined to do exactly as they please. Democratic liberty in America recognizes this fact. Bolshevik democracy in Russia does not. It allows anyone to be robbed or killed who does not agree with those in authority. This insures liberty not for all but for some, and these soon lose it. Undoubtedly some labor leaders hold a conception of industrial liberty such as would benefit all; but others do not; they seem to think that nothing can give even the least degree of liberty except a condition in which the

operatives shall decide by vote all questions not only concerning the employment and dismissal of laborers, but of oversight and general superintendence, together with subjects having to do with every phase of manufacturing, trading, or ownership, even to the extent, if it seem advisable, of confiscating the capital and distributing it among the employees according to the principle that to the workmen belong the spoils, which, in that case, they certainly would become. Most employers, accepting apparently this interpretation of industrial liberty, very naturally oppose it. They remind us that every great business enterprise, sometimes when first started, and sometimes later, especially in periods of business depression, comes upon seasons when, if continuing to employ and pay its laborers, it must have money, and that this must be obtained either by assessing its stock already issued, or by issuing new stock or bonds. In either case, it must be helped by capitalists. These are the only ones who can afford to pay more on what they already own, or to buy what is newly offered. It is not feasible, they say, therefore, to try to get along without capitalists. Sooner or later they will be needed. We are reminded, too, that great enterprises cannot be conducted successfully except by those who have education, and experience, and have the right to select and appoint as their chief helpers others who have similar attainments, and that nothing could be worse for the employees themselves than the absolute collapse of the industrial situation that would follow upon the success of some of the measures that their class have advocated.

But for this reason need the operatives give up their desire for industrial liberty? Not at all. All they need is to revise their wrong conceptions of what it demands. Nor need they lower their conceptions of liberty in general. Who is there in the United States, Great Britain, or France that thinks himself deprived of political liberty, merely because he cannot put his hands into the national treasury and take whatever money he wishes, or cannot have a direct voice in selecting cabinet officials or the millions of appointees of these or of their subordinates in army, navy, or civil life? That which gives to the individual citizen of a democracy a consciousness of having political liberty is a condition of life in which, so far as possible, a man is given equality of opportunity with his fellows. Most of us

Americans think of opportunity as represented in our free school system; and in the numberless instances in which, on account of it, the children of the poorest laborers have risen to the highest positions. They recall too that among these are very many who have worked themselves up by passing through various stages of employment in the industrial world, men like Andrew Carnegie who began as a telegraph messenger boy, or Charles M. Schwab who was once a spoke driver receiving a dollar a day. As virtually all the great manufacturing and transportation corporations of the country are headed, in part at least, by men who have risen in this way from the lowest ranks, people in general are inclined to argue that, even in present circumstances, employees have as much industrial liberty as they need.

But some certainly do not have as much as they desire. It must be borne in mind that all of them cannot become Carnegies or Schwabs, and a large part of the mental equipment that differentiates the ordinary workman from men of this character is an inability to wait patiently for a future in which alone his desires can be fulfilled. What he wants is to have them fulfilled in the present. Of course, all one's desires are never fulfilled; but a little thought ought to convince most of us that there are certain conditions fitted to convey at least a partial consciousness of industrial liberty which are now denied to the majority of employees. Not to speak at present of a natural desire to have a sense of possession, in connection with the enterprise toward which their services are contributing, and the interest that might be imparted to them by a sense of having a share in its profits, even the less ambitious would like to feel, for instance, that no one can force them to overwork or to work against their own wills, or in a way for which they are not fitted, or without receiving a fair amount of pay and as much as another is receiving for the same work. They would like to feel that, when employed, they will not be penalized or discharged merely because of personal dislike or false accusations of laziness, carelessness, drunkenness, or other irregularities; that fair consideration will not be denied them for absences due to illness or responsibility for others; and that their ability will not fail to be recognized as it should be because of the jealous machinations of some tyrannical overseer. There are innumerable matters of contention between employers and employees, that no one

likes to have decided against himself arbitrarily, *i. e.*, without a hearing. Nor is he satisfied to have the results of this hearing decided solely by the one who has seemed to have once acted unjustly. It is when this is done that he feels that he is treated as a slave. What he wants therefore he describes, without any definite notion of how he shall obtain it, as industrial liberty.

Would he want this, or feel resentful because of not possessing it, if matters of the kind that have been mentioned could be submitted to the review of a council representing his fellow workmen, just as like matters of dispute in a free state are reviewed by a jury of one's peers? Notice that this arrangement would accomplish several important results. It would cause most of the workmen, because so much would be at stake, to select for their representatives with the employers their wisest rather than their wildest associates. It would bring together representatives of both employers and employees where financial, business, economic, and social conditions could be explained and discussed in a manner to cause a better mutual understanding of them. It would put an end to strikes. Where everything was explained and an honest endeavor made to arrive at a fair and just conclusion, public sentiment among the operatives would not approve of physical force. Finally, it would insure more efficiency both in work and workers. This last is something that is difficult to believe unless one has learned that psychical non-selfish rationality is the controlling influence in the minds of the majority of people. Very many employers doubt this. They seem to think that to allow anything like liberty to laborers would be as unwise as to allow it to soldiers; that it would entirely interfere with the kind of discipline that alone can render concerted work successful. But suppose that the soldiers are as much interested in the cause of the warfare and the conduct of it as are the officers? Will there not be discipline in an army composed of such soldiers? Years ago the *esprit de corps* among college students rendered it impossible for the professors to obtain testimony from them with reference to such a matter, say, as cheating in examinations; and it was supposed that college sentiment was not opposed to it. But when partial charge of such cases was given to the students they sometimes proved to be more alert in detecting and severe in punishing the delinquents

than the faculty had been. If it could be proved that an employee deserved to have himself dismissed or his wages diminished for laziness, carelessness, or irregularity, it seems certain that, in an establishment where there were the right mental relations between employers and employees, the decisions of both would usually coincide. Moreover, the latter themselves would be the last to imperil the continuance of their own salaries by clamoring for any changes that might render less well equipped with the results of capital, experience, or education the general business which furnished them with employment.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Very singularly, on the day in which the author was correcting the final printed proofs of this volume, two articles in the *American Magazine* for December, 1919, arrested his attention. One was entitled *A Man with a Great Idea*, written by Mary A. Mullett, and the other entitled *Here is My Plan* by John Leitch. These articles furnish a remarkable confirmation of the truth of the general theory unfolded in the preceding pages—one crudely resembling which, by the way, was suggested in a lyceum lecture prepared by the author in 1877. At that time, however, it seemed hardly possible that, within forty years, its speculative conceptions would be fully demonstrated to be of practical value. Mr. Leitch during the last five or six years has been instrumental in introducing among some two hundred thousand employees his system of Industrial Democracy. According to this system, all those connected with an industry willing to agree by vote to try his method are given an organized government with a House of Representatives, a Senate, and a Cabinet. Members of the House are chosen by secret ballot cast by all the workmen, and represent each department of the industry, the number of representatives being determined by the number in the department and in the whole establishment to which it belongs. In a small factory, for instance, one representative might be elected by ten voters, and in a large factory by a hundred voters. Members of the Senate are made up of the minor executives, heads of departments, and foremen; and members of the Cabinet, who have no vote in legislation, of the chief executive officers with the President of the Corporation as Chairman. All enactments concerning dismissals, wages, salaries, hours of labor, etc., are considered in Committees as in the Congress of the United States, and must be passed by both houses. So far as Mr. Leitch knows, no measure passed in this way has ever been vetoed by a Cabinet. Hours devoted to the duties of legislation are counted as among those spent upon labor, and any money saved by increase of efficiency on the part of departments or persons is distributed, every two weeks, as a dividend on wages, a weaver, for instance, getting for a perfect product a bonus of 20 per cent.; for a product with one defect 15 per cent.; with two defects 10 per cent., etc. The records of increased satisfaction and efficiency among the laborers are marvellous. One plant, for instance, increased its yearly earnings by over eighty thousand dollars. Another lessened its yearly expenditure for coal in 1912 from \$8,967.12 to \$6,231.97, and for water from \$309.91 to \$31.82.

Another thought seems to be needed with reference to this subject. It is this, that in order to carry out the suggestions that have been made, it is only infrequently that governmental or political action is needed. All that is needed is a contract so drawn that the State courts can enforce it,—a contract between the employers and each of the employees, signing by himself or through a representative. By the contract the signers are protected, the employer from such things as irregularity in work and strikes imperiling his fulfilling of contracts, and the employee from such things as dismissal or lessening of pay without just cause. Both parties may surrender something but preserve much more. A contract in such a case is preferable to government law because it is an agreement whereby each party to the contract preserves his own freedom of action except so far as he himself assigns limits to it. Government law enforces limits without obtaining individual consent. There is another objection to settling questions of this sort through political action. Politics seldom settles them in the right way. It determines them by the result of a physical preponderance of votes, not a psychical overbalancing of ideas. A demagogue who wants votes will side with a hundred thousand operatives rather than with their one employer; and an employer will coerce a hundred thousand voters rather than have his own ability to exert influence diminished. Often whichever side wins will obtain the adoption of some extreme measure that will do about equal harm to both sides. It is always to be hoped that before such a subject becomes a shuttlecock for partisan politics great business corporations of commanding influence will see and seize the opportunity to adjust the questions at stake in such a manner as to set examples that will be of incalculable benefit both to the parties immediately concerned and to the whole community. (See footnote <sup>22</sup>, page 245.)

In addition to the method just mentioned, in connection with it or without it, there are other means through which an employer can appeal to industrial employees in such ways as to cause them to take a mental interest in his work. Sometimes this may be done merely through expressing personal sympathy and appreciation for those who work faithfully, encouragement for those who have difficulties, and gratitude to those who overcome them. Sometimes the same may be done through an exhibition, not of private but of

public sympathy, tending to benefit the employees indirectly by contributing to the comfort and enjoyment of a whole community through introducing improvements into the methods employed in connection with roadways, parks, gardens, homes, schools, churches, and places of entertainment. People may become interested in an employer's success on account of the public spirit that he manifests and the good that he does with what he gets. But more satisfactory than these indirect methods of enlisting a workman's interest are those that make a direct practical appeal to him by rewarding him for personal efficiency. Such a reward may result from a system of promotion which advances the workmen the quantity or quality of whose output has been particularly commendable; or from a system of payment not for the mere time spent in labor, but for the amount and value of that which each one's labor has produced; or the reward may result from a system of allowing all or certain of the employees to purchase by their labor, and at reduced prices, shares of stock in the company for which they work, or, at the end of each successful season, to receive, proportioned according to the amount of their salary, a bonus now and then, or, invariably, a prescribed share of the profits of the company, gradually introducing more and more of them into the position of stockholders. Lord Leverhulme, the great English soap manufacturer, says that, better than any of these methods, because supplying more nearly what the most of the laborers want, is giving a full day's pay for six hours' work, and thus allowing them to get some real enjoyment out of life. He says, too, that this can be done by manufacturers in a way that will enable them to make more money than probably they are making at present. He says that employing two gangs of workmen for six hours each, instead of one gang for eight hours, will enable owners, with the same plant and paying the same daily interest for the capital invested, to increase very greatly their factory's output (see the *Metropolitan Magazine* for July, 1919). But whatever methods may be adopted, the reader will recognize that all have a moral influence so far as, by complying in a rational and humane way with the wishes and needs of the employee, they tend to develop and increase his intelligence, enthusiasm, and energy.

A corresponding attitude is equally important on the part of those whom the manufacturer employs. Just as

he needs to receive their mental interest and, if wise, takes measures to awaken it, so they need to give him the service of their whole being,—of head and heart, as well as of hands and feet. This is the only kind of service that distinguishes a man from a brute, and, therefore, the only kind worthy of manhood. One who fails to feel that he should give it, or fails to make his actions accord with his feelings, is a pitiable and negligible factor in the world of industry, in fact, in any relationship in which he comes into contact with life.

Fifty years ago an American could almost be distinguished from a European by the mere fact that, while the former derived his pleasure from his business, the latter separated the two. The American enjoyed his work. Morning, noon, and night, whenever one met him, he was talking and thinking about it, and evidently relishing it. The European, on the contrary, seldom spoke of it. He might endure it, but what he enjoyed was his recreation, his eating, smoking, drinking, fishing, hunting, golf, cricket, and other sports. There are arguments that can be urged in behalf of each of these attitudes of mind; but there is no doubt that the American attitude at that time was best fitted to develop individual industry and enterprise; nor is there any doubt that the increased attention given in recent years in our country to recreation has tended to decrease these qualities. When a student fitting himself to become an orator, for instance, enjoyed athletics mainly so far as it helped prepare him for his future life work, he put so much thought into the exercise of voice and bearing that he became more or less of an artist. Had he been in college in recent years, his exercise would, most of it, have ended in learning to play ball. This is one reason why our country has no such orators to-day as it had when every thought that inspired the souls of men like Webster, Phillips, Everett, Beecher, or Chapin, took form that, to the very tip of tongue or finger, revealed the subordination of bodily possibilities to mental purposes. The same principle applies to all phases of employment. We usually can, and if possible we should come to enjoy them, and, only in the degree in which we can do this, can our lives become as efficient as is possible. If a man, at any time in life, find himself engaged in an occupation in which, after giving it a fair trial, he cannot take interest, or for which he cannot avoid feeling positive distaste, he ought to get out of it.



If that be impossible, he would be justified in trying to assume an interest as a matter of policy demanded by the necessity of self-preservation. He should never forget that, no matter what degree of industrial liberty he may enjoy, he must always depend, both for continued employment and for advancement, upon someone above him,—usually upon his employer; and also that if his employer have merely common sense, he will not imperil the welfare of his establishment by entrusting either its lesser or its larger interests to those who have no loyalty to its purposes, or enthusiasm for their fulfillment. In this world, competition in all branches of work is too keen to render it right to allow the indifferent or the slack to escape observation or penalty for their remissness. When business is not prosperous and the one in charge of it must lessen the number of operatives, it is not right for him to drop those who always seem eager to begin their work on time, and sorry if they must stop it before it has been completed. When he is seeking among the workmen for new overseers, it is not right for him to choose those who keep looking at the clock as the noon hour approaches, and drop their tools at the first stroke. It is his duty to choose those who apparently are willing to be kept busy; and he is all the more likely to choose them, if, besides doing their own work thoroughly, they have studied the work of the one next higher than themselves in rank, and fitted themselves to step into his place in case it becomes vacant.

It is merely adding a corollary to all this to say that often the very worst enemy that the employee can have is the professional labor agitator,—especially when he is not a fellow-workman in the industry, and, therefore, is not in sympathy with the conditions in the industry, whose workmen he is trying to influence. Whatever may be his avowed purpose, that for which he was chosen by the labor leaders and is paid for out of funds contributed by the workmen, is to awaken discontent in the minds of the employees, the theory being that this discontent will lead them to undertake measures that will force employers to grant their own laborers concessions that will benefit all laborers as a class. Very naturally, with this object in view, these agitators never represent labor as a blessing to a man, capable of making his life more interesting and enjoyable, but almost invariably as a curse to be avoided; and the employer not as a helper in a position to reward fidelity and loyalty, but

as an enemy to be resisted. To say this, is not to oppose organization among the laborers. This has been the source of many improvements in industrial relations. But one should avoid attributing the betterment of the conditions of labor entirely or mainly to the actual or threatened use of physical force, as exemplified sometimes, but fortunately not always, in connection with what is termed a strike. As a rule force thus used embitters the employers to long, stubborn, and, in the end, successful resistance, thereby causing much suffering, throwing thousands out of employment not only temporarily but permanently, and exhausting the savings that they could not afford to lose. Very frequently, too, in case the strike is accompanied by violence, those who have previously been prominent among the workmen, and had reason to expect promotion from the employers, have lost their chance to obtain this, and, because of having shown on one occasion what is considered disloyalty, have remained, ever afterward, objects of suspicion.

Meantime often, all that the strike could have gained, if it had been successful, could have been accomplished by a direct appeal to the minds of the employers, or an indirect appeal to them, addressed, first, to public sentiment. A strike may be the means of appealing to the latter. But when, instead of this, it is merely a manifestation of trust in physical influence, and of distrust in mental influence, it is usually injurious both to the cause for which it is undertaken, and to the persons who have been prominently engaged in it. The use of force, as applied to industrial conditions, may sometimes be justifiable, for the same reason that a revolution in government is sometimes justifiable,—as an exceptional method undertaken in view of an exceptional emergency. There are schoolboys, as we all know, who can be made to do right without resort to what is termed corporal punishment. But, now and then, one of them needs to be whipped; so it is with some employers. Even then, however, it is rational to suppose, and always rational to act upon the supposition, that a thinking and feeling being like a boy or a man has always within him somewhere, though possibly concealed from ourselves, that which can be influenced by a simple desire to deal with him frankly and fairly; and that, as a rule, only in the degree in which this method is used can a conclusion be reached that is destined to be permanent and, in all regards, beneficial.

## CHAPTER XXI

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT: AUTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

Citizenship Implies a Possession of Mentality—The Individual not usually Responsible for the Form of Government by which he is Ruled—Professional Revolutionists—When Revolution is Justified—Political Restlessness of the Present Age—All Beneficial Progress in Government Methods has Gradually Subordinated Physical to Mental Influence—Any Form of Government may be so Administered as to Further the Physical rather than the Mental—Different ways of Classifying Forms of Government: a Monarchy and a Republic—Autocracy and Democracy—Democracy in Great Britain—The United States is a Constitutional and Representative Democracy—Justice and Liberty as Secured through Constitutional Limitations—Through Representative Limitations—Danger of our Losing Faith in these Limitations—As Applied to the Constitutional System—As Applied to the Representative System—Nominating Candidates in a Primary Election—Framing and Enacting Laws by Popular Vote—Cure for Ills of Democracy is not More Democracy: Experience of Athens and Rome—The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings Paralleled by that of the Divine Right of the Majority—Kings and Majorities not Infallible—Government Right to Limit Suffrage—Object of Suffrage is to Protect the Rights of the Individual Citizen—These Rights sometimes also need Protection from Ignorant Voters who, as Voters, are also Rulers—Methods of Securing this Protection—These Methods as Applied to Questions needing Expert Decision—Service Suffrage—Suffrage not the Best Corrective for all Moral Abuses—Failure of Unlimited Manhood Suffrage as Applied to the American Emancipated Slaves—Mental Reform does not always Need Physical Assistance—False Methods of Some Reformers—History of the Emancipation of the American Slaves—Patronage as Related to Republican Government.

A MAN becomes a citizen of a country just as he becomes a child of a family, either by birth or by adoption, which latter, as applied to citizenship, is termed naturalization. In either case he is expected to accommodate his actions to the laws by which those are ruled with whom he has become associated. These laws constitute

a part of the environment with which nature has surrounded him; and it is not illogical to infer that it may be a great mistake for him to suppose that his first duty is to make war against them. It is more natural, rational, and humane for him to infer that his first duty is to accept them, and to try to make the best of them, and thus to gain, for himself as well as for his fellows, the kind of culture which, in fulfillment of the methods influencing life in this world, they seem fitted to impart. It is because of a failure to recognize this function of the limitations of life, that many political and economic reformers, by concentrating all their attention and effort upon endeavors to change the external and material conditions of society in general, rather than the internal, spiritual conditions of individual character, often do more harm than good. Notwithstanding the havoc wrought in the stability of institutions that they have attacked, the contentment and happiness of mankind as a whole have been very little increased.

Of course, if a man, as he grows to maturity, find himself and his fellow countrymen enmeshed in methods that are irrational and promotive of evil and, therefore, in need of reformation, he has a right—and government should recognize it—to express his opinion of them, and endeavor to induce others to agree with him. Very seldom, however, is it one's duty to go beyond this. If he attempt to organize, or to induce others to organize, armed resistance for the purpose of using physical force against the officials of the government—even, in some cases, if he merely refuse to enlist in military service in order to oppose those who are resisting these officials, he may become guilty of treason. Because he is a member of a community organized in order to do what the people as a whole consider necessary to insure their safety, prosperity, and happiness, as well as because he is an individual under obligation to be controlled by desires that are non-selfish and humane, it may become his duty to join in the public efforts put forth for the purpose of securing these ends. Even though he may not wholly approve of the particular forms or methods of his government's administration, it is not morally incumbent upon him to change them except so far as he is or has been responsible for them. But how few are the people of whom this can be said to be true; how few have had anything whatever to do with selecting or framing the form of government of which

they find themselves citizens! They were born under its jurisdiction, or brought under it by the compelling force of conquest, or by the necessity of earning a livelihood. They need have no conscientious scruples, therefore, even though they may be subject to requirements of which, theoretically, their judgments, reinforced by other mental tendencies within them, disapprove. One may be a democrat in sentiment living under an autocracy, or an aristocrat living under a democracy, but this is no reason why he should be prompted to active hostility. He has a choice to make,—a choice between that which shall conform to his own desires or theories, and that which shall conform to those of the community,—in other words, between the desires and theories of one person and those of hundreds and thousands of others; or, to put it stronger than this, though no less truthfully, between the satisfaction of one person's private wishes and the certain disturbance of public peace and order.

Thus presented, it should not be difficult for a rational mind to determine which of the two alternatives ought to be chosen; and it should put an end, at once, to the admiration which many people not only express but have in their hearts for the reckless agitators who, apparently, spend all their lives in such efforts as cause them to be appropriately termed revolutionists. Some of these men are undoubtedly idealistic, enthusiastic, resolute, courageous, and self-sacrificing, and for such qualities deserve one's respect; but, in a mind really admirable, these traits need to be balanced, as they are not in them, by reasonableness, good judgment, and kindly consideration for the safety and welfare of others. Revolutions in government, as was said, on page 265 of strikes in industry, are justifiable only when they were used as exceptional agencies in view of exceptional emergencies. Only when the administrative conditions under which one lives are clearly chargeable with injustice and cruelty, can the real interests of the people be promoted by taking forcible measures to secure the change.

The allusion to public sentiment in this phrase, the appropriateness of which most people will recognize, suggests the relationship of every revolution when it is justifiable to predominating mental influence. A revolution in itself considered is a result of the physical force of one party used to overthrow the physical force of another party. But a revolution is never entirely successful unless the minds of

the majority, at least, of the people have been prepared to desire it. A sensible reformer, therefore, will always recognize the necessity, not only among his own followers but among the whole community, of educational work intended to convince people in general of the wisdom of his theories and the practicality of his methods. If he have not the ability to do this kind of work, and the patience to wait until it has accomplished its legitimate results, then his starting a revolution is as certain to end in failure as if he were a traitor intent upon betraying the cause that he has been professing to advocate. Moreover, if he do have this ability, and do manifest this patience, it will often be found that there is no need of resort to physical force. That which otherwise might have been a sanguinary revolution has become merely a peaceful change in external conditions, which practically all the people have become willing to welcome.

This much it has seemed well to say here because we are living in an age of great political restlessness,—an age in which each man seems, as never before, perhaps, in the history of the world, to feel an individual responsibility for the political conditions surrounding him. What has been said may possibly aid in ridding the reader of the conception that, in anything like the degree in which he supposes, he is responsible for these conditions; or that, if he were, he could do as much toward changing them through exciting others to use physical force as by trying to influence them psychically.

The simple and the important fact in connection with this whole subject—and it conforms in principle to the general truth that has been brought out in this volume—is that, according to the testimony of all history, every step indicative of progress toward justice and liberty in any form of government is due to the results of processes through which, more and more, bodily and physical considerations have been prevented from outweighing those that are mental and rational. The primitive ruler, whether the father of a family, a chief of a tribe, or a nobleman, king, or emperor, needed to exercise very little mentality. This was because there was nothing to suggest to him that his authority could be, or would be, limited. Without considering the methods or results of his action, he could order his subjects to do what he chose. He was not obliged to

consult with others or to discuss any undertaking. He dominated through exerting physical force,—his own where he ruled a few, his armies where he ruled many. In our time the agency which has taken the place of unlimited authority exerted through physical force is mental. The King of Great Britain and the nobility, if they wish to secure legislation, must have the reasons for it argued in the House of Commons, and appeal made in this way to the mental desires and designs of its members. In olden times, as in Athens and Rome when most nearly approaching the methods of modern republicanism, the people, in acting together, seem seldom to have recognized any limit to their authority. They did as they chose to do; and they did this because they, too, were conscious that they could rule through the exertion of physical force,—that expressed through the action of the greater number. In our country the agency which has limited this physical power of the majority is also mental. Our written constitution was a result of reasoning on the part of the most learned and sagacious minds that, at the time when it was formulated, our country contained; and the methods devised by them for making future amendments of it necessitate delay that involves a similar exercise of thought and foresight on the part of our present legislators.

Having said this much, the reader will recognize that it is logical to infer that, as in the case of everything in this world that can be controlled by man, and therefore predominantly influenced either physically or psychically, all governments of every possible variety can be so administered as to further either the right or the wrong. A change in the mere political form, therefore, is not—as many revolutionists would lead us to suppose—all that is needed in order to redress every administrative grievance. There may be a benevolent despotism and a malevolent democracy. In each case, that which shall benefit or harm the citizen depends mainly upon the individual characters of those who, in official or other positions, exercise authority over his possibilities. As a general principle, it is true that it is more or less dangerous to allow a single man to have absolute and unlimited power. Anyone is apt to act more wisely, as well as more humanely, when he is obliged by law to confer with others concerning both his policy and practice. It is true, too, that the larger the number of those with whom he confers, or with whose representatives he

confers, the more likely will he be to know and to do what is for the interest of a large number; and that the more nearly he can confer with representatives of all the people, the more nearly will his decision be likely to secure the welfare of all. These facts furnish strong arguments against autocracy and in favor of democracy. They would be unanswerable, were it not for individuals who, whether officials or not, may be dominated under any form of government by personal—in the sense of physical or self-seeking—considerations. In a democracy, the very fact that no one man has absolute authority increases the degree of authority exercised by everyone, and it gives everyone more or less opportunity to exert it. This opportunity afforded to men who are weak mentally or strong physically—in other words, devoid of well-informed intelligence and breadth of sympathy, or else overflowing with craft and selfishness—a chance to influence others like themselves in such a way that, first, the public sentiment, and, second, the political action, shall be devised and determined wrongly. For this reason the influence of the demagogue in a democracy may sometimes prove as detrimental to the welfare of the people as that of a despot in an autocracy. In a democracy, the people constitute the ruling class, and, in case of governmental wrongdoing, it is the people who need to be resisted, but the demagogue, seeking mainly an election to office by them, is always their advocate. In an autocracy, the despot and his representatives constitute the ruling class; and, in case of governmental wrongdoing, it is he that needs to be resisted. A hero of reform in a democracy, therefore, may oppose the populace for the same reason that, in a despotism, would cause him to lead it.

Bearing these facts in mind, let us notice now some of the methods through which the laws and regulations of government may be made to accord with the promptings on the one hand of physical desire and on the other hand of mental desire. Governments are classed in different ways. They are sometimes distinguished from one another according to the origin and functions of their chief official. When either birth or election gives him his position and he holds it for life, and is termed as the case may be a king, emperor, sultan, or mikado, the country is said to be a monarchy. If the position be temporary and elective on the part of the people, acting either individually or through their repre-



sentatives, then whether there be at the head a single official termed a president, or a collection of officials termed a council, the country is said to be a republic.<sup>24</sup>

A better way of distinguishing governments is that which terms some of them autocracies and others democracies. In an autocracy, laws are framed and carried out according to the order either of a monarch, governed only by his own opinions and will, in which case his mode of government is termed a despotism; or of a group of people who constitute what is variously described as an aristocracy, a nobility, or a ruling class, in which case the government is termed an oligarchy; or of a monarch and nobility acting together. This latter form, for which there is no special name, combines some of the characteristics of both forms previously mentioned. It is the form of government that was found until very recently in Germany, Austria, and Turkey. In a democracy, laws are framed and carried out, only so far as they are sanctioned by the people acting individually or through their representatives. It makes no difference whether the chief official position in such a country be that of an emperor, a king, a premier, a president, or a counselor. If these have no authority except that which is delegated to them by the people, and can enact no law except that which the people authorize, the governments may usually be termed democracies.

On first thought, the former government of Germany might not be supposed to be much unlike that of Great Britain. Both had a monarch, and an upper and a lower house of parliament. But in many important matters, as, for instance, in the making of treaties with foreign nations, and the beginning and ending of wars, the Emperor of Germany made the final decision; and with reference to other matters, the lower house (the Reichstag or Imperial

<sup>24</sup> According to the *Century Dictionary*, a republic is "a government in which the executive power is vested in a person or persons chosen directly or indirectly by the body of citizens entitled to vote." Referring more particularly to our own republic, Harry F. Atwood, in Chapter II., of his *Back to the Republic*, says that it "is a form of government under a constitution which provides for the election of (1) an executive and (2) a legislative body who, working together in a representative capacity, have all power of appointment, all power of legislation, all power to raise revenues and appropriate expenditures, and are required to create (3) a judiciary to pass upon the justice and legality of their governmental acts, and to recognize (3) certain *inherent individual rights*."

Diet), elected by the people, had no effective way of vetoing measures desired by the upper house (those appointed to the Bundesrath or Federal Council), which was composed largely of representatives of the nobility. On the contrary, in Great Britain the consent of the people as represented in the lower house must be behind all government action. This government is sometimes called a limited monarchy. The term was originated centuries ago when there was danger of usurpation of power on the part of the king. At present there is no such danger. The king is little more than the head of society. As such, however, he fulfills an important function. He personifies the dignity and dominance of the state as an organized instrumentality securing order and peace; and the respect and loyalty conventionally extended to him express and cultivate among the people respect and loyalty for the legal methods of restraint and administration that he represents. It is the premier, however, who is at the head of the civil and military power of the country. But even he, when exercising this authority, has, in his country, less influence than can be exercised in our own country by our President. A vote in the lower English House of Commons against the premier's policy necessitates his resigning and the appointment, by the king of another premier. In this way, at any time the representatives of the people can change the officials of the administration. They were changed during the late war. In our country—and it is a condition that some think should be remedied—such changes cannot be made unless the President, before the Senate acting as a Court of Justice, can be proved to have violated some law. He is elected for four years, and for four years he must continue in office. In this regard, therefore, the administration of public affairs in England is under more direct control of the people than is the case in the United States. A better way through which to designate Great Britain's form of government would be to term it a regal or imperial democracy, or a constitutional or democratic kingdom or empire.

The United States is also a democracy. But this word alone does not define our government. It is a constitutional and representative democracy. In a pure democracy, any kind of a law may be drafted by anyone and enacted by a majority vote of all the people. In our constitutional democracy, a written document limits the subjects concern-

ing which laws can be made, so as to prevent them from interfering with local or individual rights; and, in a representative democracy, laws are drafted and enacted, not by the people as a whole, but by legislators whom, in an orderly and carefully prescribed way, the people elect to act for them.

The reason why democracy in our country is limited by being made constitutional and representative is to prevent the exercise of tyranny. If it were not for these limitations, it would be impossible to deal justly with all of as many people having different interests as are found among us. Unless all had a voice in determining taxes, for instance, those sufficient for the entire country might be levied upon cotton and rice, which are produced only in the south; or upon wheat and corn, which are produced largely in the west; or upon manufactured articles, which are produced largely in the east. To prevent numerous possibilities of wrongs like these, the Constitution prescribes the kinds of laws that can be enacted by the general government at Washington and the kinds that must be left to the local governments of the different States. Still more important than the guarding of State rights is the influence of both the Federal and State constitutions in guarding individual rights. Were it not for our constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, any cruel or irascible ruler, any conscienceless or popularity-seeking demagogue, leading any excitable majority of a community, could, as the result of a single election, deprive any citizen, merely because misunderstood or misrepresented, of his right to worship as he wished, to educate his family, to do business, to own property, or even to exist. There are many places in our country to-day where such provisions alone, with the legal redress through the courts always open to them, enable a man who differs from his neighbors by being a Mormon, a Jew, a Negro, a Hindu, a Chinaman, or any one of a score of possible things, to live in safety and comfort. "California," said an exultant politician of that State referring in the presence of the author to a successful agitation to secure the recall by popular vote of judges and judicial decisions, "is now about as nearly a pure democracy as we can make it." "Yes," was the answer, "and so Athens and Rome gradually became, and, as a logical result, Socrates in the one and Jesus Christ in the other were put to death without a fair trial."

A parallel influence in the direction of protecting local

and personal rights was intended to be exerted through the limitation of democracy in our country by means of the provision that it should be representative. The methods of pure democracy may be feasible in a small community; but they are not so in a large one. In this, no one citizen, to say nothing of all the citizens acting together, can find time in which to consider and deal justly with every one of the thousands and, as one might say, tens of thousands of measures presented for approval or disapproval. If, in such a community, everyone attempt to act for himself instead of through a representative, a few, followed by factions that support them, will try to enforce their own opinions and purposes upon other individuals and factions. Force thus used will necessarily result in civil strife and anarchy, as in bolshevism; and, if this be continued, it can be ended only by dictatorship and the ignoring of any universal principles or applications of justice.

In view of these facts, it is no wonder that many of our most thoughtful citizens feel that any effort tending to wean the faith of our people away from constitutional and representative government, and to turn it toward pure democracy, ought to be vigorously resisted. Nothing, as these citizens think, is needed more in our times than a recognition that loyalty to our country's written constitution, and to the methods of amending it that it prescribes, is as important as loyalty to our country's flag. They think that it is even more important, because the flag could continue to represent the country, even though this were to become degenerate and tyrannical; but the Constitution could not so continue. They deem one among us who denounces this deserving of no better treatment than is visited upon those under a monarchy who denounce the king; and, in case he be a foreigner to our country, they deem him deserving of no less severe punishment than banishment from it. By his own action, in proving treacherous to that which is the main source of our national prosperity in which he has sought to share, he has, in their opinion, exhibited a character exactly symbolized by that of the snake in the old fable that stung its benefactor who had sought to revive its failing life by placing it in his own bosom.

Unfortunately, however, it is not alone those who are foreigners who have failed to appreciate that which they owe to our form of government. Of late years, in some

States, owing to what is actual—though usually unconscious—disloyalty, to our nation, arrangements have been made, whereby a single whim-led vote of legislature and people can alter any constitutional provision of the State, or any decree of a judge interpreting it, or remove him from office in case he fails to give a decision in accordance with their wishes. As applied to theory, this means the adoption of a conception that right and wrong may be determined by the State as represented in the result reached by any vote of a majority, a theory differing little from that of the Germans except in matters of detail. As applied to the exercise of rationality, it deprives the individual of the delay which would give himself and other people time for reflection with reference to questions at stake; and, as applied to practice, it could not legally prevent, in times of excitement, individual rights and liberties from being left to the mercy of a mob.

Almost equally deserving of condemnation are the methods that have been adopted in some States with the design of making our institutions more democratic in the sense of less representative. Think of what has resulted from the nomination of candidates for public office by primary elections rather than by representative conventions! Owing to defects in the management of these latter, which might have been remedied by laws regulating the selection of delegates to them, it has been rendered almost impossible for a modest man, unwilling to go about telling people why he is personally superior to someone else in his own party, to become even a candidate for public office. He becomes such not because men supposed to be intelligent and to have the confidence of the community meet together publicly, and, after considering and debating his qualifications and those of his rivals, give their reasons for his nomination, at the same time stating their own and his political aims. He is selected by himself, or by a small irresponsible coterie, many of them bribed by his purse, or his promise of future political advancement; and all of them together men whose political aims cannot be definitely ascertained. Through secret methods, this coterie can usually induce several others to enter into contest with their candidate at the primary nominating election, and thus divide the opposition to him into so many separate factions that no one of them can defeat him. After the candidate has been selected, often by a small minority of a political party including some, too, who

are not members of it,<sup>25</sup> the laws of some States render it impossible for members of the same party to nominate and vote for another candidate, as they could in the olden times. The result is that, as in California in the last seven years, at important elections involving the choice of Legislators, congressmen, senators, governors, and presidents, many hundreds of thousands of voters have been virtually disfranchised. In 1912, there was no feasible way in which a resident of that State could vote to return Mr. Taft to the presidency. This was because the names of the "regular" as distinguished from the "progressive" Republican electors were not printed on the official ballots. In 1918, no one could vote for any man who had been a candidate at the Democratic primary for the nomination for governor. This was because the man nominated at the primary by that party had received certain votes also for the Republican nomination, and, therefore was considered as a Republican nominee, and yet no Democratic candidate had received as many Democratic votes as he.

Such results, clearly interfering with individual liberty of action, are evidently caused by unwise laws; and one reason why they are unwise is because they have been drafted by people ignorant of legal requirements, and then submitted to the electorate as a result of petition, and put on the statute book by a majority vote. Why is not this method of making laws just as irrational as would be that of a man making a will or a deed conveying property, and yet failing to consult one acquainted with the requirements rendering such conveyances legal? As a fact, only those who understand legislation, and who are given opportunities to consult with others who understand it, are situated so that they can even be expected to draft laws wisely. This is

<sup>25</sup> "The Michigan primaries are of the 'open' variety. That is, there is no party enrollment, nothing to prevent a Republican from voting for a Democratic candidate, or vice versa. Nor is there anything to prevent any candidates from entering the primaries of all the parties. A candidate who has been successful in the primaries of more than one party must pick out the party whose candidate he desires to become in the general election. Under the Michigan law his name cannot appear on more than one ticket. It is taken for granted that Mr. Ford, should he win in the primaries, would elect to become the candidate of the Democratic party. But in that event, the damage, so far as the Republicans are concerned, would already have been done, as they would be left without a candidate of their own."—*New York Times*, June 21, 1918.

why most of us think that laws should be drafted in legislatures. Of course, some of the legislators may be dishonest, and for this reason, undeserving of confidence; but the very best possible place in which to find out their real character is in the comparatively small community which they are elected to represent. The greatest objection, however, to an unrepresentative and, therefore, purely democratic method of enacting laws is that few feel individually responsible for the phrasing of them or even for the enacting of them. In Los Angeles, there were once in less than two weeks three different election days for votes upon laws and constitutional changes. At one election, a pamphlet describing the measures submitted for approval could not be intelligently read through in less than a whole day. Because of such conditions, the whole number voting was always comparatively small. At one time, in that city, containing about two hundred thousand registered voters, less than seven thousand went to the polls in order to decide upon the expenditure of six million dollars; and this in a place where, before the war, taxes had already been doubled within three years! In circumstances like these, it is obvious that a very small but well organized minority could enact, especially by exercising a little deceit, almost any measure no matter how unwise or iniquitous. "Eternal vigilance," said the Irish orator, John Philpot Curran, "is the price of liberty." There is no doubt whatever that carelessness about preventing the removal of provisions that secure liberty can end in nothing but its destruction.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> "What do you think of presenting a ballot to the voter containing the names of 334 candidates or a ballot over six feet long covered with printed matter upon which a vote is to be cast within two minutes of time? What do you think of having 128 boards and commissions in a single State, in addition to an executive, two legislative bodies, and seven other elective officials? What do you think of more than doubling the expenses of government in nearly every State in the Union during the decade from 1903 to 1912? What do you think of spending over \$2,000,000 of the taxpayers' money on primaries and elections in Cook County, Ill., in the single year of 1916, aside from the personal expenses of the horde of candidates? What do you think of our enacting over 62,000 new statutes in this country during the five-year period from 1909 to 1913, inclusive, and of our having over 65,000 decisions of courts of last resort during these same five years, and compiling 631 large volumes of decisions? These are only a few of the many questions that might be asked because we have drifted away from the plan of a republic?"—*Back to the Republic*, by Harry F. Atwood, Chapter I.

Those of us who once thought that, in our own times, another catastrophe like that of the Dark Ages could never again overthrow the existing civilization, have had reason lately to be disabused of that conception. May we all be preserved from practical experiences serving to prove that our forebodings with reference to the possibility of a return of such a disaster have been well founded!

The line of thought that has just been pursued will suggest that the one who argues, as some do in our day, that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, is not always giving wise advice. This fact was demonstrated, too, more than two thousand years ago. In both Athens and Rome the people applied this remedy, and the more democracy they got, the more they realized that all were exposed to sufferings from injustice, and the better were they all prepared to welcome imperialism. In applying remedies that shall bring about what is termed progress, one ought always to bear in mind that this is not indicated by mere movement. Movement may take place on the line of a circumference that carries the world back to former conditions which it was supposed to have left behind.

Almost every one, who thinks, knows that one reason why so many despotisms have led to revolutions by which they have been destroyed, is because so many of the officials of despotism have conceived that the cure for the evils of autocracy is more autocracy. Almost everyone knows, too, that the lack of mentality that has occasioned such a conception is usually associated with a belief in what is termed "the divine right of Kings," in other words, a belief that the family to which the ruler belongs holds the right to reign by appointment of an overruling Providence, and that, for this reason, his personality is more or less sacred, and obedience to him is a religious duty. Strange as it may appear, at first, a very similar belief comes to be held in a democracy with reference to the divine right, not of the monarch, but of the majority. There are countless numbers who seem to believe that this majority, voting on any given subject at any given time, represents the voice of God, and decides, then and there, the right or the wrong. Probably very many who seem to hold views of this kind would admit, when in a reflective mood and closely questioned, that the monarch or the majority may occasionally make a mistake. Nevertheless, in their heart of hearts, they feel



that they ought not to concede this; that it ought not to be true. They want to think that the head and source of the authority which claims their allegiance, and is the inspiration of their loyalty, is exalted in kind above that of anything else in the world. At the risk, however, of shocking the sensibility of people who hold to such a belief, there is nothing to be done except to ascribe it to a stupid lack of mentality, controlled by the influence of crass superstition.

In the opinion of every intelligent historian, too many monarchs have done wrong, too many majorities have voted wrong, too many nations have done right when they have dethroned their monarchs, and too many communities have done right when they have confuted and finally outvoted the decisions of majorities, to render rationally acceptable any theories with reference to government that emphasize divine rights through ignoring individual rights. All moral action in this world is a result or development of a moral decision in conscience; and conscience does not exist except in the individual. If this be so, there must always be some tendency to wrong in any theory or practice that can succeed in suppressing the influence of the individual merely because the one who would exert it happens to be a member of a physical minority. Of course, we all have to acknowledge that the origin of the theory, as applied even to the vote of the majority, is not wholly lacking in that which is commendable. It seems due primarily to a feeling of loyalty to a conception fundamental to our method of government,—a conception expressed, years ago, by the author himself:

Where, oh where shall trust in truth that speaks through manhood great  
and small

Overcome the few's oppressing by entrusting power to all?

*A Life of Song: Watching, XXI.*

but a sincere acceptance of the rule of the majority is perfectly consistent, as is also an acceptance of that of a monarch, with a recognition of the necessity of limiting, in some cases, the extent of the authority thus exercised.

We have considered so far the limitations prescribed for our democratic government through the provisions that make it constitutional and representative. A few words, perhaps, ought to be added here with reference to the limita-

tions that have been, or might be, prescribed with reference to exercising the right of suffrage. To begin with, it seems important to notice that all governments that permit suffrage invariably prescribe regulations more or less restricting it. It is not granted anywhere, probably, to minors, idiots, insane people, or all classes of immigrants. This limiting is done as a result, in strict accordance with the theory of this book, of subordinating that which is merely physical in a man to that which is mental; and it involves a practically universal recognition of a government's right to do this. Indeed, any suggestion of doubting this right is coupled logically with other conceptions so absurd that they can do no harm because they can find so few adherents. Only a superstitious belief in the divine guidance of the vote of the majority, analogous to the belief of the peasantry of some parts of Europe in the divine inspiration of idiots, could lead to a serious argument such as the author once read in a newspaper report of a lecture delivered before a Woman's Club. The lecturer argued in favor of committing the destiny of the nation to the votes, among others, of children, if old enough to attend school. This conclusion followed an argument in favor of allowing all women to vote, on the ground that it would educate them to a knowledge of politics. "Are not children," it was asked, "in still more need of such education?" This is an example of what sometimes follows when a secondary reason for a course of action is made to take the place of a primary reason.

The primary reason in favor of allowing people to vote is that doing so enables them to protect their own personal interests. This furnishes a strong argument,—an argument so irrefutable that few people in our country fail to accept, or to desire to carry into practice, all that it implies. They believe that, so far as feasible, all should have a right to vote, and that the State should impart free education for the purpose of fitting them to vote intelligently. But this belief need not, and ought not, to prevent them from recognizing that there is another side to the question. In this country, the voters, either directly or indirectly, through their representatives, make the laws. The voters of the country, therefore, are really its rulers. Suppose that a physical majority of a mass of people, irrespective of any knowledge or experience that they may possess in connec-

tion with a subject, are allowed to dictate government action with reference to it,—can this be said to be a result of trying to prevent the physical from outweighing the mental? Why should one exert a ruling influence upon a community before he knows how to speak or read its language, and thus to find out its needs and the reasons for them? Why should any foreigner, however intelligent, be permitted to vote before he has lived a sufficient time in our country to understand its methods and policies and their purposes? It would not interfere with his personal rights—it might afford him additional protection—could many legislative questions be submitted to the decisions of those alone who have had opportunity to become informed with reference to the subjects with which they deal.

It is owing to considerations of this kind that many have argued that the right to vote should be limited, as it was in many States in the early years of our Republic, to those who can pass a test of intelligence intentionally made so low that all who sincerely desire to attain to it can easily do this. The tests usually suggested are the ability to read the English language, or, in place of this, the ability to earn enough money to support one's self. Both methods, as will be noticed, are suggested, though probably unconsciously, by a desire to prevent the physical qualifications for suffrage from outweighing altogether those that are mental. A method that would, possibly, be more effective and at the same time more satisfactory to a larger number of people might follow upon an adaptation of the arrangements already adopted in our country of having two legislative houses. Why might not the qualification for members of the lower house and for those electing these members be as it is to-day,—the possession of a human body irrespective of any test applicable to anything more than the most ordinary mentality; and the qualification for those who, in addition to this, may become members or elect members of the upper house be higher? Why, for instance, might not one's tax-assessment qualify him? Is it too much to say that, in the last century, in our own country, representatives of an actual property owner, as distinguished from a non-owner, if they alone had been made members of one of the two legislative bodies controlling our large cities, might have almost entirely prevented much of the extravagance and dishonesty which has characterized expenditures

in these cities? Besides owners, others also might be made eligible for members or for electors of members of this upper house. Why might it not be feasible to introduce, for their benefit, what could be termed service suffrage,—suffrage virtually possible for all, but never granted except in recognition of some form of expression of public spirit and patriotism,—never granted except to one able to present a certificate showing that he has fitted himself for this function by having performed some service for the state,—perhaps, by attending school, perhaps by enlisting with the Boy Scouts, or in the militia, or, perhaps, by doing other like work? Through such arrangements, certain rights of suffrage would come to be regarded as attributable not, like a man's beard, to passive physical growth, but to active mental development. It would be recognized as a reward for achievement, and would be welcomed by the appreciation that it deserves.

It would seem as if the desirability of limiting the exercise of suffrage in some such ways would be recognized by all. The world is full of people who are ignorant or selfish. The ignorant are capable of making laws that are against their own interests, though they do not realize that this is so; and the selfish are prone to make laws that are against the interests of others. It would be better for the ignorant, and better for the neighbors, at least, of the selfish, to have the laws made in connection with some organized influence of the intelligent and unselfish. Of course, such an arrangement would not always be feasible. It would be difficult to determine definitely exactly who were intelligent and unselfish. But it would be feasible to do something in this direction. It would furnish the best way of promoting individual welfare for the same reason that the interests of each of the members of a family of young people are best preserved when all have, as an associate and adviser, a wise and kindly guardian.

In this connection, one cannot avoid commending our country's business men for their recent establishment of a non-political association organized to collect and distribute information gathered by those whose experience has made them most familiar with our country's commercial, industrial, and economic conditions and needs. Few doubt that this association will afford the experts whom it is now usual for each political party to consult in connection

with new measures more authority than in the past to meet together, and to discuss and formulate their views. Thus has private initiative and enterprise finally given embodiment to the conception of Pelatiah Webster who, in his *Dissertation on the Constitution*, issued in 1783, proposed that there should be a National Chamber of Commerce, or House of Business.

In connection with the unwarranted authority which many people attribute to the opinions expressed through the vote of the majority, there are two conceptions so at variance with the principle of not allowing the mental to be outweighed by the physical, that they seem to need special mention. The first conception is that suffrage gives a man, because reinforced by others who vote with him, physical power; and if he be intent upon using his power for the purpose of doing good to others, gives him an opportunity for lessening the ignorance, indolence, drunkenness, gambling, and vice of the world. To a certain extent this is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, it seems important to say that the opportunity thus afforded for doing good is not as great, nor the good to be done as high in quality, as is often supposed; and that there are certain circumstances in which the supposition that such is not the case may do harm. As related to effects upon character, neither the possession of the franchise, nor the law which its possession enables one to assist in enacting, is an end in itself, but merely a means to an end. The enactment and execution of the law have to do with an outward deed alone. They never can reach the source of moral action nor secure, for an individual subject to the law, mental control over his own physical inclinations. The man who thinks otherwise is making a fatal mistake,—fatal because it is the very thing to prevent him from pursuing the only course fitted to accomplish that which he wishes. Nothing has ever so demoralized a civilized community as the conception common to many parts of our own country that laws prescribing physical punishment for certain practices, can take the place of kindly and persistent watchfulness, instruction, precept, argument, and example exercised everywhere toward all in every relation possible to family, school, society, business, church, or state.<sup>27</sup> Of course, laws at times exert a certain

<sup>27</sup> Notwithstanding the commendable efforts of sincere reformers to put an end, by legal enactments, to the sale of liquor in one State and to

beneficial effect; but in such cases, as has been already pointed out in this volume, their chief moral influence is in calling attention to the evils against which a law is directed, and in this way causing men to think about them. It is, therefore, very unfortunate not to recognize that the primal duty of a human being begins with that which can be done by himself personally to benefit the individual at his side. This world would be governed very unjustly, if some of us could not fulfill our missions without becoming voters or legislators; or if any of us could fulfill them entirely by becoming such. What all of us need most is to realize this fact, and, first of all, in our homes and places of business. If we did this, our families and associates would not need to be restrained by law; and many laws which, for other reasons, are of doubtful expediency, would not be brought into existence. It is about three hundred years now since intelligent people began to learn that men cannot be made genuinely religious merely by drafting and executing civil or military laws penalizing those whose external conduct as manifested in words or deeds seems to be in need of reform. But, even down to our own time, many appear oblivious of the fact that an analogous method adopted for the purpose of making men genuinely moral is certain to prove equally futile. Training for morality as well as for religion must be imparted in the home or the church; and no possible influence exerted by the school or the state can ever be successfully substituted for either of them.

This seems to be a conception that is difficult to get into the minds of those who have been trained to think that suffrage is a panacea for well-nigh all the evils to which

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sights supposedly banished with the red light district, in another, notice the following testimony with reference to the lack of complete success: "Railroad and express records introduced by the prosecution showed that in a period of 146 days, beginning January 1st, more than 212 tons of intoxicating liquors had been received at Bangor, county seat of Penobscot County (Maine), without seizure or complaint by the sheriff."—*Philadelphia Public Ledger*, June 13, 1918. "If the undraped truth has no horrors for your unsophisticated eyes, drop into the . . . this week. . . . On the outside the manager is exhibiting a photographic enlargement of one of the scenes in the film which is warranted to make almost every male passer-by hesitate and stare. . . . On the inside, Manager . . . is featuring . . . posings in the nude . . . Of course the evil or impure-minded are sure to talk a lot, but the true lover of that which is artistic can only admire."—*Los Angeles* . . . , in 1916.

society is prone. Undoubtedly it can lessen some of them. But even then it is not suffrage that does this; it is the use to which suffrage as a means has been put. Even used as a means, it is frequently no more effective than would be some other means. As a rule, those who possess suffrage have to labor as assiduously to obtain the legislation that they wish, as would be the case did they not possess suffrage. It was supposed, after the Civil War in our country, that the granting of the right to vote to the former slaves would secure them all other civil rights, and in certain States it has been supposed that the granting of it to women would lead to the prohibition of certain forms of indulgence to which they are not so prone as are men; but it has been found that, in order to attain these ends, those to whom suffrage has been granted require the aid of almost as much public canvassing and private lobbying with legislators as was needed before it was granted. Very often, probably, half the energy and money expended in securing suffrage might have secured directly that which suffrage gave merely a promise of securing indirectly. In many cases, too, this promise has never been fulfilled. It was not fulfilled as a result of granting manhood suffrage to the former slaves of the South. It would have been far better to have granted suffrage to them as a reward to be won by education and industry, and then to have afforded them special aid in these activities. This would have prevented the physical from outweighing the mental; and the thoroughly rational and just spirit manifested in doing this would probably have prevented also that feeling of resentment which, for more than fifty years, has not only caused the former slaveholder to continue by subterfuge to keep his former slaves practically disfranchised, but has also kept himself in the same condition, whenever to vote for what would otherwise be of benefit to him has involved his voting also with the political party that once tried to force himself and his kind into practical subjection to a majority necessarily lacking the education and experience which alone could have rendered such an arrangement sensible and safe.

This thought suggests in connection with the subject of suffrage the second conception which on page 285 was said to be at variance with the principle of not allowing the physical to outweigh the mental. This conception does not, like the one just discussed, consider the enacting or

physical executing of law to be a substitute for exerting mental influence: but to be something that must always accompany whatever mental influence is exerted. After the Civil War in our country, mental considerations would have admitted to citizenship, upon taking an oath of allegiance, those who had been in rebellion, and, in addition to this, in order to emphasize the abolition of slavery, have admitted to suffrage former slaves whenever they became sufficiently intelligent and thrifty. This having been done, rationality, common sense, and good judgment among the people would probably, in a little time, have reconciled them to the conditions. As it was, a committee, headed by Carl Schurz, a man of unchallenged integrity, reported that slavery, though abolished by law, was being virtually reestablished in the South by a system of peonage brought about as a penalty for debt. This result, which seemed clearly an endeavor to restore conditions in which physical force should continue to determine industrial relations, seemed to justify counteraction through exertion of the same kind of force. Through votes representing the physical majority of the whole country they decided to enfranchise the former slaves. Through this course it was thought that, in certain States at least, the blacks could outvote the whites sufficiently to prevent anything like a recurrence to conditions of slavery. At the same time the Northerners knew that, as a class, the negroes were at that time too ignorant and inexperienced to use the ballot wisely; and, however difficult it might have been to find a more thoughtful and considerate method of accomplishing their purpose, which in itself was justifiable, they should not have done what they did. They made the mistake of supposing that they could correct one wrong by committing another wrong; and never since the beginning of time have two wrongs made a right.

Unfortunately, the spirit that animated these Northern politicians at that time is apt to be manifested over and over again by so-called reformers, and even by sincere ones, whenever there seems to be a chance of obtaining a victory for their own cause through influence that can be exerted through the physical force of superior numbers. Much of the campaigning even for the most praiseworthy objects is of this character. The worst feature of the case, too, is the fact that apparently sensible people justify such methods.



They think that they are doing particularly right when they join not only in the marching and shouting, but in the mobbing of those who differ from them in opinion, and in the smashing of their property. Think of the methods adopted by certain prohibitionists of Kansas and suffragettes of London! In the long run, however, a resort to physical influence is in danger of being followed by consequences in which the evil overbalances the good.

The same fact, indeed, could be illustrated not only by the attempt to enfranchise universally the former slaves of our own country, but by the whole history of their emancipation. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, a few slaves, at least, were held in every State of the Union with the exception of New Hampshire. But partly because the system of slavery was thought wrong, and partly because, in the North, it was found to be unprofitable, it was gradually prohibited by law in all but the Southern States. Even there, however, it was widely opposed. George Washington of Virginia and many others freed the slaves whom they had inherited; and Henry Clay of Kentucky, the most popular statesman of that section, advocated for years a bill in Congress emancipating all slaves by purchasing them from their owners. If those interested in the subject had aimed chiefly to influence thought, and had exercised patience, and waited a decade or so longer for mental influence to produce its legitimate effects, the war that followed would probably never have occurred. This was clearly a result of forcing the issue. Had it not been for the methods adopted and the bitter feeling excited by the sectional abuse attendant upon them, there might have been a reasonable compromise that would have benefited and satisfied both of the opposing factions. As it was, the resort to physical force brought about a satisfactory physical result, but fifty years have gone by since then, and it has not yet brought about a satisfactory mental result.

The connection between the influence exerted by the vote of the majority and that which is physical rather than mental is nowhere more evident than in the extensive use in all republics of that which is termed patronage. Considered theoretically, laws in a republic represent mental desire. This is the reason—and a worthy one—why many have a conscientious belief in the rightfulness of this form of govern-

ment. They argue that the measures adopted by it are traceable not to physical force but to the thinking of all the people, the opinion of each of whom is solicited in his vote, and, after being compared and combined with the opinions of others, is embodied in the general result. Practically, however, it often happens that laws do not represent the opinions of the people. They represent the opinions of a few self-seeking partisans. This is because some executive with the power of appointment puts in lucrative positions certain legislators or their friends who also have a power of appointment and, in their turn, put hundreds and perhaps thousands into lucrative positions, many of which involve expenditure of money not easily traceable when expended merely for the spenders' benefit. These appointees and their friends, scattered all over the community, are able to exert so much influence upon the individual voter that few candidates for office who oppose them can be elected. It is possible, therefore, for an executive to use his power of appointment in such a way as to intimidate a sufficient number of legislators to force them to vote for what he wishes. They fear that if they do not, they will be defeated the next time that the people are asked to vote for them. An executive who thus forces a legislative body to do his will, usually begins by appointing to office unfit or dishonest men, and continues by not vetoing unfit or dishonest legislation. In some cases, the expenditures of the government, before the majority of the people have divined the reason, have been multiplied three or four times, and chiefly to fill the pockets of appointees of this kind, in the expectation that they will control the popular vote and thus forward the executive's ambition. Even when he himself has not furthered the interests of those whom he knows to be dishonest, he has, too often, furthered the interests of his political party at the expense of his country. The mentality, the unselfish thinking of the people, has not been allowed free expression and sovereignty. It has been suppressed by physical force that has given mastery to the selfish schemes of partisan politicians. Nevertheless, many governors and even presidents of our country, for the very reason that they have ruled in this way, have been called strong men, and have been supposed to be worthy of honor. The time is coming when they will more likely be thought to have made themselves fit for a chain gang, and to be en-

titled to less consideration even than some in this class; for they will be recognized to have been no better than traitors to the principle that is most fundamental to the success of the government of which they have had charge.

## CHAPTER XXII

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN THE FRAMING AND ADMINISTERING OF GOVERNMENT LAWS

Laws Promote Morality when they Prevent Individuals from Interfering with Others' Mental or Rational Development—Liberty as Applied to Religion—To Education—To Social and Political Position—To Business Conditions and Surroundings—Tendency toward Government Interference as Illustrated from Experience of Railways—Results of Government Oversight and Ownership—Reliance upon Physical not Rational Influence—Arbitration, and Methods of Evading its Intended Effects—Physical rather than Rational Influence Dominant in Making Regulations with Reference to Hours of Labor—To Wages—To Allowing Sons to Follow their Fathers' Trade, or any Trade in which they Need to Experiment—Laws Interfering with both Laborers and Leaders in Industry—Laws against Combination and in Favor of Competition—Self-seeking Results in Business Cannot be Corrected by Laws Changing Physical Conditions—Influence of Capitalists in Favor of Democracy in Government—Efforts of Capitalists for the Welfare of their Employees—For Agricultural Laborers—Such Capitalists are Needed and should be Honored—False Views of Human Equality Fail to Recognize this Fact—Equality Desirable because it Brings Happiness—and this is often Mental—Logical Results of False Views as Embodied in Socialism and Anarchism—The Threatened Decay of Democracy in our Own Times—It is sometimes Wisest for One to Accept the Existing Conditions of Life, and Make the Best of Them.

THIS is no place in which to discuss in detail the various measures of legislation and administration through which a government can aid in preventing the physical from outweighing the mental. We can consider here merely a few of the principles underlying such measures. The most important of these principles seems to be that the primary object of government, as related to morals, is to prevent individuals from interfering with one another's mental development,—in other words, to prevent them from doing that which shall make it impossible or difficult

for themselves or their neighbors to carry out the promptings of their mental desires. There is nothing that large numbers in every community like better than to tyrannize over their families and associates,—to dictate to them what shall be their beliefs and practices with reference not only to little matters like those of fashion and custom, but to great matters like those pertaining to religion, to education, to social and political action, and to business and industry. One of the chief ends of government is to set the individual free from such tyranny, to give him liberty, as we say. Only as he possesses this, will it be possible for him, in many cases, to conform his outward conduct to that inward guidance which is best both for himself and his fellows.

It is because of a growing belief in this inward guidance that most modern governments allow the citizen to be an adherent of any religion that appeals to his own conscience. The majority of them no longer persecute, and few of them tax, for purposes in which he has no interest, the man who does not belong to a church established by the state. They have learned that, so far as concerns the outward demeanor which government seeks to regulate, the whole object of religion is thwarted when conditions are such as to frighten or force one into misrepresenting in form that which controls him in spirit.

Similar facts can be stated with reference to education. At one time in the world, there was a theory that the best way to maintain order and peace in a community was to keep the people in a state of ignorance. The less they knew, the more pliant it was supposed that they would be to the dictation of the government officials. But in modern times it has been discovered that, where there are no counter-acting influences, the more intelligent a man is the more inclined he is to orderly and peaceful behavior; and the complementary fact is also true—that the more intelligent the officials are, the more inclined they are to make and to administer laws in a way to lead to such behavior. These are sufficient reasons for holding the theory that the government should establish and maintain schools, making education compulsory for children and possible for those more advanced who desire it. Nothing could contribute more to the general welfare than for the government to do this; and nothing, therefore, can more justify the levying of taxes, for this purpose, upon the community.

The social and political position of a man in a country also ought to be left to be determined by mental rather than by physical considerations; and a wise government will do what it can to secure this aim. It can be done, too, without any revolutionary interest or result. Indeed, a revolution, though it might change the phase, could not affect the substance of the evils to be remedied. Wherever men go in this world, they can always find some who need to be brought to the light because they walk hidden in the shadows of those whom they follow. This is no more true of the physical heirs of the nobility in a monarchy than of the physical relatives of the wealthy, the prominent, or the partisan, in a republic. As a result, offices in the army, the navy, and the Civil Service, that ought to be filled by those of exceptional ability, experience, or efficiency, as discovered by an examination of what they know or have done, are often given to candidates utterly incompetent; or, if to others, mainly as a matter of accident, not of design. Sometimes the chief influence of those who make appointments seems to be to keep the capable from responsible positions and the community from the efficient service that they ought to receive. Nothing could more clearly manifest the importance in this, as in all other relations of life, of preventing the physical from outweighing the mental.

In a commercial country like our own, the evils that are being considered are apt to reveal themselves chiefly in business. In connection with this, there are certain arrangements and methods necessary to secure economy, efficiency, fair play, comfort, and health, which, either because of ignorance or exclusive self-seeking, are often overlooked. To these it is the clear duty of the government to call attention by enjoining certain courses to be pursued, and prescribing penalties for their violation. There ought to be laws, for instance, with reference to the methods of obtaining and preparing the materials needed for use in business; laws to prevent watersheds from being denuded of soil because their bordering forests whose roots held it in place have been removed and not replanted; laws to conserve and distribute mineral resources and water privileges; laws to encourage and help actual settlers in taking possession of fertile lands and developing them, as well as to supervise, at least, by way of advice, the nature of crops and their transportation, storage, and sale so as to avoid loss through

speculation. There ought to be laws to secure in factories plenty of ventilation and sanitation, and, in every place, cleanliness and wholesome surroundings, both indoors and outdoors. There ought to be laws against the employment of children, both because it may keep them from acquiring education and training, and because the excessive exertion involved may stunt their growth and injure their health. There ought to be laws enabling the needy to find work; prohibiting overwork, either in kind or duration; or injurious standing, stooping, or stretching on the part of laborers; or the employment of machinery so constructed as to be irksome or dangerous; or the handling, in industries, of ingredients of such a nature as to be poisonous, or in any way harmful to the user. There ought to be laws, too, making employers accountable for accidents that a reasonable amount of expense and contrivance on their part could prevent, and there ought to be laws insuring a living wage for all, as well as changes in the nature of the work required of the aged, or providing means of pensioning them when growing infirmities have rendered them no longer able to labor as they once could. These and other similar provisions, the simplest promptings of mental, in the sense of rational and non-selfish, desire would seem to demand.

Frequently, however, legislators, or the people who elect them, are tempted to go beyond provisions of this character. Purchasers who are not disposed to pay prices that are asked or employees who are dissatisfied with wages or other conditions of labor, succeed in getting the government to interfere and to pass laws in accordance with their individual, and, in many cases, selfish, interests. In some instances and countries this process has gone so far that the government has assumed complete control and management of the forms of industry against which complaints have been made. This course may succeed for a time in lowering prices and raising wages; but it is a question whether, in the long run, it does not lessen the quality of the product or service rendered, and very greatly increase the cost of it to people in general. One argument, showing that this may be the case, seems to have been presented lately to the experience of almost every reader of this book. A few years ago the railways of our country outnumbered in mileage those of all Europe taken together, while prices here for the transportation of freight and passengers were about half what they

were there, and the accommodations, as a rule, were better. Private enterprise had pushed these railways of ours, as a government never would have felt justified in doing, into almost every uninhabited region of the country; and to them, almost solely, we owe the development of the States of the West and Southwest. Some of these railways—but possibly not half of them—were very successful financially; and good railway bonds were, for years, considered among the safest investments in the market. Nevertheless, there was much speculation, especially in stocks; and much of this was manipulated dishonestly, causing some to become suddenly rich and others as suddenly poor. Speculation, however, is not confined to railway stocks; and it needed remedies not confined to them. Besides this, it was largely carried on by those who had nothing to do with the practical management of the railways themselves. But people supposed that it had, and that the money made by speculators was due to political influence able to obtain franchises and public property at less than its real value, as well as due also to making unfair discrimination and overcharging for the transportation furnished.

There were various ways in which these evils, so far as they had been actually ascertained, could have been corrected. But, as so often happens, the easiest way—the physical way—was chosen,—the way of government interference exercising authority in lowering transportation charges. This was followed, after a time, when workmen also complained of their treatment by the railways, by the shortening of the hours of labor, with an accompanying increase of pay for the service rendered. As a result, some of the roads did not receive sufficient to justify them in expenditures needed in order to keep their equipment in good condition; and, after a time, they lost their expert workmen because of the great increase in wages offered them in factories providing munitions for the European war. Then our own country entered the war; and the railways apparently proved unable to meet its exceptional demands upon transportation. So, as a temporary expedient to be applied only during the emergency, the government took control of them. We all know the result upon people in general. At present it can be said that the convenience and comfort of the individual traveler has been greatly lessened, while prices for transportation have been greatly increased;



and, in case the railways do not pay their expenses, we shall all have to be taxed to make up the deficit.<sup>28</sup> Yet many influenced apparently more by theory than by fact, are now saying, after the war is over, that this temporary arrangement should be made permanent. If it were made so, the result would certainly have a tendency, at least, to cause trains to be run for the convenience of the operatives rather than of the public, just as are the government-controlled telegraphs in Germany. There, unless, possibly, from large cities, one can send no messages out of ordinary business hours, no matter what may be the emergency. In our country the railways alone might furnish us with many millions of voters who, if they chose, could dictate the action of the government toward them, and, if the government accepted their dictation, might by their votes enable the party in power to remain there almost indefinitely. This suggests a reason why government ownership, or even management, is apt to be less successful under a democracy than under an autocracy. In America, political administration in large cities has usually shown extravagance in expenditures and inefficiency in results. This is because politicians rather than experts have been at the head of affairs. In Germany and, for many years in the city of Washington in our own country, the officials have been appointed and not elected, and for this reason the general conduct of affairs has been more satisfactory. It certainly would be unwise to place the industrial development of our country under the conditions which, so far in our history, have been most conspicuous in proving that our form of democracy is not completely successful. To do this might very easily in a short time

<sup>28</sup> In the five months to December 1st—the latest date for which a statement is now at hand—the railroads moved not very much more traffic than in the corresponding period of 1917, when they were under private management, but their operating expenses were greater by more than a hundred million dollars a month, or at the rate of a billion and a quarter a year. In July, operating expenses took sixty-nine per cent. of gross receipts; in August, seventy-one per cent.; in September, seventy-six per cent.; in October, seventy-eight per cent.; in November, eighty-three per cent. In eleven months of government operation patrons of the Pennsylvania Railroad paid sixty-six million dollars more for about the same quantity of service—due to advanced rates—but operating expenses were ninety-three million dollars more, and, after paying taxes and rents, the sum remaining for interest and dividends dropped from forty-eight million dollars in 1917 to nineteen millions in 1918.—*Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, February 22, 1919.

throw such discredit upon our institutions as to lead to their ultimate overthrow. Even in an autocracy, government management, though not so threatening to the general welfare, is not wholly safe. One reason why, in Germany, a few at the head of the government were able to begin the recent war, and were able to continue it, notwithstanding enormous loss of life and property, is because the government had come to control the minutest details of so many different employments. Almost any one who, by word or deed, opposed the government, or opposed a representative of the government happening to be one step above him, might be turned out of his position, whether a telegraph operator, a brakeman on a railway, a pastor in a city church, or a professor in a university. There is no doubt that this arrangement keeps large numbers of people orderly and diligent. But notice that it also keeps them where they can be easily made to obey the orders of those who are their masters,—a result that, after a time, is certain to follow wherever government interference has deprived people in general of the stimulus, the inclination, and, as a consequence, the ability to give free expression to their individual mental desires.

That which connects this subject with our present discussion is the readily recognizable fact that the kind of government interference indicated, so far as it may prove injurious, is traceable to the subordination of mental to physical influence. Mental influence is always exerted in the rational and non-selfish way that reaches a decision after a full and fair presentation of facts and arguments by those interested in both sides of the question involved. Physical influence is exerted in ways exactly the opposite. In a democracy it usually relies upon the numbers of people who can be brought into political union and made to demand the same thing, very often not because they all think alike, but because many of them seldom think at all. The physical method is exemplified also in the numbers of people induced to threaten to vote against a legislator in case he fails to obey their dictates; in the numbers of legislators combining to overawe an executive sufficiently to make him sign any bill that they may pass; and in the numbers of agencies that can be used by a government in carrying out its laws. This same physical method, in case of dispute between two parties, the success of each of which depends

upon coöperation in the same business, finds no more than logical fulfillment in a course that causes one of the two to call a strike, burn or smash buildings or machinery, and, if possible, force politicians to action in their behalf irrespective of exercising justice toward the other party; or else in a course equally logical that causes the other of the parties to call on the militia, get them to fire on their opponents, and oblige these to submit without question to whatever orders are given them. In both cases each party is carrying out the principle of ruling men through the exertion of physical force; and it is doing this because of a lack of confidence in the effects of mental influence.

It is to prevent and, if possible, counteract such conditions of action and belief, that wise legislators, of late, have been endeavoring to induce, and, if possible, to oblige by law, both parties in such disputes to submit to a settlement of their differences through arbitration. This is a method through which a number of selected men, sitting as a court of justice, hear what may be said by representatives of those at variance, and try to reach a decision which, through compromise at least, if not through means more satisfactory, shall deal fairly with all. Unfortunately, however, there seem to be in our country those who suppose that they can accept the principle of arbitration in form, and yet not at all in spirit,—in such a way, in fact, as not to surrender in the least their reliance upon physical force. A few months ago an issue of the *Literary Digest* contained several quotations from papers representing labor organizations, which argued that boards of arbitration could not be acceptable to employees unless composed entirely of those of their own class. The same magazine in its issue for March 2, 1918, quotes the following from one of the same class of papers,—The *New York Call*. "In a general way we should favor . . . compulsory arbitration on the part of the government. It cannot and dare not compel the laborers, but it can compel the employers with the threat of taking over the control of their business. . . . In case both sides are stubborn . . . the government would naturally follow the line of least resistance. The weakest goes to the wall, and, in this case, it is not labor that is the weakest. So, on the principle that 'might makes right,' we choose government arbitration without troubling to give ethical reasons for our choice." Here is a clear, unadulterated statement of reliance upon

physical force, and of the purpose to apply it. There is no necessity of arguing what would be the result if, in a free country like ours, physical force—the conception that ‘might makes right’—should come to be advocated by any large number of people. Such a principle could not rule anywhere without enthroning tyranny.

Even at present there are indications that this kind of rule is beginning among us. Take, for instance, the laws that have been passed, because of more or less compulsion exercised by organized voters, with reference to the number of hours that should constitute a day’s work. Everybody who thinks, knows that one who is not interested in his work—*i.e.*, who is not entering into it mentally—is tired at the end of six hours; but that the one who is interested in it is often not tired at the end of twelve hours,—indeed, if anxious to “get on,” as people say, the worst possible experience of being tired will come if he be stopped when he wants to keep working. To cause all by law to accommodate their actions to the physical requirements of the more indolent and inefficient, is to exercise the very worst form of tyranny over the mental nature. It is well enough to prevent employees from acting in an inhuman way by refusing to accept a service of six or eight hours a day from those who desire it. But this is a different thing from endeavoring to suppress the interest and enthusiasm, and rendering impossible the rightful advancement, of those who are actuated by mental desire.

So with reference to wages. One man can do twice as much work in an hour as another man can, or, even though the quantity produced by both may be the same, the quality in the one case may be twice as good as in the other. A law that tends to make the wages of both men exactly the same is not calculated to increase the efficiency of the former workman, or to lessen the inefficiency of the latter, yet this is the sort of law that large numbers who themselves are indolent and indifferent approve; and that which they particularly disapprove is an added requirement, which alone could insure justice, enjoining, in addition to a minimum wage sufficient to furnish adequate means of support, an extra wage for extra work. It is to be feared that what not a few of them really want, and what the law as formulated not infrequently accomplishes, is the enabling of the most inefficient to receive as high wages as if they were the oppo-

site. Neither in the framing of a law that omits peculiar recognition for excellence, nor in the practical effects of such a law, is there any evidence of a desire to prevent physical from outweighing mental considerations.

The same might be said of many other laws too numerous to mention here, and not needed in order to render more intelligent the principle that is being illustrated. These laws have all of them a tendency to keep the individual from following his own mental bent. Such are those that, owing to the plea that there should not be too many rival workmen in one trade, prevent sons from availing themselves of their father's experience, and probably of their own inherited aptitudes, by learning and practicing his trade; or that prevent others from leaving one trade and entering another; or, before they have determined definitely upon any one of them, from experimenting in different lines of work in order to ascertain that for which they are mentally fitted. The wording of laws that produce results of this kind is often intentionally vague, but it will usually be found that their practical effect is to keep down in life those who are looking about in different directions, because prompted to make an effort to rise. This prompting, so far as it is due to a man's mental desire to make the most of himself in order to be able to do the most for his fellows, is right. The government that does not recognize the fact is wrong. Whether termed democratic or autocratic, if its laws interfere with the legitimate expression in conduct of such desires, it is exercising tyranny over the mental nature. Wherever this is done, the progress and welfare of the entire community is more or less retarded.

Nor does the influence of such laws affect solely the young, the obscure, the inefficient, or the unprosperous, who might be supposed to be the only ones unable successfully to resist hostile legislation. Of late years, almost every class of the community, if too small to constitute, or at least control, a majority of it, has been handicapped by being made subject to unnecessary restrictions. These have been put upon methods resulting from the experience of the most able men in the country, not always because they have been dishonest or even selfishly inconsiderate, which, of course, would justify such restrictions, but apparently, sometimes, merely because they have been successful. The theory of many seems to be that to make the mental leaders of industry—

the men who have had the brains to devise and develop great enterprises—less successful, is to make their followers—men for whom they have created work and to whom they are giving wages—more successful. Of course, no theory could be more contrary to the truth. A man whose thoughtful diligence and thrift has enabled him to rise to a position in which he can control large sums of money is the one best able to help others to obtain a similar position. He is the one best able to pay a large price for work, and to pay it steadily. He is the one best able to purchase and develop facilities for transportation; and he is the one, too, who can furnish the necessities of life at the least cost to the consumer. This latter is an important fact that seems frequently to be overlooked. Let us notice, for a moment, what it involves. Suppose that one wishes to have printed a circular. The principal expense connected with this is incurred in paying for the setting of the type. To set this for one circular costs as much as for a million. Therefore, aside from the paper, the time, and the fuel expended in running the press, one circular, if only one be issued, must necessarily cost very many times as much as each of the million, if all are issued. The same principle applies in every case where enhanced facilities for production increase the output. When the product of an oil well, before it could reach a market, had to be pumped into barrels, carted scores of miles, and sent on a long trip by rail, it cost a great deal more than it does now, when from the very mouth of the well it flows to market through a pipe-line. When watches were made by hand, a good one was sometimes worth four or five hundred dollars. Now that they can be turned out by machinery, one that will keep almost perfect time can be purchased for less than a twentieth of that sum.

It is a recognition of this lessening of the cost both of production and of the thing produced that, in modern times, has caused the great combinations between different business corporations. For instance, when five separate companies unite, there are thousands of towns in the country in which one agent in one office can do all the business previously requiring five agents, occupying five offices. Merely because such combinations prove economical for capitalists, is it for the interest of the purchaser for whom also they are economical, that they should be forbidden by

law? Yet, influenced by a desire to conform statements to the prejudices of ignorant constituents, certain of our politicians keep telling people that, in order to preserve the laborer and the public from themselves losing the money that is made by the capitalists, these combinations must be broken up into separate companies; that only when the latter are rivals and antagonistic will they watch and interfere with one another sufficiently to prevent dishonesty and extortion. What facts can be instanced to justify this conception? Has competition in the past proved to be a panacea that can cure dishonesty and extortion? If not, then the conception must be derived, not from fact, but from theory. Is the theory sound then? Have we any reason to suppose that wrong in business methods can be prevented by rivalry and antagonism? What influence do these latter exert? Almost exclusively a physical influence. They are powerful because, if not actually backed by physical force, they are always more or less associated with it. But that which can best overcome wrong of any kind is mental, rational, humane, altruistic influence. Unless it can be shown that there is more of this in competition than there is in combination, it cannot be proved that to substitute the one for the other would lessen the wrong. A little thought, too, would probably cause many of us to conclude that of the two, that which is influenced most by the mental is combination. It is a form of coöperation, and coöperation is always a later result of civilization—a later effect upon it of that knowledge, calculation, and sympathy that are associated with mental development—than is competition. It is not logical, therefore, to suppose that the latter will prove a cure for that which is non-mental in the former. The more likely result will be just the opposite.

In connection with this subject, too, we should not neglect to recall that which always needs to be borne in mind, namely, the impossibility of correcting any abuse that demands a mental and psychical remedy by any mere change in external material conditions. The evils that reveal themselves in any form of business cannot be satisfactorily corrected by mere laws. The methods used are largely ineffective unless they reach the innermost source of character in those who do the business. This fact, indeed, is recognized, indirectly, though not directly by the only men who seem to place their chief reliance upon a change in laws.

No argument in favor of substituting competition for combination seems quite as convincing to them as the supposition that competition will tend to lessen the influence of individuals who have come to be capitalists, or, at least, to have the control of capital. This argument has a basis of truth. But whether it will benefit or injure the community to lessen the influence of these individuals depends entirely upon their personal character. A certain number of the indolent, ignorant, thoughtless, and, for this reason, inefficient, may believe that the very fact that a man has reached a position where he has control of capital indicates that he has taken an unfair advantage and pushed himself into the place that he occupies by pushing others out of it. In some cases this is true. But it is true very rarely. Capitalists who have money to invest do not elect a man of this kind to control it. As a rule, he is one who by diligence, self-denial, economy, intelligence, and alertness has shown both mental and moral qualities that make him superior to his fellows, and therefore entitled to a superior position. Not only does his own corporation need him there, but often also the whole community.

That this is so is a fact of which the slightest knowledge of conditions in our own country, either in the past or in the immediate present, ought to convince any candid mind. Our "War of the Revolution," was conducted to a successful issue, and the form of our government made that of a republic rather than a monarchy, owing mainly to the influence of George Washington; and he was, at that time, the most conspicuous, if not the wealthiest, capitalist of the country. An analogous result has been exemplified at almost every critical stage of our nation's history. Not a few, but probably the majority, of those who in private or public life have successfully advocated needed changes or reforms have been men who, like Theodore Roosevelt, have inherited or acquired a fortune large enough to enable them to support their families without the need of salaries dependent upon the continuance of popular favor. This is not the only reason, but it is one very material reason, why they have dared to defy party dictation and public clamor until they have overcome opposition. Everything that is good in this world seems to start in a good individual's initiative; and, therefore, everything that conditions this individual so that he can act freely is an agency for good. At the opening of



the great war of 1917, hardly one college student who was a capitalist in his own right, or the son of a capitalist, failed to enlist almost instantly for service at the front, while thousands who were too old to do this gratuitously placed at the disposal of the Government all their savings, salaries, and services. Thousands upon thousands of intelligent working-men who were not capitalists did the same. All honor to them! But it is, nevertheless, true that while the general action of the capitalists tended to make the war for the liberty of the ordinary man a success, the action of a considerable number of the working men tended to make it a failure. See the note at the bottom of the page.<sup>29</sup>

What has been said of the relative influence of capitalists and laborers is true as applied especially to interests that are distinctly social, domestic, educational, and religious. Sixty or seventy years ago, when manufacturing on a large scale in our country first began, provision for the safety, comfort, and health of the operatives was included, as a rule, in every plan for a new industrial center, and in proportion to the knowledge of the day with reference to the requirements of such subjects, was consistently carried out. Many now living can recall the care that was exercised in Lowell and other manufacturing centers of New England in the construction of factories and homes, in the provisions made for the schooling of the children, and the welcome extended to the operatives by the churches. It is a fact that, in later years, many of these conditions have been changed for less favorable ones. But they have been changed not so much through the influence of the capitalists as of the laborers. The former had made the conditions so inviting that, in connection with the extension of business due to their sagacity, the crowds of laborers, mostly foreigners, that flocked to the manufacturing centers overflowed the quarters that had been made to accommodate a smaller number, and accepted without protest those that were inadequate. Only after the capitalists had learned this fact from the acquiescence of the laborers, were some of the former tempted to let the latter live as they chose. Very many employers,

<sup>29</sup> A report issued by the National Industrial Conference Board shows that during the six months' period from April 6 to October 6, 1917, after the opening of the war, there were strikes in 2521 establishments, that a total of 283,402 men were idle, and that 6,285,519 days of production were lost thereby.

however, have not yielded to this temptation. They are still making efforts, often at great expense to themselves, to better the sanitary and social conditions of those whom they employ. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of factories and villages in the country, built by them, where the provisions for safety in the handling of machinery, and for comfort in homes, would not and could not have been conceived by associations of the laborers themselves. To secure such results, these laborers would not have had sufficient scientific knowledge or familiarity with domestic appliances. Nor is it true that these arrangements are for the purpose of extorting money from the operatives. It is largely for the purpose of attracting to the works a set of operatives who are self-respecting and doing their best to prevent the physical from outweighing the mental. The author himself has visited a model city built by the United States Steel Corporation, where, in yards, fifty by a hundred and fifty feet in size, sodded and planted with trees and vines, fronted by a cemented street and backed by a cemented alley, many hundreds of single and apartment fireproof cottages, fitted with all modern appliances in the way of electricity, heating, and bathing, can be rented for one half what is demanded for frame cottages of the same size in a much less cleanly and attractive environment of the adjacent large city. Of course, it is true that such results are also owing to the growth of public sentiment as affected by the discussions of earnest reformers and the agitations of organized laborers. But it is equally true that the theoretical conceptions of these latter could not be carried to a successful practical issue, were it not for the sympathetic coöperation and, in some cases, the intelligent superintendence of some of those who possess capital. (See footnote <sup>22</sup> on page 245).

This subject is of particular interest at the present time in our country because of an effort to extend to agricultural districts, which it is proposed to bring within reach of soldiers returning from the war, the same kind of benefits, material and intellectual, that have done so much to promote prosperity in manufacturing and business districts. The idea is to have a central farm managed by an agricultural expert with sufficient money at his disposal to purchase all modern implements of farming, the use of which implements shall be included in the rights pertaining to the owners of the adjoining farms. One can scarcely over-estimate the

advantages of this arrangement. No better illustration could be afforded of the result of an endeavor to prevent the physical from outweighing the mental as applied to the business of farming.

The truth is that, to do the work that the world demands, it is necessary to enlist in its service all the means of mental influence and all the sources of mental ability that can anywhere be obtained. Because some men who have wealth are mean to excess, is no proof that all or that the majority are so. The very fact that there is such a thing as civilization, and that year by year its conditions are becoming more and more humane, furnishes a proof that those who have been prominent, and leaders in its advances, have themselves been animated by humane motives. Indeed, great captains of industry deserve frequently as much commendation for their victories achieved for social betterment, comfort, and enjoyment as does the hero of a battle field for that which has added to national welfare. The reason why the characters of men like these are deserving of admiration, their advice of regard, and their example of imitation, is because of the mental traits that they manifest,—not merely those that are intellectual, like foresight and sagacity, but those that are volitional and emotional, like industry and public-spirit. An individual or a community that honors and follows such men is putting the mental uppermost, and deserves the advance in prosperity which is the legitimate result of doing this.

Unfortunately, however, there are those who do not recognize this fact.<sup>30</sup> Some of them are ignorant of the requirements needed for the efficient management of business. Some of them are unreasonably and, now and then, temperamentally jealous of those who have succeeded in it.

<sup>30</sup> "A valued contemporary tells us that democracy instinctively and inevitably distrusts competence and success. . . . Suppose no great war had happened. . . . Suppose a President had given cabinet portfolios to the chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Co., a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., and the President of the Anaconda Copper Company! Only two or three years ago the Senate . . . had the hardest kind of work to persuade itself that a man with Wall Street banking experience might be as serviceable in a banking board as a country editor."—*Leslie's Weekly*. That such statements can be made of conditions in our country furnishes one of the worst indictments that could be brought against it. The tendency indicated is certainly one which all intelligent people should resist.

Many, however—and let us hope the majority—seem to be misled by what, at bottom, is a praiseworthy sentiment inspired by genuine love for humanity. They say that all men are equal; that, therefore, one man should be considered as good as another, even to the extent of allowing him to exercise the same sort of control over his fellows. To say nothing of the first of these statements, the last two certainly need to be reconsidered. They ignore the fact that men are born with minds that have different aptitudes, and, as they grow up, are subjected to different influences of education and experience; and that these develop in them different mental possibilities; and that, therefore, each of them needs to be treated and can be treated as well as the others and yet, at the same time, for a different reason and in a different way. You can treat a manservant and a maidservant, a lawyer and a laboring man, equally well; and yet treat them differently. If you do not, probably neither of them will like you. And, again, if you do not treat differently an intelligent and experienced superintendent in a factory from one who is a mere beginner, it is certain that the services of neither of them will benefit you.

To go deeper into the subject, the truth is that equality is not affirmable of men considered physically alone. Some men are always physically bigger and stronger than others; and this evidence of inequality extends to everything connected with their physical nature or surroundings,—to their physical brain, memory, energy, and to the position, influence or wealth that these give them. When we refer to equality, we refer to a result not of body or form, but of mind or spirit,—to that which is meant when it is said, sometimes, that “all men are equal in the sight of God,” and which is aptly described in the American “Declaration of Independence” as a right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”—to that which gives a man a consciousness of being free, so far as this is possible without interfering with others, to obtain what he desires.

It needs to be noticed also—and, it is in accordance with the theories of this book—that what gives the majority of men the most consciousness of happiness is that which enables them to fulfill not lower and physical, but higher and mental desire,—is not money, but such things as friendship, love, education, social recognition, business prominence, literary achievement, etc. This is another fact ignored by

those whose conceptions of equality and of the happiness brought by it do not include that which is mental and spiritual. Of course, those of whom this can be affirmed are not always aware that they are ignoring the mental and the spiritual. Some of them are more likely, perhaps, than many other people to claim to be particularly rational, humanitarian, and idealistic. Their theories, they say, are founded, in an exceptional degree, upon a recognition of the claims of human brotherhood. But what do they mean by brotherhood? If their conception of this be based upon what a man is physically, and their conception of its benefits upon what can be done to improve merely his physical condition, they need to be reminded that there is no physical brotherhood except among those who have the same physical father or mother; and that the brotherhood that is not physical must be psychical and be based upon a union of thought and purpose brought about among men by an endeavor on the part of each individual to prevent the bodily and material within himself from outweighing the mental and spiritual which connects him with his fellows (see pages 20 and 21).

Unfortunately, this psychical conception of brotherhood is not the conception of those of whom we have been speaking. To them the chief evils from which a man suffers seem to be due to his not possessing enough of that which ministers to physical and material desire. Often, indeed, these people attribute such evils solely to the fact that the man has not enough money. They very naturally, therefore, draw the conclusion that the right remedy for his troubles is, so far as possible, to take the money of the country away from individuals who, as a rule, have earned it through hard work and saved it through self-denial, and distribute it, or the control of it, in equal shares among the whole populace without regard to the diligence with which any one has labored or the conscientiousness with which he has economized,—in other words, without regard to the way in which anyone has fulfilled or not fulfilled the promptings of higher rational desire. There are three different methods through which three different classes of theorists suppose that this result can be attained,—through *communism*, through *socialism*, and through *anarchism*; and there are reasons founded on a knowledge of human nature why many thinkers believe that each of the three is essentially inimical

to civilization. *Communism* seeks to abolish individual ownership,—as applied always to one's own business, property, and home, and, sometimes, as applied to his wife and children. In its extreme and exclusive form, it is too impractical to find many advocates, and needs to be considered here so far only as it may be connected, as it is in some minds, with *socialism*. This system seeks to abolish individual management, and, sometimes, also ownership, though only indirectly and so far as this interferes with management. The avowed purpose of the system is to socialize industry,—to put public utilities, like railways, telegraphs, etc., under government control, and even private enterprise, sometimes, under the control of the laborers who further its achievement. *Anarchy* is the opposite of *socialism*, it would, if possible, abolish both management and government so far as either is authorized or organized, the conception being that all community ills are due to the government's concerning itself about individual ills,—as in what men term social, political, and industrial rights; and that matters of this sort and the evils connected with them will adjust themselves through applying what the reader of this book will understand to be meant when it is termed the merely physical and material remedy of abolishing government.

It certainly seems as if a little foresight joined with a little knowledge of human nature ought to make one recognize that none of these systems could secure the ends sought by their advocates. The motto of the socialists is "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." This is admirable when supposed to express the principle in accordance with which the individual should deal with the community; but it is the opposite when supposed to express the principle in accordance with which the community should deal with the individual. The logical inference of the latter from the statement "to each according to his need" is that the more that one can show that he needs, the more he can get or deserve to get. How, from this conception, could one derive any stimulus to work? And how, where there were no stimulus of this sort could a man disinclined to work be induced to work? If, in a community ruled by socialistic methods, there were any considerable number of men who were incorrigibly lazy—in other words men in whom rational and altruistic desire

had not overcome bodily and physical desire sufficiently to make them willing to do their share of the labor necessary in order to promote and continue the general welfare, what would happen? What but this?—that the agencies of civilization would cease to function? Sufficient coal would not be mined, sufficient grain would not be sown or harvested, sufficient supplies of other kinds would not be provided or transported, to keep the people as a whole from freezing, starving, and dying. Then what would happen? Then the men whose higher desires had not been so influenced psychically in home, school, church, or society as to recognize their rational and humane obligations to others would have to be compelled to work. Society, in its own self-defence, would be obliged to make them do this, and, in such circumstances, how could there continue to be any socialistic management on the part of the workers themselves?

The only conclusion that seems natural and logical is that the condition would soon develop slaves on the one hand, and tyrannical slave drivers on the other.

Anarchism, on the contrary, would bring plenty of opportunities to develop individual initiative and stimulus; but these would tend chiefly toward the fulfilment of egoistic desires. The conception expressed in the phrase "every man for himself" could not prove a success except so far as non-selfish, rational, and altruistic desires in men had come to outweigh their bodily and selfish desires. When this had been done, such psychical conditions would prevail as would necessarily involve concessions to one's fellows and would demand a community of action with them which of itself would constitute the beginning, and lead to the consummation, of the most of that which is meant by government. Otherwise, where only physical desires were in control of men and there were no external government to restrain them from opposing one another, individuals would have to protect themselves against interference, and the strong would soon learn that the most effective way of doing this would be by putting an end to the lives of their opponents. Just as socialism seems to lead logically to slavery, anarchism seems to lead to slaughter; and one would not go far astray, were he to attribute one, at least, of the underlying reasons for each result to the fatal mistake, when forming plans for the betterment of human conditions, of supposing the comfort of the physical body to be the

object of first importance, and the fulfillment of physical desire the attainment of chief consideration.

According to the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, as unfolded in Chapter XXIII. of his *First Principles*, the results of development which he applied to all the physical phenomena of nature include two different processes,—one of growth and the other of decay. After a time—of æons of time in some cases—the crude elements which gradually acquire greater concentration, completeness, beauty, and fruitfulness begin to develop the sources of their own destruction. Dissolution sets in, and, finally, everything resolves itself once more into its elementary conditions. In the early stages only, does progress indicate improvement. In the latter it indicates deterioration. This is exactly what a number of thoughtful minds recognize to be indicated by many of the movements that, in our own age, have been termed progressive. Instead, for instance, of improving that form of democracy in which most of our countrymen believe, they have merely revealed the fact that this form carries with it the seeds of its own decay, and is hastening the time when, out of its once inspiring possibilities it shall reinstate some of the worst effects of despotism.

Notice, however, that according to what was said on pages 98 and 99 this process of deterioration, so far as there is any justification for Spencer's theory, applies to only physical development. In other words, the process applies only to those methods of so-called reform that are the outgrowths of endeavors to do no more than change merely physical conditions,—to do no more than can be done by such methods, to be specific, as are ascribed in the preceding paragraph to communism, socialism, and anarchism. Only so far as the methods used have a psychical aim and are influenced not so much to acquiescence in physical desires as to resistance of them with the intent of subordinating their deteriorating tendencies, can the mental energies of men be expected to turn these tendencies into agencies working for human advancement. This is to say that the only possibility of preventing deteriorative material changes from overcoming spiritual progress lies in the recognition, which always takes place first in the individual consciousness, of the allegiance which one owes to mental—in the sense of rational, humane, and unselfish—desire. This allegiance involves a fulfillment of obligation both to oneself



and to others. As regards himself, a man must often—in fact, invariably, as a habit—deny and sometimes sacrifice his own lower desires, in order to prevent them from outweighing the higher. As regards other people, a man must often deny and sometimes sacrifice the expression of even his own mental desires in case he perceives clearly that the learning, experience, and ability of others give them the right to be supposed to have an ideal that is higher in mental and rational quality than his own. This inference follows upon what was said on page 6 to the effect that mental desires differ in quality, some being more nearly unadulterated and entirely mental than are others. Just as in times of conflict or war between nations men feel under peculiar obligations to be loyal to the ruler of their own country, even though they may not have complete confidence in his judgment, so in times of conflict of any kind that requires mental efficiency one often feels under peculiar obligations to be loyal to some mental leader. This latter is a form of loyalty to psychical requirements the demands and limits of which—as of everything that must be determined by thinking—are not easy to define; but it involves, now and then, especially when one is face to face with those who, for any reason, may be presumed to have a right to mental authority, a subordination of that which seems most rational, non-selfish, and humane in oneself to that which seems to indicate still more of these qualities in the character of another.

The conclusion reached here corresponds very closely to that of religion of every true kind—a conclusion that has often caused it to be reviled by professed unbelievers. These revile it on the ground that it tries to cause men to be satisfied with the conditions in which they find themselves. But this is not true. It tries to cause them to accept these conditions, and then to make the best of them. If, while striving to do this, they fail, owing to the actions of others, or to their own lack of ability, to secure everything for which they had hoped, they certainly will not fail to secure the results of the kind of discipline for which all life is chiefly worth while,—that of the mental and spiritual nature, which must often be obtained through the exercise of self-denial and self-sacrifice. According to this view of the subject, it is difficult to perceive how the man always placed where circumstances of inheritance or ability keep him at the top of

the social organism is much more favored than the one who is kept at the bottom. This is the teaching of religion; but it is well to notice also that, as in the case of everything that is religiously true, it is at the same time the teaching of philosophy.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### KEEPING THE MIND'S DESIRES UPPERMOST IN STIMULATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP

The Duty of Government to Afford Men Opportunities to Give Expression to the Desires of the Mind—Application of this Principle to Levying Taxes—Developing Enterprise—Granting of Patents, Copyrights, and Franchises—To Rights Obtained by Purchase or Inheritance—Physical and Mental Desires for One's Heirs—Contributions to Art, Science, and Life by the Inheritors of a Small Competence—Demoralizing Effects upon a Country of Thinkers who Work only for Pay—Menace to Public Welfare of those Inheriting Great Wealth—The Law against Entail—Concerning the Principle Underlying a Graded Inheritance Tax—Good Government Secures for Each Individual Liberty to Think and to Act without Undue Interference—To Governments of this Kind, most Modern Progress is Attributable—Also Moral, as well as Mental Development—Different Lessons Drawn from Certain Occurrences Connected with the Recent War—Democracy as a Remedy for the Causes of the War—A League or External Organization of Democratic Nations to Enforce Peace—A Practical Ethical Inference that can Fit either the Possibility or the Impossibility of Realizing, at Present, the Ideals Underlying such Methods—Conclusion.

IN view of what has been said of the importance to the community of men of exceptional intelligence, and efficiency, that method of government seems wisest which interferes the least with the influence and the means of influence which have been obtained by a man as the natural and legitimate result of his own ability and industry. Honestly and humanely exercised, these traits invariably indicate mental superiority; and those who acknowledge and accept this in another merely manifest in their relations with him their own desire to prevent the physical from outweighing the mental. Any action of government that tends to discredit or displace him for no other reason than because he has been successful, would often be as detrimental

to the interests of the public as in the middle of a great war to act in the same way for a similar reason toward a great military commander. It seems to be the plain duty of the government to afford such a man, so far as it is compatible with the general welfare, every opportunity for stimulus and development. These are never afforded where official force is used to repress energy that is unofficial. Few heads will be tempted to emerge from the common level of humanity where it is known beforehand that their only welcome will be a club. In effect this is exactly what follows upon laws that discourage success, and lessen inducements to enterprise. Everyone knows, or ought to know, that those who contribute time, energy, or money to new undertakings do so often at great risk. Many mercantile and manufacturing industries do not pay expenses for years after they have been started, and some never pay them. Few original stockholders of any of our railways do not lose most of the money that they put into them. When the first railway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was begun, hardly anyone aside from its promoters believed that it could be completed; and no one even of them knew whether it could be made self-supporting. It is to the persistent faith and foresight of men who are not deterred by hazards like these that our country owes its great commercial and industrial development. After shops and factories became crowded with customers, after farms, mining camps, and cities came to occupy what was once termed "the Great American Desert," values increased enormously, and great wealth came to some of those to whom these developments were due. But was this wealth undeserved? No matter how selfishly those who earned it may have wrought—but this was true of few because the most of them had been exceedingly faithful to an ideal—the wealth of any one of them could form only an infinitesimal part of that which had been divided among thousands of others.

The same principle applies in all cases. There is always need of enterprise. A government is unwise whose laws discourage this. Scarcely anything checks initiative more effectively than to penalize by an extra tax, or to prohibit by confiscation, dividends in excess of an ordinary percentage. These dividends are not always unmerited. They are often merely just. A large percentage of gain for a few years seems needed in order to make up for the loss of income

in the past, at the time when the enterprise started, and that which still threatens loss in the future in case there come business depression. Nor is there always justice in laws proportioning dividends to such as afford a fair percentage upon the cost of an industry when first established. A railway that has surrounded itself with cities where once there was only a desert has made itself of much more value than it possessed on the day after it had been constructed. The builders of it have a right to claim a percentage on the value that they have created.

This last sentence suggests that it is important to bear in mind that it is not property-value alone that is increased as the result of leaving individual energy as unhampered as feasible by government action. Still more important, perhaps, is the influence of this course in enabling men of ability to open for those who have not yet begun to accumulate property the door of opportunity for continued and lucrative employment. - The world needs conditions that shall not only impel enterprising men to work, but shall place them in a position where, through exerting legitimate financial and industrial influence, they can induce other people to work. The masses need leaders, and no way of determining who their leaders shall be has yet been discovered equal to that furnished by conditions where opportunities are given for subordinates to work their own way up from the lower ranks to the higher. When those who do this reach the highest rank, they know what needs to be done, and are usually prepared to treat with sympathy and justice any men circumstanced exactly as they themselves were in the past. When this is the case, the more wealth and influence they possess, the better it is for the community.

In view of these facts, it is evident that there are many directions in which it is in the power of the government to benefit the community through encouraging and increasing individual initiative and energy. This may be done by means of a patent, issued by the government, which allows a man, or those to whom he delegates his authority, the sole right to manufacture an article which he has invented; or to a copyright which allows a similar privilege to one who is the author of a book or a drama; or to a franchise which allows an exclusive possession of property or exercise of business in a certain place, as in laying and using the tracks of a tramway or railway. In these and other

similar ways a government acts wisely in making it worth while for inventors, authors, corporations, or promoters to spend time, energy, and money in providing for that which shall add to the comfort, the instruction, the enjoyment, and the prosperity of the people as a whole. In some cases, it is right, too, that the privilege granted in this way should not be perpetual; but, if not, the limitation should be clearly announced when the privilege is given.

Similar principles apply to rights obtained either by purchase or by inheritance. That which, before a copyright, patent, or franchise expires, is paid for purchase, is a part of the reward received by the author, inventor, or promoter, and often it could not be received at all, if the privileges that the government had given one could not be transferred—but, of course, under the limitations prescribed by law—to another. It is the same with inheritance. Fully half of the inspiration that underlies the persistent efforts of successful men comes from the expectation of transmitting their gains to their children. Only a bachelor usually retires in the prime of life on an annuity. That which prompts parents who are responsible for bringing a child into the world to seek to provide for his future comfort and welfare is one of the noblest instincts of nature; and the laws of government should recognize this fact.

Of course, there are certain people who carry what they consider their devotion to the interests of their children or descendants too far. They want to found a family, as it is called, entailing upon their heirs, and sometimes upon only one of them, to the impoverishment of the remainder, all the financial privileges that they themselves enjoy. To judge by the practical effects of their theories and actions, they seem to desire chiefly to minister to the vanity of their children, to justify them in living ostentatiously, to cause them to occupy an aristocratic position in society, or to insure them commercial or political prominence. It seems clear that the fulfillment of purposes of this kind is sometimes detrimental to society because these are actuated by a desire to secure success for oneself or others through that which shall enable one to obtain a physical advantage over his fellows. There are many people, however, and a much larger number of them, whose desire to leave money to their family is actuated by no such purpose. What they want is not to provide their children with the means of luxury, but

to rid them of being obliged to spend all the time and energy of life in planning to supply physical necessities. In so far as this is their desire, it is evidently mental.

The results of such a desire on the part of parents furnish one of the most inspiring and important of the lessons of history. No matter into what sphere of endeavor we look, we shall find that the great majority of those to whom the world is indebted for noteworthy intellectual and spiritual achievements have been brought up by a parent who, often at the expense of much self-denial, has been able to give his children an education; and, now and then, been able also to leave them enough to provide for their partial support throughout life. This partial support seems sometimes needed because it is difficult for people in general to appreciate intellectual and spiritual aims, and all the more so inasmuch as, frequently, many years must be spent in youth not in productive work, but merely in preparing for what may be produced in the future. A poet, a painter, an historian, an inventor, a scientist, or even a statesman must often go through a long apprenticeship. Who is to furnish him with food and lodging while he is doing this? At this stage in his career, it is sometimes impossible for him to enter employments or to contend for prizes, or fellowships, which, if received, might support him. As a rule, no one, for the time being, can attend to his wants, if not his parents. Even later in life, many a man of undoubted genius fails in his efforts to cause his ability to be recognized. If he have no money, he must earn it by labor that may leave him no time or energy for the kind of work that accords with his plans; or by labor that may oblige him to change the character of these plans in order to conform them to the conceptions of those upon whom he is dependent for his support; and often an endeavor to do this may cause him to adopt a course which may and should result in making his career, in every important sense of the term, a failure.

Probably no more demoralizing influences have ever been exerted in the history of thought than those attending the attempts of novelists, dramatists, artists, and political leaders to earn a livelihood by wholly conforming their message for the people to some popular demand or taste. It would be difficult to conceive of a worse form of prostitution than that of mind or soul influenced to use all its power of thought and expression for the purpose of earning the

price which a constituency, ignorant of truth, beauty, and wholesomeness, or hostile to them, is willing to pay to those who will ignore or misrepresent them. There are many other lines of action in which it could be shown that people who have saved for themselves, or have inherited from others, enough money to enable them to do other work than that needed in order to obtain a livelihood are of great benefit to a community. To say no more, the community needs their capital for its factories, shops, and railways, and their subscriptions for its parks, playgrounds, schools, churches, and hospitals.

At the same time, it is unfortunate to have the wealth of a country accumulate in the hands of too few individuals, especially if these be so disposed as to spend it solely or mainly for their own benefit. They may "found families" so influential, and with holdings in land or other property so extensive, as virtually to establish a system of aristocracy and serfdom. These conditions may interfere with every interest of those surrounding them, not only industrial and commercial, and so mainly physical, but educational and religious, and so mainly psychical. Indeed, the same argument that leads one to conclude that it is wise to leave wealth and the management of it at the disposal of one who has proved that he knows how to use it to the advantage both of himself and of others, may lead one to conclude that it is unwise to leave it wholly at the disposal of a man who has not proved this. Certain facts, too, might be cited to confirm this conclusion. Some of the inheritors of great wealth in our country have spent it so as to injure themselves and the community in which they live. They have set examples and developed practices apparently actuated solely by an aim to secure the gratification of physical desire. Mental desire they have seemed to ignore. For the satisfaction of appetite, they have substituted indulgence; for comfort, luxury; for occupation, pastime; for hospitality, ostentatious extravagance; and for pleasure, demoralizing vice. It sometimes seems almost essential, in order to keep civilization from destruction, to limit the amount that such people inherit. How this can be done in such ways as not to interfere with personal liberty of action and the stimulus derivable from it, is difficult to determine. The best way—the way conforming to the methods suggested as applicable to other abuses mentioned in this book—would be, of course,



through the exertion of some psychical influence. At different times in England, the father of a family who appeared to have an excess of money has been induced to exchange a large part of it for a hereditary title of nobility. An analogous arrangement, made entirely different in form so as to accord with the spirit and character of our institutions, might be devised by some ingenious statesman for our own country. Or, through the influence of the press, the pulpit, or other social or religious agencies, there might be created a virtually universal public sentiment against bequests of large personal inheritances. One can imagine a state of popular feeling by which these inheritances would be so disapproved that any man who wished to preserve the respect of his fellows for himself or his family would resist the temptation to go against the feeling.

There are those, however, who think, that, in the direction that has been indicated, something further is needed than the exertion of merely moral influence. This conception has found successful expression in our country through the abolishment by the government of the European law of entail. In accordance with this law an entire estate was formerly made to descend to one member of the family who thus became a great aristocrat, possessed of sufficient wealth to support his station. In countries where there is no such law, and the money, in case there be no will, is divided equally among the children, the theory is that these and their descendants, as they multiply, will gradually divide among themselves even a large fortune in such a way that no one of them will possess a sufficient amount to be a menace to the common welfare.

Another method that has been applied by our State and Federal governments is to impose upon the heirs of large estates a graded inheritance tax—a levy in which the percentage of impost is made larger and larger in the degree in which the amount of inheritance is increased. The objection to this form of tax is, of course, mainly in its tendency. If, through the exercise of physical force, the government can take away a part of one's inheritance, why, through an application of the same principle, cannot all of it be taken away? The only agency that can prevent this is an influence that is psychically exerted through non-selfish and altruistic rationality. But why cannot this form of influence be exerted directly through individuals who them-

selves are prompted by higher desire, rather than indirectly through government which is a physical agency sometimes representing, but sometimes also, owing to an absence of a feeling of individual responsibility, misrepresenting this desire? In the former case, there would be no necessity for physical force, nor any danger that the exercise of it on the part of ignorant officials or self-seeking demagogues might carry the principle involved too far. In this case, because influenced psychically, those who had accumulated wealth might be led to expend a part of it, before dying, upon works of benevolence intended to benefit all; and the heirs of these would have impressed upon their minds the importance and necessity, in order to continue the popularity and prosperity of themselves and their families, of entering seriously into the work of the world, and of expecting little success except as a result of their own thoughtful industry. It is simply a fact that what the community needs most as applied to such evils as the possession, on the part of some, of too great wealth, is a more deep and full belief in the influence of higher desire working up and through rational, non-selfish, and humane individual action. So far as this action could be influenced through the agency of external law applied to the physical conditions involved, this law would prove beneficial; but so far as the action could not be so influenced, the law might prove, in the long run, of no permanent or universal benefit whatever.

There are other subjects that could be discussed here in this connection, but those that have been mentioned will suffice to illustrate the principle involved in all of them. It is this,—that government was made for man, not man for government; and, therefore, that success in its methods depends upon the degree in which it leaves each individual subjected to it free to think and to act without undue interference. No one can hold in place the springs of a mechanical toy and expect it to accomplish that for which it was planned. Much less can success attend upon efforts designed to influence analogously the springs of energy in the mind. In circumstances in which thought needs to work independently, such a course, after a few generations, will be almost certain to bring about a national condition such as is ascribed to some of the countries of Asia in which spontaneous methods of thinking and investigating have been supplanted entirely by those of memory and tradition.

As a fact, it would not be difficult to show that almost all of the great discoveries and inventions of modern times,—those of steam, artificial and natural gas, electricity, anæsthetics, aseptic surgery, the railway, the steamship, the iron ship, the sewing machine, the reaping machine, the thrashing machine, the farm tractor, the printing press, the linotype, the wire and wireless telegraph and telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving picture, the submarine, the aeroplane—have made their first appearance among people whose governments have left them comparatively free to develop themselves according to their own desires. Indeed, neither territorial size nor military strength seems to have played any large rôle in making nations intellectually prominent. The civil liberty to which this latter prominence has been attributable has, in some cases, been occasioned by the very smallness and comparative weakness of the state; and, in other cases, by the lack of power in the government to overcome the aggressive independence of the citizen. The former condition prevailed in ancient Palestine and Greece, and in comparatively modern times has characterized the Italian republics, the States of Germany preceding their union into an empire, and Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands; and the latter condition has for many years been more or less characteristic of France, Great Britain, and America.

It is not merely in the directions just indicated, that government interference may retard and prevent individual development. The same effect may be produced in educational, literary, artistic, moral, and religious directions. Influenced by such interference, all agencies of thought or expression may gradually be perverted so as to cultivate regard and admiration for physical and covetous as contrasted with rational and non-selfish ideals. The very streets and parks of a city that is the capital of a government given to such interference come to be filled with public monuments, some of them almost as heavy as a battleship and as high as a church steeple, erected to men who, according to their own confessions and the acknowledgment of their most loyal biographers, have attained their ends wholly through physical methods, through tramping down the natural rights of others, and the right also that in their own conscience is trying to protest against duplicity, injustice, and bloodshed. Where this is the case, the people, no matter

how exceptionally well educated as a whole, or supplied with leaders distinguished for the accuracy and breadth of their scholarship, will, all of them, begin to have a tendency to manifest characteristics different in form but the same in effect as those do who, in certain ages and countries, have been treated as slaves, and, because of this treatment, are not expected to be, as a class, truthful, honest, or chaste. A crippled moral development furnishes the only possible explanation that can be given for the fact that, in certain places in our own age, in times of war, hardly a single voice has been raised against the wanton destruction of vineyards, orchards, houses, towns, churches, libraries, museums filled with works of art and hospitals crowded with the wounded, or against other forms of injustice and cruelty,—not the least the separation and deportation of thousands from their homes, notwithstanding the certainty that many of them would die from exposure and starvation. These are deeds that no man whose conscience was not perverted could fail to consider or to condemn as wrong. We need not dispute about their being contrary to modern international agreements or laws! Two thousand years ago, Cicero, a senator of Rome, which was by no means the most humane of the warring nations of his time, gave not only his own opinion but the opinion of his countrymen with reference to them. Near the end of Book First, of his *De Officiis*, as translated by C. R. Edmonds, he declared, after discussing the treatment of those with whom a nation is at war, that “some things are partly so disgraceful and partly so criminal in their nature that a wise man would not commit them even to save his country . . . nor would his country undertake them to serve herself.”

The clear inference from what has been said is that the one thing necessary in order to promote moral progress through the action of national government is to encourage legislation that shall lessen the control of men through external physical force and increase reliance upon their own self-control as influenced by psychical, non-selfish, humane rationality. In the opinion of many, this is the most important of the lessons taught the world through the agency of the late war. When it began, the officials and the common people of many parts of Europe were at one in believing that the Americans especially, because they had not been trained to obey the authority of physical force, would

not fight, if individually they could be made to think it too dangerous; that, no matter what the provocation, they would never, as a nation, declare war; would never enlist for service in it; would never subject themselves to training for it; would never exercise the financial and personal self-denial and sacrifice necessary in order to obtain efficiency in it; and, if they succeeded in sending to Europe a limited number of troops, that these, in the few months that could be devoted to the purpose, could not be prepared to do anything except run away when they saw the enemy approaching. Nothing, probably, ever afforded or could afford greater surprise to the latter than the generosity in subscribing, the promptness in enlisting, the alertness in apprehending, the quickness in learning, and the efficiency in executing, which, when the practical test came, were manifested by those whom American methods had trained to individual initiative. Very singularly, however, quite a number in our own country have failed to recognize the real significance of all this. That which seems chiefly to have impressed them is the fact that our government, as a war measure, felt obliged to oppose the physical force dominating the industrial as well as military conditions of our enemies' countries by an exercise of external physical force similarly directed in our own land; and these countrymen of ours now seem to think that the same exercise of force should continue after the coming of peace. This is not a theoretical remark. It describes an existing condition. It indicates a danger that is actually threatening us. It represents the ideal of many mistaken but sincere socialists, and of others who are not socialists, but are influenced by them. They want government interference in almost everything. They think that this would secure greater efficiency. Some of them individually are sure that they themselves could carry on another person's business better than he himself can. Very likely, too, they are right in this supposition. The answer to them is that business is not the foremost aim of life. It is individual character; and no men, nor set of men, can afford to save any kind of business at the expense of losing what is needed for the highest attainments of the mind and soul.

Even many who can accept as true a statement of this kind will not consider it particularly related to any lesson taught through the agency of the recent war. Because

the governments that started it were exceptionally devoted to developing the interests of the ruling classes, to the exclusion, if deemed necessary, of the common people of their own or of other countries, many have come to attribute the destruction, misery, and death that ensued solely—not merely mainly, as is true—to autocracy. Their remedy for war, therefore, is to enforce, as applied to single nations, democracy of government; and, as applied to many nations considered together, a league of democratic governments.

In view of the many who accept these conclusions, it may be slightly unpopular, but it seems to be necessary in the interest of truth to point out that neither of these remedies, much good as they might do in certain directions, would necessarily insure the stimulation of individual initiative, whether manifested in the form of theoretic opinion, practical enterprise, or personal thoughtfulness, truthfulness, or humaneness. The conception of national machinery operating through physical force upon the mind, as if it were a part of the national machine, might be fully preserved in connection with both of them. Democracy does not necessarily change this conception. Under it, as under an autocracy, there might still be government control of army, navy, school, church, railway, telegraph, and other forms of industry and business, and this control no less than the same in an autocracy might hamper individual initiative and action. Nor would the removal from office of kings, nobles, capitalists, and other traditional leaders of society lessen to the extent that is sometimes supposed other public influences detrimental to the development of private character. The mere fact that, according to law, our countrymen elect their own rulers has not prevented the occasional dictatorship of a non-elected political or industrial boss successful in subordinating the interests of the people as a whole to those of his own self-seeking class. Such conditions prove beyond doubt the possibility of making out of democracy merely autocracy turned upside down, with the community ruled from the bottom of society instead of from the top. Inasmuch, too, as usually, owing to the necessary conditions, there is more intelligence and wisdom at the top than at the bottom, it is evident that this form of autocracy might be the most tyrannical conceivable.

A similar statement might be made with reference to a

league of democratic nations or a super-nation. As an ideal toward which to aim, most of us can approve of Tennyson's

Parliament of man, the federation of the world.

*Locksley Hall.*

And yet, for the present, is this feasible? An International Court with power to enforce its decrees might be so. But a legislative parliament, in order to achieve any worthy purpose, would have to represent people who had a worthy purpose,—in other words represent nations whose public sentiment, giving expression to the private faith of the majority of their citizens, was the result of higher, rational, non-selfish, humane, and altruistic desire. If, in such a parliament, representatives of nations serving higher desires, met with representatives of nations serving lower desires, the former nations, unless prevented by great foresight in pre-arrangements, might be obliged to compromise or surrender their ideals, together with all the benefits to the world which their example in applying these ideals to government could exert. Otherwise, there might be conflict; and in case of conflict, if both parties were pledged to enforce their views, it is difficult to understand why this pledge of itself alone might not bring on war. This is the same as to suggest that conditions in the world to-day may demand mainly at least missionary work more than, or rather than, mandatory work, even though the latter be the result of the military agency of the most perfectly constructed democratic government of which we know. Most of the readers of this volume will probably think this a mere hypothetical statement. But it is more than this. It is legitimately inferred from historic facts. The Roman State was a republic when, as a super-nation, in an aim which was virtually that of enforcing peace for the sake of forwarding the interests of trade, it began to subordinate all other nations to its own rule. The Roman Church was so non-monarchical that the humblest peasant, through appointment and election, might become the papal ruler of the world when it, too, with a similar aim—to bring a universal acceptance of him whom they termed the Prince of Peace—began to subordinate these nations. No thinker can find any good reason to doubt the non-selfish enthusiasm or sincerity of the majority, perhaps, of the Roman senators or prelates who devised these methods. But they failed, because they

were based too largely upon the exercise of physical and external force; because of faith in material reconstruction irrespective of individual spiritual regeneration. This is a mistake which people of this age ought to have learned enough to avoid. It is by no means mainly through physical force, whether manifested in bayonets or ballots, in political, social, or ecclesiastical organizations, that the world can be most permanently benefited. It is mainly through psychical influence, exerted upon each individual's mental, rational, non-selfish, humane, altruistic desires. What other conclusion can anyone reach who is thoughtfully seeking a philosophic explanation of the experiences affecting human life in this world? What are they all for, so far as they can succeed in accomplishing any good end? What can they be for except, through the instrumentality of higher desire, to develop personal character?

Perhaps the ideals of these old-time leaders and of their present representatives who are living among us to-day can be realized through the methods that seem most likely to be adopted. Let us hope that such will be the case. But, perhaps, these ideals cannot be realized thus. It is even possible that they never through any methods can be realized by human nature as it is; that, if they could be so realized, human nature itself would no longer be needed in order to carry out the purposes of the divine economy. In this case, perhaps a man would have fully attained all the discipline and development which the conditions of life as they are in this world are designed to give him. Such surmisals with reference to the general subject are sometimes suggested; but there is nothing to prove or disprove either side of the question. One thing only is certain; and, fortunately for those of us who are most interested in seeking guidance, it is also practical. This is that, so long as an individual man is in this world, he possesses a conscience that makes him conscious of an obligation to fulfill the promptings of mental, rational, non-selfish, altruistic desires whenever he is also conscious of lower desires opposing these; and also of an obligation to use all his influence, so far as this can be exerted legitimately, to make the external domestic, educational, social, industrial, political, and religious conditions of life surrounding him such as shall incite and enable all his fellows to fulfill these higher promptings within themselves.



The reader of this volume will be ready now to bear witness that the purpose stated in its opening chapter,—to draw no inference and to advance no theory not warranted by known facts as ascertainable in connection with the operations of natural law, has been carried out. The author finds it impossible, however, in closing this discussion, not to direct attention to this conclusion:—that no philosophical conception, least of all one connected with ethics, can be held solely as an end in itself. It influences not only the substance of thought but the trend of thought, so that this necessarily pushes on especially in the direction of imagination and speculation. Both of them have their functions in human experience. But the value of that which they bring is almost entirely determined by the exactness and comprehensiveness of the thinking which formulated the system of ideas from which they start. This system must be well grounded and strongly constructed like the observatory from which, unless it be free from vibration or deviation, the astronomer cannot read aright the message of the stars. For reasons stated in the Preface, this volume has not dealt with arguments drawn from theories or speculations about religion; but it has contained a great deal that is fundamental to that which is true in these. It might—possibly it should—have gone further than it has in these directions. Certainly the author, in his own mind, has done so. Fifty years ago he had already allowed his imagination to express itself in this way:

'Tis time our wandering world's philosophy  
Discern life's inward bond of unity,  
Not like the Greek in mere material fire,  
But in the soul's unquenchable desire.  
'Tis time it weigh the worth of arguments  
That treat each consciousness with reverence;  
And, starting with the soul's first certainty,  
Evolve in all its ordered symmetry,  
The Universal law of sympathy.  
'Tis time the spirit of the living force,  
Whose currents through the frame of nature course,  
And make the earth about, and stars above,  
The body and abode of infinite Love  
That breathes its own breath through our waiting frames  
With each fresh breeze that blows, and ever aims  
Our lesser lives where all we call advance  
But plays within its lap of circumstance,—  
'Tis time the spirit should be known in truth,  
Inspiring hope in age, and faith in youth,

And in us all that charity benign  
Which in us all would make us all divine.

*A Life in Song: Seeking, LV.*

Even that which should chiefly hinder, in our own age, the universal acceptance of these conceptions, was not unforeseen:

It will need no simple proof to show that justice due to each  
Never can be gained till each is free to claim his due in speech;  
Or that kings behind their armies cannot guard the rights of man  
Better than the battling masses, butchered for them in the van.  
It will need no nerveless effort to reverse that cruel mill,  
Where the wheels that run the ruling grind to dust the people's will.

*Idem: Watching, XXI.*

Nor that which should be among the earliest to further these conceptions:

That stalwart Anglo-Saxon sense that most  
In Church and State keeps thought and action free.  
Who fears a progress, charged with Freedom's mission,  
That gives to English genius broader scope?  
Earth fears far more thy foe, whose politician  
In tearing thy flag down may lower the whole world's hope.

*Idem: Serving, XLI.*

Nor that which should make them victorious:

Where, O where, shall trust in truth that speaks through manhood great  
and small,  
Overcome the few's oppression by intrusting power to all?

And a fresh wind rose that whispered, "Where shall man to man be true,  
In the old world old ways triumph: Freedom hies to seek the new."

When the time shall come, a banner by the right shall be unfurled  
Where the patriots of the nation shall be patriots of the world;  
And the right shall triumph then!

*Idem: Watching, XXI, XXII, XX.*

So much to suggest, where, in accordance with the limits prescribed for this discussion, nothing further is feasible, the practical bearings of our subject upon every phase not only of secular but of religious righteousness; and not only in the individual, but in the nation; and not only in the nation, but in the world.

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